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Abstract:  
 
This dissertation critically assesses and analyzes the institutional and political settings of 
public policymaking in Ethiopia in a space of three decades, from circa 1974. Based on data 
and/or information generated through a range of sources and instruments, it attempts to 
uncover the prominent actors in public policymaking in Ethiopia far beyond the official 
assertions that have formally been claimed in the statutory provisions. It appraises the 
institutions, their roles and leverage in the policymaking process, and the extent to which the 
profound institutional and political changes that have transpired over the past thirty years 
impacted on public policymaking, and with what effect. It examines the emergence and 
ascendance of a couple of closely linked institutions, namely the ruling party and the top 
echelon of the executive leadership, and the disproportionate influence they have on 
government, non-government institutions and overall public policymaking.  
        The supremacy of the executive and its claims on policymaking had been pervasive 
during Haileselassie’s years, with absolute executive powers vested in the monarchy and the 
person of the emperor. The combined forces of party and executive leadership and their 
overwhelming dominance in public policymaking are relatively new conventions, phenomena 
and constructs which featured prominently in the aftermath of 1974. Ideology (Marxism-
Leninism and revolutionary democracy) has since been a critical element guiding and as well 
as justifying policy elites’ claims on the choice of public policies and the institutional and 
structural mechanisms of implementing them. Wedged between staggering financial, 
managerial and organizational capacity, on the one hand, and an inhospitable politico-
administrative and legal milieu on the other, the civil society, a network of civil society 
institutions and the public over three decades appeared to have remained at the peripheral end 
in the continuum of public policymaking.  
 The most formidable challenges that the Ethiopian public policymaking process has over 
the past thirty years experienced can therefore be thematically crystallized into three issues. 
Firstly, the emergence and consolidation of party and executive leadership (policy elites) has 
been the dominant phenomena over the last thirty years, with the ruling party institutions 
invariably overlapping with the formally constituted policymaking government structures. 
Secondly, not only ideology played a critical role in the choice of public policies and 
institutional instruments for implementing them, but also provided policy elites with the 
latitude to justify their claims on policy actions, although ideological values served to 
preclude the non-state players from making legitimate claims on policymaking. Lastly, the 
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expansion of the powers of the party and the executive seemed to have taken place without a 
corresponding development of extra-bureaucratic institutions (i.e. elections and functioning 
legislatures) and civil societal associations, and which in turn boils down to the exclusion of 
the bulk of the Ethiopian public from playing its legitimate role in the policymaking process.  
        The public policymaking process in Ethiopia has, therefore, witnessed imbalances at two 
levels: first, between the executive and the legislature, and second, between policy elites (the 
party-fused-with-executive structures/institutions), on the one hand, and ordinary citizens and 
civil society organizations (CSOs) representing various interests, on the other. At both levels 
the party and the executive exact enormous power leverage. On the other hand, the ordinary 
citizens are highly disorganized, and tied up with attending to daily survival needs. Hence, 
they have little time to become fully and actively involved in holding government institutions 
accountable and responsive, articulating policy demands to policymaking institutions aside. 
The legislatures appear to have become a façade of legitimacy for party and executive 
decisions and are detached from the society.  ` 
           Finally, the dissertation puts forward proposals for more opportunities to give 
Ethiopian citizens of all walks of life a chance to influence policies and implementation 
outcomes. It suggests a range of options for greater and genuine public participation in the 
policymaking process, which would result in as much representative policy-making as 
enhancing the quality of services provided by policies and actual control of decisions by 
citizens. It also indicates Ethiopian academics’ charge in the new endeavor to launch 
independent think-tank and policy study institutions to foster professionalizing policymaking 
in Ethiopia.  
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Opsomming: 
 
Hierdie proefskrif ontleed en beoordeel die institusionele en politieke beleidmakingskontekste 
in Ethiopië oor ’n periode van drie dekades, vanaf 1974. Gebasseer op data en inligting wat 
deur middel van ’n reeks van metodes en bronne gegenereer is, poog dit om, ten spyte van 
amptelike stellings in statutêre bepalings, die prominente rolspelers in openbare beleidmaking 
in Ethiopië te identifiseer. Dit beoordeel die instellings, hul rolle en magshefbome in die 
beleidmakingsproses, en die mate waartoe die betekenisvolle institusionele en politieke 
veranderinge wat oor die afgelope dertig jaar plaasgevind het, ’n impak gehad het op 
openbare beleidmaking. Dit ondersoek die ontstaan en vestiging van ’n paar ineengeskakelde 
instellings, naamlik die regerende party en die topgarde uitvoerende leierskap, en die 
buitengewoon groot invloed wat hulle op die regering, nie-regeringsinstellings en algemene 
beleidmaking gehad het.  
 Die oppergesag van die uitvoerende gesag en sy beheer oor beleidmaking was 
wydverspreid gedurende die Haileselassie jare, met absolute uitvoerende magte gesetel in die 
monargie en in die persoon van die keiser. Die gekombineerde kragte van party en 
uitvoerende leierskap en hulle oorweldigende dominasie in openbare beleidmaking is relatief 
resente ontwikkelinge na 1974. Ideologie (Marxisme-Leninisme en rewolusionêre 
demokrasie) was sedertdien ’n kritiese element wat die beleidselites se beheer oor die keuse 
van openbare beleid en die instusionele en strukturele implementeringsmeganismes daarvoor 
gestuur en geregverdig het. Vasgevang tussen oorweldigende finansiële, bestuurs- en 
organisatoriese kapasiteit aan die een kant en ’n ongunstige politiek-administratiewe klimaat 
aan die ander kant, het ’n netwerk van burgelike instellings en die publiek oor drie dekades 
lank op die perifierie van die beleidmakingskontinuum gefigureer.  
 Die mees formidabele uitdagings wat die Ethiopiese openbare beleidmakingsproses 
oor die afgelope dertig jaar ervaar het, val daarom tematies in drie vraagstukke uiteen. 
Eerstens, was die ontluiking en konsolidasie van party en uitvoerende leierskap (die 
beleidselites) die dominante verskynsel oor die afgelope dertig jaar, met regerende partry 
instellings wat deurgaans oorvleuel met regeringstrukture. Tweedens het ideologie nie net ’n 
kritiese rol gespeel by die keuse van openbare beleid en die institusionele instrumente vir die 
implementering daarvan nie, maar het dit ook beleidselites geleentheid gebied vir ’n 
regverdiging van hul beheer oor beleidsoptredes, terwyl hierdie ideologiese beginsels 
terselfdertyd nie-regeringspelers verhoed het om hul betrokkenheid by beleidmaking op 
legitieme wyse op te eis.  Derdens, het die uitbreiding van die magte van die party en die 
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uitvoerende gesag klaarblyklik plaasgevind sonder die gepaardgaande ontwikkeling van nie-
burokratiese instellings (nl verkiesings en funksionerende wetgewers), en burgerlike 
organisasies, wat op uiteindelik ’n uitsluiting van die meerderheid van die Ethiopiese publiek 
van ’n legitieme deelname aan die openbare beleidmakingsproses tot gevolg gehad het.  
 Die openbare beleidmakingsproses in Ethiopië vertoon daarom ’n wanbalans op twee 
vlakke: eerstens, tussen die uitvoerende en wetgewende gesag, en tweedens tussen 
beleidselites (die party/uitvoerende gesagstrukture/instellings) aan die een kant, en gewone 
burgers en burgerlike organisasies wat verskillende belange verteenwoordig, aan die ander 
kant. Op beide vlakke oefen die party en uitvoerende gesag enorme magsbeïnvloeding uit. 
Aan die een kant is die gewone burgers baie gedisorganiseerd en vasgevang in ’n stryd om 
daaglikse oorlewing. Hulle het daarom weinig tyd om, benewens beleidseise aan 
beleidsinstellings oor te dra, ook volledig en aktief betrokke te raak by pogings om 
regeringsinstellings responsief en verantwoordbaar te hou. Wetgewers het klaarblyklik in 
legitimiteitsfronte vir party- en uitvoerende besluite ontwikkel en funksioneer afgesonderd 
van die samelewing. 
 Laastens maak die proefskrif voorstelle vir meer geleenthede om Ethiopiese burgers 
op alle vlakke ’n kans te bied om beleid en implementeringsuitkomste te beinvloed. Dit stel ’n 
reeks van opsies vir groter en meer effektiewe deelname aan beleidmakingsprosesse voor, wat 
sowel verteenwoordigende beleidmaking as die bevordering van die gehalte van dienste deur 
en daadwerklike beheer oor besluite deur die burgers, tot gevolg sal hê.  Dit wys ook op die 
taak van Ethiopiese akademici om onafhanklike dinkskrums en beleidsontledingsinstellings te 
skep om die professionalisering van beleidmaking in Ethiopië te  bevorder.  
  
 vi 
 
 
 
In memory of Abebe Wolde, a father and a friend,  
who in a dawn of a September morning led me towards 
the route to modern education, the world of learning 
and academic pursuits.  
 vii 
Acknowledgement 
 
I am greatly indebted to the leading promoter, Professor Fanie Cloete, Professor of Policy 
Analysis in the School of Public Management and Planning, University of Stellenbosch, 
under whose supervision the PhD study has been carried out since 2001. Not only has he been 
magnificent mentor behind my academic pursuits, but also was constant source of inspiration 
and intellectual guidance. I owe a great debt to Dr. Meheret Ayenew1, the Department of 
Public Administration and Development Management, Addis Ababa University, and co-
promoter and field supervisor, from whose valuable comments and guidance during the hard 
times of the study I benefited greatly.   
         My special thanks go to Professor Cloete and the Department of Public and 
Development Management, the University of Stellenbosch, for continued support, and 
encouragement, for providing me sanctuary, an exquisite office with all the facilities befitting 
to the professors at the School of Public Management and Development Planning. I am 
extremely grateful to Addis Ababa University, Ministry of Education in Ethiopia, and the 
University of Stellenbosch, whose financial assistances brought this study into its logical 
conclusion. My deep appreciation and gratitude also go to my colleagues in the Department of 
Management and Department of Public Administration and Development Management, 
Faculty of Business and Economics, Addis Ababa University, who graciously accepted extra 
teaching loads to allow me to engage fully in my studies.   
         A great many individuals have been helpful and cooperative in the various stages of this 
study from my field trip in Bahirdar and Mekele to Awasa and various places in Oromia and 
Amhara, and from Addis Ababa in Ethiopia to Stellenbosch in South Africa. I am particularly 
grateful to Professor Erwin Schwella, the former Director of the School of Public 
Management and Planning, whose facilitation and assistance opened an opportunity for me to 
be enrolled as a PhD student at the University of Stellenbosch.  My thanks also go to civil 
society leaders, leaders of political pressure groups, MPs, government and party leaders, 
Ethiopian and foreign academics, and local government authorities for sharing with me their 
incisive thoughts, experiences and understanding of public policymaking in Ethiopia.    
          Among the many individuals whose assistance made this study possible, I owe a great 
debt of gratitude to Professor Asrat Tessema (Eastern Michigan University), Professor 
Andréas Eshete, Mohammed Habib (assistant professor), Professor Endeshaw Bekele, Dr. 
                                                
1
 Dr. Meheret Ayenew is currently a visiting professor at  Tshwane University of Technology in Pretoria, South 
Africa 
 viii 
Tilahun Teklu, Dr. Mulat Demeke, Mohammed Said, Meseret Melese, Dr. Tadesse Beriso, 
Dr. Ayalew Gebre, Dr. Terefe Degefe  (Addis Ababa University), Alemayehu Yihunie 
(Bahirdar) Debebe Moges (Addis Ababa), my sister-in-law Elisabeth Hailemariam and her 
husband Abraham Alamaw (Los Angeles), Rene Oosthuizen, Linda Uys, Suzette Wiese, 
Charmagne Marais, Jennifer Saunders (University of Stellenbosch), my mother Nigeste 
Dinku, my sister Alemnesh Abebe (Ethiopia), my niece Alemzoud Mingestab and nephew 
Gideon Mingestab (Houston) for their support, encouragement, cooperation and 
understanding in various ways. My heartfelt gratitude also goes to Dr Jiregna Gindaba, a post-
doc fellow at the University of Stellenbosch and Faniel Sahle, a PhD student in the School of 
Public Management and Planning of the same University, without whose friendship, 
encouragement and company much of the lonesome and arduous work in Stellenbosch would 
have been a lot more difficult.  
         Last but by no means least, the study would have not been brought to fruition had it not 
been for the understanding, endurance and patience of my wife, Emuye, and our son, Girum. 
Only a two-year-old lad when this study began, Girum suffered the agony of separation and 
borne much of the brunt of the emotional cost of this study. I will always be grateful to 
Emuye and Girume. This study, however, is dedicated to my late father, Abebe Wolde, who 
invested so much in my education, who in a dawn of a September morning led me towards the 
route to modern education, the world of learning and academic exploits.    
     It is, nonetheless, important to note that all errors of facts and omissions are mine alone.  
 
Mulugeta Abebe Wolde 
The University of Stellenbosch 
Stellenbosch, South Africa 
March 2005
 ix
Table of Contents:  
 
ABSTRACT: ........................................................................................................................................................ II 
OPSOMMING: ................................................................................................................................................... IV
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.................................................................................................................................VII
 
LIST MAPS, TABLES AND FIGURES ........................................................................................................... XI
 
TABLES: ............................................................................................................................................................. XI 
FIGURES: ..........................................................................................................................................................XII
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS: ...................................................................................... XIII
 
MAPS:............................................................................................................................................................... XVI
 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO INSTITUTIONS, ROLES AND LEVERAGE IN PUBLIC 
POLICYMAKING................................................................................................................................................ 1
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. A BRIEF EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK................................................................................................... 2 
1.3. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM .............................................................................................................. 5 
1.4. THE OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES ................................................................. 7 
1.4.1. The objectives.................................................................................................................................. 7 
1.4.2. Research questions.......................................................................................................................... 8 
1.4.3. Working hypotheses ........................................................................................................................ 8 
1.5. THE RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY............................................................................................................ 9 
1.6. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY........................................................................................................10 
1.7. DOCUMENTARY DATA .........................................................................................................................12 
1.8. EMPIRICAL DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND PHASES OF DATA COLLECTION ...................................14 
1.9. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY......................................................................................................17 
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC POLICYMAKING IN DEVELOPING 
STATES ................................................................................................................................................................20
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................20 
2.2. DEFINING PUBLIC POLICY ....................................................................................................................21 
2.3. MODELS OF PUBLIC POLICYMAKING AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ..................25 
2.3.1. The rational actor model................................................................................................................25 
2.3.2. The incremental model ...................................................................................................................28 
2.3.3. The elite model ...............................................................................................................................31 
        2.3.4. The pluralist…model……………………………………………………………………………………………33 
2.3.5. The institutional model...................................................................................................................34 
2.4. SOCIO-CULTURAL, SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES .........................................................................................................................................................35 
2.5. ACTORS, INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR LEVERAGE IN PUBLIC POLICYMAKING...........................................40 
2.5.1. Policy elites and their leverage in policymaking............................................................................40 
2.5.2. The stature of societal actors vis-à-vis policymaking ....................................................................46 
2.6. THE ROLE OF CITIZENS IN POLICYMAKING ...........................................................................................51 
2.6.1. Citizens’ participation, governance and state-society relations ....................................................51 
2.6.1.1. Accountability and good governance........................................................................................................... 56 
2.6.1.2. Decentralization as a balancing strategy .................................................................................................... 59
 
2.7. CHOICES FOR IMPROVING POLICY CAPACITY........................................................................................62 
2.8. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................68 
CHAPTER 3. PUBLIC POLICYMAKING UNDER THE DERGUE, 1974-1991 .........................................71 
3.1. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................................71 
3.2. BACKGROUND PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORICAL, POLITICO-CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
ANTECEDENTS TO PUBLIC POLICYMAKING IN ETHIOPIA .....................................................................................72 
3.2.1. Historical premises ........................................................................................................................72 
3.2.2. Politico-cultural antecedents..............................................................................................................75 
3.2.3. Institutional antecedents:  Haileselassie’s period ..............................................................................78 
 x
3.3. PROCESS, ROLES AND INSTITUTIONS, 1974-1987.................................................................................82 
3.3.1. The legislative process ...................................................................................................................82 
3.3.2. The official ideology, the party and policymaking .........................................................................85 
3.4. THE MAKING OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS, 1987-1991...........................................93 
3.4.1. The making of the constitution............................................................................................................93 
3.4.2. The implications of the constitution for policymaking........................................................................97 
 3.5. STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONSHIPS AND POLICYMAKING..............................................................................102 
3.6. IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH CENTRALLY GUIDED INSTITUTIONS, 1974-1987 ..........................................108 
3.6.1. The prelude .......................................................................................................................................108 
3.6.2. Molding implementing institutions from top.....................................................................................110 
3.6.3. Central and regional policymaking structures of the PDRE ............................................................121 
3.7. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................................124 
CHAPTER 4. PUBLIC POLICYMAKING UNDER THE EPRDF, 1991-2004...........................................127 
4.1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................127 
4.2. POLICYMAKING DURING THE TRANSITION .........................................................................................128 
4.2.1.The Prelude .......................................................................................................................................128 
      4.2.2. THE MAJOR ACTORS DURING THE TRANSITION, 1991-1995 ...................................................................133 
4.2.3. The making of Ethiopian mega-public policy, the Constitution-making process .............................141 
4.3. THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE AND THE EXECUTIVE IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ........................149 
4.3.1. The legislative process in HPR ....................................................................................................149 
4.3.2. Committees and legislative oversight in HPR ..............................................................................152 
4.3.3. The House of Federation (HoF): a non-legislative chamber .......................................................157 
4.3.4. The executive: spearheading the legislative/policymaking/ process ............................................159 
4.4. ACTORS IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: THE CORE NRSS UNDER PURVIEW........................................165 
4.5. POLICIES: A REVIEW OF RURAL-CENTERED DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION POLICIES ......................172 
4.5.1. ADLI, at the apex of all socio-economic policies .........................................................................172 
4.5.2. EDUCATION POLICY: AN ARCHETYPE OF IMBALANCE IN POLICYMAKING ................................................178 
4.5.2.1.
 
The predicaments in the making of the education policy................................................................... 178
 
4.5.2.2. The downward effects of the flaws in the education policy formulation ............................................ 185 
4.6. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................................................191 
CHAPTER 5. THE PARTY, IDEOLOGY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN POLICYMAKING, 
1991-2004 ............................................................................................................................................................194
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................................................194 
5.2. THE PARTY: STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES ..........................................................................195 
5.3. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IDEOLOGY IN PUBLIC POLICYMAKING.....................................................................204 
5.4. THE LEGISLATURES AS LEGITIMATING INSTITUTIONS OF POLICY DECISIONS ......................................211 
5.5. ‘PUBLIC PARTICIPATION’ IN PUBLIC POLICYMAKING: THE ANOMALIES..............................................223 
5.6. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................................................233 
CHAPTER 6. INSTITUIONS, ROLES AND LEVERAGE IN PUBLIC POLICYMAKING SUMMED UP
.............................................................................................................................................................................236
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................................................236 
6.2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................236 
6.3. PUBLIC POLICYMAKING IN ETHIOPIA: THE CHALLENGES...........................................................................239 
6.3.1. The dictates of ideology ....................................................................................................................240 
6.3.2. The ascendancy of a corps of policy elites (party-melding-with-executive leadership). ..................245 
6.3.3. Civil society: the peripheral end in the continuum of policymaking ................................................252 
6.3.4. Concluding remarks from a comparative perspective ......................................................................257 
6.3.5. Running through the hypotheses and research questions.................................................................261 
6.4. THE WAY FORWARD: OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS .........................................264 
6.5. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACADEMICS ................................................271 
LIST OF REFERENCES:............................................................................................................................... 2742
 
                                                
2
 In accordance with Ethiopian academic tradition, Ethiopian names in intra-text, reference and bibliographical 
citations appear with the first given names followed by their second ones. The same tradition is maintained in 
this dissertation.    
 
 xi
 
List Maps, Tables and Figures 
 
Maps: 
 
Map 1.  The political map of Ethiopia from 1963 to 1987………………………………..XVI 
Map 2. The administrative map of PDRE from 1987 to 1991……………………………XVII 
Map 3. The political map representing the new FDRE structure after 1991…………….XVIII  
 
Tables: 
 
3.1. Composition of the elected members of the National Shengo………………………….102 
3.2.Numbers of neighborhood peasant (Kebele) associations (AEPA)..……………………105 
3.3. The number of towns, UDAs, basic associations and   numbers of members of REYA and 
REWA……………………………………………………………………………………….107 
4.1. Seats in the TGE’s Council of Representatives (CoR)…………………………………132 
4.2. The decisions and sessions of the Council of Representatives (1991-1995)…………...134 
4.3. Plenary sessions in HPR, legislation approved and the executive’s reports to the HPR  
       from 1995 to 2003……….……………………………….………………………..........155 
4.4. The educational level and sex composition of the HPR for the second term……..........156 
4.5. The new nucleus of executive leadership and answerable executive ministries and  
       government agencies………….………………………………………………………...164  
4.6. The number of population, districts, Kebeles, and total seats of the core NRSs    
       parliaments and date of adoption of the revised constitutions in the core NRSs………168  
4.7. Targets, achievements and performance indicators of  
        the ESDP (1996/97-2001/02)……………………………………………………..........188 
5.1. The estimated number of members of each EPRDF affiliate and percentage of social  
       composition till May 2004………...…………………………………………………....203 
5.2. The ruling party’s leverage in the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPR), 1995 to  
       2004…………………………………………….……………………………………….214 
5.3. Voting and the executive’s leverage in the legislative process, 1995- 2003. ………….216 
5.4. EPRDF’s leverage in the NRSs parliaments in 2000-2004…………………………….221  
6.1. The NRSs governments’ revenue dependence on the central government subsidy                   
 transfers 2002/03 (1995 E.C.) in millions of Birr………………..………………………...252 
6.2. Party nomenclature, ideological commonalities and policy implications: 1974- 
2004…………………………………………………..........260  
 xii
 
Figures: 
 
3.1. Policy implementation through state and party-led structures: 1974-1987………….....120  
3.2. Central and regional policy implementing structures: 1987-1991……………..............123 
4.1. The core NRSs’ policymaking structure………………………………………………..170 
5.1. A standard structure of EPRDF member organizations………………………………...200 
5.2. The central structure of Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in                 
        2004…………………………………………………………………………………….201 
 
 xiii
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations: 
 
AAU  Addis Ababa University 
ADA  Amhara Development Association  
ADLI  Agricultural Development Led Industrialization  
AEPA  All Ethiopian Peasant Associations 
AESM  All Ethiopia Socialist Movement 
AETU  All Ethiopian Trade Union  
ANDF  Afar National Democratic Front  
ANDM Amhara National Democratic Movement 
BGPDUF Benishangul-Gumuz Peoples Democratic Unity Front  
CAFPDE Council of Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy in Ethiopia 
CC  Central Committee 
CCI  Constitutional Inquiry  
COPWE Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia  
CoR  Council of Representatives 
CRDA  Christian Relief and Development Association 
CSA  Central Statistics Authority 
CSOs  Civil Society Organizations  
DSCGP Dutch Scientific Council on Government Council  
EDORM Ethiopian Democratic Officers’ Revolutionary Movement  
EEA  Ethiopian Economic Association  
EEPRI  Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute  
EHRCO Ethiopian Human Rights Council  
EIIPD  Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development  
EMI  Ethiopian Management Institute 
ENDO  Ethiopian National Democratic Organization  
EPDM  Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Movement 
EPLF  Eritrea People’s Liberation Front  
EPRP  Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Party  
EPRDF Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front 
ETV  Ethiopian Television   
ESDP  Education Sector Development Program  
EWLA  Ethiopian Women Lawyers’ Association  
 xiv 
EWRP  Ethiopian Workers Revolutionary Party  
FDRE  Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia  
FSS  Forum for Social Studies  
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GONGOs Government Organized Non-Government Organizations  
GPDP  Gambella Peoples Democratic Party  
HNL  Harari National League  
HPR  House of Peoples’ Representatives  
HoF  House of Federation  
IMF  International Monetary Fund  
INGOs  International Non-Government Organizations  
JRM  Joint Review Mission  
LNGOs Local Non-Government Organizations 
MLLT  Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray 
MoE  Ministry of Education 
MoJ  Ministry of Justice  
MPs  Members of Parliament 
MRM  Mid-Term Review Mission  
NGOs  Non-Governmental Organizations   
NRSs  National Regional States  
NDRP  National Democratic Revolution Program 
NRDC- 
CPSC National Revolutionary Development Campaign and Central Planning 
Supreme Council 
NGO  Non-Government Organization    
NDRP  National Democratic Revolution Program  
NCO  Non-Commissioned Officers  
NIPSS  National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies 
NNPs  Nations, Nationalities and Peoples  
NSAs  Non-State Actors   
OLF  Oromo Liberation Front  
OPDO  Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization  
ORDA  Organization for the Rehabilitation and Development of Amhara  
 xv 
PA  Peasant Association  
PC  Producers’ Cooperatives  
PMO  Prime Minister’s Office  
PMAC  Provisional Military Administrative Council  
PACD  Policy Analysis and Coordination Division  
PDRE  People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia  
PM  Prime Minister  
PMO  Prime Minister’s Office  
POMOA Provisional Office for Mass Organization Affairs 
PPD    Planning and Programming Department  
PRI  Policy Research Initiative  
PRS  Policy Research Secretariat 
RAB  Regional Affairs Bureau  
REST  Relief Society of Tigray  
REYA  Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth Association 
REWA Revolutionary Ethiopia Women’s Association 
SCGP  Scientific Council for Government Policy  
SDPRP Sustainable Development for Poverty Reduction Program   
SEDPU Southern Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Union 
SNNP-  
NRS  South Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ National Regional State  
SPDP  Somali People’s Democratic Party 
TDA  Tigray Development Association  
TGE  Transitional Government of Ethiopia  
TNO  Tigray National Organization  
TPLF  Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front  
UDA  Urban Dwellers’ Associations 
UK  United Kingdom 
US  United States 
WB  World Bank  
WPE  Workers Party of Ethiopia 
 
 xvi 
  
Map 1. The political map of Ethiopia from 1963 to 1987 
-- - --~ 
 xvii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 2. The administrative map of PDRE from 1987 to 1991 
 xviii 
 
 
 
Map 3.  The political map representing the new FDRE structure after 1991 
 
 
 
1. Addis Ababa 
2. Benishangul 
3. SNNP NRS 
4. Dire Dawa 
5. Gambela 
6. Hareri 
 1
Chapter 1. Introduction to institutions, roles and leverage in public policymaking 
 
1.1.Introduction 
 
 
The past three decades have witnessed profound socio-economic and political transformations in 
Ethiopia, from circa 1974. Rural land had been turned into state property, and the age-old 
landlord-serf relationship was abolished by a stroke of a proclamation in 1975. In the same year, 
not just was urban land nationalized, but extra houses were also expropriated. Banks, insurance 
companies, and manufacturing industries, whether owned by foreign entrepreneurs or local 
investors, had already become government-owned. In view of the socio-economic changes taking 
place, the organization of government and society had fundamentally been altered, with the 
balance as much tipped towards the former as in the pre-1974 years. In a space of seventeen years 
between 1974 and 1991, ideology and institutions had undergone remarkable metamorphoses 
during the Dergue years. Ethiopian socialism superseded Ethiopia First (Ethiopia Tikdem), and 
Marxism-Leninism replaced both and continued to dominate public policymaking almost until 
the regime was ousted in 1991. Likewise, this period had seen remarkable institutional changes. 
Milestones, which left their imprints on policymaking, included the Provisional Military 
Administrative Council (PMAC/Dergue), the Provincial Office for Mass Organizational Affairs 
(POMOA), National Revolutionary Development Campaign and Central Planning Supreme 
Council (NRDC-CPSC), the Commission for the Organization of the Ethiopian Workers Party 
(COPWPE), the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE), the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
(PDRE) and the attendant institutions, and the party- and government-sponsored civil 
organizations, as well as the urban and rural neighborhood associations (Kebeles) which came to 
be known as mass organizations.      
       In a similar way, far more radical socio-economic and political policies have been introduced 
since 1991, with the institutions and policies of the previous order undone. The July conference, a 
precursor of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) that embodied the Council of 
Representatives and the Council of Ministers, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF), the protagonist of the 1995 constitution, the bicameral parliament in which the 
EPRDF emerged as the single most architect and important player in public policymaking, the 
establishment of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), the Prime Minister’s 
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Office, the national regional states (NRSs), the local and international NGOs and civil society 
organizations, which exploded in the wake of 1991, are amongst the major institutions that have 
clearly made their entry into the public policymaking process, albeit with manifestly uneven 
leverage. The economic reforms that reinvigorated the market economy, the restructuring of the 
state to institute ethno-federal administrations, the education and training policy, the introduction 
of land lease in the urban setting, agriculture-led development industrialization (ADLI), and 
revolutionary democracy as the value or frame of reference guiding policymaking have all been 
events dominating the Ethiopian public policymaking process since 1991.  
       The thrust of this dissertation is to describe, critically compare and assess the main 
institutions, their roles and leverage in the policymaking process in Ethiopia, and how the 
profound institutional and political changes over the past three decades have affected public 
policymaking in Ethiopia, and with what effect.   
       This chapter begins with an explanatory framework, and presents the statement of the 
problem. It then spells out the objectives, research questions and the working hypotheses of the 
study. Considering public policy analyses undertaken in Ethiopia are scarce, Chapter 1 specifies 
the historical and political milestones that make this study important and relevant. In view of the 
limitations of past studies, the chapter also sheds light on how this study can set a course for 
more thorough and critical analyses of public policymaking in Ethiopia. Finally, it details the 
documentary data, methods of data collection, analysis
 
and the organization of the study.
  
 
1.2.A brief explanatory framework  
 
 
In the literature the definitions of an elite refer to people with influence other than those who hold 
formal political power. Among others, members of government and of high administration, 
military leaders, leaders of powerful economic enterprises, leaders of political parties, trade union 
leaders, businessmen and politically active intellectuals coalesce into forming elites (Ham and 
Hill, 1993: 30). Arguably, however, in developing countries where wielding political positions 
(more particularly, party and executive leadership) becomes the primary source of policymaking 
power, policy elites should embrace individuals and groups who seize the mantle of high political 
responsibilities. Of course, bureaucratic positions associated with political offices have 
increasingly buttressed the policymaking leverage of policy elites, and so are integrated into the 
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corps of the elites group. Policy elites are, therefore, groups composed of persons whose 
positions enable them make policy decisions having far-reaching consequences (Grindle and 
Thomas 1991, 59). Hence, they are in command of major hierarchies of policymaking structures; 
they run the apparatus of government and claim its prerogatives; they direct the military 
institutions; they are well placed to maneuver power and economic wealth; and they occupy the 
strategic command posts of the social structure (Mills, 1995: 73).       
       Hence, premised on the ascendant ideological values, policy elites make decisions that have 
paramount impact on the lives of the public, with far-reaching consequences. In other words, 
policies are hardly based on the demands and interests of the people.  The starkest reality is that 
elites appear to see the societal forces as passive, apathetic and ill informed; ipso facto public 
sentiments are more often manipulated by elites, rather than the public influencing elite values 
(Dye, 1995; Anderson, 1997). Not only are the elites making critical policy decisions, but also 
the flow of communication is for the most top-down. At the same time, political institutions such 
as the executive, bureaucratic agencies and parties in power employ strong statutes such as 
constitutional provisions to force the masses to observe the rules of the game of the elite system 
and values in developing countries. Elites do not just shape consensus about the continuation of 
the social system as well as the basic rules of the game, but the survival and stability of the 
system also depends on the elites’ consensus to preserve the fundamental values of the system 
(Dye, 1995: 25). Therefore, policies that can only comply with the shared consensus and values 
of policy/ruling elites will be given appropriate attention. The circumstances in most of the 
developing countries point to the fact that ‘people are generally ill informed about policy issues 
and, hence, apathetic, both the political and bureaucratic elites fashion mass opinion than masses 
shape the leadership’s views’ (Saasa, 1985, 5:309-321).       
       Furthermore, interest and civil society groups are fragmented and lack the capacity to 
articulate their interests. Nor has there been a climate conducive to promoting involvement in a 
vibrant civil movement.  In fact, in some instances when these forces are active, the mechanisms 
of wielding influence through formally constituted policymaking institutions and/or channel of 
communications are absent. In some other cases, not only have the executive, ruling parties and 
bureaucratic institutions developed clientele organizations that pre-empt autonomous initiatives, 
but also they use their power prerogatives to induce and guide corporatist participation, whereby 
groups designated by policy elites are escorted into controlled participation (Brinkerhoff and 
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Crosby, 2002: 138). For the most part, policy elites encourage public participation to ensure 
support for themselves and their policy initiatives (Huntington, 1976). It is therefore highly 
unlikely for public demand to have any effect on the public policymaking process. 
       Additionally, one of the most critical questions at the heart of the congenital link between 
governance and public policy in the context of developing countries is how would one institute a 
governance system so that public policymaking becomes technically efficient and effective, while 
at the same time policies are responsive to the needs of large sections of the citizenry (Olowu, 
2002).  The question may well be reckoned with in the realm of governance. Over the last two 
decades, competing governance approaches have increasingly been gaining currency among 
academic and multilateral circles. Despite the varying perspectives in approaches, the differences 
appear to crystallize into two schools, namely, between those who view governance as the 
conduct of public affairs, and those who see it as steering and controlling public affairs (Hyden, 
1999; Hyden and Court, 2002; Olowu, 2002).   
       The latter approach has been promoted since the 1980s by powerful multilateral 
organizations and United Nations institutions. To all intents and purposes, governance, as 
conceived by these multi-lateral organs, emphasizes leadership - the manner in which political 
(state) leaders manage, use, or misuse power - to promote social and economic development or to 
pursue agendas that undermine such goals (Olowu, 2002: 4). Hence, good or better governance is 
conceived from a process perspective with an emphasis on the rule of law, accountability, 
participation, transparency, and human and civil rights (World Bank, 1992a). These elements 
appear to be comparable to those governance elements that are ascendant in the Western liberal 
democracies. Considered chiefly as a partnership approach, the second approach focuses on 
sharing of authority for public management between state and non-state institutions with greater 
emphasis on the framework in which public policy decisions are made (Hyden and Court, 2002: 
17; Olowu, 2002: 5). The second school therefore extends the issue of governance beyond the 
confines of an exclusive state domain and action, and sees it as a domain of multi-actors and 
multi-organizations.  A further element that sets apart this school from the first one is that 
governance is judged as good or bad by both processes as well as outcomes: the use of state and 
non-state institutional resources to solve social and political problems (op. cit).  In view of the 
fact that participatory and transparent policymaking process in Africa and the bulk of the 
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developing world is in its infancy, and considering the problems stated below, this study follows 
the second school of thought in governance.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
1.3.Statement of the problem 
 
Ever since the recorded history of Ethiopia began, public policymaking has invariably been the 
prerogative of the emperors, kings and palace courts, the nobility, military dictators, and civilian 
and bureaucratic elites. Chiefly due to the awesome power of the policy elites and their 
dominance, and partly because societal actors lack the organization, the autonomy, the capacity 
and the resources needed to counterbalance party and government players in Ethiopia, any 
attempt to limit the intervention of state actors and their sphere of influence has rarely been 
successful in the past. One of the recurring problems in the maze of public policymaking in 
Ethiopia is, therefore, the imbalance between policymaking institutions and policy beneficiary 
societal actors. 
 Party and executive leadership in Ethiopia have assumed disproportionately central roles in 
initiating, shaping and pursuing public policies from 1974 to 2004. More importantly, the parties 
and the upper reach of executive leadership (policy elites) (Dergue, WPE, EPRDF and the 
political executive) are the most important actors in placing issues on an agenda, assessing 
alternatives, as well as being in charge of implementation. As a result, central government 
institutions have been centralizing policymaking, and make policies that affect people down the 
remote districts and Kebeles (villages). Put simply: over the past three decades the upper reaches 
of party and executive leadership in Ethiopia (party-fused-executive leadership) have deeply been 
involved in the policymaking process. On the flip side, the overwhelming party and executive 
presence in the policymaking sphere appeared to inhibit the growth of robust legislatures, 
voluntary associations and other civil society groups essential for viable democratic governance. 
In other words, the expansion of the party and the power of the executive have always taken 
place without a corresponding development of extra-bureaucratic institutions and civil societal 
associations. Consequently, the exclusion of the bulk of the populace from participating in public 
policymaking tended to characterize the Ethiopian public policymaking scene of the past three 
decades.  
 Putting it differently, chiefly because the ruling party and government institutions have very 
narrow circles of policy makers that make participation limited, and because large sectors of the 
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public are for the most part politically inactive and inarticulate, participation in the policymaking 
process by the citizenry has appeared to be much less. Democratic institutions such as elections 
and parliaments either appear to be in shambles or tend to be manipulated in favor of policy elites 
in Ethiopia. While there have been claims that public participation is encouraged, prior decisions 
and understanding have been reached almost unanimously among policy elites to mobilize 
support from ‘the inert and apathetic masses’, without eliciting critical inputs into the 
policymaking process. Apparently, where electoral and legislative systems are weakly instituted, 
where robust and vibrant societal forces that could have countervailed the executive are absent, as 
is the case in Ethiopia, the mere establishment by decree of electoral procedures and the 
parliamentary seats can probably contributed very little to forging the balance between 
policymaking polity and policy receiving larger society. 
 In Ethiopia, as is probably the case in other developing countries, policy elites (party-fused-
executive leadership) play decisive roles to determine policy outcomes and the process through 
which issues get into the policy agenda, through which they are deliberated within government 
institutions; and more importantly, how they are pursued and sustained. The preponderant share 
of the leverage to determine agenda setting, formulate policies and change institutional outcomes 
for their execution have been invested in the party and the executive leadership. Among others, 
policy elites who determine who gets what and when have been the key party leadership (WPE, 
EPRDF), the upper reaches of the executive (the Dergue, the PMO and the Council of Ministers), 
and key regional executive and party heads, with almost all the leadership of these institutions 
encapsulated in the ruling party leadership. On the other hand, over the past three decades in 
Ethiopia, not only have the legislatures (the National Shengo and the House of Peoples 
Representatives) been used as instruments of legitimating policies, but they have also been 
passive institutions that can easily be manipulated by the parties and executive leadership. 
Therefore, the dominance of the executive in policymaking and the overbearing influence of the 
party structures relegated the legislative institutions to docile organs having little influence on 
public policymaking. 
The institutional impact of government structures and institutions on policymaking has not 
been studied extensively, and the few policy analyses that have so far been attempted point to the 
fact that the black box of Ethiopian policymaking should be uncovered and studied. This study 
attempts to do just this. In a bid to understand where the real power to make public policy resides 
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in the policymaking system in Ethiopia, explanatory variables and empirical evidence concentrate 
upon the institutions, roles and leverage of major actors such as the parties, the executive, the 
legislatures, civil society at different point in time and their relative capacity (power or resources) 
to affect public policymaking. Policy elites in contemporary Ethiopia play what appear to be 
centrally important roles in identifying policy issues for agenda setting, defining policy changes 
and managing their implementation as well as pursuit. This dissertation attempts to critically 
assess the salient problematic and recurrent features of public policymaking in contemporary 
Ethiopia: the imbalance between policymaking institutions and policy beneficiaries. 
 
1.4.The objectives, research questions and hypotheses  
 
1.4.1. The objectives  
 
The dissertation attempts to address the following main objectives: 
 
1. to lay bare the institutional mechanisms and organizational instruments used; the 
overriding ideological values and outlooks that have influenced, dictated and shaped 
public policymaking; and the key actors who have dominated and spearheaded policy 
formulation and implementation over the past thirty years in Ethiopia;  
 
2. to examine the relationship between the party-fused-executive leadership, on the one 
hand, and the legislatures, on the other, and the leverage that each has brought to bear on 
the public policymaking process;  
 
3. to critically assess the salient features and perennial problems of public policymaking in 
contemporary Ethiopia: the imbalance between policymaking institutions and policy 
beneficiaries;  
 
4. to suggest potential scenarios which are in the prospect of fruitfully forging the balance 
between policymaking institutions and societal actors, which have hitherto been 
peripheral actors in the policymaking process. 
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The following research questions and hypotheses shall guide the study.  
 
1.4.2. Research questions 
 
1. Who are the major actors or the leading players (groups and institutional actors) that 
exercise the strongest leverage in the policymaking process in Ethiopia? 
 
2. Why have the political executive and the ruling party-fused-executive leadership (policy 
elites) been dominating public policy making in Ethiopia?  
 
3. How can one assess the relative strength, participation of the civil society and its role in 
public policymaking vis-à-vis policy elites and the existing socio-political milieu in 
Ethiopia?  
 
4. What strategies will rectify the imbalances in public policymaking in Ethiopia? 
 
1.4.3. Working hypotheses  
 
1. The dominant ideologies (Marxism-Leninism and revolutionary democracy), which 
policy elites have embraced and promoted over the past three decades in Ethiopia, 
have vitally influenced the type of socio-economic policies to be pursued and the 
choices of institutional mechanisms of implementing them. 
 
2. The domination of the party-fused-executive political leadership in public 
policymaking has inhibited and obstructed the contributions of the legislature, civil 
society agencies and independent-minded individuals in national policymaking 
processes in Ethiopia. 
 
3. Effective democratic participation in public policymaking in Ethiopia is only possible 
through a deliberate separation of party and state and a deliberate creation of more 
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effective policy agenda-setting and participation opportunities in public policymaking 
for legislative institutions, civil society organizations and the public.  
 
1.5.The relevance of the study 
 
Public policymaking and the attendant policymaking institutions have experienced more 
profound transformations than at any other time, first, in the wake of the 1974 revolution during 
the Dergue era, and second, since EPRDF took power in 1991. Therefore, the following 
milestones, which have been documented over the past thirty years, make the study vitally 
relevant.
   
 
 
1. 1974 ushered in a defining moment in Ethiopian history, in which the bulk of the 
Ethiopian populace from every corner of the country took to the streets, with most of the 
civil commotion lasting several months, till it culminated in the usurpation of power by 
the Dergue in September 1974. Not only had the Ethiopian revolution represented the 
citizens’ defiance against an anachronistic feudal order, but also had abundantly 
demonstrated their expressed desire to be involved in the public policy system and 
become the key players in the policy decisions that affected their lives as well as become 
the ultimate beneficiaries of socio-economic development.   
 
2. Ethiopia has, over last thirty years, seen much more radical and sweeping policy reforms 
on a scale unmatched before (namely, 1974-1991 during the Dergue era, and 1991 and 
beyond under the EPRDF). 
 
3. This period also witnessed an upsurge of constitution making, two constitutions in less 
than a decade – one in 1987 and the second in 1995, with each accompanied by a general 
election and institution of national and regional parliaments. The period has also seen a 
flurry of statutes with new conventions, constructs and new institutions characterizing 
them.   
 
4. Carried to the extreme, not only have the ruling parties been fused with the executive, but 
also the ideologies (Marxism-Leninism and revolutionary democracy) that the policy 
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elites have over the past three decades espoused and promoted set the parameters for 
policy choices as well as the institutional instruments for policy implementation. 
 
5. Despite operating within a difficult legal and political environment, which challenged 
critical and independent initiative, and with an inadequate resource base, insufficient 
capacity and minimal experience in civil society activism, on the other, the public and 
civil societal institutions emerged and proliferated in the wake of 1974, and even the more 
so after 1991.  
 
       Hence, not only shall the events that have transpired over the previous thirty years be 
examined and addressed in the light of the hypotheses, research questions and objectives, but 
they also certainly point to the importance and relevance of the study. Furthermore, there has 
been a convergence of concern in most of the developing countries with citizens’ engagement in 
policy formulation and implementation, and with good governance, broadening political 
participation to include a search for new and more direct ways through which citizens may 
influence policies and hold government accountable (Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002). The last 
twenty years have, therefore, witnessed a further emphasis on democratization, with a renewed 
commitment to citizens’ participation in the policymaking process in developing countries. In 
part due to the spuriousness of Ethiopian political culture, and partly because the constraints 
posed by ideology, party and executive leadership, Ethiopia stands out the developing world, 
where citizens’ empowerment for policymaking has invariably left a lot to be desired. These 
factors, too, make the study all the more timely and important.   
 
1.6.The significance of the study  
 
Past studies on public policymaking in Ethiopia were few in number (Redden, 1966; Shiferaw, 
1989; Fasil, 1997; Alemayehu, 1998). In his work The Law Making Process in Ethiopia, Kenneth 
Redden (1966) described the law-making process in what was known as Hailesellassie’s 
Ethiopia. Having been entirely predicated on the 1955 revised constitution, and the laws 
promulgated by the executive and the legislative branches, Redden (1966) described the role of 
the monarchy (executive), the bicameral parliament (the Chambers of Deputies and Senate) and 
their competences as spelt out in the constitution (cf. Chapter 3). Likewise, Shiferaw 
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Woldemichael (1989) produced two separate pieces in which he described the legislative process 
in much the same fashion as his predecessor. One deals with the law-making process before the 
1987 constitution, and the second detailed the part that formally and constitutionally instituted 
state structures (viz. the National Shengo, the President, the Council of the State, and the Council 
of Ministers) played in the legislative process after the 1987 constitution came into effect (cf. 
Chapter 3). There have very few attempts to study policymaking in the wake of 1991. However, 
Fasil Nahum (1997) and Alemyehu Yihunie’s works merit attention. In a major work, 
Constitution for Nations of Nations: the Ethiopian Prospect, constitutional lawyer, Fasil Nahum 
(1997), explained and interpreted the current Ethiopian constitution gravel-to-gravel.  In his own 
words, the work is intended to clarify the new constitutional process in Ethiopia, taking the 1995 
constitution as the point of departure (op. cit.).  On the other hand, in an M.A. thesis entitled 
‘Enhancing Public Policymaking Through Institutionalization of Policy Analysis in Developing 
Countries with Special Reference to Ethiopia’, Alemayehu (1998) identified weak policymaking 
capacity in the executive structure as a critical problem of policymaking in Ethiopia, and 
recommended a high level of interdisciplinary policy analysis unit located right in the heart of the 
machinery of the government or political executive to deal with the problem (cf. Chapters 5 and 
6).  
       One of the major deficiencies that past attempts to study policymaking in Ethiopia have in 
common is that they were not based on primary empirical data, and the few analyses made have, 
therefore, entirely depended on secondary sources (see Redden, 1966; Shiferaw, 1989; Fasil, 
1997; Alemayehu, 1998). Furthermore, not only do the studies lack empirical rigor, their study 
sources and materials have chiefly been the formal constitutional and statutory provisions. In 
other words, the materials and data limit the breadth and depth of understanding of public 
policymaking and the major players in the process that should have been examined far beyond 
the formalities. Moreover, other studies have for most part been discrete, specific and focused on 
the isolated aspects of the public policymaking process which examined problems in education, 
health, transport and population policies, but never were targeted at a thorough analysis of 
institutions, roles and leverage. Hence, analyses of public policymaking premised on manifold 
data-collection techniques and methods have so far been non-existent. Nor has there been any 
such attempt in Ethiopia to undertake as much comprehensive public policy analysis, as with 
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such measures as to explore and examine the institutions, roles and leverage in policymaking of 
the past three decades.    
       Furthermore, because of time lapses, the earlier studies were not able to capitalize either on 
the techniques or knowledge that has grown and developed over time, with knowledge gaps 
predominantly characterizing them (cf. Redden, 1966; Shiferaw, 1989). As a result, the studies 
lacked thoroughness in the treatment of the players in the policymaking process at best, and were 
unsubstantiated at worst. Therefore, there has been little research, and even less has been written, 
on the problematic of public policymaking in Ethiopia. This is, nevertheless, not to write off the 
avalanche of studies and research conducted on various discrete policy spaces including land, 
education, health, population and other socio-economic and political policies.  
       A systematic anatomy of the role of state-society actors in policymaking and the leverage 
that each brought to bear on policies and practices, and the influence that institutions, ideological 
values and/or frame of references of policy elites (the party-fused-executive leadership) exert on 
the content as well as the course of public policies has nevertheless not been undertaken.  Hence, 
not only is this dissertation intended to fill the void left by knowledge gaps, but it probably also 
offers a relatively thorough and critical policy analysis based on data and information generated 
through manifold techniques. It further aims to diagnose germane conceptual tools, qualitative 
and quantitative events, facts, data and/or information that probably supplement the quantum of 
the existing knowledge in public policy in Ethiopia in particular and developing countries in 
general (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6; also see sections 1.7, and 1.8). 
       
 
1.7.Documentary data 
 
The study uses a descriptive method and critical analysis leading to explanatory and exploratory 
approaches to the understanding of the complex formal and informal relationships between 
policymaking institutions (the executive and legislature), on the one hand, and between the party 
and executive leadership and civil society organizations, on the other. The nature of the study 
necessitates reflecting on largely qualitative data, although a reasonable quantity of quantitative 
data in tabular forms has also been used. A large volume of primary and secondary data sources 
has also been consulted. Apparently, because of the rarity of opportunities to explore and garner 
primary data/information sources, the author relied largely on the perusal of the secondary 
sources to ascertain information about the policymaking institutions, roles and leverage of the 
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Dergue era. Statutory materials, including the constitutions and pieces of legislation of three 
distinct periods (Haileselassie, Dergue and the current government), have been examined to 
determine the leverage that the formally constituted policymaking institutions enjoy and these 
have been cross-checked with the data generated through interviews, questionnaires and direct 
observations.  Furthermore, the minutes of the plenary sessions of the Council of Representatives 
(CoR) of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) from August 1991 to August 1995 in 
109 volumes, the minutes of the plenary sessions of the House of Peoples’ Representatives 
(HPR) and the House of Federation (HoF), from September 1995 to April 2004 in 12 volumes 
and the minutes of the Constitutional Assembly in 6 volumes were studied and documented, 
although the restrictions imposed on the use of all of the materials made the study time-
consuming, daunting and cumbersome.   
       Because of the secrecy shrouding the operations of the ruling party, the Ethiopian Peoples’ 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the author had to rely on his personal acquaintances, 
most of whom have been former students, to have a conduit of constant and unrestricted access to 
its unofficial and unpublished documents that chiefly circulate among the educated corps of the 
ruling party. Almost all written in Amharic, and intended neither for propaganda nor external 
consumptions, the materials provided ample evidence about who has claims on agenda setting, 
how public policy agendas have been established and with what effects. Some of the documents 
were further complemented from the party’s headquarter in Addis Ababa, and through separate 
visits to the four headquarters of Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
affiliates in Addis Ababa (Oromo People’s Democratic Organization-OPDO), Bahirdar (Amhara 
National Democratic Movement - ANDM), Awassa (South Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic 
Union - SEPDU) and Mekele (Tigray People’s Liberation Front-TPLF). The literature was 
reviewed at three places: the GS Gericke Library at the University of Stellenbosch in South 
Africa with all its electronically equipped facilities and inter-library loan system; and at the 
libraries of the Institute of Ethiopian Studies (IES) and Institute of Development Studies (IDR) of 
Addis Ababa University in Ethiopia, and the library of the House of Peoples’ Representatives 
(HPR), whose generous cooperation from staff of both universities and the HPR’s library this 
author had enjoyed.  
       For much of the period 1991 and beyond, primary data/information gathering focused on 
four core regions, namely Oromia; Amhara; South Nations, Nationalities and Peoples; and Tigray 
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national regional states (NRSs) as well as the capital city, Addis Ababa. Not only do the five 
regions embody almost all the major policymaking establishments which have been operational 
since 1991, but also these five areas have over the past thirteen years been the strongholds of the 
ruling party; ipso facto the party and the executive structures are actively involved in 
policymaking and extending down the line to the Kebele levels. Certainly these regions represent 
the core of public policymaking in Ethiopia, and this was sufficient reason to capture the 
imagination of the author to undertake his field studies there. In other words, issues and concerns 
involving the fundamental details of public policymaking are abundantly available in the regions 
mentioned earlier.  
       Furthermore, this study places the dynamics of public policymaking in Ethiopia in the 
context of the analytical and conceptual framework of public policymaking in developing 
countries. By doing so, it has set the scene for unraveling the mazes of policymaking process in 
Ethiopia; the actors and their power as well as resource leverage they command; the legal and 
institutional preconditions for public policy formulation and implementation; and the 
relationships between state and society, as well as the origin and ascendancy of the elitism of the 
party-fused-executive leadership in public policymaking in Ethiopia (Cloete, 1991, 2000; Dror, 
1968; Grindle, 1980; Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Horowitz, 1989; Saasa, 1985; Brinkerhoff and 
Crosby, 2002). The analytical framework explains the complex relationships between the nature 
of policies, the characteristics and systems of government institutions and party apparatuses more 
deeply involved in the policymaking process (op cit).   
 
1.8.Empirical data collection, analysis and phases of data collection  
 
 
Given the qualitative nature of the study, the author relied on in-depth interviews (with most of 
the interviewing taking an hour and half to two hours), an open-ended questionnaire, and direct 
observation for primary data/information collection. The latter was used to observe the debates 
and/or deliberations of the plenary sessions of the House of the Peoples’ Representatives 
(Ethiopian lower house of parliament) and public hearings on draft legislation. Questionnaire 
responses were obtained from Ethiopian members of parliament (MPs), civil society leaders, 
Ethiopian and foreign academics and leaders of key political pressure groups, teachers and 
government officials. Likewise, interviews were conducted with key informants, leaders of civil 
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society organizations, leaders of political pressure groups and government and party officials. 
These were selected either for having closely studied both policymaking systems (the Dergue and 
the present) and/or for getting involved with the systems in one form or another; almost all of the 
interviewees provided incisive information.  
       Interviews and questionnaire responses were collected in Amharic, the lingua franca of 
central government institutions and the bulk of Ethiopian populace, translated into English and 
processed. Since almost all of the interviews were tape-recorded, not only did this provide the 
author with the opportunity to go through the tapes quite frequently and carefully transcribe them 
handwritten on papers, but it also simplified the translation of the Amharic versions of the 
interviews into English. Organized and categorized primarily by target respondent groupings, 
namely, civil society organizations, MPs, political pressure groups, academics, and teachers, 
questionnaire responses were summarized in Amharic and translated into English. As Amharic is 
not part of the language family of the German or the Latin stock, translating the interviews, 
questionnaire responses, unpublished party, and government documents from Amharic into 
English were as daunting and arduous as summarizing and analyzing the qualitative information 
was.   
       It took three periodic phases to collect study materials and primary data. Running from 
January to June 2003, the author had close contacts with the archival center of the HPR and some 
of the MPs during the first phase, collected the bulk of the relevant materials, and had talks with 
several of the MPs. It was not permissible to borrow the materials, nor was it permitted to 
photocopy them, which complicated the task of data collection. This prompted the author to rely 
on personal contacts with the MPs and administrative staff to get access to the hard copies of the 
minutes of the plenary secessions of the HPR. From early October to the end of December 2003, 
the author was allowed unrestricted access to the sessions of the HPR, and had the opportunity to 
meet the chairpersons and secretaries of the standing committees, although interviewing them 
was not that successful (for reasons specified in Chapter 5, page 219). Despite this, the direct 
observation, by way of participating in the sessions of the HPR and public hearings, very well 
served the purpose of the study and was largely successful. Most of the field visits to Oromia, 
Amhara, SNNP and Tigray NRSs and Addis Ababa were made from January to June 2004.  
      The lion’s share of the last phase had been devoted to primary data gathering in NRSs (i.e. 
350 to 700 kilometers to the north, south, north-west and south-east of Addis Ababa), with the 
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bulk of the time spent talking to or interviewing NRSs’ Speakers or heads of secretariats of NRSs 
parliaments, party and government officials and leaders of civil society organizations (youth, 
women, and teachers associations). Concomitantly, enough time was devoted to examine the 
secondary sources at the Institutes of Ethiopian Studies (IES) and Development Research (IDR), 
both of which are among the oldest institutes affiliated to Addis Ababa University.  The author 
traveled three times to Stellenbosch, South Africa, twice (each lasting three months) to consult 
the leading promoter, Professor Fanie Cloete of the School of Public Management and Planning 
(SOPMP) and to use the abundantly equipped GS Gericke Library for the literature and 
theoretical surveys. The last visit to South Africa coincided with writing up the final draft (July, 
2004-March, 2005). Having taught public policymaking at the oldest institute of higher learning 
in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa University, for over eight years now, the author’s mix of teaching and 
modest research experiences in the area probably provides added significance to the study.  In 
short, manifold data-collecting methods with a range of methodological approaches had been 
used to generate data and analyze them in light of the hypotheses and research questions.  
       It is, however, worth mentioning the daunting challenges, which delay the task of data 
collection that one can face in a qualitative research of this stature. Despite being an ancient state 
that has maintained its independence over the last two millennia, Ethiopia’s political past 
nonetheless appeared to have weighed down on the collection of study materials and primary data 
(see Chapter 3). This ranges from foot-dragging in providing materials and questionnaire 
responses to completely shunning interview appointments. Despite repeated assurances [by the 
author] that it is the ethical responsibility of the researcher to keep them anonymous and the 
ramifications of what they said and/or wrote, this was more conspicuous among the ruling party 
members of the Ethiopian parliament and government officials. For some party or government 
officials any researcher carrying a letter bearing the emblem of the University (as the author did) 
would almost immediately be seen as a nemesis intruding into his office to seek information, 
much the same as a journalist in the private press or as a member of an opposition party, and they 
were thus loath to divulge any information. Indolence, indecency and reluctance characterize 
some of persons in academic circles from Addis Ababa to Mekele, from Awasa to Bahirdar. The 
author, more particularly, remembers with much dismay how a department chairperson at one of 
the universities in Ethiopia, whom he requested to fill in a questionnaire designed for Ethiopian 
academics, ridiculed and kicked him out of his office. Nevertheless, thanks to the generous 
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cooperation that the author enjoyed from former students and personal acquaintances, the 
unpublished and unofficial materials abundantly collected during the field visits, as earlier 
indicated, neutralized the ramifications of other’s reluctance.   
 
1.9.The organization of the study  
 
The dissertation consists of six chapters. This chapter provides a brief outline of the explanatory 
framework, and presents the statement of the problem, introduces the hypotheses, the objectives 
and research questions, establishes the rationale for the relevance and significance of the study, 
and finally the chapter specifies the methodology, study materials, methods of data collection and 
analysis.   
       Chapter 2 introduces conceptual and analytical tools on the basis of which pertinent data; 
information and the public policy phenomenon in Ethiopia are assessed and analyzed. The 
chapter places Ethiopian public policymaking dynamics within the context of institutional and 
socio-political features that typically characterize pubic policymaking in developing countries, 
and carefully selects germane theoretical constructs that pertinently explain circumstances of 
Ethiopian public policymaking. It further explores tentative choices and strategies that allow the 
use of a wide range of tools, knowledge and experiences which offer potentially fruitful scenarios 
viable for redressing the policymaking problems that have over the past three decades prevailed 
in Ethiopia 
       Chapter 3 begins with tracing the country’s tumultuous history and socio-political contours 
that stretch as far back as several centuries, which are essential to our understanding of 
contemporary public policymaking in Ethiopia. It emphasizes traditional and indigenous socio-
political values and norms that have been deeply embedded in Ethiopian culture, which 
simultaneously militate against the ascendant contemporary values of good governance and 
forging a balance between the ruling party and the executive, on the one hand, and civil society, 
civil society organizations and the public, on the other.  Separately treating the institutions, roles, 
leverage and socio-economic policies pursued during the Dergue era (1974-1991), and the 
EPRDF rule since 1991, Chapters 3 and 4 provide descriptive analyses. Chapter 3 further 
describes and explores the key institutional, individual and group players that had exclusive claim 
over the public policymaking process in what was popularly known as the Dergue regime. It 
examines the profound ideological and socio-economic transformations that had been taking 
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place over the years, and the influences that these transformations brought to bear upon policies 
and practices. It further discusses the assertion of power by the party (WPE/COPWE) and the 
executive, and the exclusive dominance of a couple of institutions over the organizations of 
society and the policymaking process. Focusing on the governmental establishments that the 
Dergue had created in the wake of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Chapter 3 
analyzes the center-region relationship; the legal, institutional and ideological guidelines put in 
place to guide the relationship; and the implementing agencies re-launched to execute centrally 
guided socio-economic policies.      
 Chapter 4 deals with the current policymaking landscape, the roles, leverage, and institutions 
and the trajectories that the public policymaking process has undergone, over the last thirteen 
years, since 1991. The chapter appraises two periods with distinct institutional arrangements; the 
first was a four-year transition period, which accompanied the establishment of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) following a ratification of the constitution by a 
constitutional assembly in December 1994. With the benefit of hindsight, not only have the 
socio-economic policies formulated and implemented under the auspices of EPRDF had an 
enormous impact on the periods immediately following the transition, but they also have set 
institutional precedents and ideological parameters, and created a political context within which 
policies continue to be made to this day. Focusing on the relationships between the executive and 
the legislature both at the national and NRSs levels, the chapter examines the statutory powers 
vested in each, and the perceived roles and leverage each executes in public policymaking after 
1995. Finally, Chapter 4 assesses agricultural development-led industrialization (ADLI) and 
education policies, which were among the major socio-economic policy measures sponsored by 
the new policy elites, and looks into the motives spurring state and party to situate agriculture and 
rural-focused development policies at the heart of almost all socio-economic policies in Ethiopia. 
Hence, ADLI is treated in this chapter, not only because it forms the centerpiece of the ruling 
party’s ideological commitments to the peasantry, but also because it is the core of all socio-
economic policies.  
       Chapter 5 appraises how the predominant ideological recipe (i.e., revolutionary democracy) 
that the leading protagonist of public policymaking embraced and promoted in the wake of 1991, 
and hence arrogates for itself virtually the sole claim on the formulation and implementation of 
socio-economic policies in Ethiopia. The chapter reflects on the resolve with which ideology (i.e. 
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revolutionary democracy) is pursued to bolster the EPRDF’s leverage, as well as that of the 
network of the leading persons in the party and executive leadership, on the entire gamut of 
public policymaking. In fact, this has nowhere been more vividly manifested than in the national 
and NRSs parliaments, where the blend of ruling party-executive leadership sways all the socio-
economic decisions. Informed by empirical evidence gathered from field and from the EPRDF’s 
unpublished and unofficial documents, Chapter 5 details how the combined forces of the ruling 
party and the executive dominate the socio-economic and political policymaking process in 
Ethiopia. The chapter further provides insight into how the lesser recognition that the party and 
the executive leadership accord to the civil society and civil society organizations generate less 
democratic interaction and consultation in the policy process. Finally, it analyzes how the surge 
of paternalistic and clientelistic participation has rather continued to cast an ominous shadow on 
efforts to build democracy and promote good governance.  
       Finally, Chapter 6 provides a succinct explanation of the significance of the theory and 
recapitulates the findings, explores potentially fruitful courses of action and scenarios that may 
put Ethiopian public policymaking on the right path, and proposes future research options and 
challenges that Ethiopian academics should address. Having summarized the formidable 
challenges that the Ethiopian public policymaking process has faced over the last three decades, 
Chapter 6 encapsulates the finding into three fundamental thematic problems. It comes to grips 
with the dictates of ideology and the crucial role that it has played in guiding policy elites in their 
choice of policy options and the perceived institutionalization of policy actions, the emergence 
and ascendance of a camaraderie of policy elites with overlapping membership to the ruling 
parties and top echelon of the executive leadership, and the marginal place that civil society and 
the attendant associations have in the policymaking process. Chapter 6 further explores a 
spectrum of options to address genuine public participation in the policymaking process to build 
the capacity of the society to be able to provide critical input into the policymaking process, and 
the capacity of the state to be able to accommodate the society’s growing involvement in the 
public policymaking. It also appraises potentially useful institutional mechanisms to pragamatize 
and to professionalize public policymaking in Ethiopia.   
 
 20
Chapter 2. Theoretical perspectives on public policymaking in developing states 
 
2.1.Introduction  
 
This chapter situates the dynamics of public policymaking in Ethiopia within the context of the 
analytical and theoretical framework of public policymaking in developing countries. It 
introduces conceptual and analytical tools on the basis of which empirical evidence shall be 
assessed, examined and analyzed.  In an attempt to examine where real policymaking power 
resides in the policy system in Ethiopia, explanatory variables and conceptual issues concentrate 
upon the role of major institutions (legislatures at different point in time, the political executives, 
political parties, interest groups) and their capacity (power or resources) to affect public policy. 
The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to offer an explanatory framework that draws on many 
strands in public policy theory to help us comprehend the dynamics of public policymaking 
process in Ethiopia, to provide insight into the salient features and perennial problems of public 
policymaking, and to explore potential mechanisms for contending with the problems of public 
policymaking in Ethiopia. It proffers an explanatory framework for an appraisal of the 
institutions, roles and leverage in public policymaking. Among others, it adopts the elite model 
theory of policymaking (Sassa, 1985; Dye, 1995; Anderson, 1997), and examines how the modus 
vivendi of people, and the socio-economic and socio-cultural variables determine and influence 
the dynamics of policymaking (Cloete, 2000). It also looks at the state-society relationships vis-à-
vis policymaking in essentially developing country context (Dror, 1968, 1986; Grindle, 1980; 
Horowitz, 1989; Smith, 1973, 1985; Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Turner and Hulme, 1997; 
Cloete, 1991, 2000).  
       It further explores a wide range of knowledge and experience that are essential for coming to 
terms with the multitude of policymaking problems in Ethiopia. It appears that the power of 
policy elites has rarely been balanced by the plurality of autonomous civil societal associations 
such as professionals, intellectuals, trade unions, business associations, religious groups, 
voluntary associations and NGOs in most of the developing world. Moreover, systems and 
structures of governance have not only widely involved socio-political and economic actors in the 
society; the state and its administrative structures in developing countries have not invariably 
been accountable to the civil society. This study, therefore, addresses the contentious issue of 
forging the balance between state and society. The latter presupposes developing and 
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institutionalizing sound governance structures, ensuring the accountability of political and 
administrative institutions to the civil society, and encouraging citizens’ involvement more fully 
in public policymaking, and providing professional skills to public institutions for formulating 
and implementing sound policies.  
       The next section explores a spectrum of concepts to define public policy, and adopts 
Gerston’s formulation as a working definition. Focusing on conceptual lenses (models), this 
chapter also sheds light on a selected set of approaches to public policymaking that feature 
prominently in the realm of policy analysis. In a bid to trace inherent commonalities, it further 
appraises the socio-cultural, socio-economic and socio-political characteristics of developing 
countries. Furthermore, this chapter clearly demonstrates who the prime movers, architects and 
players in public policymaking in developing countries are, and evaluates the stature of non-state 
actors in the policymaking process.  Finally, it offers an exposition which points to potential 
instruments for dealing with the recurrent problems of policymaking in Ethiopia in particular and 
developing countries in general.  
 
2.2.Defining public policy 
 
The historical root of the concept of policy can be identified from its etymological origins (Dunn, 
1994: 33). The term policy comes to us from Greek, Sanskrit and Latin languages. Dunn (ibid.) 
further noted ‘the Greek and Sanskrit root polis (city-state) and pur (city) evolved into the Latin 
politia (state) and later, into the Middle English police, which referred to the conduct of public 
affairs or the administration of government’.  The etymological origin of two other important 
words, police and politics, is the same. This is also one of the factors contributing to the present-
day ambiguity surrounding the boundaries of such disciplines as political science, public 
administration and the policy sciences, each of which is heavily committed to the study of 
politics and policy (ibid.).  
 It has been argued that the study of public policy is far from a new venture; the systematic 
study of public policy, however, began nearly half a century ago (Bauer, 1968). The discipline of 
public policy emerged as an important field in the early 1950s with the pioneering works of 
Harold Lasswell. In the mid-60s the works of David Easton also provided an intellectual 
framework for understanding of the entire policy process (Sabtier, 1991). Howlett and Ramesh 
(1995) also noted that policy science is a relatively recent discipline, emerging in North America 
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and Europe after World War II as students of politics groped for new understanding of the 
relationship between government and citizens. Pioneered by Harold Lasswell and others in the 
West, the focus of policy sciences was not so much on the structure of governments or the 
behavior of political actors, or what governments should or ought to do, but on what governments 
actually do (ibid.).  
 There are as many academic definitions of ‘policy’ as there are many everyday usages of the 
term (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). Some scholars pointed out the difficulty of finding a single 
neat phrase to define the concept of public policy (Bauer, 1968 Saasa, 1985; Theodoulou, 1995). 
De Coning (2000) stresses that an assessment of the nature of definitions in the field of policy 
provides no universally accepted definitions. ‘However, an adequate framework of definitions 
enables one to explore the multi-dimensional nature of policy, to establish the key elements of 
definitions in the field and to develop a working definition’ (op. cit.).  It is with this heuristic 
understanding that we should critically explore the various definitions of public policy and their 
interpretations.  
 Public policy is what governments choose to do or not to do (Dye, 1995). Dye not only offers 
a definition too generalized to be useful; the formulation also tends to be too simple and fails to 
provide the means to conceptualize public policy. It would include every aspect of governmental 
behavior from purchasing or failing to purchase paper clips to waging or failing to wage nuclear 
war; it thus provides no means of separating the trivial from the significant aspects of 
government activities (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995). Dye’s definition, however, states clearly that 
the agent of public policymaking is a government. Second, he highlights the fact that public 
policies involve a fundamental choice on the part of governments to do something or do nothing. 
Policy can even be viewed as change and goal oriented (Cloete, 1991: 4). ‘The policy of 
government can be defined as its programme of action to give effect to selected normative and 
empirical goals in order to address perceived problems and needs in society in a specific way, and 
therefore to achieve desired changes in the society’ (ibid.).  
 Anderson (1997: 9) offers a more generic definition. He describes public policy as ‘a 
relatively stable, purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a 
problem and matter of concern’. Anderson’s formulation adds two important elements to those 
noted by Dye. Primarily, it stresses that sets of actors, rather than a sole actor, within 
government, take policy decisions. Policies are also the result of not only multiple decisions, but 
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of multiple decisions taken by manifold actors. Second, it highlights the link between 
government action and the perception of the existence of a problem or concern requiring 
governmental action. 
 Dror (1968: 12) offers a more succinct and comprehensive definition of public policy. It is ‘a 
more complex, dynamic and continuous process whose various components make different 
contributions to it. It decides major guidelines for action directed at the future mainly by 
governmental organs…’ (op. cit.). Dror’s definition contains the essential elements of public 
policy. First, it stresses that public policymaking involves structures (components), and is an 
ongoing process taking place within governmental institutions. Second, depending on the nature 
of the structure of policy and policy system, the institutions in the public domain (such as the 
legislature, the executive, the judiciary and the administrative apparatus) make different 
contributions to public policymaking. Third, it asserts that public policy decisions are legislative 
enactments that can be made by public institutions.  
 Saasa (1985) introduces the idea that public policy is not only a conscious goal-selecting 
process undertaken by actors in the political system, but it also includes the identification of the 
means for achieving such public goals. Policy decisions should also appreciate the capabilities of 
the major actors vis-à-vis policy objectives (ibid.). The assertion, implicitly or explicitly, signifies 
that policies are often far from achieving the originally established objectives mainly because of 
the gaps between power and resource capabilities of that policymaking and implementing 
institutions command, on the one hand, and the objectives accomplished gauged in terms of 
concrete goods and services, on the other.  
 The composite of ideas and elements that are incorporated in the majority of definitions are 
the following. First, public policies are designed to accomplish or produce definite results. 
Proposed policies may usefully be considered as hypotheses till concrete actions are taken to 
meet policy objectives (Saasa, 1985; Anderson, 1997). Second, policy is broader in scope and 
deeper in perspective than would discrete decisions account for (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). 
Third, public policy should distinguish between what governments intend to do and what, in fact, 
they actually do. Policy involves what governments actually do, not just what they intend to do or 
what they say they are doing (Anderson, 1997).  Fourth, public policies are enacted and enforced 
by governmental institutions and actors. However, this assertion should not be interpreted as 
belittling the role of non-state actors in public policy and the influence that they may bring to 
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bear upon policymaking. Fifth, public policy involves all level of actors, and is not necessarily 
restricted to formal actors (Theoudoulou, 1995). Sixth, numerous government structures and 
institutions contribute to policymaking. Policymaking is thus a pervasive process that is not 
solely limited to legislative and executive orders, rules and other ordinances (Dror, 1968). Last, 
public policy is an ongoing process, which involves not only the decision to enact law but also 
the subsequent actions of enforcing and implementing them (Theoudoulou. 1995, Anderson, 
1997).   
This study adopts Gerston’s formulation as a working definition: 
 
Public policy is defined here as the combination of basic decisions, commitments, and actions made by 
those who hold or affect government positions of authority. In most instances, these arrangements result 
from interactions among those who demand change, those who make decisions, and those who are affected 
by the policy in question. The determinations made by those in positions of legitimate authority – most 
commonly, one or more public offices in government – are subject to possible redirection in response to 
pressures from those outside government as well as from others within government…The linkage between 
policymaking and policy receivers is vital to understanding the meaning and power of public policy. (1997: 
6-7) (emphasis added).  
     
 Before winding up this section, it is necessary to distinguish between policymaking and 
decision-making. Decision-making involves discrete choices from among alternatives, and it is 
not a self-contained stage, but a specific stage rooted in the policy cycle (Anderson, 1997; 
Howlett and Ramesh, 1995). Policymaking, on the other hand, encompasses a flow and a pattern 
of action that extends over time and includes many decisions, some routine and some not. 
Second, policymaking is a highly political process where continuous conflict, bargaining and 
negotiation occur between groups, and between state and non-state actors as well. Discrete and 
mundane decisions can, however, be made routinely by households and individuals.          
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2.3.Models of public policymaking and their relevance to developing countries 
 
 
In this section, in search of approaches that qualify the imperatives of ‘avant-garde’ developing 
countries, various models of public policymaking are explored. The discussions will, however, be 
limited to five models, namely rational, incremental, elite, pluralist and institutional models. 
Some of the models are reviewed here for the purpose of comparison.  However, this should not 
be interpreted as denigration of the usefulness of models that are not treated here. Systems 
approach and mixed-scanning are not discussed, primarily because the systems model essentially 
views policymaking as ‘a response of a political system to demands arising from the society’ 
(Dye, 1995; Anderson, 1997), which does not appear to be the case in the context of developing 
countries.  Second, although Amitai Etzioni suggested mixed scanning as an alternative approach 
to both rational and incremental models, it is nevertheless less clear how would it operate in 
practice.  Although all the models originated from the mainstream Western social and political 
values, elite and pluralist models appear to be relevant to developing countries in general and the 
Ethiopian realities in particular.      
 To begin with, Dye (1995:18) offers a list of uses of models of public policy as conceptual 
lenses or tools. Among others, models simplify our thinking about public policy. They also 
channel our efforts to understand public policy by way of distinguishing between what is 
important and not important. More importantly, models suggest explanations for public policy 
and predict its consequences (ibid.). Writers in the field, nevertheless, argued that most of the 
contemporary policymaking models are of imperfect application and limited relevance in 
understanding the policymaking processes in developing countries (Milne, 1972 Saasa, 1985; 
Dror, 1968).   
The following models have been selected as the most appropriate models to assess and 
understand the policymaking processes in Ethiopia.  
 
2.3.1. The rational actor model  
 
The rational actor model is one of the leading models of policymaking. In essence, rational 
decision-making involves the selection of an alternative which maximizes the decision-maker’s 
values, the selection being made following a comprehensive analysis of alternatives and their 
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consequences (Ham and Hill, 1993). It is ‘rational’ in the sense that the model prescribes 
strategies for decision-making that will lead to the choice of the most efficient means of 
achieving policy goals. The rational model is, therefore, based on the belief that problems of the 
society ought to be solved in a ‘scientific’ or ‘rational’ manner by gathering all relevant 
information on the problems and alternative solutions to them, and selecting the best alternative 
(Etzioni, 1967; Dye, 1995; Anderson, 1997; Howlett and Ramesh, 1995). Simon suggested and 
elucidated the idea of bounded rationality or ‘satisficing’ to describe a realistic decision-making 
in practice (cited in Ham and Hill, 1993). According to Ham and Hill (1993), bounded rationality 
involves a decision-maker’s choice of an alternative intended not to maximize his values. The 
term ‘satisficing’ portrays not only this process, but enables policymakers faced with a decision 
to simplify by not examining all possible alternatives as well. In this sense ‘the exacting demands 
of rational comprehensive model are avoided’ (ibid: 84).  
 There have been considerable criticisms directed at this rational comprehensive approach. 
Several writers pointed out that there are limits to the ability of policymakers to be 
comprehensive in establishing alternatives and calculating costs and benefits (Lindblom, 1959; 
Etzioni, 1967; Ham and Hill, 1993; Anderson, 1997). Lindblom (ibid) contended that ‘limits on 
human intellectual and on available information set definite limits to be comprehensive’. 
Therefore, the rational model is criticized for ‘being at once unrealistic and undesirable’ (Etzioni, 
1967). Several other scholars in the field questioned the validity and relevance of rational 
comprehensive model to the Third World policymaking (Milne, 1972; Dror, 1968; Saasa, 1985). 
They recognized the many deficiencies inherent in a rational comprehensive approach to public 
policymaking in developing counties.  
 The model is not practicable for the following reasons: first, the availability and quality of 
information is the most important handicap. It is not only costly to produce and process the 
required information, but also difficult to comprehend because of the absence of human and 
material resources and capacities to meet the demands of rational decision-making. This state of 
affairs is made worse in developing countries ‘by the lack of skilled and experienced manpower 
to make decisions in the manner prescribed by the rational deductive model’ (Saasa, 1985: 314). 
Second, the radical policy reforms and social transformations that are taking place in the 
developing countries make the use of rationality unreliable and uncertain. Therefore, scientific 
criteria for a thorough assessment of policy alternatives and their outcomes would be difficult to 
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ascertain (Dror, 1968). The rapid social and economic transformations may also result in changes 
in goals and values at a faster rate, which makes the practicability of rationalism suspect. Third, 
in part due to deficiencies in the policy structure, and partly due to the absence of a propitious 
environment within which the policy system operates, the rational components are of a poor 
quality in developing countries (ibid). More importantly, the bureaucracy is weak and cannot 
supply very many rational components in policymaking. Last, ascertaining agreements on most 
crucial policy issues among citizens, politicians and the bureaucracy can often be complicated by 
social fragmentation, absence of agreement on policy goals and crisis of leadership caused by 
social fragmentation based on primordial ties (op. cit).   
 Saasa summarized his skepticism about the validity and relevance of the rational 
comprehensive approach to developing countries as follows: 
 
Developing countries that attempt to use ‘rational’ and ‘scientific’ approaches towards policymaking often 
plan with out going through the mechanics of implementation. For those countries that are not pragmatic in 
their approaches, it is common for their ambitious development plans, for example, to be founded on 
inadequate and unreliable information (especially of resource availability and implementation capabilities) 
and, thus, to end up being mere statements of intentions. (1985:318) 
 
       Overall, information that is critical in the decision-making process is not only in short 
supply, it is often unreliable. The shortage of information means ‘policy makers have much less 
information than they need and that what they have is of questionable reliability’ (Grindle and 
Thomas, 1991: 45). As a result, policymakers must depend more on intuition and experience than 
on solid information in making decisions. Decisions that capitalize on intuition are subjective and 
unpredictable. In the absence of adequate data and reliable information, decisions are likely to be 
more politically oriented in developing countries. Nevertheless, developing countries which 
cannot successfully practice other models of policymaking, such as incrementalism, may be 
induced by the drive for innovation to adopt policies which have unpredictable consequences. 
Ironically, the drive for innovations coupled with the rapid social and economic transformations 
perhaps leaves third world policymakers no option other than adopting those that resemble the 
rational model (Etzioni, 1967).  
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2.3.2. The incremental model  
 
Misgivings about the relevance and usefulness of the rational model led to efforts to develop a 
theory of policymaking that avoids many of the difficulties of the rational comprehensive 
approach. Charles Lindblom is the leading protagonist of the approach that has several names: 
disjointed incrementalism, successive comparison or simply incremetalism. Essentially, the 
incremental method can be summarized as follows (Etzioni, 1967: 386-387): 
 
1. Rather than attempting a comprehensive survey and evaluation of all alternatives, the 
decision-maker focuses only on those policies that differ incrementally from existing 
policies; 
 
2. Only a relatively small number of policy alternatives are considered; 
 
3. For each policy alternative, only a restricted number of ‘important’ consequences are 
evaluated; 
 
4. The problem confronting the decision-maker is continually redefined. Increlmentalism 
allows for countless ends-means and means-ends adjustments, which, in effect, make 
the problem more manageable; 
 
5. Thus, there is no one decision or ‘right’ solution but a ‘never-ending’ series of attacks 
on the issues at hand through serial analysis and evaluation;  
 
6. As such, incremental decision-making is described as remedial, more focused on the 
alleviation of present, concrete social imperfections than to the promotion of future 
social goals.  
 
       In Lindblom’s view, policymakers develop policies through a process of making successive 
limited comparison with earlier decisions (1959). He (1959: 81) argued that policymakers work 
through a process of ‘continually building out from the current situation, step-by-step and by 
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small degrees’, unlike the rational approach, which starts ‘from fundamentals anew each 
time…and [is] always prepared to start completely from the ground up’. Policies thus arrived at 
only marginally differ from those that already exist. In other words, the departures from the 
status quo are incremental. The test of good policies, therefore, is not whether or not the policy 
maximizes the values of the policymaker; rather it is whether the policy secures agreement of the 
interests involved (Lindblom, 1959). 
       Although they fell by far short of appreciating the realities in the third world, Howlett and 
Ramesh (1995) advanced two important reasons to demonstrate why policies should not vary 
significantly from the status quo. Primarily, since bargaining requires distribution of limited 
resources among various participants, it is easier to continue the existing pattern of distribution 
rather than trying to attribute values to radically new proposals. Unlike the uncertainties 
surrounding new arrangements that may make agreement on the changes difficult, the 
policymakers are presumed to know the benefits and costs of the present arrangement. Second, 
‘the standard operating procedures that are the hallmark of bureaucracy tend to promote the 
continuation of the existing practices. The methods by which bureaucrats identify options and the 
methods and criteria for choices are often laid out in advance, inhibiting innovation and 
perpetuating the existing arrangements’ (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995: 142). 
       Furthermore, policymakers adapt objectives to available means rather than striving for a 
predetermined or fixed objective. Means and ends are simultaneously chosen in the incremental 
approach. The model, therefore, views policymaking as a pragmatic exercise concerned with 
solving concrete problems rather than achieving lofty goals. More importantly, the means chosen 
for solving problems are discovered through a trial-and-error approach rather than through the 
comprehensive evaluation of all possible means, and ‘policy does not move in leaps and bounds’ 
(Lindblom, 1959; Howlett and Ramesh, 1995).  Policymakers simply consider only familiar 
alternatives for appropriateness and stop the search after an acceptable alternative has been 
found.  
       There have, nevertheless, been criticisms leveled against the incremental method (Etzioni, 
19673; Dror, 1968; Milne, 1972; Saasa, 1985; Anderson, 1997). Before considering the 
applicability, validity and relevance of the incremental model to the Third World policymaking 
                                                
3
 Amitai Etzioni suggested an alternative approach, mixed-scanning, to both rational comprehensive and incremental 
approaches in 1967. His model has not been dealt with here.   
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circumstances, we will enumerate the criticisms generally made of the model. First, 
incrementalism suggests that the most powerful interests in the society will make most policy 
choices, and therefore, ‘the demands of the unprivileged and politically unorganized would be 
underrepresented’ (Etzioni, 1967: 387). This would thus mean powerful interests have the most 
to gain from policies that differ marginally from the status quo. Second, the model is criticized 
for being inherently conservative and pro-inertia, for its suspension of large-scale change and 
innovation. As Etzioni (op. cit.) noted, incrementalism disregards basic societal innovations, as it 
focuses on the short run and seeks no more than limited variations from past policies and 
programs. Third, Lindblom’s model seems to be a characteristic of policymaking in a stable 
environment, ‘where all relevant parties have a more or less clear image of the expected results of 
a certain policy’, and it is a typical policymaking process of advanced countries like the US 
(Dror, 1964: 154; Etzioni, 1967: 387).  Last, according to Etzioni (op. cit) major strategic 
decisions are different from day-to-day operational decisions, a distinction that incrementalism 
has not adequately taken into account.  
       The preceding criticisms are of a universal nature and perhaps may not necessarily appreciate 
developing countries’ policymaking realities. Very few writers in the field of policy delved into 
the subject to comprehend whether some of the policymaking models, developed based on 
Western socio-economic circumstances are indeed practicable. Incrementalism is unsuitable for a 
developing state with a mass leader and small political elite who have high aspirations for rapid 
and radical socio-economic transformations through centrally guided social changes (Dror 1964, 
1968). The following series of problematic issues were raised to address the difficulties of using 
the incremental model in guiding policymaking in developing states (Milne, 1972; Saasa, 1985).  
 
1. Because of a high desire and motivation to catch up, policy reforms in most developing 
countries show a radical departure from the past to meet the requirements of rapid socio-
economic changes. Policymakers in developing countries would, therefore, conceive of 
incrementalism’s limited usefulness, because it apparently promotes inertia and 
discourages innovation. 
 
2. Most developing countries are perhaps unable to secure a sufficient degree of consensus 
envisaged, which is essential to make the incremental model feasible.   
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3. Stability has been presented as a necessary and desirable criterion for incrementalism to 
succeed. In developing countries, where grand and fundamental policy reforms are often 
launched, war and natural calamities continually disrupt normal life, and amidst resource 
scarcities, it would be unrealistic to conceive of the suitability of incrementalism. 
Lindblom (1959) himself admitted that his model is applicable only ‘to relatively stable 
countries such as the United States’.  
 
       In a more general sense, the incremental approach has been found appropriate neither on 
descriptive nor prescriptive grounds (Turner and Hulme, 1997). On a prescriptive basis 
incremental solutions are not the requirements for development problems that deserve major and 
urgent attention, and on descriptive grounds incrementalism fails to incorporate enough of the 
extra-rational components which impinge on the policymaking process in developing states 
(ibid.).   
 
2.3.3. The elite model  
 
Despite the fact that the reasons for the lack of suitability of the models may differ, neither the 
rational comprehensive model nor incrementalism is suitable for understanding the policymaking 
process in the Third World states (Dror, 1968; Milne, 1972; Saasa, 1985). It can nevertheless be 
argued that elite theory describes and explains developing countries’ policymaking circumstances 
more appropriately than incremental and rational approaches do. Drawing on the work of the 
classical elite theorists, Pareto and Mosca, writers such as Wright Mills pointed to the 
concentration of power in the hands of a minority of the population (Ham and Hill, 1993: 31). 
Mosca (cited in ibid) wrote: 
 
In all societies-from societies that are very meagerly developed and have barely attained the drawings of 
civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies-two classes of people appear-a class that 
rules and a class that is being ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political 
functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more 
numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more 
or less arbitrary and violent.   
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       In a modern state the definition of elite has increasingly involved persons other than those 
who hold formal political power. Included are members of government and of high 
administration, military leaders, leaders of powerful economic enterprises, leaders of political 
parties, trade union leaders, businessmen and politically active intellectuals. However, whether or 
not these groups are included in the category of policy elites in developing countries is highly 
questionable. The primary source of power for the policy elites in developing states is the 
wielding of political offices. The latter involve individuals who actually exercise political power 
in the society at any given time (Ham and Hill, 1993). In modern times, of particular importance 
is the creation and proliferation of bureaucratic positions to carry out the increasing 
responsibilities of governmental institutions. Bureaucratic positions and technical expertise 
associated with the former have increasingly strengthened the power positions of policy elites in 
developing countries.  
       Elite theory, therefore, asserts that public policy decisions are not made based on the 
demands and interests of the people, but rather based on the interests of governing elites, whose 
preferences are carried into effect by bureaucratic agencies. Albeit with considerable Western 
predispositions, values and experience, Dye (1995: 25-27) succinctly describes the elite 
perspectives of public policymaking. Significant elements of the assertions and perspectives 
resemble those of the developing countries.  Dye (ibid.) noted that elitism views the masses as 
passive, apathetic and ill-informed; mass sentiments are more often manipulated by elites, rather 
than elite values being influenced by the masses. Policy decisions are not only made by the elites, 
but communication also flows from top to bottom. ‘Democratic institutions elections and parties’ 
merely have symbolic value and tie the people to the prevailing political system. In developing 
countries political institutions such as the executive, bureaucratic agencies and parties in power 
employ strong statutes to force the masses observe the rules of the game of the prevailing system.  
       Second, public policies reflect the demands and interests of governing elites, rather than the 
masses. Changes and innovations in public policies come because of redefinitions of their own 
values by the elites (Dye, 1995; Anderson, 1997). Because of the general conservatism of elites 
in preserving the system, changes in public policies are seldom fundamental. More importantly, 
changes in the nature of the political system can only occur when events threaten the system; 
elites will then be obliged to introduce reforms aimed at protecting the fundamental values of the 
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system. Third, elites also carve up consensus about the continuation of the social system as well 
as the basic rules of the game. The survival and stability of the system depend on the elites’ 
consensus to preserve the fundamental values of the system (ibid.). Therefore policies that echo 
the shared consensus and values of ruling elites will be given appropriate attention.     
       The circumstances in many developing countries largely demonstrate that ‘people are 
generally ill informed about policy issues and, hence, apathetic, both the political and 
bureaucratic elite fashion mass opinion than masses shaping the leadership’s views (Saasa, 1985: 
311). It is thus inescapable to conclude that elite preference more aptly explains the policymaking 
conditions of developing than developed countries.  
 
2.3.4. Pluralist model  
 
More direct participation in policymaking is possible when the interests of various and/or 
divergent groups in society are aggregated in the formulation and implementation of public 
policies. Policymaking in pluralist perspective is the process by which various competing 
interests are reconciled; public policies are thus a result of competition and collaboration among 
groups working to further their members’ collective interests (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995: 34). In 
other words, the pluralist approach to policymaking assumes that public policy is the outcome of 
a free competition between ideas and interests (Parsons, 1995: 134).  
Nevertheless, the Marxist-Leninist approach to policymaking appears to be antithetical to 
liberal democratic values that emphasize on the importance of accommodating plural interests 
within a given institutional and political setting of the policymaking process. The predominant 
values in Marxist thinking are rather anchored in class and class struggle, democratic centralism 
and the advent of communism that sharpens contradictions within groups and instigates divisions 
within a given political society.  In other words, unlike the pluralist model of policymaking, the 
Marxist-Leninist model tends to exclude certain segments of society at the expense of others.  
The Leninist model has collapsed worldwide because it never delivered in the way of democracy, 
nor had it demonstrated any significant shift away from the direct control of economic and social 
institutions by the state.  
The trend towards liberal and pluralist approaches to policymaking in developing 
countries therefore seems justified on the grounds that the ‘liberal democracy is a powerful 
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stimulus to societal progress, basically because it provides a more conducive institutional 
environment for market-led economic development, while at the same time creating a conducive 
socio-political milieu for accommodation of various interests in the policymaking process, rather 
than the exclusivist Marxist-Leninist approach  (White, 1998: 21). Therefore, a democratic 
developmental state that combines the accommodation of divergent societal interests in the 
policymaking process and delivering sound economic development increasingly become an 
attractive option for developing countries that face formidable developmental challenges, 
although practicing the liberal democratic values exactly as in Anglo-Saxon countries may not 
feasible for developing countries.  
However, White (ibid. 31) cautioned that the distinctive political and institutional model 
of the democratic developmental state can be seen as one of the alternatives among a wide range 
of political economies shaped and determined by the socio-economic system, civil society, 
political society, state institutions and global environment. In sum, a developmental state that is 
characterized by liberal values of inclusive embeddedness that goes beyond a narrow band of 
elites to involve broader sections of society (ibid.), and which at same time delivers economic 
development to the larger segment of society over long range, appears to be a relatively sound 
model for developing countries as an alternative to Marxist-Leninist models.   Its experience in 
Ethiopia will be summarized and assessed in detail in chapters 3 to 5. 
 
2.3.5. The institutional model  
 
Policy as an outcome of political institutions has been the oldest concern of political studies 
(Dye, 1995; Anderson, 1997). Public policy is authoritatively determined, legitimated and 
implemented by governmental institutions (Hanekom, 1987). Intuitionalism tends to emphasize 
the more formal and structural aspects of policymaking and implementing institutions. Anderson 
(1997) defines an institution as a set of regularized patterns of human behavior that persists over 
time and performs some significant social function or activity, whose outputs are public policy 
decisions.  
       The heart of policymaking activities is government institutions such as the legislature, the 
executive, the courts and bureaucratic agencies.  Dye (op. cit.) argued that public policy can 
become public policy only when it is adopted, implemented and enforced by public 
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(governmental) institutions. Government institutions lend public policy three distinguishing 
characteristics (Dye, 1997). First, government gives legitimacy to policies. Public policies are 
generally considered as legal obligations that command the loyalty of citizens. In other words, 
only policies issued by public organs involve legal obligations. Second, unlike policies or 
regulations of other groups and associations, public policies have universal application. Only 
government policies extend to all people in the society. Last, only government institutions can 
legally proceed against citizens who violate their policies, because it can make effective use of 
the means of coercion (ibid.).  
       The regularized and stable patterns of behavior as well as rules and structures can influence 
the content and context of public policymaking. Such dynamic aspects of public policy as parties, 
public opinion and interest groups can affect the policy outcomes of policymaking institutions. 
Nonetheless, policymaking institutions can be so structured as to serve certain elite group 
interests rather than others (Dye, 1995, Anderson, 1997). As is the case in most developing states, 
policymaking institutions give advantage to certain interests in the society and withhold it from 
other interests. The very small number of persons-policy (ruling) elites, who allocate values and 
resources, are also the ones who enjoy greater access to government and bureaucratic power in 
developing countries. The existing structure of government institutions can have important policy 
consequences. It has thus been argued that since ‘both structure and policy are largely determined 
by social or economic forces and that tinkering with institutional arrangements will have little 
independent impact on public policy if underlying forces remain constant’ (Dye, 1995: 21).     
 
2.4. Socio-cultural, socio-economic and socio-political characteristics of developing 
countries 
 
Despite some socio-cultural and socio-economic variations among developing countries, various 
characteristics are shared largely by differing developing states. Dror (1968: 105) identified six 
characteristics that can generally be applied to most or ‘avant-garde’ developing states: 
 
1. A very low level of technological development; 
 
2. A once strong tribal or communal structure that is now slowly disintegrating; 
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3. A mass leader and small political elite, who are aspiring toward a rapid and radical 
socio-economic transformation by means of centrally, directed social change, the 
leader maintaining a strong grip on the masses by both charisma and force, but 
depending on support by the military; 
 
4. Almost complete absence of a middle class; 
 
5. A long history of colonial rule; 
 
6. Wide scope of public policymaking that covers most economic activities. 
               
       Well over three decades after Dror suggested these characteristics, only few of them are 
perhaps unworkable today. The second and fourth characteristics could be questioned.  Ethnic 
and communal structures are increasingly gathering pace in many parts of the Third World today. 
The inter-communal strife in Somalia, India, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Ethiopia would not only 
testify that the forces of ethnic structures are still at large, power elites in these countries 
maneuver these forces as a policymaking leverage as well. Second, on account of the rapid 
economic and political transformations that have been taking place, a robust, but a middle class 
of a comprador nature has flourished over the past many years in large number of developing 
countries.         
       Low per capita income, agriculture-dependent economies, large rural populations and the 
emergence of more complex societies generally characterize developing countries (Cloete, 2000). 
These harsh realities have added to the onerous tasks of policymakers and development managers 
in these countries.  Hence, the principal work of ‘policymakers is to address the critical issues of 
stimulating growth’ and of development.  Both in developed and developing countries, socio-
cultural, socio-political and socioeconomic variables bear upon the contents of policies and 
determine the power leverage of actors and their efforts to influence policies (op. cit.).  However, 
developing states suffer more than their counterparts in developed countries, essentially because 
they are underdeveloped in ‘their history’, in their ideology, in their resources and in their 
political regimes (Dror, 1968). Thus, for policymakers in most of the developing countries the 
job description is ambitious, the skills it requires are extensive (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). 
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       The benefits of economic development and growth can be measured in terms of life 
expectancy, mortality rate and literacy. Weaver et al. (1997) noted that longevity is a good 
measure of a country’s capacity to provide a high quality of life for its citizens. Closely related to 
life expectancy is mortality rate, measured by infant mortality for children below the age of five. 
The literacy rate also indicates how well a country prepares its people to cope in a modern and 
literate environment. Life expectancy, infant mortality and literacy are therefore measures of 
development. Furthermore, access to safe water, sanitation and health care are additional 
measures of a society’s commitment to including all people in the development process.  
       The realities in developing countries are harsher and could perhaps present enormous 
difficulties to overcome in the near future. In connection with sociocultural variables and the 
debilitating features that these bring to bear on the people of developing countries, Cloete writes: 
 
Lesser developed states normally have much larger numbers of illiterate, poorly educated people and on the 
average a much younger and less mature population (the stereotypical examples are probably most sub-
Saharan African countries, Latin American Countries… Asian countries…). The role of the extended family 
is crucial in community life, while in many cases women still occupy subordinate roles in society and ethnic 
tolerance is sometimes superficial. They frequently have only primitive means of transport available to them 
and are therefore not really mobile.  
     Their populations have relatively short life expectancies compared with the inhabitants of more 
developed countries, with incidences of infant mortality and poor health services that struggle to cope with 
ballooning populations. Large numbers of people still live in primitive conditions in rural areas, where they 
eke out an existence, barely surviving from day-to-day. They have only rudimentary services and facilities, 
with large regions of the country frequently being inaccessible owing to a serious lack of transport and other 
communication routes. The governments concerned cannot provide for even the most basic needs of their 
citizens. (2000: 83)  
         
 
       Moreover, as the populations of most developing states are rural, they are scattered and are 
far from public institutions that make important decisions affecting their lives. It follows from 
this that people in developing countries have neither enough knowledge of what the government 
is doing, nor do they influence decision making, nor do they have access to important decision 
makers. These emanate from the poverty that sets apart these states from developed countries, 
which itself is closely linked to levels of literacy and school enrollments. For example, adult 
literacy was 52 percent female, 74 percent male in 1997 for low-income countries; and 80, and 91 
percent for female and male respectively for middle-income countries 89 and 91 percent 
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respectively compared to 100 percent in most developed countries. The records for secondary and 
tertiary education are even more striking. The enrollment ratio for low-income countries was 46 
and 8 percent in secondary and tertiary schools respectively of the appropriate age groups; for 
middle-income countries, 69 and 12 percent; and for industrialized countries 100 and 62 percent 
respectively (World Bank, 2001). It is thus self-evident that ‘low levels of education limit the 
extent and complexity of communication among the population about the issues and problems 
facing the countries. This can easily translate into feelings of powerlessness among the least 
informed and most isolated sectors of the population (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). Grindle and 
Thomas go on to say that:  
 
the age distribution of the population is significantly different in developing countries than in industrialized 
countries, and this tends to reinforce the aloofness of decision makers from their societies… significantly 
larger proportions of population in low-income and middle-income countries are fourteen years of age or 
less. This means that the politically aware and active percentage of the population is also lower in 
developing countries than in industrialized ones. A large rural population, limited communications, low 
levels of literacy, and limited adult population tend to mean that a much larger percentage of the population 
is out of touch with what is happening especially when government is strongly centralized. This inevitably 
enhances the role of policy makers while tending to isolate them from critical information about what is 
occurring in their societies. (1991: 51)         
 
       These cases attest to the fact that the socio-cultural variables debilitate the policymaking 
leverage of societal actors more than they do state actors. These have partly become saliently 
featured when the public’s access to information and knowledge of what a government does is 
much less limited; and partly because of the same a government’s capacity to reach society is 
constrained even more. However, structural characteristics place decision makers in very critical 
roles of making important policies that affect people in remote villages, and ironically, the 
affected parties have much less power and/or leverage in influencing the decisions in which they 
have vested interest (ibid.).     
       The most commonly mentioned figures in the study of socio-economic characteristics of 
development are closely related to such economic concepts as, gross national product (GNP) per 
capita and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. From this vantage point, the major division 
is between the high-income counties of Western Europe, East Asia, North America and 
Australasia, on the one hand, and developing economies of Africa, Asia and Latin America and 
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the Pacific, on the other (Turner and Hulme, 1997; Weaver et al. 1997; Cloete, 2000).  Although 
the limitations of per capita GNP in terms of income distribution, it can indicate disparities in 
distribution of wealth between rich and poor countries. The World Bank (2003: 233-235) divides 
countries in the world into low-income (US$745 or less per capita), lower-middle-income 
(US$746-2975 per capita), upper-middle-income (US$2976-9205) and high-income economies 
(US$9206 or higher). The World Bank division lumps the first three income categories into 
developing economies. The range is enormous – such as between Rwanda US$100 per capita and 
Saudi Arabia US$7230 (op. cit.). 
       The developing countries, therefore, involve the low-income, middle- and upper-middle 
categories. The economy of this category is largely based on agriculture and extraction of 
primary products that are traded much less in the world market. The structure of production thus 
discloses that nearly all developing countries have relied heavily on natural resource exploitation, 
including agriculture, mining, forestry and fisheries (Turner and Hulme, 1997; Cloete, 2000). For 
rich countries agriculture provides less than 5 percent of GDP. The developing countries vary and 
stand in marked contrast. While agriculture provides 28 percent of GDP in the low-income 
economies, it is 10 percent of GDP for all middle-income economies (Turner and Hulme, 1997). 
But the range is considerable among the developing nations, with middle-income economies 
often possessing substantial industrial sectors and sometimes revealing production structures 
nearer to the high-income than to lower-income economies. Among others, South Korea, 
Argentina and Brazil can be good examples. Cloete (2000) noted that productivity in developing 
countries is low and technology primitive and substandard. Poverty is not only widespread; 
resources are inequitably distributed as well. International debt is normally high, which does not 
only reduce the decision-making autonomy of the third world governments, but also makes them 
vulnerable to policy prescriptions from international aid agencies (Todaro, 1992; Cloete, 2000).       
       Certainly, the socio-political characteristics are rooted in the economic, cultural and social 
contexts. Governments in most Third World states have taken upon themselves a crucial role in 
guiding the course of social and economic development. Policymaking is highly centralized and 
often involves more extensive issues of economic and social development. Policymakers are not 
only considerably influential, but structural and historical conditions also allow them to make 
decisions way beyond their mandate that have far-reaching consequences (Grindle and Thomas, 
1991). The policymaking system is radically changed by ideological revolutions, sometimes even 
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by personal take over, but lacks systematic and rational evaluation (Dror, 1968). Persistent 
instability and unscheduled change of regimes prevail in most of developing countries. ‘Sudden 
policy announcements tend to occur with out consultation with the affected interest groups or the 
masses, leading to dissatisfaction, coups and a new regime with totally new policies’ (Cloete, 
2000: 84). Policies are made regardless of the consent and contributions of the larger segment of 
population who would be affected by them. 
       Hence, a large portion of individual as well as group demands in developing countries reach 
the policymaking system not before policies are passed, but rather at the enforcement stage. 
Organized interest groups find it easier to influence the administration (implementation) of 
policies than its formulation (Grindle, 1980). In other words, to have any impact on decision 
making many may have found the implementation phase to be better suited to their needs. 
Moreover, there are few organizations representing the interests of broad categories of citizens in 
either formulating or implementing policies. Even if there are any of the organizations that claim 
to commit themselves to representing citizens, they are often co-opted, neutralized, or abolished 
by the action of governments (Smith, 1973).  
       The socio-economic reforms and ‘democratization initiatives’ that have over the past few 
decades been taking place in most of the developing countries did little to promote the public’s 
interest in the public policymaking process. In fact, many of the commendable policy goals set 
out in the various public policies failed either because of the absence of balance between 
policymaking polity and policy-receiving societal entity and/or owing to the absence of capacity 
that societal forces could have marshaled to effectively countervail the overbearing power of 
policy elites in developing countries.  
 
2.5. Actors, institutions and their leverage in public policymaking 
 
2.5.5. Policy elites and their leverage in policymaking 
 
The prime task of government seems to be the formulation and implementation of public policies. 
Governments issue policies to generate economic development, provide education, guarantee 
personal safety, expand job opportunities, and adopt many other policy initiatives which should 
lead to development (Turner and Hulme, 1997). Tuner and Hulme (ibid: 57) further noted that 
governments often use their own version of policy outcomes and initiatives to legitimate their 
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hold on power, while opposing forces belittle these same policies in order to justify their own 
claim to office. Be that as it may, the fate and future of millions of people hinge on the outcomes 
and performances of government policies in developing countries.   
       In developing countries, policy elites or central minds of government or central 
policymaking process systems play crucial roles in the process of policymaking and bringing 
about institutional reforms to implement them (Dror, 1986; Grindle and Thomas, 1991). Despite 
the fact that historical, cultural, international constraints, as well as societal pressures, are 
essential in shaping the actions and perceptions of those who make authoritative decisions, in 
developing nations policy elites or central minds of government play major roles in determining 
policy and institutional outcomes and the process through which issues get onto reform agendas, 
through which they are deliberated within government, and through which they are pursued and 
sustained (Grindle, 1980; Smith, 1973, 1985; Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Turner and Hulme, 
1997; Cloete, 1991, 2000).  
       Scholars in the field of public policy have attributed the relative force of policy initiatives, 
formulation and implementation to policy elites in developing countries (op. cit.). An assessment 
of the actors and structures of policymaking in developing countries tends to prove the 
prevalence of limited policy circles compared to more developed states (Dror, 1968; Horowitz, 
1989). The policymaking structures in developing countries are much less complex than in 
developed countries. Government elites, and individual and small group decisions play a greater 
role in policy decisions than complex organizations that could have involved a relatively large 
segment of the affected population. More importantly, the political executive claims a significant 
margin of power on the determination of issues to put on the policy agenda, and formulate and 
allocate resources for the execution of policies. Dror (1968) noted that the political executive in 
developing countries plays a larger role in formulating public policies than do the legislatures and 
the public, not only because power is exceedingly concentrated, but the political  executive also 
possesses better latitude for establishing policies on many major issues without worrying about 
building coalitions with other vested interests.   
       Cloete (1991: 26) summarizes the major actors in the policy process as follows: 
 
1. The political/power elites directly engaged in governing;   
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2. Interest groups and societal actors inside and outside of public institutions entering into 
competition to influence the contents of policies; 
 
3. Groups of citizens instructing representatives and legislators through elections, referenda, 
or meetings to implement a specific policy agenda, or pressurizing them in various other 
more unconventional ways to change government policies.  
 
       It has, however, been argued that, except for some clientele groups which have more access 
to sharing the political resources of policy elites, in developing states the latter two sets of 
societal actors influence policymaking much less.  Cloete (ibid.) says that elites who are directly 
involved in governing act as ‘gatekeepers’ to screen demands for change. They are in a more 
advantageous position to influence the end product than other interest groups or citizens, who are 
not as close to the locus of decision-making or implementation of policies.  
       There have seldom been disagreements among scholars in the field concerning the major role 
assumed by power/policy elites in the Third World countries in making and executing policies. 
The question of what leverage and/or capacities they command and how they maneuver their 
power resources are of paramount importance in unraveling the imbalance between policymaking 
institutions, on the one hand, and the larger public on the other. The relative importance of 
societal actors, the resources that they muster and their participation in the entire policymaking 
process vis-à-vis policy elites should warrant attention as well.  
       Policy elites are those who have official positions in government and whose responsibilities 
include making or participating in making and implementing authoritative decisions (Grindle and 
Thomas, 1991). The composition of relevant elites will nevertheless vary, depending on the 
policy under consideration. In the education sphere, for example, the prominent decision makers 
are the minister of education and his/her closest assistants. In such policy spaces as structural 
adjustment and stabilization programs, the major policy makers will include presidents or prime 
ministers, executive ministers, reigning political parties and key decision makers in the national 
capital. 
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Wright Mills provided a cogent explanation of elites:  
 
The power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of 
men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences. Whether they do or 
do not make such decisions is less important than the fact they do occupy such pivotal positions: their 
failure to act, their failure to make decisions, is it self an act that is often of greater consequence than the 
decisions that they do make. For they are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern 
society… They run the machinery of the state and claim its prerogatives. They direct the military 
establishment. They occupy the strategic command posts of the social structure, in which are now centered 
the effective means of the power and the wealth.   (1995: 73)            
 
       It has also been contended that, since the masses are ill-informed about policy issues and, 
hence, apathetic, it is the political and bureaucratic elites that actually fashion mass opinion (i.e. 
demands from the environment) more than masses shape the leadership’s views (Dye, 1995; 
Anderson, 1997). This is especially so in developing countries. Hence, in a situation in which 
government is unlikely to be broadly representative and power tends to be highly centralized, the 
number of authoritative and influential positions in government also tends to be limited, those 
who play important roles (elites) in the policy process often have much in common (Grindle and 
Thomas, 1991). 
       Policy elites who assume critical roles and determine who gets what and when in most of the 
developing countries are head of states or head of governments, cabinet ministers, ruling party 
stalwarts and the executive bureaucracy, and to some extent the list includes the legislators (cf. 
Dror, 1968; Cloete, 1991; Grindle and Thomas 1991). Of these, heads of states, cabinet ministers 
and their advisors are at highest echelon of the policymaking structure that is well placed to 
influence all of the important policy decisions. On account of the key position he holds, the 
president or the prime minister can be much more extensively involved in major decision 
making. In a crisis situation it is more likely that policy making will involve the president or 
prime minister, close associates and advisers, who usually hold positions in the office of the 
president or prime minister. The latter can have close political links with the head of the state, 
and ‘their loyalty may have been cemented through political, professional, social, and even 
kinship ties’ (Grindle and Thomas, 1991:60).   
       Most ministers can also be intensively involved, depending on the cabinet portfolios that 
they assume, the close personal and political links that they may have with the executive and 
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ruling parties, and the technical or other specialized skills they possess. In many African 
countries such as Ethiopia, major ethnic groups have representation in the higher echelons of 
government. The executive bureaucracy, more generally the public bureaucracy in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America, plays a significant part in public policymaking (Saasa, 1985; Grindle and 
Thomas, 1991). In Kenya, for example, the public bureaucracy, supported by the political 
executive and in collaboration with expatriates, heavily influences policymaking (Oyugi, 2000). 
In quite a large number of developing states, policy initiatives can emerge from the 
administrative and technical staff of government. The bureaucracy is not only involved in 
formulating and legitimizing policies; it is also a chief actor in the implementation process and an 
essential interface between policy elites and societal actors.   
       Dror (1968) described government bureaucracy in development countries as weak because it 
lacks the capacity and experience to usefully contribute to policymaking. Hence, the public 
bureaucracy in most developing countries cannot supply very many rational components to 
policymaking and therefore ‘reinforces the weaknesses in the behavior patterns of the politicians 
instead of compensating for them’ (ibid).  However, as Grindle and Thomas argued otherwise:  
 
Despite the more political and less permanent appointment process, the highly centralized nature of decision 
making means these officials are as powerful as high-level civil servants elsewhere. They may, however, be 
more dependent on the political favor of ministers and chief executives. 
     In those countries where there is formal civil service, it usually has power rivaling that of the political 
establishment. Its power derived from its capacity to operate the government, from its status, and from the 
fact that, while the political leadership may change, the civil servants remain in place and generally know 
the complexities of governing more fully than do the political leadership. In many countries they sit in the 
senior positions in ministries and run organizations on a day-to-day basis. They are frequently the ones who 
deal with aid donors and take charge of planning and budgeting. In some cases their staffs do whatever 
analytical work is done, and they see that proposed changes are cleared through the political system. (1991: 
60-61)   
 
       In many African countries, the rapid growth of the bureaucratic apparatus that accompanied 
the consolidation of power following independence had important implications for the structures 
of the state and policymaking. The corps of the proliferating bureaucracy and its members holds 
privileged positions. The Ethiopian experience over the past two decades, however, showed that 
governing elites approach the proliferating bureaucratic administration with some measure of 
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skepticism, mainly because the political loyalty of the bureaucracy was doubted.  In order to keep 
an eye on the administration, the ruling parties are often used as instruments of supervision. As 
we shall see in the next chapters, the process of politicization and holding of key offices by party 
functionaries has thus been carried out by injecting party political and ideological doctrines into 
the civil service, the police, the army and local government. As a result, the line of distinctions 
between the party and the executive become nebulous, as is still the case in Ethiopia. Similar 
examples elsewhere in Africa are: the Tanzanian African National Union in Tanzania, the 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) in Uganda and many others.  
       In most of the developing countries the legislature is largely used to recruit support for the 
policies that the power elites favor. The legislative bodies’ influence in public policymaking in 
developing countries is not only much less, they are also passive instruments that can be 
manipulated rather than active contributors (Dror, 1968; Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Smith, 
1985). Members of parliament are often marginalized in taking policy decisions because of lack 
of experience in managing government and their lower levels of education compared to the 
members of the executive bureaucracy. Hence, in many instances the executive in developing 
states uses legislative approval to legitimize its actions, simultaneously though keeping members 
of parliament away from actual decisionmaking (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). It has also been 
asserted that legislators rarely have sustained policymaking power compared to the executive or 
the bureaucracy (op. cit.). Moreover, the dominance of the executive coupled with the penetration 
of party functionaries into the legislature drastically reduce its leverage in policymaking; instead, 
legislators often endorse policy decisions made by ‘court’ actors.  
       Hence, the major concern of policy elites in most of the developing countries is to 
consolidate and maintain the hegemony of their regimes (Esman, 1991). All other goals such as 
economic development, national integration, and expansion of education should always be 
consistent with and subordinate to the survival and consolidation of the rules of policy elites. It is 
thus clear from the foregoing that the policy/state elites guide and determine the course of 
development, and make a wide range of policy decisions that affect the lives of millions of people 
in developing countries (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). Their hold on state power, and over 
historical, cultural and economic factors have increased their relative autonomy and raised their 
leverage in making decisions that have far reaching consequences. The rapid expansion of the 
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bureaucratic apparatus over the last several decades in Africa and other developing states has 
injected skills and expertise into the policymaking system. As noted, the proliferation of the 
administrative apparatus, however, has been met with some suspicion from the top echelons of 
the policymaking structure. The latter pre-empted potential dissents and carried on the 
predominance of the political executive through party functionaries. This has also been replicated 
in state-society relations and governs the policymaking-policy beneficiary (policy stakeholder) 
relationships.  
 
2.5.6. The stature of societal actors vis-à-vis policymaking 
 
Although policy elites are centrally placed to make authoritative decisions on many policy issues, 
their preferences, decisions and activities can be constrained by the actions of societal forces. The 
degree to which societal actors influence decisions and have access to the legally functioning 
policymaking institutions differs significantly between industrialized and developing countries. 
The literature concerning the vexing question of the distinctive nature of policymaking process in 
developed vis-à-vis developing states is meager. But several writers in the field contend that there 
is a marked distinction between the two (Dror, 1968, 1986; Smith, 1973, 1985; Grindle, 1980; 
Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Turner and Hulme, 1997; Cloete, 1991, 2000; Horowitz, 1989). 
       The structures, institutions, participants as well as the weight of the state power relative to 
the society vary in developed compared to developing countries. In this connection Horowitz 
writes: 
 
Policy in Asia, Africa, and Latin America tends to be made in an environment characterized by several 
foundational elements-something close to givens-that differ sharply from those prevailing in advanced 
industrial societies. First, the legitimacy of many Third World regimes is in question. Second, policy 
concerns do not match those that predominate in the West. Third, the state structures of developing 
countries, whatever their weaknesses are still relatively powerful vis-à-vis their societies. Fourth, the 
capacity of Third World states to make and effectuate policy is, in several respects, more imperfect than that 
of their counterparts in the West. Fifth, participants in the policy process are fewer in developing countries 
than in the West, and some sectors of the society are hardly participant at all. Sixth, the channels for 
participation are less well established and less clearly prescribed in developing countries. Seventh, 
information for policy making is much scarcer in Asia, Africa and Latin America than it is in advanced 
industrial societies.  (1989:199)
 
(emphasis added).    
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       In developed countries public policy tends to be a function of public opinion and pressures. 
Hence, ‘public opinion is to the political market what consumer demand is to the economic 
market place…Policy demand determines policy supply’ (Parsons, 1995: 110). Moreover, there 
has often been much emphasis on inputs to the policy process. Unlike in developing states, 
multiple channels of aggregation of individual and group interests are available and are formally 
institutionalized as parts of the policy-making systems in developed countries. In developing 
countries open clashes between individuals and groups who may have a stake in policies during 
conception, initiation and formulation of policies is unknown. Policies are largely formulated 
with little consultation of relevant interests and societal groups (Smith, 1973, 1985; Grindle, 
1980; Cloete, 1991).  
       Apart from socio-economic and cultural barriers, the leviathan power of the state militates 
against societal actors’ leverage and their legitimate part in the policymaking process. While 
organizational interests and specific groups are institutionalized in industrialized countries, there 
is a more obscure link between societal interests and the policymaking process in developing 
countries. Interest groups are not only well organized and articulated; the activities of some of 
these that are organized are either ill defined or less clearly defined. Interest groups, however, 
tend be active, but are integrated into political institutions (Dror, 1968; Grindle and Thomas, 
1991).  Since policy circles are inaccessible to societal groups, individuals and societal groups 
tend to exert their pressure on policymaking institutions through informal and non-official 
channels. In fact, many authoritarian governments in developing countries tenaciously prevent 
representation and organization of interests through formally established channels. In some 
instances, interests may well be organized, but are unable to wield real influence through formal 
interactions with political leaders; in others, ‘organizations will lack access to policy makers or 
even the capacity to control their followers or to exert pressure on the decision making process’ 
(Grindle and Thomas, 1991). In extreme cases, organized interests may be dependent on 
particular clientele organizations supervised by policy elites or of bureaucratic agencies, with 
little capacity and agenda to press on their patrons in government (Grindle, 1980).  In some other 
cases, policy elites designate selected sets of interest groups for controlled participation, and the 
participation usually excludes other competing groups (Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002).   
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       The policymaking structures and inputs are often in a precarious condition. The information, 
knowledge, resources and skills required in making and implementing policies are of poor 
quality. It has to be recognized that policymaking should be based on expert knowledge 
supported by specialized and adequate information (Horowitz, 1989). In many developing 
countries, however, data collection is not only far from enough, the motivation to solve critical 
public problems arises in advance of an adequate understanding of society’s problems (Dror, 
1968, Horowitz, 1989). Moreover, institutions charged with periodically and systematically 
evaluating and designing policies are absent. There tends to be organizational distance between 
those that make and implement policies (Dror, 1968). 
      Oyugi (2000) noted the pervasiveness of increased centralization and monopolization of 
political power since independence in Africa, and even after the surge of so-called multi-
partyism. Not only do personal rule and charismatic domination overwhelm the content of Africa, 
but also mass mobilizations and involvement give the false impression of popular participation in 
policymaking. Moreover, with the emergence of ‘State House’ as a dominant locus of policy 
activity, the leverage and the political clout of such political institutions as parliament and 
popular elections are rendered meaningless (ibid). Few leaders in Africa possess overlapping and 
multiple leadership roles that enable them assume control over the affairs of the state, legislatures 
and parties. Thus exercising such control has a direct bearing on popular participation, including 
denying citizens the opportunity to participate and to debate over policy issues which have 
national significance that affect them. As a result, ‘what we have in many African countries are 
the “submerged masses”: masses with little or no say about what goes on around them in spite of 
the resurrection of democratic pretensions since early 1990s’ (Oyugi, 2000: xi).  He goes on to 
say that: 
 
the masses in Africa have so far not been playing any meaningful role in determining who shall govern at 
the center and what policies the center shall follow, let alone in influencing how elected local institutions 
should be governed. They have been used to legitimize the existence of a system that those in control in the 
State House wish to see continued. More importantly, the citizens still have little or no influence over the 
political processes in their own local communities the freedom of initiative is denied them by both political 
leaders and the state administrative machinery which acts to promote what it perceives to be in the interest 
of the center. (2000: xii) (emphasis added) 
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       A more serious problem that often affects the balance between the state and society is the 
absence of regime legitimacy. Governments in developing countries are frequently occupied with 
constitutional reforms, continually issuing proclamations and designing policies to shore up 
regime legitimacy exercises (Horowitz, 1989). The stakes are much higher when issues of 
legitimacy remain unsettled and regimes are fragile. Despite the fact that regimes in developing 
states are fragile and of questionable legitimacy, what the state does and decides may be 
enormously important for the society. Thus, ‘the share of resources both invested and consumed 
by the state is typically larger than it is in advanced industrialized countries. Mediating 
institutions – the sort of organizations that can pursue their interests and activities in considerable 
measure set apart from the state-are in general more developed in industrial than in non-industrial 
societies. The balance between the state and society is fundamentally different from what is in the 
West’(ibid). Any claim to limit the sphere of state intervention can rarely be enforced where extra 
state organizations lack autonomy, resources and power leverage.   
       De Coning and Cloete (2000) also argue that the policymaking process has to call for 
participatory actions involving direct representation, empowerment and active decision-making. 
Thus, ‘if development is defined as the capacity to make rational choices, the participatory nature 
of policy process is of primary importance’ (ibid: 27). Obviously, large sectors of the public in 
developing states are not only politically inactive and inarticulate would mean that participation 
in the policy process by the public and the citizenry is much less than in developed countries. 
Regimes in developing countries have very narrow circles of policy participants, which makes 
participation limited. Forms of democratic institutions such as elections and parliaments are 
either non-existent or are manipulated in favor of policy elites. In some situations when 
participation has to be induced, prior decisions and understanding may have been reached among 
elites to mobilize support from ‘apathetic masses’ to bolster their positions with respect to an 
advocated policy issue. 
       It has been argued that the most vital decision about political participation emanate from the 
nature of political institutions, the sources, and goals of political leadership (Huntington, 1976). 
However, the more decisive influence on political participation comes from those elites who are 
able to command the offices and resources of government. The decision to limit or intensify 
political participation depends on the calculus of policy goals to be achieved and elite interests to 
be served. As Huntington (ibid) argued, most policy elites would like to have the benefits of 
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participation, in terms of support for themselves and their policies, but they would rarely like to 
incur costs for the participation, in terms of limits on their power, the time effort required to win 
acquiescence, and the demands that participation produces for the allocation of scarce resources. 
Hence, for most political elites political participation is, at best, an instrumental rather than a 
primary value (ibid: 23).  It is self-evident that the policy elites in many parts of Africa, Asia and 
Latin America favor and elicit limited political participation from among the masses to remain in 
power, achieve economic and social goals that might be thought to strengthen their power 
positions. In fact, in several developing countries governments have taken an active role to 
establish systematic parantela relationships with pressure or interest groups through the 
dominant parties (Peters, 1995: 195). A typical characteristic of the parantela relationship is that 
the hegemonic party imposes its control over as much of the society and economy as possible. 
These relationships become instrumental in developing interest groups directly allied to the 
dominant party (ibid).  
       More importantly, patron-client relationships can predominantly characterize the plurality of 
the societies’ of developing countries. Governing elites and the higher echelons of the 
bureaucracy are expected to relate to the society and distribute the benefits through these patron-
client channels, in exchange for which the patrons deliver their support and the compliance of the 
clients to the regime. The state selects or works through patrons who can take care of their 
followers and keep them under control; resources and access provided by the government enrich 
the patron, reinforce the patron’s authority and stabilize the regime (Esman, 1991). One of the 
major manifestations of such plurality in countries like Ethiopia is through government-
sponsored ‘civil society organizations’ such as the youth, women, farmers and ruling party-run 
and-organized non-governmental organizations. Moreover, voting and elections, in most 
developing states, are manipulated in favor of the executive and bureaucratic elites. In other 
words, despite the fact that elections are the most basic means of participation in the 
policymaking process, they afford the electorate little opportunity to express their choice of 
government; neither do they empower them to pressure parties and candidates seeking their votes 
to offer attractive policy packages. 
       There have been sweeping and radical reforms taking place over the last two decades in 
Ethiopia and many other developing states. Nonetheless, the economic and political reforms 
initiated and sponsored by the most powerful international institutions and donor countries 
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introduced few changes that favor societal actors. In other words, the reforms generated little 
improvement, as the weight of state actors in comparison with societal actors in developing 
countries has remained overwhelming. The result has, therefore, been that the bulk of the 
population in the developing world is excluded from the policymaking process. The perceived 
apathy of these populations may result from ‘the rigors of attending to daily subsistence needs, 
the demands of patron-client networks, the difficulty of organization in hostile political 
environment and the systematic closure of policy circles by elites’ (Turner and Hulme, 1997: 73). 
The exclusion of major societal groups and actors from the policymaking process not only 
accentuates the imbalance between policymaking institutions and societal actors, but it also has 
detrimental effects on the outcomes of policy implementation. It has been recognized that 
affected parties and groups articulate their interests during the process of implementation (Smith, 
1973; Grindle, 1980). As a result, in developing countries policies have often been modified and 
the major purposes of policies were subverted to suit group and individual needs during the 
process of implementation (Grindle, 1980).     
 
2.6. The role of citizens in policymaking 
 
2.6.1. Citizens’ participation, governance and state-society relations 
 
The foregoing discussions amply demonstrated that policy elites authoritatively determine policy 
choices in most of the developing countries, regardless of the preferences of relevant publics or 
interests. The political process through which elites wield power may well make the legitimacy of 
regimes questionable. As a result, gaps exist between policymaking institutions, on the one hand, 
and civil and social movements, on the other. The failure of a plethora of policies in a large 
number of Third World countries is uncovered in the course of implementation, mainly because 
actors whose interests have not been articulated at the initial stage of the policy process often find 
implementation a lot more suitable for demand making and put acute pressure on the process 
(Grindle, 1980). Moreover, following independence from colonial rule, the demands of rapid 
social and economic transformation have been accompanied by mammoth expansion of the 
bureaucracy in most Third World countries (Turner and Hulme, 1997). However, this expansion 
has occurred without a corresponding strength in the political institutions and development of the 
civil society. This has severely affected the balance between policymaking institutions and the 
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society. Therefore, failure to forge a symmetry and/or balance between the state and society has 
increasingly become detrimental to the public policymaking process (Balogun, 1998).  
       At the heart of this gap between state-society relations is the failure of accountability 
between government and citizens, and the absence of channels of communication and 
participation for citizens and societal groups to have a direct involvement in the policymaking 
process and influence policies. It has been recognized that the channels though which 
governments hold themselves accountable to citizens, and citizens communicate their demands 
for better policy and delivery of services, are often non-extent or dysfunctional (Oyugi, 2000; 
Balogun, 2000). In other words, ‘external demand from citizens is muffled by popular cynicism 
about the public sector and by inadequate channels for communicating demand’; neither is there 
any internal demand from public sector leaders, because they feel too little pressure from citizens 
for change (Schacter, 2000). In developing countries an issue of critical importance in public 
policymaking is opening up the policy process beyond the relatively closed circles of interlocking 
elites, and increasing government responsiveness and accountability to the society (Brinkerhoff 
and Crosby, 2002).   
       Participation is, therefore, a vitally important mechanism through which citizens and relevant 
stakeholders directly influence policies. Government and its institutions will be more accountable 
and responsive to citizens’ demands if adequate, direct, institutionalized and binding channels of 
communication and participation are developed and allowed to operate without restraint. 
Responsive and accountable institutions presuppose a governance structure that accommodates 
the demands and interests of the relevant public or stakeholders.
 
There should, therefore, be 
multiple institutional designs whereby citizens can be encouraged to participate and/or provide 
inputs into the policymaking process. Many ways as well as institutions and structures provide 
citizens with the opportunities to participate effectively. Public hearings, citizens’ juries, round 
tables and electronic town meetings are examples of institutions meant to create opportunities for 
citizen participation (Toddi and Ascher, 1997; Adams, 2004). In the public meeting and hearing 
exercises, more often than not the officials sponsoring them tend to set the issues to be discussed 
as well as a framework for discussing the issues beforehand. Not only does this thwart 
constructive deliberations, but also it limits the voice of citizens, preventing them from altering 
the structure of the conversation and changing the way that the issue is framed. As a result, 
citizens’ recommendations go unheeded, thereby reducing the whole exercise to naught. Forums 
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for public participation exercises should, thus, empower politically active CSOs and advocacy 
groups, academics, research institutes and the citizenry to develop informed opinions on public 
issues and they can thus become venues of expressions of policy demands to policymaking 
institutions, and can also become deliberative as well as instruments of forming ideas on a public 
policy or program (op. cit.). 
       Arguably, the issues of participation, accountability, decentralization (with all its diverse 
forms) and the role and leverage of societal groups in public policymaking are situated within the 
broader context of good governance. In other words, governance can be seen as an umbrella 
genre encompassing the whole gamut of state-society relations with respect to public 
participation in policymaking and setting up of institutionalized decentralization (de-concentrated 
and devolved) administrative and political structures that are responsive as well as accountable to 
the public. The concept has been around in both political and academic discourse for a long time, 
referring in a generic sense to the task of running a government, or any other appropriate entity 
for that matter4.  
       While a few scholars seem to use the concepts of governance and good governance 
interchangeably (Balogun, 1998, Mule, 2001), others establish a marked distinction between the 
two (Blunt, 1995, Cloete, 2000), and yet others use the term democratic governance instead of the 
broader concept of governance (Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002). Be that as it may, many of the 
elements and principles underlying good or democratic governance have become an integral part 
of the meaning of governance. Since the 1980s powerful global institutions such as the IMF and 
the World Bank set the design and establishment of good governance systems in Africa and other 
developing countries as preconditions for financial assistance. In fact, donor countries and other 
international institutions have prescribed the elements and parameters that make up good 
governance systems. It implies a high level of organizational effectiveness in relation to policy 
formulation and the policies actually pursued, especially in the conduct of economic policy and 
its contribution to growth, stability and popular welfare, and tends to be a prerequisite for 
political legitimacy (Blunt, 1995). Good government also implies accountability, transparency, 
participation, openness and the rule of law (Smith, 1996; Grindle, 1997; Cloete, 2000).  
       According to World Bank (1992a; Blunt, 1995), six elements of good governance are of 
paramount importance: political accountability, freedom of association and participation, a fair 
                                                
4
 http://www.sit.edu/global_capacity/gpdocs/articles/civil_society.html 
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and reliable judicial system, bureaucratic accountability, freedom of information and expression, 
efficient and effective public sector management.  
 
1. The effectiveness of government depends largely on perceptions of its legitimacy or 
political accountability. The favored method for ensuring some degree of political 
accountability is to subject political leadership, and possibly other officials, to periodic 
tests of their acceptability to the people by holding elections and limiting periods of 
office. 
 
2. The second prerequisite of good governance is freedom of association and participation 
involving the freedom to establish religious groups, professional associations and other 
voluntary organizations that possess social, economic and political purposes. The role of 
the media is critical here.  
 
3. Clear, established legal frameworks are necessary to create a predictable and secure living 
and working environment for ordinary citizens and an environment conducive for 
entrepreneurs, farmers, investors and other economic actors. Moreover, a fair and 
effective legal framework requires, first, that there exists a set of rules, which are known 
in advance; second, that rules are in force; third, that means exist to ensure the application 
of rules; fourth, that conflict resolution is a function of binding decisions made by an 
independent and credible judiciary.    
 
4. Bureaucratic accountability requires a system to monitor and control the performance of 
government officers and organizations, particularly in relation to quality, inefficiencies 
and the abuse of resources. Transparency is a key element of bureaucratic accountability 
that includes making all public accounts and audit reports available for public scrutiny. 
 
5. Efficient markets and bureaucratic transparency are highly dependent on the availability 
and validity of information. Debates on public policy issues can be widely conducted 
involving societal groups, if governments make available data pertaining to national 
accounts, balance of payments, employment, cost of living, and so on. Civil society 
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organizations such as independent research organizations and institutions of higher 
learning can engage in independent analysis of information, if data are available.  
 
6. The last component of a sound governance system is effective and efficient public sector 
management.  
        
       In most of the developing countries the power of the state has not been balanced by a 
plurality of autonomous associations such as professionals, traditional leaders, independent rural 
institutions, intellectuals, trade unions, business associations, religious groups, students and 
journalists, which are necessary for responsive and stable government. More importantly, 
wherever bureaucratic and repressive rule restricts the autonomy of interest groups, civil 
associations and political parties, the foundation of good governance and democratic practices are 
replaced by authoritarian consequences (Smith, 1996). A well-functioning government can 
address the elements of sound governance and be responsive to societal needs if state-society 
relationships are positively reinforced by the cooperation between government and various civil 
society groups. Hence, systems and structures of good governance should widely involve socio-
political and economic actors in the society. In relation to Africa, the crisis of governance that has 
long been dominating the continent’s development crisis is attributed to a failure to forge a 
symmetrical relationship between the state and the society (Balogun, 1998). The way forward, 
therefore, lies in reordering the links between the state and society and ensuring reciprocity as a 
basis for resolving issues of rights and obligations (ibid).  Events that have taken shape in Eastern 
Europe over a decade ago, developments in Africa, the surge of new democratic governments in 
Latin America and associations for democratic space in several countries of Asia, are reflections 
of the pressures towards the need for renegotiating the balance of relationship between the state 
and civil society. 
       While there seems little or no ambiguity about the critical role that civil society plays in 
public policymaking as well as its pivotal part in countervailing state actors, the meaning 
assigned to it and individuals and groups that should form part of the civil society has raised 
debate as well as skepticism. There is also much less disagreement among scholars about the 
importance of the civil society and its virtue in providing experience of governance and 
democratic process with widespread participation, thus perhaps providing a cultural environment 
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that fosters and protects good governance and sustain the balance between state and society. For 
some, civil society is extended to include the state (Blunt, 1995); others equated civil society with 
all those groups which are organized and operated not only outside of the state, but also those that 
are presumed to be autonomous from it (Polidano and Hulme, 1997; Blowgun, 1998). Yet others 
narrow down and limit the meaning of civil society to all institutional forms, excluding state and 
markets.  Civil society includes a wide range of organizations that exist between the level of the 
family and the state, including NGOs, mass movements, cooperatives, professional associations, 
cultural and religious groups, etc5. This clearly indicates that government agencies and 
commercial companies are not part of civil society. Political parties are also in an ambiguous 
position vis-à-vis civil society. As opposed to this, the former are outside of the state, but their 
objective is to take control of the state rather than remain part of civil society, although they have 
the potential of countervailing state and bureaucratic institutions (ibid.).  
       Various studies of structures and systems of governance across the developing world have 
found that the greatest threat to democratic functioning has been the dominance of the state over 
the institutions of civil society (Diamond et al. 1999). Wherever democracy has been threatened 
or derailed, wherever fascist and authoritarian tendencies (including military dictatorships) have 
taken over, it has been a consequence of the ‘supremacy’ of the state over civil society and the 
suppression of the institutions of civil society built over a period of history (ibid.). In view of this 
fact, therefore, the relationship between the state and civil society needs to be reformulated. 
Buttressing the role of society in public policymaking just as much requires different significant 
ways of reordering state-society relationship. Although there is a great deal of overlap among 
these concepts, both practically and analytically, it is accountability, participation and 
decentralization that epitomize the enlistment of good governance.  
 
     2.6.1.1. Accountability and good governance 
 
 
Accountability represents one of the hallmarks of good governance and it reinforces the latter. 
Despite there being a positive re-orientation towards holding those who govern accountable for 
their actions, the modalities of wielding as well as exercising power has ramifications for good 
governance outcomes. Although interventionist policy stances have recently shifted more towards 
                                                
5
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market institutions, state-centered socio-economic policies have often represented uppermost 
features in African, Asian and Latin American countries. Since independence, not only do state 
institutions and bureaucratic structures play expansive development roles, but also the successful 
implementation of development policies and programs increasingly depend upon them (Dwivedi, 
1985; Haque, 1997; Turner and Hulme, 1997). The complexity and diversity of the engagement 
of state institutions in making and implementing development policies and the pursuit of societal 
goals have enormously increased the powers of state players. Dwividi (1985) noted that the 
expansion in the scope and magnitude of activities assigned to state institutions has not only 
given them an awesome power base, but also that the more society is administered by public 
officials, the greater is the concentration of power in the hands of these officials. Dwividi 
continues: 
 
Thus, the administrative state has emerged in which public servants play the roles of crusading reformers, 
policymakers, social change agents, crisis managers, programme managers, humanitarian employers, 
interest brokers, public relations experts, regulators of economy, bankers and spokesmen for various interest 
groups including their own associations. These roles are in addition to the traditional functions of 
government such as maintaining law and order, providing education and social well fare, managing health 
programmes, operating transportation and communication facilities and organising various cultural and 
recreational events. Through the performance of these several and various roles, public servants and their 
ministers have acquired enormous power. (ibid., 61)  
 
       Especially when the unwieldy expansion of government is accompanied by the politicization 
of the bureaucracy, not only do instances of misuse of power increase and ethical expectations 
dissipate, the public also begins to view public institutions as too powerful and having the 
tendencies of a fearsome leviathan (ibid.). This thus prompts the notion that there should be a 
requirement for sound administration and improved moral fiber among government officials, and 
the demand for responsible use of power, but the authority and political as well as administrative 
accountability become very critical. The major concern is how those that have administrative and 
political positions exercise their power responsibly, and in a way that makes them accountable for 
their actions. One of the predominant forms of accountability - administrative accountability - is 
holding appointed officials answerable to their actions. In most developed countries, public 
management reforms have added a new strand to make bureaucratic officials directly accountable 
to clients, instead of the more conventional upward accountability to politicians (Polidano and 
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Turner, 1997).  However, it is certainly understood that unless political accountability at higher 
echelons of government structures is primarily ensured, administrative accountability at 
professional and administrative levels would be illusory. Thus, the state and its administrative 
structures should be accountable to the civil society. This has several implications. The 
accountability implies that the state, its institutions and practices are entrenched in the culture, 
morality, values and norms of civil society (Tandon, 1991). Tandon (ibid.) argued that, since the 
alien forms of state apparatus and practices, policies and programs will result in weakening the 
positions of societal actors, the capabilities of civil society, its institutions and actors need to 
satisfy the requirements of good governance, if the absence of accountability has to be redressed.  
       Mechanisms of critiquing, questioning, debating and rejecting policies, programs, 
approaches and decisions of the state, its agencies and officials provide an additional dimension 
to accountability. Therefore, civil society must be able to critically examine policies any policies 
that the state construes before and after formulation. Civil society should be allowed to develop 
informed opinions and build public judgment on policies, and thus should have access to 
information as much important as influencing policies and practices. Not only should the process 
of formulating policies, laws, rules and procedures be an open and public process, but the 
mechanisms for arriving at public and participatory judgment also have to be promoted (Tanden, 
1991; Balogun, 1998). Balogun (1998) situates the issues of rights and obligations within the 
context of revertible sovereignty, where the sovereign power of the people is annulled at the will 
of the people. The doctrine of revertible sovereignty thus legitimizes the decisions taken by 
government institutions in the name of the people, and the laws enacted to back the decision. In 
other words, the question why a citizen should obey the state or comply with its edicts can only 
be answered within the context of the doctrine of revertible sovereignty (op. cit.).  
       Sustaining state institutions’ accountability depends on maintaining the balance between the 
state and society as much as on a corresponding strength of the institutions of civil society. 
Institutions that could thrive in a free atmosphere should include: civic organizations, community 
gathering places, women's groups, rural organizations, poor people's groups, youth groups, 
farmers associations, professional associations and labor unions (Haque, 1997; Balogun, 1998; 
Polidano and Hulme, 1997). What is more, good governance should be matched by good citizens, 
who are: informed about their needs, resources and objectives, participate in governmental 
processes, and are dedicated to national process, proactive in observing rights and duties, realistic 
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in the expression of demands, tolerant of different views, and honest and productive in their work 
ethic (Cloete, 2000).  
 
    2.6.1.2. Decentralization as a balancing strategy 
 
 
The ultimate goal of public policy is to improve the quality of social life through various social 
and economic development policies and programs. Thus, policymaking calls for actions by a 
large numbers of people to improve social life and achieve the desired policy objectives. 
Participation, pluralist consultation and decentralization are not only features of an effective 
policymaking process; they are also integral elements of good governance (Brinkerhoff and 
Crosby, 2002).  It has been widely acknowledged that participation and decentralization not only 
reinforce each other, but they are also critical ingredients in improving the quality of the 
policymaking process and promoting development (Hope, 1997; Omiya, 2000; Brinkerhoff and 
Crosby, 2002). This section will simply discuss the importance of decentralization as a choice 
and/or strategy for bridging the gap between the state and societal actors or cementing the 
imbalances between policymaking institutions on the one hand, and policy beneficiaries on the 
other.  
       Good governance, peoples’ participation in policymaking, decentralization and 
accountability are interlocking and indivisible issues. Sound governance can be promoted when 
public and administrative officials are called to account for their actions, and a decentralized 
governance structure permits citizens’ participation in public policymaking. Not only does 
decentralization enhance citizens’ participation, but also can it make policy issues accessible to a 
wide range of civil and societal groups for debate. Decentralization is not an end but a strategy (a 
means) for achieving good governance, accountability and popular participation in policymaking 
(Haque, 1997; Oyugi, 2000); neither is it a panacea for challenges presented by participation, 
accountability and responsiveness. It can, however, be seen as a strategy for increasing the 
activities and influence of stakeholders and policy beneficiaries on the planning and 
implementation of programs and projects that directly affect their lives. According to the World 
Bank (2001:54), decentralization improves good governance and public service delivery by 
increasing allocative efficiency (through better matching of public services to local preferences) 
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and productive efficiency (through increased accountability of local governments to citizens, 
fewer levels of bureaucracy, and better knowledge of local costs).  
       Decentralization as a multi-dimensional concept involves (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983: 18-
25, Luke, 1986: 79): 
  
1. Deconcentration or the redistribution of administrative responsibilities within the central 
government from headquarters to field and/or local administration; 
 
2. Delegation of decision making and management authority for specific functions to semi-
independent agencies such as public enterprises, regional planning and area development 
authorities, multi-purpose and single-purpose functional authorities, and special project 
implementation units;    
 
3. Devolution seeks to create and strengthen independent units of government. Theoretically, 
it is seen as an ‘arrangement in which there are reciprocal, mutual beneficial, and 
coordinate relationships between central and local governments; that is, the local 
government has the ability to interact reciprocally with other units in the system of 
government of which it is a part’;  
 
4. De-bureaucratization or the facilitation of decision-making though political processes 
that involve larger number of interests including non-governmental and private 
institutions, rather than having decisions made exclusively or primarily by major political 
institutions in government.  
         
Each form of decentralization has different implications for organizational structure, the 
degree of authority transfer and the amount of popular participation envisaged (Luke, 1986, 
Haque, 1997). When policymakers are centrally located and accountable to central authorities, it 
is centralization; when they are centrally located and accountable to the electorate, it is 
democratization; when they are located at the local level but still accountable to central 
authorities, it is deconcentration; and when they are located at the local level and are accountable 
to the electorate, it is devolution (Haque, 1997). This attests that the extent to which 
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decentralization allows civil societal groups opportunities for participation and assists 
maintaining the symmetry between them and the state forces may be determined by the degree to 
which decentralization is associated with sound governance, where the people are able to 
influence the process and the substance of decisions made by government (Oyugi, 2000). 
However, decentralization can stand the best chance of realizing the purposes of good 
governance and ensure popular participation in policymaking, if robust democratic institutions 
are put in place to augment the role of lower-level units of government in decision making. In 
other words, decentralization presupposes democratically institutionalized central and local 
government structures that are mandated by and responsive to popular will.  
       The upshot of the overall effect of much of the documented experiences with 
decentralization in Africa and most other developing states was to bring people under the control 
of central government bureaucracy rather than inducing them into becoming self-governing and 
proactive in decision-making (Oyugi, 2000). Other studies also revealed that such 
decentralization efforts over the past four or so decades in Africa did not encourage popular 
participation in local governance and development; the centrally engineered measures (such as 
deconcentration and distorted devolution) kept substantial powers in the hands of centrally 
located political, bureaucratic elites and their local allies (Balogun, 2000). Likewise, Haque 
(1997) concluded that pressure for central control did not only destroy governmental autonomy 
below national levels in Africa; it is also hard to find any local government with control over its 
budgets or any with autonomous policy-making powers.  
       The way forward, therefore, lies in promoting democratic decentralization, at the same time 
without losing sight of the administrative benefits that can be derived from administrative 
decentralization (deconcentration). While political or democratic decentralization emphasizes 
political rights, civil liberties, institutional pluralism and pluralism in policy choices, 
administrative decentralization seeks to transfer responsibilities to field agencies and reforming 
administrative organs to generate greater efficiency, responsiveness in delivering public services 
(Turner and Hulme, 1997; Haque, 1997; Oyugi, 2000). 
       Nonetheless, it is widely recognized that administrative decentralization limits policy and 
program decision-making to small and select set of actors occupying the top positions in official 
hierarchies (Oyugi, 2000; Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002). On the other hand, political or 
democratic decentralization increases the opportunities to lobby local officials and to hold them 
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accountable through the ballot boxes. As a result, not only is participation expanded to a large 
number of citizens, but increased responsiveness and better performance in public service 
delivery can also be secured (op. cit.). Thus, decentralization (and all its diverse forms) can 
contribute meaningfully towards shaping the balance between state and societal actors, when 
democratic governance institutions both at the national and local levels are reinvigorated to 
incorporate and reinforce citizens’ participation in policy formulation and implementation.   
  
2.7. Choices for improving policy capacity 
 
 
Attempts to improve the quality of public policymaking and measures to enhance the 
coordination and sustainability of policy implementation will involve efforts to improve 
administrative capacity within implementing agencies to make them more responsive to citizens’ 
demands, strengthening the policy capacity of higher-level government agencies to achieve better 
policy analysis and coordination; equipping legislatures with adequate facilities and professional 
staff to raise their level of capability and promote enlightened policymaking; and encouraging the 
establishment of independent think-tanks and/or policy-oriented research academic institutions to 
assist in cultivating sound policymaking. Some policy scholars suggested that efforts to improve 
the quality of policymaking should focus on the central minds of government or the political 
executive (Dror, 1986; Schacter, 2000). Schacter (2000), for instance, suggested that measures to 
build policy capacity at central level and at the level of line ministries should include 
rationalizing and standardizing of the decision-making process and improving the flow of policy-
relevant information, and strengthening capacity for policy analysis. Policymaking, therefore, has 
little chance of success unless significant redesigns are introduced into the central minds of 
governments, into the broader policymaking process system, into governance as whole and into 
societal problem solving (Dror, 1986). Dror (ibid.) categorically recommended an establishment 
of ‘policy planning and analysis unit’ near heads of governments. The quintessence of the 
proposal can be summarized as follows (cf. Dror, 1986: 281-282):   
 
1. The policy analysis unit may consist of fifteen to twenty experienced professionals drawn 
from different disciplines (such as policy studies, political science, law, public 
administration, economics, sociology and so forth) selected from different structures of 
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government, and some recruited from outside to serve for a limited period (three to five 
years);  
 
2. The principal function of the unit is to provide a comprehensive and professional 
perspective for evaluating major current decision issues, with special attention to more 
critical ones. The unit’s tasks will also include identification of emerging momentous 
choices, setting policy and governmental priorities, and assisting government with 
managing policy-formulation and implementation in times of crisis; 
 
3. The unit is not a substitute for any function run by regular government institutions, but 
reconsiders agenda setting, provides a critical and second look, reviews options from a 
broader and long-range perspective, pays special attention to interfaces as well as 
coordination between different decisions, and initiates further studies as the need arises;  
 
4. The unit’s clients are the central minds of government (the head of government and the 
entire cabinet). Thus, close access to the client and relations based on confidence and 
mutual understanding are essential prerequisites for success;  
 
5. Although there is less chance that the policy analysis unit to serve as an intermediary 
channeling societal demands and policy preferences to policymaking and implementing 
institutions, it can nonetheless provide and facilitate a free flow of information to civil 
societal groups, policy-oriented research institutions, independent think-thanks and 
universities on the wider spectrum of government policies made and implemented. This 
will not just ensure a greater chance of acceptance of policy decisions, citizens’ 
enlightenment on public policy, participation by the public and enhancement of 
policymaking capacity, but also serves as a counter-weight to over-centralization and 
bureaucratization. 
 
       Examples abound. Following the end of the cold war in 1990, donor countries and the 
powerful international institutions such as World Bank and IMF pressured many African and 
Third World states to adopt ‘multi-party democracy’. However, the emerging ‘multi-party 
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democracies’ faced the challenges of reforming their governments in accordance with donor 
countries’ and international organizations’ policy prescriptions. Thus, given the sheer size of the 
task, some countries found it important to introduce a unit within the executive or cabinet office 
that can manage policy formulation and implementation. Zambia is a classic and instructive 
example in this case. When Chiluba’s government came into power in October 1991, the new 
Zambian leaders faced an unfamiliar and unresponsive state bureaucracy (Garnet et al., 1997; 
Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002). The president and his colleagues, who came from the private 
sector, found that their private business experiences counted very little in managing unfamiliar 
public institutions. It quickly became clear that unless higher government officials could do a 
better job of coordinating policy formulation and implementation, Zambia’s government’s ability 
to deliver on its promises of economic growth and improved service delivery would be 
compromised. With the assistance of USAID and foreign consultants, organizational redesign to 
improve the quality of policymaking and implementation took place over a period of five years, 
from 1992 to 1997 (Garnet et al. 1997).   
       The redesign for policy formulation and implementation started with the formation of PACD 
- Policy Analysis and Coordination Division - in the cabinet office in 1993. PACD has 12 
professional staff, divided into three sections: financial and economic policy, social and human 
resources development policy, and domestic, regional and international affairs. The staff are not 
only expected to make sure that all due collaboration takes place among ministries in the 
preparation of a cabinet memorandum, each member of PACD is assigned a number of ministries 
and is also expected to develop a close relationship as well as familiarizing them with each 
ministry’s policy issues (ibid.). Simultaneously, an analysis of the existing policy management 
process was conducted to identify constraints and problems and to make some initial 
recommendations for change. To introduce the division, and reach consensus on its missions and 
responsibilities, a workshop convened PACD’s staff and cabinet personnel. PACD’s 
responsibilities include analyzing sectoral ministries’ policy proposals, submitted to the cabinet 
to check for consistency with government policies, collaborating with ministries to improve the 
quality of their policy submissions, serving as the secretariat for the cabinet (preparing minutes 
and transmitting policy decisions to implementers), coordinating implementation of cabinet 
decisions across agency boundaries, monitoring the implementation of cabinet decisions, and 
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facilitating inter-ministerial implementation problems (Garnett et al. 1997; Brinkerhoff and 
Crosby, 2002).  
       In very few years PACD nurtured reasonably good relationships with ministries. It also 
developed a new policy formulation and implementation process. More importantly, while the 
old process lacked the coordination needed for effective policy formulation, the new 
policymaking process covers the entire policy cycle: formulation, decision-making, 
implementation and evaluation (Garnett et al. 1997).  
       The preceding discussion demonstrates that Chiluba’s government in Zambia made a heavy 
investment in improving the quality of policymaking and increased policy coordination across 
line ministries. Over the five-year period the effort paid off and the outcomes in terms of the 
coordination and quality of policy proposals have proven successful. However, in a country 
where authoritarian rule prevailed for decades, and where civil society groups had little or no role 
and participation in policymaking, the Zambian Policy Analysis and Coordination Division’s role 
as promoter of ‘results-oriented, client-driven, participatory, transparent and accountable’ 
policymaking system should be regarded with caution. In fact, the manner in which PACD’s staff 
have been brought on board would raise more skepticism as to how far the division’s mandates 
permit the staff to involve societal actors and/or stakeholders ‘in the design and implementation’ 
of policies that affect the their lives. Moreover, experience has shown that a policy analysis 
project such as this will eventually be captured by the policy/power elites, and the euphoria may 
soon dissipate unless a robust legislature and relatively well-developed societal groups stand to 
counter the elitism of the executive. Accordingly, the mere establishment of a policy analysis unit 
near the higher echelon of the executive leaves no space for pressure groups and societal actors 
for participation and demand making in the policymaking process. But, not only is Zambia’s 
experience and redesign in managing the process of policymaking and implementation 
instructive, but countries such as Ethiopia can, somehow, also draw important lessons for a 
significantly modified endeavor, such as arms-length, independent and professionally advanced 
policy think-tanks, without belittling the role of institutionalized policy analysis units located 
inside the heart of government . 
       Similarly, over the last decade, there has been a renewed emphasis on improving policy 
capacity in more developed countries such as the US and Canada.  In Canada, for example, from 
the mid-1980s to the early 1990s the government’s capacity to perform its policy functions 
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effectively declined steadily (Kernaghan et al., 2000). Since the mid-1990s there has been a 
renewed effort to strengthen the policy coordination and capacity of senior ministers as well as 
the public service. In response to this, the Canadian government established the Policy Research 
Initiative (PRI) in 1996. PRI involves more than thirty government departments and agencies, 
and has established four big interdepartmental research networks dealing with growth, human 
development, global challenges and opportunities. It sought to build a solid foundation of 
horizontal research upon which public decisions can be based (ibid.). The overriding purpose of 
enhancing policy capacity is to enable governments to cope with the current and emerging 
challenges of a rapidly changing political and social environment. Moreover, a Policy Research 
Secretariat (PRS) has been established ‘to facilitate the integration of the work of the research 
networks, to seek innovative ways of sharing policy research data, to develop knowledge 
partnerships with the broad policy research community… and to link up with policy researchers 
in international organizations and other countries’ (Kernaghan et al., 2000). PRI and PRS in 
Canada worked mainly towards improved management of horizontal policy issues. PRI managed 
to promote collaboration, cooperation and consultation as the pivotal means of policy 
coordination, both within government and between government and other policy actors.  
       Both Zambia’s Policy Analysis and Coordination Division and Canada’s Policy Research 
Initiative have sought to improve the policy capacity of the central minds of government, 
including the executive, line ministries and key public institutions. Each sought to manage the 
policy process with a view to ensuring that they had sufficient policy capacity and/or building the 
required policy capacity to make sound policies and implement them effectively. Moreover, both 
worked towards ensuring that public policies are mutually consistent, that duplication and 
overlap are avoided – or, at least, recognized, so much so that efficient, effective and responsive 
public services are provided (Garnet et al., 1997; Kernaghan et al., 2000). The Zambian 
endeavor, however, demonstrated a new initiative to raise the quality of policymaking, improve 
the coordination of the policymaking process across ministries, and has focused on molding the 
process of policy formulation and implementation within the executive structure. On the other 
hand, not only was the PRI initiative an incremental approach to building a foundation geared to 
nurturing a horizontal inter-ministerial coordination and management of policy, but it was also a 
renewed emphasis (rather than a new one) that aimed at reversing the tendency of the Canada’s 
senior government officials to denigrate their policy functions and the erosion of the good 
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capacity that they inherited. Likewise, an institutionalized high-level policy analysis unit is 
operating in Nigeria under the name of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies 
(NIPSS). In the Netherlands the Scientific Council for Government Policy (SCGP) has been 
assisting Dutch policymakers since 1972. Similar high-level policy analysis institutions are 
working toward improving policy management and coordination in many parts of developed and 
developing world.  
 It is worth mentioning here that in the context of developing countries policy think-tank 
institutes that are located away from both government machinery and policy advocacy 
institutions can do justice more in terms of professionalizing policymaking and augmenting 
policymaking capacity than those located near the political executive and party leadership.    
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2.8. Conclusion 
 
This chapter assesses and explores various analytical and conceptual perspectives on public 
policymaking in developing countries. By doing so, it has set the scene for unraveling the maze 
of the policymaking process in Ethiopia; the actors and their powers as well as resource leverage 
they command; the legal and institutional preconditions for public policy formulation and 
implementation; the relationships between state and society; and the origin and ascendancy of the 
elitism of the political executive and ruling parties in public policymaking. In many ways this 
study commits itself to extending the explanatory variables of the public policymaking process in 
developing countries to the investigation of the process by which policies are made in Ethiopia 
over the past three decades under two different governments. It will also explain the complex 
relationships between the declared policies, the characteristics and systems of 
governments/institutions in which policies have been made and the socio-administrative context 
in which they have been implemented.          
       In the bulk of the developing countries policy elites play critical roles to determine policy 
outcomes and the process through which issues get onto the policy agenda, through which they 
are deliberated within government institutions, and more importantly, how they are pursued and 
sustained (Grindle, 1980; Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Cloete, 1991). The lion’s share of this role 
goes to the executive, with a significant control over agenda setting, formulating policies and 
changing institutional outcomes for their execution. Among others, policy elites who determine 
who gets what and when are head of governments, party leaders, head of states, cabinet ministers, 
the executive bureaucracy, and the catalog can also include law-makers (Grindle and Thomas, 
1991). In most developing countries, not only are the legislatures used as means of legitimating 
policies, but also they are passive instruments that can easily be controlled by the executive and 
party structures. Therefore, the dominance of the executive and ruling elites and the overbearing 
influence of the party structures relegated the legislative institutions to docile organs having little 
influence on the public policymaking process.  
       Interest groups, private initiatives and civil society groups are fragmented and lack the 
capacity to articulate their interests. In some instances, when these forces are active, the 
mechanisms of wielding influence through formal policymaking institutions tends to be weak 
and/or channels of communications are absent. In some other cases, the executive and 
bureaucratic institutions not only develop clientele organizations that pre-empt autonomous 
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initiatives, but they also use their prerogatives to induce and guide corporatist or clientelistic 
participation, whereby groups designated by policy elites are escorted into controlled 
participation (Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002). For the most part, 
policy elites encourage public participation to ensure support for themselves and their policy 
initiatives. It is thus highly unlikely that public demand will have any effect on the policymaking 
process.     
       An issue of crucial importance and the way forward in public policymaking should, 
therefore, be opening up the policymaking process beyond a coterie of interlocking circles, 
promoting the accountability and responsiveness of government institutions to the society, and 
developing and nurturing a state-society alignment. As stressed in this chapter, policymaking 
institutions will be accountable and responsive to the demands of the public only when a network 
of adequate and accessible channels of communication that make participation a lot easier are 
established and operate unhindered. In other words, instituting participatory, responsive and 
accountable policymaking structures presupposes reinvigorating state-society relationships, with 
institutionalized and decentralized political and administrative governance structures buttressing 
the same process. These can reliably serve as a mainstay of responsive and accountable 
governance, when the civil society and its attendant institutions are firmly established and thrive 
to the extent that the power of state actors can be balanced by the plurality of autonomous 
associations. It should nevertheless be stressed that ensuring the accountability of political and 
administrative institutions to societal forces and sustaining the balance between the state and the 
latter should be accompanied by a corresponding capacity and strength of civil society (Blunt, 
1997; Blowgun, 1998; Polidano and Turner, 1997). To the extent that stakeholders are 
empowered to present demands and encouraged to initiate solutions to solve policy problems, 
sustainable and successful policy implementation can be more likely to materialize (Brinkerhoff 
and Crosby, 2002).  
       Moreover, forging the balance between state and society and making government responsive 
as well as accountable calls for improving the policymaking capacity of government. For the 
policymaking system to accommodate the demands of the public as well as command a high 
chance of success, not only does it require significant redesign of the central policymaking 
process, but also the initiative can be a step towards institutionalization of policymaking and 
analysis in the entire governance structure (Dror, 1985). Arguably, however, a robust legislature 
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and vibrant civil society forces that could reliably counterbalance the elitism of the political 
executive and ruling parties should accompany an enterprise such as this.  Moreover, in the 
absence of professionally advanced, qualified and arms-length policy think-tank institutes that are 
located away from both government machinery and policy advocacy institutions, 
professionalizing and pragmatizing policies are inevitably bound to be suspect. 
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Chapter 3. Public policymaking under the Dergue, 1974-1991 
  
        3.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter set down the conceptual and analytical framework for the study. This 
chapter presents the historical, socio-political variables and institutional forms that preceded 
current public policymaking in Ethiopia. It then provides a descriptive analysis of the 
policymaking process, principal institutions and structures that claimed the highest leverage 
during the Dergue era from 1974 to 1991. Discussed at length is thus the series of major 
legislative enactments promulgated by the Provincial Military Administrative Council (PMAC or 
the Dergue) that had a bearing on the policymaking process, and government establishments that 
claimed prerogatives in the formulation and implementation of policies. It also explores the 
relationship between the ideological metamorphosis over the years and the party, on the one 
hand, and policymaking institutions, on the other. Apparently, not only did policy guidelines 
follow the lead of the official ideology, but so also were the modalities through which 
policymaking institutions had been configured as well as altered based on the established 
principles of the official ideology. More particularly, the official pronouncement of the National 
Democratic Revolution Program (NDRP) in 1976 marked a turning point in the history of the 
country in terms of the recourse of the state to Marxism-Leninism as a panacea for the socio-
political and economic policy problems. Henceforward, not only were policy objectives 
motivated by adherence to the official ideology, but it also dictated the organization of policy-
implementing institutions.    
       The chapter also explores in some detail the structuring and restructuring of party- and 
government-organized ‘civil society organizations’ under the rubric of mass organizations. The 
land reform proclamation of March 1975 set the stage for fundamental transformations as well 
the organization of rural social life in the countryside. As a result, led by the party, peasant 
associations, producers’ cooperatives, villagization and resettlement programs became essential 
instruments of carrying out rural transformation and implementing agricultural policies in 
Ethiopia. Furthermore, mass mobilization in the cities and towns in the entire country had been 
carried out after the nationalization of urban land in the same year. Consequently, urban dwellers’ 
associations, youth and women’s organizations mushroomed immensely after the mid-1970s. 
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Stretched from their headquarters in the capital to towns and villages (Kebeles) in the 
countryside, the structural networks of all of the mass and professional associations had been 
streamlined, although their part in policymaking was predetermined and circumscribed by the 
prevailing frame of reference (i.e. ideology) and the preeminence of the party and central 
planning.  Implementing agencies had also been restructured in ways to execute centrally guided 
socio-economic policies along the principles of central planning ascendant in the socialist states. 
Especially, after the establishment of COPWE and NRDC-CPSC, state and mass organizational 
establishments became highly institutionalized and integrated into a common and centralized 
implementing administrative apparatus. 
       This chapter primarily throws some light on the historical, politico-cultural and institutional 
antecedents to public policymaking in Ethiopia (see section 3.2). It then expounds on the 
legislative process and the major players in the making of a plethora of laws during the Dergue 
era (3.3.1).  This is followed by an assessment of specific developments of the official ideology, 
the apparatus of the governing party and their influence as well as leverage in policymaking 
(3.3.2). It also appraises the trajectories that the constitution-making process went through and 
the ramifications of this for policymaking (3.4.). It further appraises state-society relationships 
vis-à-vis policymaking and the roles that the major establishments on both sides of the equation 
played (3.5); and this is followed by an examination of the structures of policy implementation 
through centrally guided institutional mechanisms from 1974 to 1991 (3.6).  
 
3.2. Background perspectives on the historical, politico-cultural and institutional 
antecedents to public policymaking in Ethiopia 
 
3.2.1. Historical premises 
 
Ethiopia is one of the oldest countries in history. Once known as Abyssinia, ancient Greek 
writers such as Homer and Herodotus mention it in the most ancient written records.6  The origin 
of the Ethiopia as a state can be traced back two thousand years to the Kingdom of Axum, which 
                                                
6
 As legend had it, the state existed as a polity for three thousand years. The anonymous (Greek) author of The 
Perilus of the Erythrean Sea is said to have mentioned Ethiopia in several part of the work. In the Septuagint version 
of the Old Testament, the Hebrew name ‘Cush’ was translated into the Greek ‘Ethiopia’, giving rise to the claim of 
Ethiopia’s existence in Biblical times and the myth of history that it is 3000 years old (Markakis, 1974; Teferra, 
1997).   
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flourished in the first century and declined in the seventh century of the Christian era7 following 
the rise of Islam in Arabia (Clapham, 1969; Bahru, 1991). The Kingdom of Axum established the 
twin institutions that had since guided Ethiopia’s socio-economic and political courses, namely, 
the office of the Emperor and the Orthodox Christian Church (op. cit). The latter was introduced 
during the fourth century AD in the era of the Axumite kingdom. Not only did the religion that 
became institutionalized in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church evolve into becoming the dominant 
cultural, political and economic phenomenon that all future traditional rulers had to reckon with, 
but also Ethiopia is the only place on the continent of Africa where Christianity survived as an 
indigenous belief system (Markakis, 1974; Schwab, 1985).    
       The remnants of the Axumite Kingdom moved southward and established the Zagwe 
Dynasty ruling the highland kingdom from about the middle of eleventh century until 1270. After 
1270 AD those claiming Solomonic ancestry, based much further south in the plateau of Shewa, 
contested the dynasty. The restoration of the so-called Solomonic dynasty8 marked the second 
great (after the Axumite period) acme of historic Ethiopia that dominated Ethiopian socio-
economic and political life for several centuries (ibid). These three hundred years of history 
marked the genesis of traditional political forms, forms that chiefly represented indigenous 
Ethiopian outgrowths and values as opposed to the ones introduced from outside such as from the 
West (Markakis, 1974).     
       Over the succeeding centuries the center of the Ethiopian state changed locations westwards 
to Gonder in the sixteenth century, to Tigray in the middle of nineteenth century, and finally the 
capital shifted to and settled in Addis Ababa from the 1880s. Although Christian monarchs 
defended themselves against Muslim invasions in the seventeenth century, the Ethiopian 
kingdom was relatively weak, lasting for a century till the middle of the nineteenth century. This 
period was known in Ethiopian history as the Era of Princes - Zemene Mesafint - in which rival 
princes were embroiled in inconclusive struggle for supremacy.  During this period not only was 
Ethiopia a collection of independent principalities, but it was also marked by an absence of 
central government for nearly hundred years (Bahiru, 1991).  
                                                
7
 The first identifiable and historically recorded Ethiopian state was formed in the first century AD at Axum, in 
today’s Tigray region of Ethiopia.  
8
 According to Solomonic myth, before the birth of Christ, the Ethiopian Queen, Queen Sheba, visited King 
Solomon, King of Jerusalem, converted to Judaism and bore a son, Minilik I. Minilik I was considered related to 
Christ through the holy man Solomon and the Solomonic line of Ethiopian kings claimed inheritance and became a 
Christian dynasty (Schwab, 1985:5).        
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       The thrust of modernizing Ethiopia, however, came with Tewodros II (1855-1868), one of 
the exceptional kings whose ambitions were motivated by a vision for the restoration of a strong 
Ethiopian state, its use of Western technology and recognition by Western powers. More 
categorically, he was largely successful in re-establishing Ethiopia as a unified state, a vision that 
his successors Yohannes (1872-1889)9, Minilik (1889-1913) and Haileselassie (1916/1939-1974) 
maintained. Among the modernizing monarchs, Emperor Minilik, as the epitome of the Shewan 
dynasty10, had the highest claim of the three nineteenth-century emperors to be seen as the 
founder of the modern Ethiopian state (Clapham, 1988; Markiakis, 1974; Bahiru, 1991).  
Minilik’s astute leadership and shrewd diplomacy earned the recognition of the country’s 
independence among the then powerful European colonialist powers - France, Britain and Italy. 
Particularly after the Italian invading forces met their decisive defeat by Ethiopian forces at the 
battle of Adwa in 1896, led by Minilik, a Tripartite Treaty between France, Italy and Britain was 
concluded in 1906 to recognize Ethiopia as an independent state (Halliday and Molyneux, 1981).  
Markakis (1974: 25-26) noted that Ethiopia is the only African state below the Sahara whose 
boundaries have been determined by an internally induced natural process of expansion carried 
out in a classic method of military conquest.  
       In any case, the recognition of its independence by the then colonial European powers 
accorded Ethiopia a relatively stable environment, and allowed Minilik further opportunities to 
pursue his visions of modernization. Among other things, the initiative to institute and sustain 
centralized government structures backed by the army and modern bureaucratic institutions 
supported the modernization drive. The effort that Minilik exerted in developing and expanding 
modern government and administrative institutions culminated in the establishment of the first 
ministerial cabinet in 1907. Although the ministerial system is a reflection of Minilik’s desire to 
provide government with an institutional basis, the power of the ministers was highly restricted 
(Bahru, 1991). 
                                                
9
 Emperor Yohannes, from what is now known as Tigray NRS, was crowned King of Kings in 1872, taking the name 
of Yohannes IV. He met his death at a place called Metema fighting the incursions of Madhist forces in the Sudan 
who infiltrated into Ethiopian territory from the western part of the country.       
10
 Shewa was one of the provinces in Ethiopia where the capital Addis Ababa is found. It was from Shewa that the 
powerful aristocrats expanded their sphere of influence to the south, southeast and southwest. Like the south, the 
north also came under the tutelage of the Shewan aristocracy. Schwab (1985) noted that during the reign of Sahle 
Selassie (1813-1847), Shewa took the south, west and southeastern territories and he proclaimed himself the ruler of 
Shewa and Oromo. However, it was during the reign of Minilik II, who himself was a native of Shewa, that the 
empire virtually doubled in size, leading to the creation of boundaries which have lasted until today (Markakis, 1974; 
Clapham, 1969).  
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       Appointed by the emperor, the ministers were given lists of functions to carry out. Not only 
were they palace councilors and retinue in the Emperor’s court, but also they performed 
assignments strictly under the personal auspices of the emperor. In other words, the modern 
policymaking institutions of central government had evolved directly from the imperial 
entourage, with the responsibilities limited to advising the emperor and foreign consulates in the 
capital, Addis Ababa (Lipsky, 1962; Markakis, 1974; Bahiru, 1991). Towards the beginning of 
the twentieth century, however, the instruments and institutions of modern government and 
administration were as yet in their incipient forms. Moreover, not only did the power of decision 
making rest in the person of the emperor, but he was also the only person with the authority to 
rule over the country, to appoint palace court attendants, dispensed justice, issue decrees, make 
and revoke appointments and direct all public affairs (Lipsky, 1962; Markakis, 1974; Clapham, 
1969). It was thus unlikely to place any formal (constitutional or legal) limit on the power of the 
emperors.  
 
3.2.2. Politico-cultural antecedents  
       
 
Ethiopia’s past (its history and the traditional institutions developed in the course of time) have 
had an enormous impact on state-society relationships with respect to policymaking. The 
traditional values and institutions appeared to have encouraged neither open opposition nor 
reasoned criticism of government authorities, nor the policies that they unilaterally adopted. It is 
argued, therefore, that deep-seated traditional and indigenous political forms that have long been 
rooted in the past have vital relevance in explaining state-society relationships and the dynamics 
of public policymaking in Ethiopia.  
       Therefore, having a good grasp of the historical, social and cultural circumstances will be of 
paramount importance in understanding the dynamics of public policymaking in Ethiopia. 
Minilik II was the Emperor who oversaw the country’s expansion to the south, the restoration of 
the medieval territories and the unification of Ethiopia, as noted above. The treaties that he 
concluded with the colonial powers that had colonial territories bordering on Ethiopia – such as 
Italy, France and Britain – earned him the recognition of the country’s sovereignty.  
       However, the success in territorial gains in the course of internal conquest, expansion and 
resistance to external colonial expansions brought with it and bequeathed to the succeeding 
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generations the notion that the use of force could be largely recognized as a major instrument of 
control and domination. Over the years not only has this been gradually ingrained in the belief 
system and values of the policy elites in Ethiopia, but also has it been promoted by the cultural 
and social structure of traditional Ethiopia. The Solomonic myth, for instance, purportedly 
established the ruling line of Ethiopia into blood relationship with the House of David and 
ultimately with Christ. The people were persuaded to believe that Solomon’s descendants, such 
as Emperor Haileselassie, should rule over Ethiopia, because they were divinely ordained. 
Chapter I, article 1 of the first Ethiopian constitution provided: ‘the Imperial dignity shall remain 
perpetually attached to the line of His Majesty Haileselassie I, descendant of King Sahleselassie, 
whose line descends…from the dynasty of Minilik I, son of King Solomon of Jerusalem and of 
Queen Sheba of Ethiopia’. Thus, Emperor Haileselassie, who ruled Ethiopia for half a century, 
used the following titles in policy documents and official appearances: ‘Conquering Lion of 
Judah, Haileselassie I Elect of God, Emperor of Ethiopia’. Additionally, not only did the 
Solomonic legend find its spiritual justification in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, but the latter 
also campaigned to inspire awe among the Ethiopian populace. The people were preached into 
believing that, although the ultimate source of authority is God, its worldly exercise was 
bestowed up on the emperor.  
       Therefore, not only was authority claimed to have originated from the pinnacle of the 
hierarchy and the direction of its flow downward, but also the excessive respect accorded to 
authority made it difficult, and even impossible, to express any opposition to a superior.  This 
was even more complicated by the hierarchical nature of the politico-administrative structure and 
the predominantly feudal socio-economic formation. Ethiopian society has long been ruled by a 
hierarchical politico-administrative order, with public institutions operating under the monarchy 
(Meheret, 1997: 64). Since land was the basis for status and wealth, the monarchical structure had 
to sustain and adapt to modern bureaucratic institutions by extracting surplus from the mass of 
the peasantry. The basic components of the social system were the monarchy, the landed 
aristocracy, the clergy and the mass of rural farmers (ibid). However, the traditional polity had to 
strike a balance between the landed nobility and the modern educated elites, in which case a 
measure of adaptation had to take place in order to preserve the stability of the monarchical 
structure and exercise control in the face of continuing social and administrative changes. The 
process of adaptation not only integrated educated elites into the apparatus of the administrative 
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structure, but it also become instrumental in the process of centralization that Haileselassie’s 
regime had pursued ever since his ascension to the throne. Centralization was accomplished 
through the partial modernization of state apparatus, and thereby establishing the basis of the elite 
status of the educated group (Clapham, 1969; Markakis, 1974; Bahiru, 1991). In the last years of 
the imperial era, the incorporation of the educated group into the politico-administrative structure 
not only had changed the monarchy into a veritable autocracy, but also this very adaptation 
engendered an imperial-bureaucratic elite structure (op. cit).   
       Hence, most Ethiopians have long been captured by traditions deep-seated in their socio-
political cultures that defined the relations of the state to the society in authoritarian terms. The 
only politically active groups were those in the upper-most hierarchy of the government 
institutions. Authority was treated with the utmost respect, and a person holding it was received 
with reverence; thus, he could neither be challenged nor was there any reasoned criticism of 
policy proposals possible. Most Ethiopians had profound reverence for their great men, above all 
for their monarch, and to them it was considered as a diminution of that greatness for the 
subordinates to take decisions and perform actions entrusted to their superiors (ibid). For the 
latter, too, delegating ones authority was unlikely, because doing so could be seen as lowering of 
the status of the superior in the eyes of the subordinates (op. cit). These entrenched feelings might 
have gradually changed over the past three decades, though they have been influencing 
remarkably the broad spectrum of public policymaking and relationships between state and 
society.  
       Furthermore, policy and political problems have hardly been resolved through open debate 
and compromise; rather authority and the use of force have more often than not been used to 
discourage even the most ordinary disobedience and dissent. Except for the privileged few, the 
bulk of the people remained apolitical. Nor was there any right to form associations. Till very 
recently neither transfer of power nor change of government were resolved peacefully. In the 
Ethiopian context, therefore, resorting to a violent mechanism of ascertaining political power and 
asserting one’s domination has been integral in socio-political culture and history. History and 
culture also have an enormous influence on the dynamics of public policymaking and state-
society relationships in contemporary Ethiopia.    
       In summary, major social and economic policy decisions affecting citizens and the country 
were conceived and made by the emperors and palace courts. Not only were the administrative 
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personnel who executed policies protégés of court officials of higher order, but they were also 
groomed to implement policies and decrees with absolute obedience. Moreover, the feudal order 
had long been the bedrock of the Ethiopian socio-economic order. In its worst form the feudal 
order nurtured a culture of subjugation and inculcated absolute compliance with the decisions 
made by the imperial court. Not only was the power of the emperors and nobility unchallenged, 
but citizens also had no say in policy matters. In pre-revolutionary Ethiopia socio-economic 
power and/or status were dictated by one’s possession of large tracts of land (Bahiru, 1991). 
Emperors allocated land to the nobility and loyal subjects as patronage. The landlords, 
government officials and the Orthodox Church owned the bulk of land, and controlled the lives of 
millions of the peasantry. The latter had no legal, economic and political rights. The fact that 
state-society relationships and the structure of policymaking evolved from and were determined 
by the prevailing socio-economic order meant not only that the ordinary citizens’ participation in 
the policymaking process was virtually undermined, but also that independent civil society 
groups had no chance of entry into the narrow circle of the policymaking process.  In short, the 
client-patron relationship that has over the past several hundred years been developing between 
the state and society tends to haunt the structures and institutions of public policymaking in 
Ethiopia to this day.   
 
   3.2.3. Institutional antecedents:  Haileselassie’s period 
 
To begin with, the 1931 constitution was a landmark in the history of Ethiopian public policy, not 
only because the first constitution was promulgated, but also because the first bicameral 
parliament convened immediately after the constitution was promulgated. The first constitution 
resembled in part that of the Japanese Empire of 1889, which in turn was similar to the 
constitution of 1871 of the German Empire (Redden, 1966; Assafa, 2002). Looking back to the 
time (i.e. 1931) when parliament was founded, nearly all sub-Sahara African states were still 
under colonial rule. It is probably not surprising to see a legislature whose powers had been 
circumscribed entirely. Nor was it expected to represent the basic repository of the authority of 
the people or supreme policymaking body of the state. The emperor had unrestricted 
constitutional powers, extraordinarily exceeding the power of the legislators, including the power 
to declare war, appoint judges, dissolve parliament, negotiate as well as sign treaties (Meheret, 
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1997: 86). The gist of the matter lies in article 6 of the constitution: ‘In the Ethiopian Empire 
supreme power rests in the hands of the Emperor’. Hence, the parliament was neither meant to 
carry out the usual functions of an elected legislature, nor was it a source of pubic authority.  
       The 1931 constitution concisely defined the structure of the legislature to consist of two 
deliberative chambers.  The Chamber of Senate or upper house (Yeheg Mewesegna Mekerbet) 
was to consist of members appointed by the emperor drawn from among the nobility ‘who have 
for a long time served his Empire as Princes or Ministers, Judges or high military officers’ 
(Article 31).  Till the people are in a position to elect the members of the Chamber of Deputies or 
lower house (Yeheg Memria Mekerbet) themselves, the constitution stated, the nobility and local 
chiefs shall designate them (Article 32). The bulk of the 1931 constitution, nevertheless, was 
devoted to stipulating the power of the monarch, with the virtual power of initiating laws and 
policies resting in the person of the emperor.            
       Promulgated in November 1955, the revised constitution appeared to state some provisions 
giving the lower house (Chamber of Deputies) a power base separate from the emperor. In much 
the same way as the 1931 constitution, however, while the Senate remained an appointed 
chamber with members still chosen from among the nobility, dignitaries, the clergy and other 
prominent personages assigned to sit for a 6-year term by the emperor, members of the lower 
house (Deputies) were elected by universal adult suffrage for a four-year term (Revised 
Constitution, 1957). Unfortunately, a strict wealth requirement imposed on candidates coupled 
with the absence of a party from which Deputies could have drawn organized inspiration forced 
the MPs to rely on government patronage for re-election (Lipsky, 1962; Clapham, 1969).  Nor 
did they put up any challenges to any legislative proposals originating from the executive. In fact, 
the powers of the monarch were even more precisely sharpened in the revised constitution than in 
the first constitution promulgated in 1931. It vested a multitude of powers of vital importance in 
the emperor.  Not only did it invest sovereignty of the empire in the emperor with the power to 
determine the organization, powers and duties of all government departments, and to appoint and 
dismiss government officials, but he also had absolute control over the armed forces with wide-
ranging emergency powers (Articles, 26, 27 and 29).  Apart from this, the emperor had absolute 
control over foreign relations, the power to dissolve the parliament and to reverse the decisions of 
the courts and grant pardons (Articles 30, 33 and 35).   
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       Instead of reducing the powers of the emperor, the revised constitution substantially enlarged 
and reinforced his powers. Article 4 of the constitution, among others, made an explicit reference 
to the absolute powers of the emperor:  ‘…the person of the Emperor is sacred, His dignity is 
inviolable and His power indisputable’.  Additionally, he had virtual powers and control over the 
executive and administrative structures: ‘The Emperor has the right to select, appoint and dismiss 
the Prime Minister and all other Ministers and Vice-Ministers’ (article 66). Put simply, the 
Council of Ministers, the organs of administrative apparatuses at central and provincial levels, 
operated as extensions of the palace court. After 1943 the emperor appointed ministries till an 
imperial order issued in 1966 granted the prime minister the power to nominate members of his 
cabinet, though subject to palace approval (Markakis, 1974) 
       In fact, intermediating between the emperor and the parliament, the prime minister and the 
council of ministers chiefly remained a clearinghouse for legislation. The close involvement of 
the emperor with the executive functions of central government certainly made the executive 
more important than the legislature and higher organs of the judiciary. Unlike as we know it 
today, the prime minister’s office then lacked a useful supervisory and executive power, with 
little influence on the central government (see Chapter 4). In other words, the prime minister 
hardly provided unified executive direction for the government, whether by enforcing general 
policy initiatives or by commanding the obedience of other high officials, nor had he powers over 
such vital areas as provincial administrations and the armed forces (Clapham, 1969; Markakis 
1974).  
       Furthermore, radiating from the central government in the capital, the emperor also gained 
more control over local government. The administrative divisions had been revised and 
administrative offices corresponding to them were established to reflect the modernization thrust 
and ambitions of the emperor. The provinces (Teklay Gizat) constituted the biggest 
administrative units, with each province divided into sub-provinces (Aawrajas), districts 
(Woredas) and sub-districts (Mikitil Woredas). Local administrators in rural Ethiopia were 
primarily concerned with the traditional functions of law enforcement, maintenance of law and 
order, and collection of taxes (Lipsky, 1962). Although provincial administrations remained the 
preserve of the nobility and traditional ruling elites, young educated men of unquestioned loyalty 
to the emperor were also assigned to help provincial governors and streamline administrative 
processes (Perham, 1969; Meheret, 1997).   
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       The foregoing discussion attested to the fact that both legally and politically the palace (the 
monarchy) was the most powerful institution of policymaking and the center of all political 
activities during Haileselassie’s era. The vital institutions of the palace court such as the Crown 
Council11, the Private Cabinet12, the Minister of Pen13, Aquabe Saat14 surpassed the formally 
established institutions of policymaking and implementation such as the council of ministers, the 
parliament and the provincial administrations. The emperor, as an apogee of both modern and 
traditional political institutions, became the source of legislation, and no policy was issued 
without his approval (Bahiru, 1991). As noted earlier, both constitutions had duly underlined that 
the power of the palace can neither be disputed nor challenged. Furthermore, the predominant 
legal, socio-cultural, historical and political milieu permitted no political associations of any 
kind; thus, the political system hardly encountered demands for preferred policies, neither were 
there any such significant societal pressures on the political system to put up proposals and 
demands for policy changes till 1974.   
In the wake of the 1960 aborted military coup15, the last fourteen years of Haileselassie 
reign witnessed growing opposition to his regime. In the aftermath of the coup, the Emperor 
sought to re-claim the loyalty of coup sympathizers by introducing a few reforms, but they were 
                                                
11
 The Crown Council was an informal policymaking body and was the central focus of the emperor (Perham, 1969: 
89).  In accordance with the revised constitution of 1955, the Council was to consist of the primate of the Orthodox 
Church (Abune), the president of the Senate, and ‘such Princes, Ministers and Dignitaries’ as may be designated by 
the emperor. Presumably, it was to convene only when fundamental issues or major policies had to be considered. 
Although most traditional institutions of policymaking declined in the 1960s, the Crown Council was the most 
important surviving element of the traditional form of Haileselassie’s regime (Lipsky, 1962: 177).  
12
 The Private Cabinet was designed to perform a function analogous to that performed by the White House of the 
President of the US (Markakis, 1974). Its members were to provide liaison with the formally established public 
institutions, appraise proposals emanating from them and advise the emperor, and also report to him on the 
performance of government organizations. Although the Private Cabinet did not have a constitutional mandate, it 
served as an independent source of information for the emperor over the officials in charge of major government 
departments.     
13
 The Minister of Pen (Tsehafi Tezeaz) was one of the traditional institutions that wielded immense power in making 
key decisions. Although a prime minister and council of ministers had been set up in 1943, the dominating institution 
of the period was the Minister of Pen. It was so close to the emperor that its operations were often indistinguishable 
form his. By the virtue of his duties the Minister of Pen enjoyed unrestricted access to the palace.  
14
 Aquabe Saat can probably be translated as ‘appointment’, where each minister would be expected to deliver 
reports about the activities of his ministry to the emperor; and get clearance for decisions needing imperial order 
(Markakis, 1974). Thus, it had been the most important regular decision mechanisms in the Haileselassie’s 
government since liberation in 1941. Its effect had been to emphasize the personal responsibility of each minister to 
the emperor, and thus to hamper attempts at collective responsibility under the supervision of the council of ministers 
or the prime minister (Clapham, 1969: 109-110).  It had also provided each minister with a court of appeal where he 
could argue his side of a question before the emperor and other higher authorities. Equally important, it had given the 
emperor a channel for direct intervention in the affairs of each ministry.       
15
 The 1960 coup represented one of the most serious challenges to Haileselassie’s rule before 1974.   However, the 
coup lasted for only few days. Despite its failure, the 1960 attempted coup marked the beginning of the failure of 
monarcho–aristocratic and bureaucratic elites in Ethiopia.   
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far too few. For the most part the measures, which took the form of land grants, primarily 
targeted enriching the senior and middle-level military and police officers, but no coherent 
economic and social development programs had been launched (Ottaway, 1978; Halliday and 
Molyneux, 1981). Haileselassie’s government failure to carry out significant economic and 
political reforms over the previous fourteen years, combined with rising inflation, widespread 
corruption and maladministration, a famine that affected millions of farmers in the northern part 
of the country, and the growing discontent of urban interest groups provided the backdrop against 
which the Ethiopian revolution unfolded in 1974 (Teferra, 1997; Ottaway, 1995). 
 
3.3. Process, roles and institutions, 1974-1987 
 
3.3.1. The legislative process 
 
For thirteen years since the downfall of Haileselassie’s regime in 1974, there had not been any 
written constitution in Ethiopia. Established as a collective head of government by a 
proclamation, a body of junior and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) drawn from the armed 
forces, police and territorial army held government power (PMAC, 1974). The group was 
popularly known as the Dergue (the Amharic word for ‘committee’ or ‘council’). It deposed the 
emperor, annulled the 1955 constitution, dissolved Hailesellasie’s parliament and officially 
declared the establishment of a Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) in place of 
the imperial government (PMAC, 1974:1-2).  Afterwards, a plethora of proclamations were 
promulgated in the name of the corporate group, namely, the Dergue or the PMAC.   
       After removing the imperial establishments, the Dergue did not offer guidelines to deal with 
the policymaking process. The proclamation that the Military Government issued in September 
1974 nonetheless suggested, at least indirectly, where the power of policymaking in Ethiopia 
resided. It stated:  
 
… Hailesalssie I is hereby deposed as of today, September 12, 1974. 
The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (Parliament) is hereby dissolved until the people elect through 
democratic processes their genuine representatives dedicated to serve the interests of the people... 
 
The Constitution of 1955 is hereby suspended  
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The Armed Forces, the Police and Territorial Army Council has hereby assumed full government power 
until a legally constituted people’s assembly approves a new constitution and a government is duly 
established… (PMAC, 1974).
  
  
The proclamation was, however, vague about many contentious issues such as what the 
legislative-executive relationships and the separations of functions in the policymaking process 
would entail. Nor did it clearly stipulate the institutions with powers to initiate, adopt and 
implement policies, which did not augur well for a democratic policymaking process. Issued in 
the same year, the PMAC designated the organs of government that would be active in the 
legislative process, and it, too, lacked clarity on a wide range of issues pertaining to 
policymaking (PMAC, 1974).  
      Towards the end of December 1976 the Dergue introduced a hierarchy within itself. It 
involved a congress (consisting of all of the Dergue members), a central committee comprising 
forty members and designated by the congress, and a standing committee consisting of seventeen 
officers drawn from and elected by the congress (PMAC, 1976). A year later the Dergue 
promulgated a piece of legislation that had a semblance of ‘a supreme law of the country’. The 
legislation was enforced till the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) was officially 
inaugurated in September 1987 (PMAC, 1977). Not only did the legislation substantively guide 
the policymaking process in the country, but it also widely regulated relationships within various 
government agencies, on the one hand, and between government and mass organizations, on the 
other.  
       The proclamation empowered the Dergue with both the legislative and executive mandates 
(PMAC, 1977).   Not only did the legislation institutionalize the hierarchy within the Dergue, but 
also the virtual powers of legislation and execution resided in the Standing Committee. Hence, 
almost all the powers of policymaking resided in the PMAC. The Congress consisted of all 
surviving members of the Dergue, the Central Committee composed of thirty-two members 
elected by the former and sixteen Standing Committee members elected by the Congress from the 
members of the Central Committee (PMAC, 1977, EMI, 1981).  Thereafter, its membership 
never changed, although actual membership declined from 120 in 1974 to 80 in 1978 as 
defections, death and assassinations took their toll (Pilany, 1978: 3).  Chaired by the Head of the 
State, who was also the Chairman of the PMAC, the Council of Ministers’ competences had been 
limited to one of deliberating rather than incorporating critical inputs into the draft laws and 
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policies (Shiferaw, 1989; Andargachew, 1993).  However, with the assignment of trusted 
personnel from the military to each ministry and administrative regions, not only had 
administrative fiat eclipsed responsibilities assigned to civilian ministers by law, but also parallel 
decision-making characterized the policymaking institutions. In other words, government 
agencies at each level of the policymaking structure had to account to the PMAC, the trusted 
military officials posted in every ministry and the Council of Ministers, which came to be known 
as multiple disunity of command.  
       What is more, the legislative process appeared to be limited to small circles of policymakers.  
In fact, the bulk of policy decisions of vital importance as rural and urban land reforms, 
nationalization of manufacturing industries, banks and insurance companies were made by the 
Dergue.  Andargachew noted: 
 
All these radical reforms could be said to have originated from the demands of the public and of the civilian 
activists. Once a policy was taken up by the Derg, however, it was up to the department heads to follow up 
their successful completion. Each one of had one or more ministries and other public agencies under their 
jurisdiction to assist them in this endeavor. Following the initiation of a policy, a drafting committee was 
established in the relevant public agency over which the concerned head of the Derg’s department presided. 
Again, after the completion of the draft, it was up to the same department head to submit and explain it to 
the Ad-hoc Supreme Organizing Committee. The latter would then approve it with or without referring the 
matter to a general assembly of the Derg. (1993, 169)
      
 
       Lacking experience and expertise in legislation, the Dergue sought the assistance of civilian 
ministers in the policymaking to complement its apparent weaknesses, although the latter had 
marginal influence on agenda setting and the choice of policies. Nor had they exacted any 
significant leverage to affect the directions of the implementation process (Teferra, 1997). Hence, 
each ministry or government agency primarily proposed laws, pending their deliberation and 
approval by the Dergue (Shiferaw, 1989). The Legal Department in the Office of the Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers prepared the draft when, under certain conditions, the Head of the State 
or the Council of Ministers had to initiate laws (Shiferaw, 1989:124). The draft laws from these 
sources were to be sent to the Legal Committee in the Council of Ministers, with the Department 
of Legal Affairs in the Prime Minister’s Office serving as secretariat of the Committee. Chaired 
by the Minister of Law and Justice, the Legal Committee, whose members included the Minister 
of Education, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Minister of Finance, the Deputy 
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Minister of Mines and Energy, a representative from the National Planning Supreme Council, the 
Department Head of Legal Affairs in the Office of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and 
the Minister or Head of the Agency sponsoring the draft legislation would deliberate the sprit of 
the legislation, and send that to the PMAC via the CoM for approval (ibid).   
       Shiferaw (ibid.: 125), however, noted that there were exceptions to the established 
procedures, as when draft laws were assigned to a group of experts specially established to 
examine bills to be able to provide their expert opinion and recommendation. In some other 
cases, legislation was referred to a joint Legal and Administrative Committee or to a joint Legal 
and Economic Committee, all of which were established by the Office of the Council of 
Ministers (ibid.). After having studied and incorporated their wisdom, the draft legislation would 
be sent to the Provisional Administrative Council for final approval. The proclamations were 
published on the official Negarit Gazeta bearing the name of the corporate body, Provisional 
Military Administrative Council (the Dergue). Albeit the same personalities remained in the 
leadership positions, the virtual power of decision making over the years shifted from the Dergue 
(PMAC) to COPWE/WPE.  
 
3.3.2. The official ideology, the party and policymaking 
 
 
In a desperate search to find a guiding philosophy, the ideological values, which PMAC (Dergue) 
espoused, had metamorphosed since its coming to power in 1974. It started with ‘Ethiopia 
Tikdem’ (Ethiopia First) and/or Hibrettesebawinet (Ethiopian Socialism), which had for most part 
been kindled with the rhetoric of justice, equality, freedom, nationalism, national sovereignty and 
the primacy of the economic benefit of the common people. The first such attempt appeared in 
the official government policy document. It states: 
 
If we were to use the historic opportunity to create a new nation which we will all be proud of, it is 
necessary to provide an answer to the question ‘what will be the political philosophy on the basis of which 
this new Ethiopia will be built? 
 
…having demolished the old order, it is necessary to demonstrate what political and social order takes its 
place. An act of demolition should immediately be followed by an act of creation. It is unfinished job which 
starts with the former and shies away with the latter. We have said that the new Ethiopia will be created on 
the basis of our motto ‘Ethiopia Tikdem’. But the full meaning of this motto ought to be spelled out. The 
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political philosophy should provide the meaning of ‘Ethiopia Tikdem’…The political philosophy embraces 
five fundamental principles of the present movement: 
1. All Ethiopians of whatever religion, language, sex or local affinity shall live together in 
equality, fraternity, harmony and unity under the umbrella of their country. Ethiopia will 
become a country in which justice, equality, and freedom will prevail. 
2. The boundless idolatry of private gain has chained our country to poverty, and which has 
humiliated our country in the eyes of the world, will be eradicated. Henceforth, the 
interests of the community will be paramount. 
3. The rights of self-administration which our people had exercised at the village, district 
and regional levels and which had been usurped will be restored. The central government 
will be responsible for national or otherwise fundamental matters of state and give 
assistance and support to communities exercising self-administration. 
4. Man is meant to work to support himself and his community. Human labor will 
consequently be accorded a respected place in our social framework. Conversely, 
exploitation and parasitism will be socially condemned modes of living. 
5. Above all, the unity of the country will be the scared faith of all our people.    In short: 
‘Ethiopia Tikdem’ (‘Ethiopia First’) means Hibrettesebawinet (Ethiopian Socialism); and 
Hibrettesebawinet means equality; self-reliance; the dignity of labor; the supremacy of 
the common good; and the indivisibility of Ethiopian unity. That is our political 
philosophy. And those are the principles upon which the foundations of the new Ethiopia 
will rest. (emphasis added) (PMAC, 1974: 7-8)  
 
       The politico-administrative, social and economic policies that underpinned the philosophy 
had further been emphasized (op. cit). Dergue pledged to invest resources and exert efforts to 
promote collective decision making from village to higher-level government institutions. It also 
pledged for an establishment of a single political party under which every facet of social life had 
to be mobilized and to which every segment of Ethiopian society had to pay its allegiance (ibid: 
8). Hence, not only was this single political party enjoined to ensure ‘popular participation’, but it 
would also be instrumental for the dissemination of the political philosophy as well as state 
control (ibid, 8). Ottaway and Ottaway (1978: 63), nevertheless, argued that Ethiopia Tikdem 
meant in effect a rejection of a pluralist parliamentary system in which various societal groups 
were represented in a struggle to determine national policy. In other words, only the military 
government and the higher echelons of its administrative structures could interpret the common 
good and steer Ethiopia in the ‘right direction’ (ibid.).   
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       The guidelines certainly indicated that the Dergue placed it self in an analogous position to a 
vanguard party among the plethora of government institutions, with the public bureaucracy 
enforcing its policies (Schwab, 1985). In addition, the political philosophy that set policy 
guidelines redefined Ethiopia’s economy, calling for the state control of major industrial 
establishments, with a limited participation of the private sector in the economy. It also called for 
government ownership of land (which was the center piece of Ethiopia Tikdem), 
communications, manufacturing industries, electricity, and mining of precious metals, tourism, 
and large-scale construction. In effect, the new economic policy provided value premises upon 
which a socialist Ethiopia would be constructed. The Dergue further outlined its economic 
program as follows:   
 
The principle that the common good takes precedence over the pursuit of individual gain is the starting 
point of both economic and social policies. In the domain of economic policy, giving priority to the interests 
of the majority means curing its basic economic diseases. The basic economic disease of the majority is at 
present poverty. The primary element of economic policy is consequently the abolition of poverty. In 
addition, the prevention of economic exploitation will also be an element of this policy. This requires the 
public ownership of the nation’s economic resources.   
         Accordingly those resources that are either crucial for economic development or are of such a 
character that they provide an indispensable service to the community will have to be brought under 
government control or ownership… 
       The natural resources of the country will be a special instrument of this policy. Agriculture is at present 
the mainstay of the national economy. Land tenure and agricultural policy will consequently be changed in 
a manner which will make it possible to abolish poverty and narrow the gap in the level of living. As land 
belongs to the entire community, the government is the trustee of this important national resource. 
     
Land exclusively under public ownership and management will be designated periodically.  Government 
will give guidelines for land which is owned communally. Similarly, private holdings which will fall under 
cooperative associations will also operate under guidelines provided by the Government.  Individuals and 
communities which have the legal right to operate communal, cooperative, or private farms will be 
accountable to the Government for the good care and management of their holdings. The forthcoming law 
on land reform will in particular cover this point. Those who operate communal and cooperative farms will 
be given special government support and assistance. (PMAC, 1974: 10)
  
 
       These represented the overriding parameters and beliefs that had guided the commitment of 
the emerging policy elites till they adopted National Democratic Revolution Program (NDRP) in 
April 1976. This period had also witnessed the rapid growth of a cohesive administrative 
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framework in which all social, political and economic policies that were to be pursued would be 
incorporated within that socialist construct (Schwab, 1985).  In other words, not only did 
December 1974 represent the genesis of the institutionalization of policymaking structures under 
the leadership of the Dergue, but it was also a turning point in Ethiopian history for it witnessed 
the official introduction of socialism.  
       The ideological metamorphosis16 that had its inception even before the Dergue took power 
culminated in the National Democratic Revolution Program (NDRP) that made its entrance into 
the official government policy documents and pronouncements after April 1976. Predicated on 
the teachings of Marx and Lenin, the NDRP was a radical recourse for ideological commitment 
towards scientific socialism. The Program set out the following objectives: 
 
1. To completely abolish feudalism, imperialism and bureaucratic-capitalism from Ethiopia and with united 
effort of all anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces build a new Ethiopia and lay a strong foundation for the 
transition to socialism. 
2. Towards this end, under the leadership of the working class and on the basis of the worker-peasant 
alliance and in collaboration with the petty bourgeoisie and other anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces, 
establish a peoples’ democratic republic in which the freedom, equality, unity and prosperity of Ethiopian 
peoples is ensured, in which self-government at different levels is exercised and which allows for the 
unconditional exercise of human and democratic rights. (PMAC, 1976)
      
 
       These pronouncements coincided with the establishment of the Provisional Office for Mass 
Organizational Affairs (POMOA). The responsibility of translating the teachings of Marx and 
Lenin into different ethnic languages, disseminating the same among the Ethiopian public and 
laying the groundwork for the establishment of a workers’ party as well as a Soviet-style people’s 
republic was assigned to the latter by legislation (PMAC, 1976). Despite it took several years of 
acrimonious conflict and bickering within the Dergue and between it and civilian activists, the 
objectives stipulated in the Program had an enormous impact on the modus operandi of 
policymaking and organization of policymaking institutions. From this time forth, the teachings 
of Marx and Lenin set the parameters of rallying the peasantry and the urban poor behind the 
government and its policies and practices. Nationalization of the means of production and the re-
organization of the economy in terms of a central planning and command structure; and the 
                                                
16
 Adargachew (1993: 163) summed up the ideological metamorphosis as follows: Ethiopia First (Ethiopia Tikdem) 
of July 1974 could be described as the program of a coup d’etat; Ethiopian Socialism (Hebrettesebawinet) of 
December 1974 as a program of African Socialism, and NDRP of April 1976 as a program of scientific socialism. 
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promotion of anti-West and pro-East foreign policies were entirely predicated on the ideology. 
Not only did the ideology set the parameters and modus operandi of public policymaking, but it 
also provided the party and the executive leadership with the powers to set priorities for agenda 
setting and policy choices to be made. Put simply, policy elites adopted Marxism-Leninism, 
whose conceptual tools guided the policy goals to be pursued and the institutional instruments to 
be constructed in formulating and implementing public policies.  
       When the Commission for Organizing the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) was 
established in 1979, not only did the Dergue make the official claim that building socialism and 
communism in Ethiopia would only be possible under the leadership of a Leninist party, but it 
also claimed that the single most important actor in the socio-economic policymaking process 
was the party of the working people (PMAC, 1980: 60). With COPWE as a leading political 
entity, the importance of disseminating Marxist-Leninist doctrine among government and mass 
organizations, cooperatives and the public had boldly been underscored (op. cit.). Policy elites 
further pledged to organize a single party of the working people and instituting a new people’s 
democratic republic essentially guided by and based on the ideology of Marxism-Leninism (ibid: 
61). A party document further reaffirmed: 
 
Marxism-Leninism, the philosophy of the working people, is indissolubly linked with practice, with 
political struggle. Born and developed in the heart of class struggle between the working class and the 
bourgeoisie, Marxism Leninism has already lit up mankind’ s road to communism. … Since its momentous 
upsurge, the Ethiopian Revolution has stage-by-stage opened new vistas for the adequate dissemination of 
Marxism Leninism among the Ethiopian working people. Successive political measures effected by the 
revolutionary government in the last six years have created propitious climate for the spread of scientific 
doctrine. To mention but some, the government declaration proclaiming socialism as our political guideline 
and the establishment of institutions that enable the spread of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism among 
the broad people and the revolutionary army have been instrumental in this regard. The proclamation of the 
NDRP and the efforts of genuine revolutionaries have also facilitated the spread of Marxism Leninism in 
the country. 
         It is well worthy to note that the formation of COPWE entails and has necessitated the spread of 
Marxism Leninism in a coordinated and centrally guided manner. The formation of the commission has 
opened wide avenues for the dissemination of Marxism Leninism free from dogmatism and 
revisionism…The Ethiopian working people who have reached a decisive stage in their revolutionary 
struggle need Marxism Leninism because they are striving to build a just society…Today, when conducive 
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atmosphere for the dissemination of Marxism Leninism is at hand, the masses would certainly make 
strenuous efforts to all the more embrace it as the sole guidepost in their struggle.   (COPWE, 1980) 
 
        Hence, the clamor for embracing Marxism-Leninism stems from the fact that it served as a 
tool for the socio-economic transformation of the country. It was also seen as the only reliable 
conceptual tool and guiding principle for formulating the ‘correct’ socio-economic strategies and 
policies and determining the lines of the country’s socio-economic and political development (op. 
cit.).  
      In just a few months after its establishment, COPWE’s structure spanned almost all the 
regions, provinces, districts and work places in the towns and rural villages. It increasingly came 
to symbolize the cutting edge of all socio-economic and political initiatives and national policy 
decisions, although the core group of Dergue members as yet remained the top echelon of the 
COPWE leadership. The Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee of COPWE, for 
instance, conducted a four-day deliberation on the vital national social and economic policy 
issues, and issued an 11-point resolutions mainly targeting the re-organization of the Ethiopian 
trade unions, urban dwellers’ and peasant associations, youth, women’s and professional 
associations along party lines (COPWE, 1981). COPWE’s leadership issued a set of guidelines 
for restructuring and implementing administrative institutions that had vital importance, such as 
the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing, National Revolutionary Development 
Campaign and Central Planning Supreme Council (NRDC-CPSC) and other implementing 
agencies dealing with natural resources, tourism, agriculture and commerce (ibid.). Having been 
the hallmark of socialist socio-economic transformation, the establishment of NRDC-CPSC in 
Ethiopia marked the ascendance of a command economy and central planning based on 
socialism.  
      By a proclamation promulgated in September 1984, COPWE was renamed as the Worker’s 
Party of Ethiopia (WPE). Since then, the latter issued guidelines and decrees to guide and 
monitor state-society relationships. Although much of the statutory pronouncements were often 
made in the name of the Dergue, since the end of the 1970s, nevertheless, COPWE and after mid-
1980s WPE assumed virtual control over the entire socio-economic policymaking process. With 
the coming into being of the WPE, not only had policymaking by far been centralized and 
institutionalized, but so also did the teachings of Marx, Lenin and the program of WPE dictate 
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the policymaking process. The overriding strategic objective of the party was claimed to be 
building socialism, and via socialism achieve socio-economic and political transformation and 
move towards a classless society, namely, communism (WPE, 1984). The party professed that 
any socio-economic development and transformation in Ethiopia would be unthinkable in the 
absence of the leading role of the WPE and the principles of Marxism-Leninism from which it 
got its inspiration (ibid: 24).  WPE contended: 
 
Accordance to the stage of development that the Ethiopian revolution has currently attained, the primary 
and fundamental goal of the revolution is the establishment of the People’s Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia under the leadership of WPE. The realization of this goal will primarily necessitate the political 
hegemony of the working class. In the economic sphere, the expansion and strengthening of the socialist 
relations of production, as well as facilitation of the development of the forces of production are second to 
none.  Ideologically, promoting the cultural and the level of knowledge of the working people and achieving 
ideological unity among them are of paramount importance. The realization of the principle of proletarian 
internationalism should simultaneously be promoted in line with the political, economic and ideological 
objectives of the party. In sum, not only will the effective achievement of the preceding objectives deepen 
the democratic revolution, but also can create conditions conducive for building socialism. (1984: 116)         
   
      Having perceived the insignificance of the socialist portion in the economy, WPE pledged to 
work towards organizing and broadening the socialist economic base (op. cit.). While recognizing 
that the socialist and private forms of production relations were locked in competition, it saw the 
necessity of establishing state control over the private sector to prevent the latter from 
undermining the socialist form of production relations (WPE, 1984: 25-26). WPE saw revamping 
and strengthening of the party’s structure as the most important precondition for the promotion of 
the public sector as well as laying the material basis for socialist socio-economic construction. 
Much like its successors, WPE laid emphasis on the primacy of agriculture both in the short and 
medium terms, and transformed the economy from a predominantly agriculturally based to an 
industrially based economy. WPE’s central strategy in agriculture, therefore, was targeted at the 
transformation of miniscule and isolated farming units into modern large-scale farming whereby 
more advanced organization of agricultural production could be utilized (ibid.). The corollaries of 
WPE’s agricultural strategies, at least in the medium term, included expanding big state-owned 
farms, and transforming small peasant holdings into large-scale producer cooperatives that would 
in turn facilitate improved organization, use of better and more advanced technology, better 
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production services (op. cit.).  Another important corollary of the rural transformation program 
was the relocation and reorganization of the peasantry from peasant associations based on 
scattered homesteads to producers’ cooperatives organized on the basis of rural resettlement and 
villagization programs, which had rigorously been pursued before and after the establishment of 
WPE (Harbeson, 1988). Additionally, WPE exerted an effort to create an efficient system of 
socialist economic management based on the principles of democratic centralism and strong 
central and regional planning.  
      In the political and administrative spheres, based on a worker-peasant alliance and 
progressive revolutionary elements, WPE pledged the establishment of a people’s democratic 
republic of Ethiopia. ‘WPE is at the forefront of the new socio-political order whose ultimate 
objective is the establishment of proletarian dictatorship and under the leadership of WPE. The 
Party’s commitments to its historic mission of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat and 
laying the socio-political basis of socialism can come true only if it can assert its supremacy in 
the political leadership’ (WPE, 1984: 39-40). Moreover, not only did the party claim that it was 
at the cutting age of the entire political process, but also professed that no socio-economic 
development programs would be accomplished without its leadership. Suffice it to say that 
Marxism-Leninism profoundly influenced development goals, with the establishments of the day 
centrally guiding policy implementation.  
      As earlier noted, the real policymaking power in WPE, however, resided in the Politburo, 
which had eleven full and six alternate members.  Dawit (1990), an insider and a former member 
of the Central Committee of WPE, nevertheless noted that, although WPE’s Politburo had 
ostensibly been the country’s most important policymaking body, the latter was a little more than 
the articulation of ideas already decided on personally by Mengistu. In other words, most policies 
of vital importance, including major socio-economic decisions, that Mengistu proposed had little 
difficulty finding their way onto the agenda, and, therefore, he could make decisions that had far-
reaching consequences without consulting the executive ministries (ibid., 1990).  
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3.4. The making of the 1987 constitution and its implications, 1987-1991 
 
 
   3.4.1. The making of the constitution 
 
WPE’s program set the preconditions for the making of the constitution in 1984. It spelt out the 
following points. 
 
1. A new political order called for an establishment of the Peoples’ Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia under the leadership of WPE. The major task ahead of the leadership of 
WPE and the government of PDRE would be to undertake a non-capitalist path of 
socio-economic development, build socialism and communism. The achievement of 
these objectives would again call for restructuring of government institutions based on 
a worker-peasant alliance, which would gradually evolve into the dictatorship of the 
proletariat.    
 
2. The institutional structure of the PDRE would be based on the universal tenets of 
Marxism-Leninism and the principles of socialism. Hence, the republic would be 
supported by democratic centralism, socialist legality and proletarian internationalism. 
In general, the modus operandi of the PDRE as well as the fundamental rights of 
citizens would be enshrined in the constitution and other laws.   
 
3. WPE would ensure that the National Shengo operates as the supreme organ of state 
power in the PDRE, and the supremacy of the working people would be affirmed in 
the republic. Moreover, the structures of PDRE would be unitary and take into 
account the settlement factors and economic conditions of ethnic groups or 
nationalities. In the republic the organization of government power from the lowest 
regions to the national government organs would be predicated on popular elections.  
 
4. In view of the proper discharge of duties at different levels in the hierarchy of the 
republic, government officials would come under close government and public 
scrutiny as well as control (WPE, 1984: 41-43).   
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      Although there had been a flurry of activities (among the public, the ruling party and 
government circles) during the process of the making of the constitution, the above guidelines 
continued to reign all along. In fact, the directives appeared in the different parts of the 
constitution that contained 119 articles and 17 chapters in 1987. In his opening remarks to the 
first plenary session of the Constitutional Commission, Mengistu reiterated the guidelines that 
underpinned the constitution making process:  
 
….the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) will be organized and run on the basis of the 
well-known principles of Democratic Centralism, Proletarian Internationalism and socialist legality. It will 
also be founded for the purpose of the realization of the programs and policies of the WPE. It will 
accordingly make a vital contribution to finalize our struggle, which is aimed at accomplishing the National 
Democratic Revolution through mobilization of the working people, and lay the necessary material and 
technical foundation for the attainment of socialism. 
          As you well know, intensive and extensive research has been conducted at the Institute for the Study 
of Nationalities to act as a springboard for the preparation of the constitution. Considerable work has been 
carried out in this regard primarily with the close attention of COPWE and the Revolutionary Government 
and later under the guidance of our party (WPE). Useful preliminary ideas have been advanced by 
examining conditions in light of the characteristics of the revolution and its long-term objectives in order to 
qualitatively formulate the constitution of the New Ethiopia. Accordingly, the constitution drafting 
commission is not beginning its work in a vacuum but on the basis of the concrete studies and research on 
which much labor has been invested. (Herald, 25 February 1986)  
  
      The primary task facing the WPE following its formation in 1984 was thus to develop a new 
national constitution that would lead to the inauguration of the People's Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia (PDRE). A Constitutional Commission consisting of 343 members was formed, by a 
proclamation, to draft a new constitution in March 1986 (PMAC, 1986:3-8). Eventually, the 122 
full and alternate members of the WPE Central Committee who had been appointed to its 
membership dominated the commission (Teferra, 1997). The Constitutional Commission had its 
origins in the Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities17, which the Dergue established in 
March 1983 to seek solutions to problems resulting from Ethiopia's ethnic diversity, to conduct 
research, and undertake studies leading to the drafting of the constitution as well as the 
                                                
17
  The Institute for the Studies of Nationalities was established by government proclamation in 1983 to conduct 
studies on the nationalities of Ethiopia, to draft a new national constitution and prepare and submit proposals for new 
administrative regions (Hailu, 2003).    
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restructuring of national and regional organs (Hailu, 2003: 2). Mostly academics from Addis 
Ababa University and practitioners from different government institutions, who also served as 
advisers to the Constitutional, Referendum and Electoral Commissions, staffed the institute. 
Considering the provisions stipulated in the legislation that established it, the Institute was re-
organized into five professional groupings, namely, Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
Administrative Affairs, Economic and Geographic Affairs, Historical and Nationalities Affairs, 
and Social and Sociological Affairs (ibid.).   
      Hailu (ibid: 4-6), who himself was a staff member of the Institute for the Study of 
Nationalities, noted that the most important task was the drafting of the constitution, whose 
preparation began in earnest in 1984 and continued till the beginning of 1985. During this period 
the staff of the Institute made several short-term visits to ‘friendly/socialist countries’, including 
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, North Korea, Vietnam and India to gather relevant information 
on state formation, state structuring, organization and conduct of elections, parliamentary systems 
and regional administrations (op. cit.). It was also during this period that ‘eight draft constitutions 
were examined, discussed and revised by the experts in the Institute. In the process, consultations 
were made and feedback gained from higher-level organs of the Party and Government’ (Hailu, 
2003: 6). After obtaining the seal of approval from high state and party officials, and 
accompanied by detailed explanatory documents, the 9th draft was presented to the Constitution 
Drafting Commission. This point to the fact that the so-called National Constitution Drafting 
Commission, whose members had been selected and appointed by the Head of State (Mengistu), 
was pressured into endorsing the 9th draft.  
      Although the commission's diverse membership included religious leaders, artists, writers, 
doctors, academics, athletes and workers, WPE selected and appointed all of them. For about six 
months the commission allegedly discussed the details of the new constitution. While the 
Commission consisted of a congress, an executive committee, coordinating committee at 
regional, provincial and district levels, most of the discussion was invariably among the 
executive committee led by key figures in the party leadership. In June 1986 a 120-article draft 
document was officially issued. The government printed and distributed nearly two million 
copies of the constitution (to kebeles18 and peasant associations throughout the country), the text 
                                                
18
 Kebeles- were formed after the two consecutive proclamations that turned rural and urban lands to state ownership. 
Kebeles are thus popular terms used to describe cooperative rural and urban neighborhood associations. These 
institutions provided the basic level of administration in the countryside as well as towns.  
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of which was translated into languages of fifteen nationalities (PMAC, 1986). During the next 
two months the draft was discussed at about 25,000 locations. The regime might have used the 
public discussion to legitimize the constitution-making process. In some cases, people attended 
constitutional discussion sessions only after pressure from local WPE cadres, but in other cases 
attendance was voluntary. Where popular interest was apparent, it centered on issues such as 
taxes, the role of religion, marriage, the organization of elections, and citizenship rights and 
obligations. By far the most controversial draft provision was the one that outlawed polygamy, 
which caused an uproar among Muslims (ibid.). In contrast, as Teferra (1997: 277) observed, the 
articles that attracted the largest number of comments and questions were those that provided for 
the question of nationality, the rights and duties of citizens, socio-economic systems and political 
order, and ownership of property and leadership of the working class. In any case, the public 
submitted more than 500,000 suggested revisions (PMAC, 1986). In September the commission 
was reconvened to consider proposed amendments, and decided that the draft be presented to the 
Central Committee of WPE. In all, the commission accepted ninety-five amendments to the 
original draft, notwithstanding the fact that most of the changes were invariably cosmetic.  
      It has nevertheless been noted that the major decisions regarding the constitution were made 
personally made by Mengistu and his close associates. In fact, the Central Committee and 
politburo of WPE were not even involved in the drafting process (Dawit, 1990: 67-68, 
Andargachew, 1993:  267). Be that as it may, the referendum on the constitution was held on 
February 1, 1987, and the results were announced three weeks later (Hailu, 2003).  96 percent of 
the 14 million people eligible to participate (adults eighteen years of age and older) voted (ibid.). 
Eighty-one percent of the electorate endorsed the constitution, while 18 percent opposed it (1 
percent of the ballots were invalid) (Hailu, 2003:10). Although this was the first election in 
Ethiopia's history based on universal suffrage, the heavy presence of WPE cadres throughout the 
country had complicated the democratic virtues of the constitution-making process (Clapham, 
1988; Dawit, 1990).  In any case, the constitutional document, which established the normative 
foundations of the PDRE, consisted of 17 chapters and 119 articles.  
      An election commission whose major task was to facilitate and oversee the election of 
deputies to the national parliament (National Shengo or National Assembly) was designated by a 
proclamation in April 1987. According to the constitution, the party, government and mass 
organizations nominated candidates to the Shengo. Voting took place on June 1987, and results 
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were compiled and delivered to the election commission; accordingly, out of 2466 candidates, 
813 deputies were elected to the National Shengo (Hailu, 2003). The constitution was officially 
put into effect on February 22, 1987, although it was not until September that the new 
government was fully in place and the PMAC formally replaced by PDRE (op. cit.).  
 
  3.4.2. The implications of the constitution for policymaking 
  
The preamble of the PDRE’s constitution traced Ethiopia’s origins back to olden days, praised 
the historical heroism of its people, eulogized the country's unexploited, natural and human 
wealth, and pledged to continue the struggle against imperialism and poverty (PDRE, 1987:55). 
The government claimed that its primary concern was the country's development through the 
implementation of the National Democratic Revolution Program (NDRP), with the primary 
emphasis placed on setting the material and technical bases necessary for the implementation of 
socialism (ibid.).  
      It further situated Ethiopia in the context of the movement of proletarian internationalism and 
progressive states. Critics claimed that the constitution was no more than an abridged version of 
the 1977 Soviet constitution, although strong powers were assigned to the office of the president 
(Clapham, 1988; Andargachew, 1993; Teferra, 1987). A second difference between the Ethiopian 
and Soviet constitutions was that the former declared the country a unitary state rather than a 
union of republics. The 1987 constitution also pledged to seek solutions to simmering problems 
of ethnicity within the framework of a single multiethnic state rather than a federation (PDRE, 
1987).  
      The ultimate policymaking power appeared to have resided in the president of the republic 
and the Council of the State (which largely comprised the highest echelon of Dergue members). 
The articles that follow the preamble largely addressed the political and socio-economic system 
that the country had to be built to be a member of the family of socialist nations (PDRE, 1987: 
55-61).  With the republic’s commitment to the building of socialism via the accomplishment of 
national democratic revolution, Ethiopia was seen as a state of the working people established on 
the basis of a worker-peasant alliance (1987: 55-56). The equality of nationalities and languages 
within the framework of a unitary state were also assured. Guided by Marxism-Leninism, the 
Workers’ Party of Ethiopia (WPE) was the sole vanguard political organization with a supreme 
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commitment to determine socio-economic policies of the country as well as with the powers to 
lead the state and the entire society (article 6). Not only did socialist legality take center stage in 
the governance of the relationships between the different state organs in the hierarchy of state, on 
the one hand, and mass organizations, officials and individuals in the society, on the other, but it 
was also the key political parameter in the selection of the participants and actors in the country’s 
socio-economic policymaking process (articles 5 and 6). Furthermore, the organization of the 
organs of the state were based on democratic centralism, with the lower organs accounting to the 
next higher organs for their actions and abiding by the decisions of the higher organs (article 4).  
      In the economic sphere the state would relieve the country of economic backwardness by 
strengthening the socialist relations of production and building ‘a highly integrated national 
economy’ based on central planning (article 9).  While allowing for a limited form of private 
ownership within limits set by laws, it reaffirmed the pre-eminence of socialist ownership of the 
means of production, distribution and exchange (articles 9 and 12). In the field of culture, the 
constitution pledged to imbue the working people with socialist morality and the proletarian 
culture (article 23).  
      Having provided for equality before the law regardless of ethnicity, sex, religion, occupation, 
social and cultural status, the provisions dealing with citizenship, freedoms, rights and duties 
tended to be egalitarian. Citizens were granted the right to work, to receive free education, to 
have access to health care, to conduct research and engage in creative activities in science and 
technology. Unlike in an imperial state, the state and religion were separate. Citizens were also 
guaranteed the freedom of conscience, religion, of speech, press, peaceable assembly, 
demonstration and association, although in reality citizens enjoyed very little in this regard 
(articles 35, 40, 41, 42, 46 and 47).    
      The bulk of chapters eight to fifteen of the constitution described the modus operandi of 
policymaking during the first republic and detailed the hierarchical and horizontal relationships 
between organs within the republic (PDRE, 1987: 73-92). PDRE was essentially a unitary state 
comprising of administrative and autonomous regions, with the administrative regions and units 
of administration hierarchically organized from the highest to the lowest levels (articles 59 and 
60). Elected for a five-year term and holding sessions annually, the supreme organ of the 
Republic was the National Shengo (national parliament) with extensive legislative powers 
(articles 63, 67 and 68). They were, among others, enacting, amending and following up the 
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observance of the constitution and proclamations, issuing domestic, foreign, defense and security 
policies; determining the state of peace and war; determining monetary and fiscal policies (ibid).  
      As provided under the constitution, the National Shengo was empowered to institute the vital 
organs of the state such as Council of the State, the Council of Ministers, ministries, state 
committees, commissions and other government agencies, the Supreme Court, the Office of the 
Procurator General, the National Workers’ Control Committee and the Office of the Auditor 
General. Electing the President of the Republic, the Vice-President, the Vice-Presidents of the 
Council of the State, approving the appointment of other high government officials had also been 
vested in the National Shengo (article 63). It is worth noting here that the Council of State, the 
President of the Republic, Commissions of the National Shengo, members of the National 
Shengo, the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court, the Procurator General, Shengos of higher 
administrative and autonomous regions, and mass organizations through their national organs 
were designated to propose laws and policies, although in practice the upper reach of the party 
and executive leadership had exclusive claim on public policymaking (article 71).  
      Having been assigned to follow up the implementation and interpretation of the constitution, 
the Council of the State represented the standing body of the National Shengo. Its powers 
included, among others, revoking the directives and decisions of regional government organs that 
had to account to the National Shengo, ratifying and revoking international treaties, granting 
amnesty, granting citizenship and political asylum (articles 81 and 82). Announcing the date of 
the election of the Shengo, calling its extra-ordinary sessions as well as coordinating the work of 
its ad-hoc and standing committees, overseeing the discharge of responsibilities by the Council of 
Ministers, the Supreme Court, the Procurator General, the National Workers’ Control Committee 
had as well been entrusted to the Council of the State. Moreover, the latter had the power to issue 
decrees in the pursuit of responsibilities assigned by the Shengo. Comprised of the president of 
PDRE, the vice presidents, a secretary and high officials of the National Shengo, not only was the 
Council of the State empowered to issue special decrees between the recesses of the Shengo, but 
also was it empowered to declare states of emergency, war, martial law, mobilization or issue 
peace decrees (PDRE, 1987: 79). 
      Although the Council of Ministers was formally the highest executive organ, sweeping 
executive powers were vested in the President, a position which was held by Mengistu (PDRE, 
1987: 81-84). The President of the PDRE was, therefore, the Head of the State, who represented 
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the Republic both at home and abroad, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (article 
85). The constitution also vested additional executive powers in the President, ranging from 
presiding over the sessions of the National Shengo and Council of Ministers to appointing 
personnel to ministerial and executive leadership, and conferring high military and civilian 
appointments (ibid). He enjoyed legislative powers such as: issuing Presidential decrees in the 
pursuit of powers provided by the 1987 constitution, promulgating laws approved by the Shengo, 
the Council of the State and the President of the PDRE (PDRE, 1987: 83). Equally, the President 
enjoyed the privileges of appointing or dismissing the prime minister, deputy prime minister, and 
members of the Council of Ministers, the president and vice-presidents of the Supreme Court, the 
Procurator General, the chairman of the National Workers’ Control Committee, and the Auditor 
General and the Judges of the Supreme Court (article 87). Consisting of the Prime Minister, 
Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and other members as defined by law, the Council of 
Ministers was the highest executive as well as administrative organ of the Republic (article 89). 
Comprised of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and other government officials, the 
Council of Ministers was chiefly empowered to execute policies (articles 91 and 92).  
      The constitution and other statutory provisions, nevertheless, appeared not to have clearly 
shown the overwhelming powers of the combined forces of the executive and party leadership in 
public policymaking during the first republic (i.e. from 1987 to 1991). The powers of legislation 
and policy initiation had been vested in the National Shengo, as provided under the 1987 
constitution. In practice, nevertheless, policymaking power resided in the higher echelons of the 
organs of the Republic and WPE precisely because of the requirement of the principle on which 
policymaking institutions were premised, namely,  ‘democratic centralism’. In fact, by default or 
design, not only had the party and the executive claimed the prerogatives of designating and 
fielding candidates to the Shengo, but they were also the architects and key players to lead the 
state and society. Apparently, the party (WPE) represented a sustained effort to create a political 
leadership with a structure though which policy decisions were to be communicated and 
implemented (Clapham, 1988).   Despite the official claim put the members of the Dergue’s 
parliament drawn from the peasantry and urban poor to 48 percent, in reality, however, over 95 
percent of the Shengo members who had been classified as workers, farmers, state and party 
functionaries were the members of the party (see Table 3.1., Teferra, 1997).  
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      In addition, the fact that the Dergue’s parliament could only hold sessions once in a year 
rendered difficult the exercise of legislative duties, oversight and subpoena over the executive as 
stipulated in the constitution. In other words, while the National Shengo was during the long 
recess, the Council of the State which drew its members largely from the ‘top-notch’ members of 
the Dergue chaired by Mengistu, made all the policy decisions (Asmerom, 1993: 87). Assafa 
writes: 
 
…Not only was the concentration of power in the emperor transferred wholesale to the new head of state, 
the president, the same functions of the royal retinue which filled and sustained the imperial state were 
restated in favor of the only party allowed to exist in the country, the so-called Workers Party of Ethiopia. 
The absence of any distinction between the state and the party structures and the overlapping powers of the 
functionaries in both re-created the autocracy at the zenith. Ultimate power resided in the president and in 
his appointees down the line, despite and because of the confusion and overlap in the powers of the 
executive, the judiciary and the Shengo as well as the party. (2002: 69) 
   
      Additionally, while the Council of Ministers, various government bodies and the national 
leadership of mass organizations received official recognition in proposing policies, in reality, 
however, enormous powers remained with the executive, the President and the party leadership 
(Dawit, 1990).  In sum, by default or by design, the Presidency, the Council of the State and the 
inner circles of the WPE leadership remained the repositories of policymaking powers till 1991.  
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Table 3.1. Composition of the elected members of the National Shengo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Peoples Democratic Republic of Ethiopia; Facts and Figures (CSA: 1987: 9) 
 
 
 3.5. State-society relationships and policymaking 
   
Over a period of seventeen years since the Dergue took the lever of state power, the official 
ideology, namely Marxism-Leninism, guided the state-society relationship. Not only were 
democratic centralism, socialist legality, proletarian internationalism, the hegemony of the 
working class and the leading role of the WPE inviolable and unchallengeable, but they were also 
the foundation on which the entire state-society relationships depended. Organized and sponsored 
by the ruling party, societal forces involving the peasantry, industrial employees, urban residents, 
women, teachers, the youth and professional associations tended to be subservient to the party 
and state policies.   
      In the wake of the promulgation of rural land proclamation that completely wiped out the 
landlord-tenant relationship in 1975, the peasantry had initially been allowed opportunities for 
self-administration. Not only had the rural land proclamation made the peasantry the owner of the 
fruits of its labor, but it also permitted them to establish peasant associations at Kebele 
(neighborhood), district and provincial/regional levels. The peasant associations enjoyed limited 
powers in such areas as distribution of land, administration of property, building of schools, 
clinics, and similar institutions essential for local socio-economic development as well as 
 
* Social Composition                                                  Percent 
-Workers…………………………………………………………………….12.1 
- Farmers…………………………………………………………………….36.5 
- State Functionaries……………………………………………………….. 23.6  
- Party Functionaries/Cadres…………………………………………………8.6 
- Members of the Armed Forces…………………………………………….12.9 
- Artisans……………………………………………………………………...1.5 
- Others………………………………………………………………………. 4.9                           
* Age 
 
- 21- 30……………………………………………………………………….18.2 
- 31-60………………………………………………………………………..79.6 
-60 and above………………………………………………………………….2.2 
 
*Education 
- Literate………………………………………………………………………4.7 
-Elementary and Secondary………………………………………………….67.1 
- Higher (B.A. 8.1 %, M.A. 4.4 %, PhD 3.1 %, and others 12.6 %)…………28.2   
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establishment of judicial tribunals to settle land disputes (PMAC, 1975: 96-97). Among the most 
important piece of the enactment that has left its vestiges to this day has been the provision that 
stipulated the setting up of a Kebele (neighborhood) association, which represented an incipient 
from of peasant self-administration. Equally important, though, the Ministry of Land Reform and 
Administration wielded wide-ranging powers such as the establishment of peasant associations, 
presiding over district and provincial judicial tribunals of the associations, monitoring their over-
all activities and expropriation of peasants’ lands for public use (ibid.). 
      At the outset it was not that clear whether peasant associations were self-governing units or 
merely local agencies for administering the land reform legislation, till a second law was enacted 
eight months later (PMAC, 1975). The proclamation stipulated that not only were the peasant 
associations channels through which land legislation and rural development programs 
implemented, but they were also seen as self-governing administrative and political units with 
legal personality. In fact, the economic roles of the associations were more boldly pronounced in 
terms of the organization of service and agricultural producers’ cooperatives, notwithstanding 
these had subsequently led to villagization19 - a measure that contravened the will of the 
peasantry and thereby aroused an international outcry (ibid.). Additionally, the legislation 
enhanced the powers of the associations to adjudicate criminal and civil cases that went far 
beyond dealing with only land reform issues. It further broadened their administrative powers and 
allowed them to participate in ‘revolutionary administrative and development committees’, which 
were established at different levels in the hierarchy of government administrations and 
strengthened their part in the formulation and execution of a wide variety of socio-economic 
policies (op. cit.). At this stage it would probably be safe to conclude that the peasants as much 
influenced government policies as they were influenced by government policies and 
administration. In the early years of the revolution, therefore, it might not be fair to doubt that 
peasants and their associations functioned as effective self-governing institutions (Ottaway and 
Ottaway, 1978; Cohen and Koehn, 1980; Clapham, 1988). 
      With the establishment of COPWE and WPE, however, peasant associations increasingly 
came under party and government control. The reorganization of peasant associations at a 
national level in 1977 combined with the establishment of COPWE two years later completed 
                                                
19
 The next section will discuss villagization and resettlement schemes as integral parts of institutionalized structures 
of implementing agrarian policies in the countryside.   
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central management and control. The absence of ‘a central leadership of a monolithic political 
organization of the working class’ was considered as the main weakness responsible for the lack 
of coordination and ascendance of spontaneity among the peasant associations and other mass 
organizations (COPWE, 1980).  In his report to the second plenary session of the Central 
Committee of COPWE, Mengistu, the Chairman of the PMAC and of COPWE, disclosed that 
preparations to re-organize mass organizations such as the All Ethiopian Peasant Association 
(AEPA), Urban Dwellers’ Association, All Ethiopian Trade Unions (AETU) and professional 
associations under the leadership of COPWE had been finalized (COPWE, 1981). Henceforth, 
not only were peasant associations increasingly bureaucratized and came to be symbolized as the 
mouthpieces of the state, but they also became institutions of government directives channeling 
instructions downward (Dessalegn, 1984: 84; Clapham, 1988: 159). Nor had they any significant 
leverage on government policies in respect of agricultural prices, credit and related services 
which vitally affected their lives (op. cit.).  In the late 1970s, party cadres permeated peasant 
associations and made sure that peasants observed production quotas. Furthermore, party and 
government control of local peasant associations paved the way for imposed implementation of 
villagization and resettlement programs on the peasantry from the mid-to-late 1980s. Eventually, 
the associations had virtually been reduced to becoming agents of party and government 
structures and provided merely a system of communication between the state and party 
leadership, on the one hand, and the peasant population, on the other (Harbeson, 1988).  
Harbeson wrote: 
 
Peasant associations appear to have become instruments for transmission of official directives rather than 
institutions though which members’ interests and concerns are articulated to government. The existing … 
evidence suggests that leadership within the associations has been impermanent in duration as well as 
variable in perceived quality and that the associations have been executive-dominant with the constituent 
assemblies playing weak, intermittent and passive roles. They have been weakly institutionalized: Operating 
procedures have not been widely discussed and established on the basis of consensus, and elections have 
been held irregularly, and members have rarely used the associations effectively to articulate their concerns 
and those of their fellows.  (1988: 204)  
 
      Few years after the reconfiguration of COPWE’s structure in the entire land, the need to 
reorganize peasant associations and acculturate them with the ascendant party policy guidelines 
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(such as augmentation of agricultural production, expansion of the basis of socialist relations of 
production and broadening the party’s support base in rural Ethiopia) was maintained (PMAC, 
1982: 115). A third law was therefore issued and completed government and party control over 
the peasantry. With this end in sight, a national peasant association was reorganized with the 
leading members of AEPA affiliated to COPWE. Down the line, however, not only were the 
decisions of peasant associations overshadowed by local party and government agencies, but the 
latter also determined the elections, who should be removed and who should assume official 
leadership positions in the peasant associations (Dessalegn, 1984). In general, not only had the 
process of reorganization and restructuring measures denied the peasantry the bulk of the local 
autonomy and self-administration that the peasants and their leadership had enjoyed to a relative 
extent over the previous two years, but also had the institutional transformations taken place 
since the late 1970s proved the determination of the state and party to assimilate peasant 
associations as local organs of state administration (Pausewang, 1990).  In 1990 AEPA had 5.8 
million household members with a total number of 20565 basic level (kebele) peasant 
associations (CSA, 1990: 26) (see Table 3.2).  
 
Table 3.2. The number of neighborhood peasant (Kebele) associations (AEPA) 
 
Region No. of peasant associations No. of house holds 
Arsi 1,027    240,252 
Bale    594    113,756 
Eritrea     637    141,380 
Gamo Gofa    803    209,908 
Gojjam 1,778      583,477 
Gonder 1,063    363,959 
Hararge 1,346    456,913 
Illibabor    978    178,113 
Kefa 1,621    386,716 
Shewa 5,352 1,396,257 
Sidamo 1,616    615,506 
Tigray    319    143,434 
Wolega 2,208    370,762 
Wello 1,223    660,969 
Total 20,565 5,861,408 
Source: CSA, People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Facts and Figures, 1990: 26 
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      Likewise, party- and state-sponsored reorganization of other mass organizations continued till 
late 1982. Both government and party sought the importance of mass organizations as hotbeds of 
mass political actions as well as dissemination of the official ideology (COPWE, 1980). COPWE 
(ibid.) further claimed that not only were the mass organizations considered instrumental in the 
mobilization of the public for national defense and political action, but they were also seen as 
‘transmission belts of transposing, elaborating government policies and rallying them to 
implement’ state and party policies (op. cit). WPE’s program encapsulated COPWE’s decisions. 
In other words, adopted in 1984, the program of the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia (WPE) 
designated the Party, the State and Mass Organizations as the three pillars of the new political 
order (WPE, 1984). The inner circles of the party pledged to rely on the latter for the expansion 
of party membership and the propagation of party/state ideology (ibid: 38).   
      In fact, the primary potent force that the party and the state kept a watchful eye over was the 
industrial work force. In the first few years of the PMAC’s coming to power, the Confederation 
of Ethiopian Labor Union (CELU) was one of the strongest civil society organizations that 
attempted to assert its relative autonomy from the state. Even in the initial years of the revolution, 
however, the government’s attitude toward the industrial work force was unambiguously control 
oriented.  The government dissolved CELU and organized another trade union under the name of 
All Ethiopian Trade Union (AETU) in November 1977. The latter was continually being 
restructured to reaffirm that the prevailing values of the party and government leadership such as 
socialist reconstruction, democratic centralism and socialist legality had been internalized 
(PMAC, 1982). 
     Much like rural transformation and peasant associations, the formation of urban neighborhood 
(Kebele) associations coincided with the legislation ‘Government Ownership of Urban Lands and 
Extra Houses’ that the PMAC promulgated in July 1975. Over the succeeding years, the Urban 
Dwellers’ Associations was continuously being reorganized to bring them into line with the 
predominant party thinking that was earlier indicated. Likewise, the youth (Revolutionary 
Ethiopia Youth Association - REYA), and  women (Revolutionary Ethiopia Women’s 
Association - REWA), and eight other professional associations were reorganized under WPE to 
join the chorus of mass organizations, and expectations run high for such associations to prove 
themselves worthy of the party and revolutionary government of socialist Ethiopia (see Table 
3.3., COPWE, 1986).  
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Table 3.3. The number of towns, UDAs, basic associations and numbers of members of 
REYA and REWA 
                      UDAs                                            REYA                                      REWA                                         
 
 
Region 
No. of 
towns 
No. of urban 
neighborhood 
(kebele) 
associations 
 
 
No. of basic 
associations 
 
 
 
No. of 
members 
 
 
No. of basic 
associations 
 
 
No. of members 
Arsi 17 37 1,091 186,876 1,093 262,597 
Bale 9 18 561 113,380 574 127,146 
Eritrea 15 156 313 52,266 637 143,786 
Gamo Gofa 7 13 806 155,527 764 156,129 
Gojam 24 62 1,822 299,208 1,815 441,544 
Gonder 25 58 791 205,235 1,073 194,895 
Harerge 25 83 1,373 289,745 1,362 318,329 
Illibabor 12 20 973 122,518 1,014 164,106 
Kefa 16 46 1,700 371,253 1,693 398,879 
Shewa 60 177 5,664 1,485,554 5,669 1,103,648 
Sidamo 33 88 1,633 295,010 1,661 414,563 
Tigray 28 83 139 28,041 160 61,061 
Wollega 26 48 2,270 255,232 2,311 521,567 
Wello 26 73 1,234 363,681 1,222 502,454 
A. Ababa 1 284 292 163,355 284 183,045 
Assab Adm. 1 12 19 10,258 15 9825 
Total 325 1,258 20,751 4,417,139 21,247 5,003,547 
Source: CSA, People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Facts and Figures, 1990: 28 &30. 
 
Andargachew summed up as follows: 
 
The non-government organizations which also had the duty to cooperate …were what came to be 
known as the mass organizations including Peasant association, Urban Dweller’s Association, 
Revolutionary Ethiopian Women’s Association, the Revolutionary Ethiopian Youth Association, the All 
Ethiopian Trade Unions, and the professional associations like those of the doctors, nurses and teachers. 
The most important of these were the first two which, since their establishment in 1975, were expanded 
organizationally to embrace the entire population except the nomads and those under the guerilla control. 
 … The basic organizations of Revolutionary Ethiopian Women’s Association and the 
Revolutionary Ethiopian Youth Association were subordinated to the Basic Peasants’ and Urban Dwellers’ 
Associations and, hence, brought under the leadership of the latter two mass organizations. In addition, they 
were subordinated to their own higher bodies which were established at woreda, awraja20, provincial and 
national levels. The All Ethiopian Trade Unions and the professional associations, on the other hand were 
                                                
20
 While woreda represented the district level of local administration, aweraja was the next higher level of provincial 
administration which had widely been used during the imperial era and the military government.   
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established independently from the Peasants’ and Urban Dwellers’ Associations.   This has meant that  
almost every citizen belonged to one mass organization or another, and often he belonged to more than one 
organization at the same time. (1993: 260-261)
   
 
      Hence, all the mass and professional associations that were continuously reorganized under 
the rubric of ‘mass and professional associations’ had barely any chance of becoming channels of 
soliciting new ideas and the generation of inputs into the policymaking process. Instead they 
were auxiliary structures led by, closely tied to, and monitored by party and government 
leadership. Put simply, their roles were limited to carrying out directives channeled from the 
party and government organs, and pass data and/or information to the central political organs 
(Schwab, 1985). The relationship between leaders and the led, even within mass and professional 
organizations, was built on fear and subjugation, but not on a partnership to promote the interests 
of members. The initiative to come up with demands that bear on policies and practices were 
neither expected, nor was it approved. The mass and professional organizations thus remained 
exclusively instruments of recruiting support, means of communicating and mass political 
mobilization for state and party policy initiatives. Nor had the mass and professional 
organizations the opportunity to operate as interest groups to articulate their interests to 
policymaking institutions.  
 
3.6. Implementation through centrally guided institutions, 1974-1987 
 
3.6.1. The prelude 
 
The bulk of the implementing agencies and government institutions had been introduced since 
1974, notwithstanding the fact that a few agencies were inherited from the imperial government. 
Most of these structures appeared to be volatile, due in part to the uncertainty characterizing a 
revolution, partly because clear guidelines to govern the relationships between the Dergue, the 
Council of Ministers, ministries, various other government agencies and the fourteen provincial 
administrations were almost non-existent (see Map 1).   Hence, in the first few years of the 
revolution, the Dergue had to rely on transient government bodies to execute most of its reforms. 
The Dergue depended on, among others, its sub-committees to a considerable degree to preside 
over and parallel the civilian ministries. Additionally, despite that fact that they had not held 
official government positions, the PMAC assigned a few of its key individual members such as 
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liaison to such ministries as transport and communication, housing and urban development, 
agriculture and settlement and various other ministries and quasi-governmental agencies (Pliny, 
1978: 8-9). Pliny wrote: 
 
From late 1974 or early 1975, in fact, all ministries have had someone who has communicated directly with 
the dergue itself. This procedure has supplemented the practice of calling the ministers and civil servants to 
attend the relevant dergue committee in the Grand Palace. It has meant that the PMAC has been able to 
keep a close and watchful eye on all day-to-day ministerial activities and interfere at will. At the working 
sessions between the ministers and the dergue committees, the committees can and frequently do override 
decisions taken by the council of ministers. The dergue has always had the final word. (ibid.)
      
      
      In a bid to acquire loyal personnel, the PMAC selected over 250 persons from the army and 
assigned them to government ministries and nationalized commercial and industrial enterprises in 
the capital city and the fourteen administrative regions as permanent secretaries, department 
heads and managers (Pliny 1978; Teferra, 1997). The powers and responsibilities of the vigilante 
groups, who came to be known as the ‘missionaries of change’ (Yelewout Hawariat), vis-à-vis 
professional appointees and experts had not been properly defined. Ranking civilian officials 
usually complied with the orders of the military supervisors, while informally indicating their 
lack of respect for inexperienced military judgments regarding the professional and technical 
problems confronting the government agencies (Cohen and Koehn 1980, 296). Although the 
‘missionaries of change’ (Yelewout Hawariat) were ostensibly seen  as roving cadres upon whom 
the Dergue relied for the implementation of socio-economic reforms, their appointment to 
various government institutions nevertheless generated perpetual inefficiency and 
mismanagement in the public bureaucracy, and despondency and mistrust among employees 
(Pliny, 1978; Andargachew, 1993; Teferra, 1997). Furthermore, having had the objectives of 
explaining socio-economic policies to the regional administrators, the public and the military 
units, Dergue members took regular tours throughout Ethiopia. In mid-1978, the regular tours 
through the provinces were replaced by postings of PMAC members as permanent 
representatives to the regions. Toward the end of 1977 PMAC posted twelve of its members to 
the provinces to oversee the implementation of socio-economic and political policies (Pliny, 
1978: 11). Not only the representatives enjoyed enormous powers and seized ultimate authority 
in overseeing implementation outcomes, but they also capitalized on their direct contact with the 
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Standing Committee of the Dergue leadership to override the decisions of regional and local 
administrations (ibid.).  
      However, as the socio-economic transformations and institutional restructuring deepened, and 
in view of the recourse to Soviet-style government structures, the transitory structures proved 
inadequate. As a result, the wave of proclamations that the PMAC issued in the mid-70s called 
for fundamental institutional transformations at the center, and down the line at the regional and 
local levels. In other words, the post-revolution government had moved forward to strengthen 
central planning and policy implementation through modifications on the Soviet models and 
reliance on central level bureaucratic technicians (Cohen and Koehn, 1980: 302).                    
 
  3.6.2. Molding implementing institutions from top 
 
The Council of Ministers, which the Dergue established in the first few years of its coming into 
power, consisted of civilian ministers and other high-level government officials appointed by the 
chairman of the Dergue (PMAC, 1977, EMI, 1981). Although the legislation assigned the CoM 
wide-ranging responsibilities, in reality it remained a clearing-house of legislation and channel of 
communication between the military elites and a network of administrative institutions. In mid-
1981, twenty-one ministries, several commissions, authorities and other government agencies 
were organized under PMAC/COPWE (EMI, 1981). 
      Following the COPWE/WPE establishment, not only had party establishments overlapped 
with the bureaucratic structures, but also ministries and other implementing agencies had to 
account to the party and its leadership for all of their actions. In other words, chiefly because of 
the ascendance of the party and central planning, the powers of the government bureaucracy had 
been severely curtailed. Emerging victorious over the Somali invading force and civilian 
opposition, the Dergue’s leverage in reorganizing centrally controlled implementing structures 
had substantially been enhanced.   
     Enthused chiefly by the principles of democratic centralism and the centrally led economy, the 
PMAC launched the National Revolutionary Development Campaign and Central Planning 
Supreme Council (NRDC-CPSC) in 1978, although CPSC undermined the powers of the Council 
of Ministers (CoM). It is interesting to note that, unlike its successors, the thrust of the Dergue’s 
economic policy appeared to be driven by a balanced socio-economic development of industry 
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and agriculture, though the outcome of development was intended to accrue primarily to the 
peasantry and the urban poor (PMAC, 1978). At the national level the NRDC-CPSC had a 
cumbersome structure involving a congress consisting of standing committee members of the 
Dergue, the members of council of ministers, the commanders of the armed forces and the 
commissioner of the police, administrators of the fourteen regions, and leaders of the mass 
organizations, with the executive committee of the Supreme Central Planning Council (CPSC) 
chaired by the chairman of the PMAC. At the regional levels, development committees 
subordinate to the supreme council, provincial and district planning councils were integrated into 
the central command and control structure.  
      A government document summed up the importance of central planning as follows: 
 
The establishment of the National Revolutionary Development Campaign and the Central Planning 
Supreme Council (NRDC-CPSC) provided the institutional framework for on-going popular undertaking 
for economic, social, and cultural development in Ethiopia. The nation-wide development drive is being 
streamlined under the central guidance of the Supreme Council, which continues to exert resolute effort to 
promote the aims and objectives of the Development Campaign through marshalling and co-coordinating 
the material, financial and human resources of the nation. … Revolutionary Ethiopia is today striving hard 
to lay the basis for a strong and independent national economy, by mobilizing all available material and 
human resources under centrally planned and guided mechanism. 
        The principle of central planning on the basis of socialist principles followed conscious efforts to 
release the forces of production relations of feudalism and imperialism that prevailed in the days of fallen 
regime. The target in development planning now is to ensure balanced growth of the economy on the basis 
of central planning. This approach conforms to the NDRP, the provision of which relating to economic 
matters state: 
 … Since the building of a strong and an independent national economy is possible only through the 
balanced development of the industrial and agricultural sectors of the national economy, it is necessary to 
have a centralized national plan based on socialist principles’. 
       The nation-wide drive to effect economic and cultural development, in which the working people of 
Ethiopia are taking active part, is being guided and co-coordinated within the framework of these basic 
principles of socialist construction. (PMAC, 1980)  
 
      Not only had the preceding principles set the stage for the re-organization and re-structuring 
of implementing institutions, but also they set the parameters for implementing a wide-range of 
socio-economic policies. In fact, with the reorganization of the mass organizations in the early 
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1980s, the entire Ethiopian population was integrated into highly centralized planning and party-
guided and ideologically committed mechanisms. During the period of the central plan campaign 
(1979-84), five annual plans had been projected and implemented (Teferra, 1997: 221). In the 
first two consecutive plan periods, i.e., 1879/80 and 1980/81, GDP showed a remarkable increase 
of 5.2% and 5.5% respectively (ibid.). The GDP growth, however, plummeted to 2.9% per 
annum in the next two consecutive years, and any hope for similar or more improved growth rate 
in the immediate future was lost because a famine that affected over six million people broke out 
in 1984. Nonetheless, centrally planned and guided economic policy formulation and 
implementation continued unabated.   
      In June 1984 the Office of the National Council for Central Planning replaced Central 
Planning Supreme Council (CPSC), with the politburo and central committee of WPE 
dominating it. This was soon followed by an announcement of the so-called Ten-Year 
Perspective socio-economic plan for the period 1984/85 to 1993/94. The Ten-Year Perspective 
Plan was an ambitious plan with a projected yearly GDP growth rate of 6.5% (Clapham, 1988). 
The entire ten-year project was divided into three medium-range plan phases, namely, two years 
(1984/85-1985/86), three years (1986/87-1988/89) and five years (1989/90-1993/94) each of 
which was to be further broken down into annual projects (Asmerom, 1991). In retrospect, due in 
part to the planning councils at the lower echelons not being consulted over the issues of plan 
implementation and partly due to the failure to incorporate local realities in the comprehensive 
socio-economic plans, the Ten-Year Perspective Plan with its ultimate objective to accomplish 
fully-fledged socialist development failed (Clapham, 1988; Asmerom, 1991). However, stretched 
from the center in the national capital to peripheries in the rural villages, the surge of central 
planning and the series of efforts exerted to establish socialist socio-economic construction and 
policy implementation generated huge organizational establishments.  
      Among the massive restructuring measures that the state and party pursued, the 
reorganization of rural institutions was the hallmark of rural land reform implementation. 
Institutional restructuring and transformation in rural Ethiopia started with the proclamation that 
turned rural land from landlord ownership to public ownership of all rural lands in March 1975, 
as noted earlier. Certainly, agriculture continued to contribute nearly 50 percent of gross domestic 
product and provided living for 85% of the work force in Ethiopia. However, the state and party’s 
enthusiasm to control rural society was motivated not just by the fact that land was the mainstay 
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of the country’s economy, but because of 85% the people in Ethiopia constituted the rural 
population, as in fact is still the case today. A few months before the legislation that made land 
public ownership was issued, a government policy document noted the following: 
 
… Agriculture is at present the mainstay of the national economy. Land tenure and agricultural policy will 
consequently be changed in a manner which will make it possible to abolish poverty and narrow the gap in 
the level of living. As land belongs to the entire Ethiopian community, the government is the trustee of this 
important resource. And it is the responsibility of the government to determine land tenure policy in an 
appropriate manner… 
     Individuals and communities which have a legal right to operate communal, cooperative, or private 
farms will be accountable to the government for the good care and management of their holdings. The 
forthcoming law on land reform will in particular cover this point. (PMAC, 1974: 10) 
  
 
      Furthermore, much like its successors, the peasantry was then seen as the most exploited 
mass under the imperial regime, the driving force as well as an ally of the revolution and socialist 
reconstruction (WPE, 1984). The most important agrarian institution, on which the party, central 
and local government administrations relied for the implementation of agricultural reforms, was 
the peasant association. In this regard, Stahl wrote: 
 
Peasant Association (PA) is the basic rural institution in post-revolutionary Ethiopia. Initially created for 
the purposes of defeating the landlords and abolishing the feudal system, the PAs are now semi-official 
administrative units at the grass roots level. The PA is a territorial organization encompassing 800 hectares 
or more. All peasant households living in area should be members. … The average peasant membership is 
150-300 households. All arable land areas in regions under state control are covered with a network of PAs.  
… The PA members constitute an assembly which gathers a few times a year. It elects a chairman and an 
executive committee which run the daily affairs of the association. In addition, the assembly elects a judicial 
tribunal which functions as a local court adjudicating minor legal matters. There are sub-committees 
attached to the executive committee to deal with matters such as defense/security, administrative affairs and 
development. Government, local administration and the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia get in touch with the 
peasant population through the PAs. Information on new directives and proclamations, development 
campaigns, public work are transmitted to the population and implemented by the PAs. They also mobilise 
labour for free planting and soil conservation programmes. (1989: 28-29)
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      Strictly hierarchical and knitted to the party and administrative institutions, the four-tier 
(namely, national, regional, provincial and district levels) peasant associations became the core 
establishments on which the state depended for the implementation of its socio-economic 
transformation. Moreover, several other rural institutions had been established and integrated as 
subordinate units of government institutions and assisted the WPE’s programs of promoting 
socialist reorganization, construction and the implementation of agricultural policies. 
Agricultural producers’ cooperatives, villagization and resettlement were, among others, the key 
rural institutional measures that the party and government unleashed, although they underwent 
extensive restructuring over the subsequent years.      
      Having perceived the backwardness and fragmentation of rural organization and agriculture, 
state and party authorities urged that only a profound break with tradition would make way for 
intensive use of modern technology in agriculture and better rural organization (PMAC, 1976; 
Harbeson, 1988; Stahl, 1989). Established by government proclamation in 1976, agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives were seen as essential avenues of rural development (PMAC, 1976). The 
party tried to substantiate its position on producers’ cooperatives both on ideological and 
technical grounds (WPE, 1984). In ideological terms the government discouraged individual 
farming for a family-based agricultural system was suspected of proliferating capitalist 
agriculture. Hence, socialist forms of collectivized agriculture, similar to those peasant 
communes in China and mechanized collective agricultural endeavors in the former Soviet 
Union, would be possible through producers’ cooperatives. Peasant producers’ cooperatives 
were, therefore, regarded as the yardstick of modernized collective agriculture and crucial 
instruments of building socialist forms of ownership in the agrarian sector (WPE, 1984).  
      At a technical level the fragmentation of the rural organization provided the authorities with 
the ground to promote producers’ cooperatives. Government officials argued that the pooling of 
land, labor and other resources viable for improving productivity as well as production, and 
adoption of modern agricultural technology would only be possible through peasant producers’ 
cooperatives (Stahl, 1989; WPE, 1984). As a result, the latter had virtually monopolized a 
plethora of services provided by the government to the peasant associations. It received the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s top priority on its agricultural extension services, supply of agricultural 
inputs including fertilizer, oxen, high yielding seeds, access to capital, credit and arable land (op. 
cit.). Producers’ cooperatives had also been induced to participate in the official economy 
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through priority access to consumer goods, farm-gate prices from the Agricultural Marketing 
Corporation, although amid imposed restrictions to sell their produce to the latter, which was a 
government agency that had established a semi-monopoly over regulating domestic grain and 
food trade (Harbeson, 1988; Clapahm, 1988; Stahl, 1989). By 1986, however, only 190,372 
peasants were willing to form producers’ cooperatives, which would mean only 3.3 percent of the 
peasant population in the country volunteered to be part of the PC scheme, a clear indication of 
forced incorporation of the peasantry into party-sponsored rural transformation projects (CSA, 
1990: 36).                             
      In any case, the government’s attempt to generate rural development through control and 
command had excluded the greatest majority of smallholder rural producers on whom 95 percent 
of agricultural production and 65 percent of marketed production depended (Harbeson, 1988). In 
other words, insignificant resources for the agricultural sector and their concentration on 
producers’ cooperatives and state farms eventually excluded the bulk of rural households from 
participating in the making and implementation of sound agricultural policies. Harbeson further 
contended: 
 
The imposition of centralized, command-based development and fundamental transformation of the life at 
grass roots for millions of rural households effectively replaced the rural development hierarchy envisioned 
in the original 1975 land reform proclamation. It overlaid and superseded the pyramid of regional and 
provincial peasant associations that were to be elected from the grass roots under the provisions of the 1975 
rural land reform with a hierarchy of military, civil service, and party officials charged with carrying out the 
military high command in Addis Ababa. Representatives of the elective peasant association pyramid were 
included in the hierarchy of centrally directed officials but only as a minority without leadership 
responsibility. The structure of the hierarchy at regional, provincial and lower levels clearly revealed the 
military regime’s expectation that peasant associations would serve primarily as instruments of its authority 
at the lowest level rather than a principal vehicle of peasants’ initiative and political expression at the grass 
roots…The measures promulgated with the NRDC and afterwards undertook the political organization of 
the reform’s beneficiaries through the imposition of the extensive controls on their economic activities. 
(ibid: 178-179)  
 
      Another form of rural reorganization that enhanced and reinforced the state and party’s 
commitment to the implementation of socialization of production and distribution, and a program 
which was launched in mid-1980s to accelerate transformation from smallholder to large-scale 
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production and/or from private to social forms of ownership was villagization. The official aim of 
the villagization scheme was to alter the prevailing isolated homestead settlement pattern of 
peasant rural households, and to move them from scattered dwellings to clustered villages as part 
of government policies to improve rural life through modernizing agricultural production 
patterns, rational land use and thereby expedite the delivery of social services (health, education, 
water, electricity, transport, market, etc.) (Alemayehu, 1990, Lealem, 1991). In other words, 
villagization aimed at changing the pattern of settlement of rural households by regrouping 
villages. The government claimed that not only did small and fragmented farms impede the 
development of mechanization as well as the use of modern techniques in agriculture, but it had 
also been deterring the socialist transformation of agriculture and development of the socialist 
relations of production (PMAC, 1981). The scheme became controversial, not because the 
underlying objectives stipulated in government documents did not make sense, but because the 
government resorted to villagization as a means of denying ‘producers access to private markets 
and price competition with the government, controlling their consumption and accumulation, and 
dictating their form of social organization, i.e., the establishment of producer’ cooperatives’ 
(Harbeson, 1988). Beginning from the mid-1980s, villagization gathered momentum and became 
institutionalized in the entire country under the leadership of WPE. With the Ministry of 
Agriculture providing secretarial services, by late 1989 13 million peasants had been moved to 
12, 013 villages (Harbeson, 1988; Teferra, 1997). 
      A third major rural development strategy that the post-revolution government used to alter 
and control the social organization, production and consumption of rural society and 
implementation of a wide range of agrarian policies was the resettlement program.  At the height 
of the drought and famine in 1984, the regime was poised to introduce a resettlement program 
that was designed to relocate rural residents from areas most severely affected by drought (north) 
to areas in the west and south that had experienced adequate rainfall. Again, the government 
claimed that relocation of rural households from drought-prone regions to other parts of the 
country would reduce population pressures and thereby restores ecological balance (Teferra, 
1997). Alula (1990: 121) outlined the three perspectives with which the resettlement option 
would be considered. From an ecological perspective it was seen as a means of redressing 
population imbalances and reducing population pressures in the drought-prone regions of Wello, 
Tigray and Northern Shewa; and from an economic point of view it was believed that 
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resettlement could help to increase productivity and make use of under-utilized fertile lands; and 
lastly from a social standpoint it was seen as a way of providing land to those without it (ibid.).  
In any case, the government defended its resettlement policy on technical grounds, that it would 
make good sense to move people from drought-prone, exhausted, overgrazed, over farmed and 
eroded land to fertile areas; besides, these settlements tended to be in coffee-rich areas, where 
increased coffee production could significantly help the country’s problems with foreign 
exchange (Keller, 1985). Critics in the international community, more particularly from the West, 
charged that the government’s resettlement program was characterized by undue haste and 
carried out in the absence of careful planning, although they conceded that there was nothing 
inherently wrong with the program (ibid.).  
      The real motive for the resettlement program was not so much far from the government’s 
motive attributed to the rationale for establishing agricultural producers’ cooperatives and 
villagization schemes. It offered an appealing model of large-scale government action which 
would give a prominent role to the party and increase state control over the large segment of rural 
society, and help it to further the government’s plan for transforming the structure of 
implementing its agricultural policies by putting more people into producers’ cooperatives, where 
farm equipments and other resources were to be utilized collectively (Clapham, 1988; Harbeson, 
1988; Teferra, 1997). In this regard, Alula wrote: 
 
Resettlement was the largest and most complex operation in the history of the state, requiring the 
coordination of almost a dozen government ministries and authorities. An action programme to resolve the 
crisis resulting from the famine was formulated by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the 
WPE. The resettlement component accounted for 123 million birr21, or a quarter of the planned expenditure 
on emergency development. A committee comprising high-level officials selected settlement sites on 
helicopter tours often led by the Head of State. The whole venture was organized with great haste on a 
campaign-basis by the newly formed Workers’ Party of Ethiopia which took over direction of the 
programme, and sent out cadres to organize the settlements, much in the same way that a decade earlier 
students were sent to the rural areas to spread the messages of the nascent revolution. (1990: 124)            
 
      Suffice it to say that the planning and the modus operandi of its implementation revealed 
greater political commitment accorded to the program than technical rationale. In addition, the 
                                                
21
 Birr is the legal tender in Ethiopia; and in the 70s and 80s it had traded 2.09 Birr for a dollar. Currently, one dollar 
is the equivalent of 8.65 Birr.  
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resettlement scheme was largely used as instrument for the formation of more agricultural 
producers’ cooperatives that were accorded high priority for accelerating rural transformation 
geared to building socialism in the countryside. Overall, since it was believed that the 
organization of peasants into producers’ cooperatives would eventually evolve to collective 
ownership of the instruments of production; PCs were by and large regarded as the political 
instruments of bringing about a worker-peasant alliance. The party and state authorities also 
boosted villagization and resettlement schemes as mechanisms for implementing socialist-
oriented rural policies, including the agricultural producers’ cooperatives.                  
      Equally, not only did the state control both government and mass organizations, but it also 
had a virtual monopoly on manufacturing and service sectors, to such an extent that urban 
establishments, too, came under centrally planned and party-guided implementing structures. 
With the government as the single most extensive employer, the power of the state and the party 
was notably high in the civil service. In fact, the state bureaucracy expanded enormously in the 
first decade of the revolution, and control by the military deepened and expanded in the process. 
After the formation of the WPE in 1984, the regime established a wide array of government 
institutions that radiated from the center out to the regional and local levels, as earlier discussed. 
Leadership positions in these new institutions were used as patronage by the regime to reward 
loyal supporters or to co-opt potential adversaries in the bureaucracy.  
      As Figure 3.1 depicts, almost all organizations of the society and social, economic and 
political activities in the country appeared to have been regimented under the party. Far beyond 
their imagination and consent, party structures and disciplines captivated ordinary citizens. 
Premised on the Marxist understanding of the state and party interests superseding the interests of 
individual citizens, public policies flow top-down unquestioned and unchallenged. Nor had there 
been any national mechanism of soliciting opinions and critical inputs into the policymaking 
process. The National Revolutionary Development Campaign (NRDC), for instance, envisaged 
development in martial terms.  Hence, ‘development plans were formulated, human and material 
resources mobilized, and directives formulated at the center. Plans and directives had been 
disaggregated and implemented at regional level, provincial, district, and local levels, with 
procedures and parameters determined by party and state leadership (Harbeson, 1988). Taking all 
the state and party agencies together, therefore, the institutions add up to a controlling capacity to 
organize the lives of Ethiopians by central directions in ways that had never been seen before. As 
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the Figure below demonstrates, beneath the high level party and state leadership, almost the 
entire government structure, the mass and professional organizations, and the entire public had 
been encapsulated in a standard and centralized state and party structures.    
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Figure 3.1.   Policy Implementation through State and Party-Led Structures: 1974-1987  
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 3.6.3. Central and regional policymaking structures of the PDRE 
 
The institutional mechanisms that had over the previous eight years evolved were also used for 
much of the duration of the first Republic, except that new names appeared to reflect the 1987 
constitution of the PDRE. Officially, however, the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
(PDRE) replaced the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC). The first congress of 
the National Shengo adopted legislation introducing new state organs including itself, the Council 
of the State, the President, the Procuracy, the Judiciary and the Council of Ministers, as noted 
earlier (PDRE, 1987). Designated as the highest executive and administrative organ of 
government, the latter became responsible for the implementation of policies that the Shengo, the 
standing legislative organ of the Republic (the Council of the State) and the President formulated. 
The second important institutional mechanism that the Institute for the Studies of Nationalities 
contributed to PDRE was the reorganization of Administrative Regions into five autonomous 
regions and twenty-five administrative regions22 (see Map 2). The reorganization of 
administrative regions was primarily motivated by the desire to streamline the implementation of 
policies and legislation made along the then prevailing party thinking.    
     By 1989 the Council of Ministers became a massive structure spanning the national and 
regional implementing agencies, with a prime minister, five deputy prime ministers, twenty 
ministries, two state committees, seven commissions, six authorities, two institutes and a central 
bank under its jurisdiction. In essentially administrative respects, the newly carved-out five 
autonomous and twenty-five administrative regions came under ‘the highest executive and 
administrative organ’ of the Republic. Much the same as in the Soviet-style republics, the Prime 
Minister had five Deputy Prime Ministers working under him, with each Deputy Prime Minister 
heading a division (see Figure 3.2). Assisted by a secretariat and a group of advisors, the Prime 
Minster was the head of the government with wide-ranging powers, although Mengistu appeared 
to have eclipsed almost all of the competences of the executive assigned to the CoM as provided 
under the 1987 constitution (Dawit, 1990).    
                                                
22
 In the immediate aftermath of taking power, the Dergue adapted the imperial regime’s fourteen ‘provinces’ 
(Teklay Gizat), and renamed them ‘regions’ (Kifle Hager) so as to dispel any vestiges associated with the feudal 
order. With the addition of the capital city of Addis Ababa and the port city of Assab, the number of administrative 
regions rose to sixteen in 1981. 
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      Furthermore, down the line central government establishments had been replicated at 
different levels in the hierarchy of administrative structures, with a three-tier structure consisting 
of autonomous and administrative regions (at regional level), provinces (Awerajas), and 
neighborhood (Kebele) at a local level. The district (Woreda) that appeared the lowest unit in the 
hierarchy of the administrative structure in the imperial period, and a very basic institution of the 
administrative apparatus till 1987, was integrated into the provincial structure (Awerajas) after 
the constitution came into force. However, not only does the Kebele (neighborhood) 
establishment remain the basic unit of administration to this day, but was also was as much at the 
center of immense socio-economic and political activities during the Dergue era as it is today.  
      Endowed with limited executive powers, the implementing agencies operating below national 
levels had solely been required to ensure and/or follow up the implementation of policies of the 
higher state and party organs (FDRE, 1987). Not only had regional and local assemblies very 
limited legislative powers, but central government institutions such as the CoM could also 
override their decisions. Nor could administrative organs of the local government implement the 
decisions of their respective assemblies without the approval of the central government 
institutions (op. cit.). In other words, regional and local government institutions had neither the 
powers to formulae policies in a very rudimentary and local sense, nor did they have the leverage 
to use the local initiative to execute policies as local circumstances permit.  
By 1989, amidst civil war and a malfunctioning economy, regional Shengos (regional 
assemblies) had been elected in only eleven of the twenty-five newly designated administrative 
regions and three of the five regions designated as autonomous (Hailu, 2003). Excluding Eritrea 
and Tigray, where the insurgents grew stronger, the government introduced the structures of the 
new Republic in Dire Dawa, Assab and Ogaden. Eleven of the 25 administrative regions singled 
out for introducing the PDRE structure included North Wello, South Wello, Metekel, Asosa, 
Bale, Gambella, West Hararege, East Hararege, South Omo, North Omo and Wollega (op. cit.). 
In retrospect, WPE dominated the entire election process, and party members filled the positions 
in Shengos and their respective executive committees (op. cit.). Eventually, the newly emerging 
autonomous and administrative regions came under the centralized and strong arm of the party 
and the national executive structure. The all too familiar, ‘the hegemony of WPE, democratic 
centralism, socialist legality, the primacy of central planning and proletarian internationalism’, 
guided the choices of public policies and the modus operandi of policymaking.   
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Figure 3.2. Central and regional policy implementing structures: 1987-1991 
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 3.7. Conclusion 
 
Ethiopia has an impressive history, with two millennia of state sovereignty and 
independence. Compared to other African states, it is the oldest state that successfully 
defended its independence against colonial powers, and so has survived as a sovereign 
country (Clapham, 1969). The state also grew progressively in an internal expansion in the 
last quarter of nineteenth century (Bahiru, 1991: 60-68). On the other hand, the 
maintenance of sovereignty and territorial gains through internal expansion in traditional 
Ethiopia, both of which had been obtained militarily, appeared to encourage authoritarian 
tendencies in public and political life. Most Ethiopians have also been captured by 
traditions deeply rooted in the socio-political culture that defined the relationships between 
policy elites and the society in authoritarian terms (Lipsky, 1962; Perham, 1969). The 
problem of the relationship between state and society or between the governed and 
governors are, therefore, entrenched in the country’s history and ruling culture (Clapham, 
2002). The stark reality that lies at the core of the past is that it has brought to bear 
enormous influence on the socio-political policymaking processes, institutions, roles and 
structures at different times in the country’s history.   
During Haileselassie’s era, even the most important legal documents affirmed the 
executive power and the supremacy of the emperor over the policy formulating and 
implementing institutions in the entire country. Both the 1931 and 1955 constitutions 
vested absolute power in the emperor. He was the chief legislator with the power to 
approve and disapprove parliamentary legislation and dissolve the parliament; he had an 
indisputable executive power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and other 
ministers, as well as to determine foreign relations; he had complete control on the armed 
forces and the single most important institution and power to appoint or dismiss provincial 
governors, and judicial powers with the constitutional mandates to supervise courts and 
grant pardons (under the 1931 and 1955 Revised Constitutions). The parliament remained 
a rubber-stamping body merely endorsing the policy decisions of the emperor and his 
entourage. There had never been any channel of communication between the public 
(members of society affected by policies) and those at the apex of policymaking structures. 
Therefore, consulting the affected parties both before and after policy decisions was 
unimaginable. Nor was there any channel of communication between policymakers and the 
citizenry.     
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In the absence of an organized body, the void created by the ousting of 
Hailesellassie’s government was filled by the Provisional Military Administrative Council 
(PMAC/Dergue). The latter promulgated a series of laws. PMAC’s first legislation did not 
clearly reveal the state organs with powers to adopt and implement policies, albeit the 
second set of laws to a limited extent clarified the roles of the Military Council and the 
Council of Ministers in the legislative process. Towards the end of the 1970s, it became 
clearer that the Dergue, and apparently the Standing Committee came to represent the 
repository of policymaking power. Not only did the latter issue almost all the statutory 
enactments, but also made all the appointments to government positions in the entire 
country.  In other words, the Dergue spanned on a wide range of policies with far-reaching 
consequences.  Moreover, chaired by the head of the state (who was also the Chairman of 
the PMAC) the Council of Ministers (CoM) was empowered to follow up the 
implementation of policies, despite parallel appointments of loyal personnel drawn from 
the military had circumscribed their leverage. There had, therefore, been very limited 
circles of elite groups, mainly involving the PMAC and the Council of Ministers (which 
was comprised of civilian technocrats) which had virtual claims on agenda setting and the 
policymaking process.    
Although the ideological metamorphosis began even before the Dergue seized the 
mantle of power, the official pronouncement of National Democratic Revolution Program 
(NDRP) in 1976 marked a turning point in the adoption of the teachings of Marx and 
Lenin. Henceforth, not only were policy choices premised mainly on Marxism-Leninism, 
but the policymaking institutions and the policymaking process were also institutionalized 
in COPWE/WPE. Consequently, the program of the vanguard party, WPE, set the 
preconditions as well as the parameters for the making of the constitution, and the 
principles on which the PDRE was established. It is worth noting here that the 
establishment of WPE (1984) preceded PDRE (1987). The 1987 constitution, for instance, 
unambiguously stipulated that ‘the party is the leading organ of the state as well the 
society’ (PDRE, 1987). This would therefore mean that the party made policy choices and 
decisions in advance, and then these would be processed thorough the organs of the 
Republic established by the constitution, although in theory it was claimed that the 
repository of public power resided in the National Assembly (National Shengo). 
Furthermore, since the mid-1970s farmers, women, the youth, industrial workers, 
teachers and other professional associations had continuously been reorganized to ascertain 
their loyalty to the party and the prevailing values guiding state-society relationships. Not 
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only were the party and central government assured of complete control over mass and 
professional organizations, but the latter were also turned into auxiliary institutions pegged 
to state and party structures. Hence, non-state actors had neither the capacity to generate 
alternative policy ideas nor relative autonomy to influence policies and practices.  
Likewise, implementing agencies had been organized and reorganized to enhance 
central planning and to promote centrally guided policy implementation. Structured from 
the capital city down to towns and villages, the establishment of the NRDC-CPSC and 
later the Office of National Planning Council represented the vehicles for the execution of 
centrally guided socio-economic policies in the entire country, with state organizations, 
and mass and professional organizations effectively integrated into the system. 
Furthermore, the reorganization and transformation of rural social life for the 
implementation of agricultural policies was accorded top priority. Peasant cooperatives, 
villagization and resettlement schemes, inter alia, had rigorously been pursued to promote 
the ideals of socialism and central planning in the countryside. In the wake of the 
establishment of PDRE, the newly emerging state organs, administrative and autonomous 
regions were integrated into the machinery of central planning, party and state institutions.  
In short, largely drawn from the Dergue, the executive leadership (WPE and the Council of 
State) had claimed virtual control over the entire gamut of public policymaking from 1974 
to 1991, as the empirical evidences presented earlier made clear.   
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Chapter 4. Public policymaking under the EPRDF, 1991-2004  
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
The preceding chapter discussed at length the key institutions and groups that played vital 
roles in the formulation and implementation public policies in Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991. 
The assessments made abundantly clear that policymaking power, by default or by design, 
had been centrally located in the party (WPE) and the executive comprising the coterie of 
Dergue members. Non-state actors had neither the organizational autonomy nor the legal 
basis to influence policymaking, as Chapter 3 elucidated. Carrying on from 1991, this 
chapter examines the key players that have come to light over the past thirteen years, and 
the conditions that set the context as well as the precedence for some groups to play critical 
roles and create enormous leverage in public policymaking in Ethiopia.   
The chapter evaluates two periods with distinct institutional policymaking 
configurations, albeit the EPRDF spearheaded the agenda setting and determined the 
policy choices that were made in both periods. The first period is commonly known as the 
transition period that runs from 1991 to 1995. As will soon be discussed in this chapter, the 
Transitional Government of Ethiopia is constituted of the Council of Representatives and 
the Council of Ministers, and passed laws and issued socio-economic policies with 
enormous impact and consequences, well beyond the transition period.  The context of 
public policymaking from 1995 to the present has obviously been rooted in the preceding 
period. The policymaking institutions, however, have been restructured, as provided for 
under the 1995 constitution, into NRSs and Federal Governments, each normally 
consisting of the legislature, the executive and judiciary, although the executive at every 
level has assumed a predominant role in the choice of the socio-economic policies and the 
contexts in which they are to be implemented. This chapter explores, more particularly, the 
relationship between the executive and the legislature, the role that each played in the 
legislative process, and the influence that each bore upon policymaking in both periods. 
Moreover, not only does this chapter examine the impact that a wave of policy reform 
measures taken in the previous period had on the subsequent period, but it also sheds some 
light on the executive-legislature relationships a propos the legislative process.   
As a prelude, this chapter, first, throws some light on the train of events ranging from 
the pre-1991 commitments of the groups that subsequently dominated the policymaking 
scene to the legislative and institutional instruments used, which includes the constitution. 
 128
Second, it explores the executive and legislative relationships, and the role as well as the 
influence that each has exacted in the legislative process since 1995. Third, the chapter 
examines the major players in the legislative process at the NRSs and local levels, although 
the central authority has laid down the modus operandi of the legislative and/or 
policymaking process. Lastly, among major socio-economic policy measures sponsored by 
the new policy elites, it elucidates agricultural development-led industrialization (ADLI) 
and education policies, which not only have epitomized their ideological obsessions but 
also manifested a marked imbalance between the benefactors and the receivers of public 
policies. Hence, ADLI is selected, not only because it forms the centerpiece of the ruling 
party’s ideological commitments to the peasantry, but also because agriculture and rural-
focused development policies are currently at the heart of almost all socio-economic 
policies in Ethiopia. Education policy is nevertheless chosen because it distinctively 
represents the imbalance between policymaking institutions and the constituents of the 
policy (i.e., teachers, students, academics and the public), which has over the last ten years 
been at the hub of the debates among policymakers, practitioners, and academics. Finally, 
the chapter concludes with a summary.    
    
4.2. Policymaking during the Transition 
 
4.2.1. The Prelude 
 
The backdrop to the leading role as well as the overwhelming influence that EPRDF has 
had on socio-economic policies over the past thirteen years should be traced to the Tigray 
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which is the forerunner of the umbrella organization, 
i.e., EPRDF. Almost immediately after the Dergue seized power, urban elites and 
university students from Tigary established the precursor of TPLF, namely the Tigray 
National Organization (TNO). The latter drew its inspiration mainly from the radical 
Ethiopian student movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Young, 1997; Kinfe 2001; 
Clapham, 2004; Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). When TPLF was transformed into an 
armed insurgency in 1975, Marxism, Maoist thinking and national self-determination were 
the dominant values that the leaders of the movement embraced (Young, 1997). The TPLF 
believed that ‘the Amhara ruling classes ruled Ethiopia in league with and the support of 
their imperialist masters’ (TPLF, 1983: 4). Therefore, instead of class conflict, the national 
form of struggle was the driving force of the TPLF revolution, and class oppression could 
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be eliminated only when the national component of domination was primarily addressed. 
In other words, the national question supersedes all other questions (ibid). TPLF, therefore, 
sought the solution in the usual Marxist motto of the day, ‘the state under the leadership of 
the proletariat’, apparently, under the leadership of Tigrian ‘proletariat’ (TPLF, 1983: 9). 
While Tigrian nationalism was the persuasive and critical force that eventually 
secured the front’s victory over the Dergue, the political leadership of the TPLF has long 
espoused Marxian ideology as a guiding principle that culminated in the formation of the 
Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (MLLT) in 1984. More particularly, the Leninist and 
Maoist variants proved viable in terms of organizing the administrative apparatus and 
streamlining propaganda work in the liberated areas (Young, 1997:33). MLLT became a 
highly influential organization that gained the support of urban elites, the peasantry and 
mass organizations in Tigray. Furthermore, the peasantry was the largest and strongest 
social base from which TPLF/MMLT’s leadership drew the bulk of its fighting force that 
ipso facto brought about a crushing defeat of the Dergue’s mighty military power. 
According to Young (1997), the TPLF/MLLT’s commitment to the peasantry stemmed 
from ‘an appreciation that the revolution’s success depended upon its ability to militarily 
challenge the Dergue and for this it needed the unreserved support of the peasants’. As 
shall be discussed in some detail later, while it is certainly clear that the 
TPLF/MLLT/EPRDF victory drew the inspiration and strength from the peasantry, the 
predominant ideological precept of the new policy elites – revolutionary democracy – and 
the post-1991 socio-economic policies on which these policies are premised tended to 
preclude the participation of non-state actors in the policymaking process (see Chapter 5).  
Two years after liberating the entire Tigray in 1989, and in a bid to advance 
southward, TPLF formed a united front with the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement 
(EPDM), a splinter group from the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP). The 
Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Movement (OPDO) and the Ethiopian Democratic Officers’ 
Revolutionary Movement (EDORM) also joined the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) before a large-scale assault on the Dergue’s army to oust it 
began in 1991. Each affiliate had a Marxist-Leninist group as counterparts of TPLF’s 
MLLT. While the Marxist-Leninist recipe, by then, was abandoned with the collapse of the 
Soviet block three years before the EPRDF forces came to power, ironically, the three 
Marxist-Leninist groups established an umbrella Marxist-Leninist party under the name of 
the Ethiopian Workers Revolutionary Party in December 1991 (Reporter: May 2001, 4: 10-
11). The Marxist rhetoric nevertheless was dropped from the EPEDF’s lexicon soon after 
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they entered Addis Ababa. Not only did this make clear the commitment of the new elites 
to Marxism-Leninism and Maoist thinking, but the latter also subsequently had an 
enormous impact on nearly all socio-economic policies. It, too, left its indelible imprint on 
the 1995 constitution.   
A few days before the Dergue’s seventeen years of brutal dictatorship ended, peace 
talks were held in London between the Dergue, TPLF, OLF and EPLF under the auspices 
of the US in May 1991. In fact, because of the abrupt collapse of the Dergue regime, the 
London peace talks ended before they even got going. Nevertheless, one of the major 
outcomes of the London peace talks was the decision to organize a ‘broad’ national 
conference in the capital Addis Ababa that would represent various shades of political 
views23. Prior to the conference, and following the fall of the Dergue regime, EPRDF 
established an interim government that lasted a month. The interim administration of 
EPRDF was in full and exclusive control, which elevated its leverage to have unrestricted 
access to the massive power and resources of the government. When the national 
conference was held in early July 1991, the EPRDF was in a comfortable position to 
determine the participants, including the additions and subtractions to the coalition in the 
Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). In other words, the EPRDF used the power in 
its favor to build or break coalitions and promote its agenda. When the conference was 
convened, the representation of many ethnic groups was fragmented into different forces 
and most of these forces were fractious24, and some were even quickly formed for the 
occasion with the assistance of the EPRDF, including those selected minor multi-national 
groups and individuals to attend the conference. Political groups, which in the view of 
EPRDF were considered as anti-peace and anti-democratic, notably the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the All Ethiopia Socialist Movement (AESM), were 
excluded from participating in the Conference. By and large the EPRDF’s leverage to push 
its policy agenda through, either through the Council of Representatives (CoR) or the 
Council of Ministers (CoM), were unassailable.  
In any case, the outcome of the July 1991 national conference was a five-page 
public policy document or quasi-constitution and the establishment of the Transitional 
                                                
23
 Kife Wodajo (2001: 142), who was appointed by the EPRDF to be the Head of the Constitution Drafting 
Commission, noted that EPLF, EPRDF and OLF leaders met in Asmara two weeks before the National 
Conference was held to decide ‘the formula for allocating seats to participating organizations’ and draw up 
an agenda for the Conference.  
24
 Organizations that participated in the July Conference representing the Oromo ethnic group included 
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromoia (IFLO), United Oromo People’s 
Liberation Front (UOPLF), Oromo Abo Liberation Front (OALF), and Oromo Peoples’ Democratic 
Organization (OPDO) (CoR: the Minutes of the First Regular Session, July, 1991).  
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Government of Ethiopia (TGE). The Charter should, however, be credited probably as one 
of the most egalitarian policy enactments that Ethiopia ever had. While the provisions in 
the Charter are laden with a high dose of self-determination and independence for ‘hitherto 
neglected’ ethnic groups, the recognition accorded to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of the United Nations, and the provisions acknowledging the freedom of conscience 
and the right to organize political parties were some of the departures from the past. In the 
pursuance of the Charter, the TGE consisted of the Council of Representatives (CoR) and 
the Council of Ministers (CoR) (ibid). The organizations that participated representing 
different ethnic groups in the July conference formed the CoR, albeit EPRDF took the 
preponderance of seats (see table 4.1. below). An EPRDF Prime Minister was appointed by 
the President to preside on an eighteen-minister council of ministers.    
In summary, firstly, through the majority seats it had in the CoR, EPRDF 
successfully organized the voting system to have an EPRDF President elected, who was 
the Chairperson of CoR as well as the commander in chief of the army, which gave him 
extensive power and influence in the policymaking process25 (TGE, 1991). Secondly, not 
only did the President preside over the legislative body, but he also had the powers to 
nominate the prime minister and preside over the CoM, at his convenience. The Prime 
Minister not only had executive and administrative power over the bureaucracy, but he was 
presumably also a second strongman in the EPRDF leadership (the 4th and 5th Plenary 
Sessions of the CoR: August, 1991). Thirdly, EPRDF effectively used the power vested by 
the Charter in the CoR and the President to such an extent that it assumed important 
ministerial positions in the executive ministry such as Prime Minister, the Minister of 
Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs, and had placed 
its representatives as permanent secretaries in the ministries where the EPRDF did not 
have positions with ministerial portfolios. Lastly, EPRDF had the CoR approve its 
proposal for the EPRDF army to be the defense force of the country during the transition 
(the 1st Plenary Session of the CoR, July 1991). The Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) was therefore both the umpire and the guardian of 
statesmanship. The above picture demonstrates that beyond the orbit of the ruling party 
(i.e. EPRDF) the prospects for non-state actors to influence the policymaking process were 
bound to appear dim. It is, therefore, against this backdrop that the new policy elites’ 
                                                
25
 The Minutes of the 1st Plenary Session of CoR, July 1991.  
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leverage in the policymaking process in 1991 and beyond and the imbalances thereof have 
to be examined.         
 
 
Table 4.1. Seats in the TGE’s Council of Representatives (CoR)   
Names of Political Organization  Seats in the CoR 
Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
             Tigray People’s Liberation Front  (TPLF) 
             Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front (EPDM) 
             Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) 
             Ethiopian Democratic Officers’ Revolutionary Movement (EDORM) 
(32) 
10 
10 
10 
2 
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO)  
Representatives of Workers  
Afar Liberation Front (ALF) 
Benshangul People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM)  
Gambela People’s Liberation Movement (GPLM) 
Gurage Peoples’ Democratic Movement (GPDM) 
Hadiya Nation Democratic Organization (HNDO) 
Kembatta Nationality representative  
Omotic Peoples Democratic Movement (OPDM) 
Sidama Liberation Front (SLM) 
Wolayta People’s Democratic Front (WPDF) 
Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) 
Kefa People’s Democratic Union (KPDU)* 
12 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
 
The Adere People’s Representative  
The Ethiopian Democratic Action Group (EDAG) 
The Ethiopian Democratic Coalition (EDC) 
The Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) 
Ethiopian National Democratic Organization (ENDO) 
Horayal  
Oromo Abo Liberation Front (OALF) 
Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF)  
United Oromo People’s Liberation Front (UOPLF) 
Addis Ababa University Representative26  
The Yem Nationality Representative*  
The Gedeo People’s Representative*  
The Burji People’s Representative*  
The Agaw People’s Representative*  
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Total Seats in the Council of Representatives  87 
Source: The Minutes of the First, Second and Thirteenth Regular Sessions of 
the CoR. 
 
* The decision to apportion 6 seats to 5 different ethnic groups, most of which were 
from the South, was made in early September 1991, although it was less clear why 
and how these organizations were selected.   
 
                                                
26
 CoR’s Chairperson tabled a proposal to annul Addis Ababa University’s seat from the Council at its 36th 
Plenary Session held in March 1992, which ensued a relatively heated debate between members who debated 
for and against the proposal. Eventually the CoR passed a decision to cancel the University’s seat voting 29 
against 15 (The Minutes of the 36th Plenary Session of CoR, March 1992).  
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4.2.2. The major actors during the transition, 1991-1995  
 
In the wake of the fall of the Dergue, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) 
promulgated scores of policy and legislative enactments. A total of one hundred thirty-
three (133) proclamations providing for regional restructuring and regional elections, the 
powers and duties of central and regional government agencies, annual and emergency 
budget legislation, terminating the institutions of the defunct regime and ratification of 
multilateral and bilateral relations with foreign governments had been promulgated during 
the transition period (the Minutes of CoR: 1991-1995). The CoR held 114 sessions, 109 
plenary and 5 ad-hoc sessions, with each session extending to two or more meetings. Held 
in April 1994 for a series of twelve days to deliberate on the draft constitution, the 94th 
Plenary Session marked the highest such extended meeting. Although the minutes of every 
session were regularly recorded, it was not until several months later that they were subject 
to approval, to such an extent that redressing the soundness of the records proved beyond 
reproach. Attendance of all the sessions was properly recorded and incorporated into the 
minutes, albeit the volatile nature of the TGE coalition rendered continuous membership 
unlikely.  
The CoR began its sessions in July with 80 active members, save Addis Ababa 
University’s representation, whose seat remained vacant till in fact its representation was 
annulled in January 1992 (the 36th Plenary Session, March 1994). In September 1991 CoR 
decided to distribute six seats to ‘hitherto neglected’ nationalities and thereby expand the 
number of active CoR members to 86. However, amidst acrimonious conflict and armed 
pressure, the major partner in the TGE coalition, namely the Oromo Liberation Front 
(OLF), withdrew from government in June 1992. The expulsion of five-coalition partner-
political organizations from south Ethiopia in February 1993, apparently for their part in 
the Paris peace conference27, reduced the active number of CoR member organizations and 
individual members to 22 and 66 respectively (see Table 4.2. below).  
 
 
 
                                                
27
 The Paris Peace Conference was organized by opposition forces based both at home and abroad. The 
outcome of the Conference was a demand for a re-constitution of an interim government representative of all 
parties. Participants also urged for an international conference for peace and national reconciliation as a first 
step for more democratic institutions and development. A group of political parties which participated in the 
Paris conference were expelled from the COR, and formed the Southern Ethiopian Democratic Union. The 
latter joined the Council of Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy in Ethiopia (CAFPDE). 
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Table 4.2. The decisions and sessions of the Council of Representatives (1991-1995) 
 
 
Source: Compiled and computed by the author from the achieves of the House of 
Peoples’ Representatives (HPR) 
 
Table 4.2 depicts the average number of CoR members present and absent in 
percentage and absolute figures. Taking 1991 as a benchmark, making judgments about the 
stature of CoR’s non-EPRDF political organizations and their role vis-à-vis policymaking 
could to some degree be complicated. After the withdrawal of the OLF and the expulsion 
of South Ethiopia’s coalition partners, EPRDF achieved close to fifty percent majority over 
the remaining divided and fractious non-EPRDF members of the CoR. It was thus self-
evident that EPRDF had increasingly ascertained overwhelming leverage to push any 
agenda and policy decisions through the Council of Representatives after the latter half of 
1993. Nonetheless, this should not give one the impression that EPRDF was not well 
positioned to put its agenda through before mid-1993. Certainly it was, but the withdrawal 
and expulsion of 20 non-EPRDF members of the CoR (in an 87-seat legislature) absolutely 
guaranteed EPRDF a monopoly on policy agenda setting, and emboldened its control over 
the voting system in the CoR and the entire policymaking arena during the transition in 
Ethiopia.  
Additionally, the legislative enactments that EPRDF had the CoR endorse bolstered 
its role in the legislative process. The President of the TGE had in fact been empowered to 
preside over the CoR to ensure the implementation of policies, to confer positions on high 
civil and military officials, to appoint the Prime Minister and the members of the cabinet, 
and to call the sessions of the CoM at his leisure (TGE, 1991). Having had the highest 
executive and administrative eminence during the transition, the competences of the latter 
Year 
No. of 
Plenary 
and Ad-
hoc 
Sessions 
Held 
No. of 
Meetings 
conducted 
No. of  
Proclamations/Laws 
Passed 
Average No. 
of members 
Present 
No.           % 
Average No. of 
members 
Absent 
No.           %     
1991 14 20 6 60 74 21 26 
1991/92 
 
 
39 72 21 
53 
 
55 
62 
 
74 
33 
 
19 
38 
 
26 
1992/93 23 48 47 50 75 16 25 
1993/94 23 35 28 48 73 18 27 
1994/95 12 17 31 46 69 20 31 
Total 111 192 133     
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inter alia included ensuring the implementation of socio-economic policies, controlling 
and supervising the activities of the country’s bureaucracy, preparing the national budget, 
initiating legislation to be approved by the CoR (TGE, August 1991). Except for three 
positions and one deputy ministerial appointment that went to the OLF and a member of 
the South Ethiopia coalition partner respectively, the rest of the cabinet positions with and 
without portfolios had been assigned to the EPRDF and its close allies (Kinfe, 1994). 
Answerable to the President and the Council of Representatives, the Prime Minister was 
the head of the CoM and the entire civil service that provided the EPRDF with the leverage 
to see whether government agencies and civil servants observed policies and legislation. In 
other words, which individual and institutional players in the TGE commanded a legally 
mandated (or otherwise) influence on the policymaking process depended a lot on which 
group had ample access to the conduits of the massive powers of the state and its 
resources.  
Hence, despite the fact that the CoR’s vice-chairmanship and the secretary had 
been assigned to non-EPRDF members of the CoR, whose organizations held not more 
than two seats each and who also had neither the power nor the leverage to influence 
agenda setting and policymaking, the two vital positions, the Presidency and Prime 
Minister, with enormous powers and leverage, went to the leaders of EPRDF. Furthermore, 
apart from having a strong military power that installed it at the top of the policymaking 
pyramid, EPRDF allocated itself a controlling number of seats that earned it and its allies 
(friendly organizations, so to speak) a comfortable majority to have the TGE legislature 
endorse its legislative proposals. So, till the end of June 1992 the EPRDF had 32 seats 
(37.2%), and its control over the agenda and voting system with the same seats steadily 
grew to 42% after the withdrawal of 12 members of the OLF; the proportion was scaled up 
even further to 48.5%, following the expulsion 8 members from the south Ethiopia 
Coalition partners (see Table 4.1.). This attests to the fact that the EPRDF was in firm 
control of the carrot and the stick, so much so that the few friendly organizations which 
remained to its side were rewarded with power and amenities (i.e. the carrot), but had little 
effect in influencing policies. In contrast, the many others that resisted EPRDF’s positions, 
terms and conditions were either outmaneuvered to withdraw or face their outright 
expulsion (i.e. the stick)28.  
                                                
28
 Interview held with a former member of the Council of Representatives. 
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As is evident from the foregoing discussion, through the majority seats in the TGE 
legislature and the key leadership positions in the executive, the new policy elites were 
poised to propose and scrutinize the agenda and check their feasibility against EPERDF’s 
policy blueprints. Despite the fact that the TGE Charter empowered the transitional 
legislature to initiate and promulgate laws and policies, to all intents and purposes, 
reframing policies to match their designs increasingly became the exclusive preserve of the 
new policy elites. Evidence for this abound. Nobody would probably contest that the 
economic policy during the transition was one of the key policy measures taken during the 
transition to transform the country from a command and control economy to a market 
economy. Nevertheless, the economic policy of the transition period was put into effect as 
of November 1991, despite the fact that the members of the CoR had not adequately 
deliberated on the sprit of the policy, nor was it tabled as a motion so that the members of 
the CoR vote for or against its approval (19th Plenary session, October 1991). In fact, 
despite repeated pleas from several members of the CoR that valuable economic scenarios 
and proposals were generated from non-EPRDF member organizations for example, the 
Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce and professional economists had not yet been 
incorporated into the policy – they were left unheeded (21st Plenary Session, November 
1991). Probably, by then the EPRDF leadership decided that it was needless to canvass for 
more ideas, mainly because only the intelligentsia and urban elites who knew that they had 
the right to speech and expression could only exercise that right. This, in their view, was 
not regarded as public participation (ibid.). A former member of the CoR recollected: 
 
Before the transition period economic policy was issued, I remember there was this draft policy 
document proposed by the then Prime Minister Tamrat Layne. Every member organization of the 
CoR was also encouraged to develop its own draft. Every one of us including organizations outside 
of the CoR (such as Chamber of Commerce) canvassed and brought on board all the available 
resources and expertise to develop and present our visions and policy scenarios that would probably 
contribute to the economic development of the country. We were also told to induce professionals 
and experts in the area/in the field to give their views and/or comments on the proposed policy as 
panelists. We did what we could possibly do. Most of us presented our economic policy proposals in 
booklet from. By the end of all these exercises, however, the economy policy document 
originally/initially drafted by the EPRDF Prime Minister Tamrat Layne was published and became 
TGE’s official economy policy during the transition. The same tradition has continued to this day; 
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and this points to the fact that the system is not permissive for a genuine public participation in the 
policymaking process.29 
 
Additionally, although a consensus had been reached among the members of the 
CoR that preparation soon should begin for teaching subjects in the primary schools in the 
many nationality languages, all the designs and strategies of the controversial education 
policy were nonetheless carried out behind the back of the CoR; neither were they put 
through the CoR for deliberation, decision and approval (17th and 66th Plenary Sessions, 
April 1994). The members of the CoR, for example, protested to no avail, though the 
discussions were held in the Ministry of Education (MoE) sponsored by EPRDF and 
chaired by its permanent secretary in the MOE to determine the modalities of teaching 
subjects in ethnic languages in the absence of broad public and party representations (the 
17th Plenary Session of the CoR, October 1991). Despite the proclamation (7/1992) to 
provide for the formation of regional self-governments approved by the CoR provided for 
fourteen regional states to be constituted, the pleas of the non-EPRDF members of the CoR 
that the legislature’s decision was eclipsed by administrative fiat when five ethnic regions 
in South Ethiopia were amalgamated into one, also went unheeded (cf. 70th Plenary 
Session, May 1993, TGE, 1992). Furthermore, members of the CoR had not been aware 
that there was an ‘Economic Reform Steering Committee’ comprised of the President (the 
Chairperson of the CoR), representatives of the IMF and World Bank, the governor of 
National Bank, the Prime Minister, and ministers heading the economic sectors 
(agriculture, finance, industry, etc.), which made vital policy decisions, including macro 
economic restructuring measures, till a draft law  on privatization was proposed for CoR’s 
approval (the 90th Plenary Session, February 1994). In other words, the CoR did not 
establish the economic steering committee, nor had it known that such a committee existed 
which decided on such fundamental economic policy issues, nor was it informed about the 
economic reform programs that it [the economic steering committee] introduced (ibid.).   
There had been lengthy discussions, and in some instances even bitter debates, on 
some of the issues in the CoR, despite the debates invariably being between the 
Chairperson and the non-EPRDF members of the CoR. While there had not been any 
meaningful debate and/or discussions for much of the sessions, the most fiercely debated 
issues in the CoR at different points in time are indicated below. 
 
                                                
29
 Interview held with Ethiopian academic and prominent opposition leader, Addis Ababa, December 2003. 
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1. The government’s excessive use of force when Addis Ababa University students 
protested the administration of the referendum in Eritrea that left several students 
dead or injured in mid-1993, which was immediately followed by the expulsion of 
academic staff from the University the same year (71st Plenary Session, June 1994). 
 
2. Notwithstanding the fact that the economic policy during the transition deferred the 
issue of land ownership (i.e. whether or not land should be under state or private 
ownership) till a referendum sponsored by a constitutionally instituted government 
would be held, a bill to introduce a lease system of allocating urban land stimulated 
bitter debate between the Chairperson and non-EPRDF members of the CoR. 
According to non-EPRDF legislators, the legislation was designed to preempt a 
referendum on the land ownership issue, when the Chairperson made the 
unsolicited revelation that he, in fact, was in favor of state ownership. The 
legislation that introduced a lease system into the urban administration had been 
approved with 38 deputies voting for, 3 against and 4 abstentions (TGE, November 
1991, 83rd Plenary Session, November 1994).  
 
3. The most acrimonious debate in the CoR took place when the draft constitution was 
discussed in April 1994. The most contentious and controversial provisions, 
namely, articles 37 and 38 (articles 39 and 40 in the finally approved constitution), 
unleashed fierce debate between the Chairperson and non-EPRDF members of the 
CoR (the 94th Plenary Session, 1994). 
 
4. The fourth such debate took place when the executive proposed a law to restructure 
and organize the media institutions, namely the Ethiopian News Agency, Ethiopian 
Radio, Ethiopian Television and Ethiopian Press Agency under the Ministry of 
Information. The non-EPRDF members of the CoR proposed a fundamental 
modification to the bill to the effect that administering the media agencies by an 
independent board that was accountable to the parliament would stem the unfair 
influence of the ruling party and the state apparatus which had an overwhelming 
control (100th Plenary Session, February 1995).  It is worth noting that the same 
issue prompted heated debate in the HPR, and it has been the only such agenda 
item to reappear three times (comparable to a third reading) in the history of the 
EPRDF parliament (see Chapter 5).   
 139
 
In all of the cases, not only did the President almost always use his position to 
interrupt debates and discussions for voting, but the EPRDF also won all of the debates 
with a wide margin. In view of the composition of the Council of Representatives, any 
private bills and/or initiatives were much less likely to be tabled. The Ethiopian National 
Democratic Organization (ENDO)30, which had only one seat in the CoR, nonetheless, 
came with a legislative proposal to provide for monetary subsidy to political organizations 
fielding candidates for the 1995 general election. This was the only bill proposed by a non-
EPRDF member of the CoR, and it became law (102nd Plenary Session, March 1995). This 
would means that out of 133 proclamations and the numerous policy issues discussed and 
debated in the CoR throughout the duration of the TGE (i.e. July 1991-August 1995), a 
non-EPRDF member of the CoR proposed only one law.   
Furthermore, when EPRDF seized power in 1991, Ethiopia had yet to emerge from 
a quagmire of civil war. In the pre-1991 period, as noted in Chapter 3, there was little room 
for organized and independent civil movements, nor was there any freedom of expression. 
In the wake of 1991 the relationship between state and non-state actors and fledgling civil 
society organizations (CSOs) was volatile. In other words, the conflict that had ravaged the 
country together with the Dergue’s muffling of the civil society and/or the poor state-civil 
society relationship undermined the latter’s role and influence on the policymaking process 
during the transition. On the flipside, the new policy elites’ leverage for comprehensive 
and overwhelming influence on policymaking was guaranteed, partly because of the pre-
1991 hangover (civil society and other political forces were either very weak or disunited 
to able to pose any challenge to the new elites), and partly due to EPRDF’s military might 
that emerged victorious over the Dergue army. To put it differently, organized and 
proactive civil society – in the sense of asserting and countervailing the new policy elites 
and thereby regenerate the policymaking process and/or influence policies – was non-
extent.  
          Moreover, while the statutes including the Charter were geared towards 
democratization, the EPRDF embarked on a crackdown on any challenge to stem 
opposition and/or any dissent. In the immediate aftermath of 1991, the academic 
community of the oldest institution of higher learning in the country, Addis Ababa 
University, was branded as center of chauvinists, in much the same way as Hailesellasie’s 
                                                
30
 Kifle Wodajo was the leader of ENDO (see foornote 24).  
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and Mengistu’s regimes branded the University as a center of communism and counter-
revolutionaries respectively. As a result, the party (EPRDF) adopted a negative attitude 
towards the University community, so much so that the research outputs of the University 
staff had little effect, at least as input into the country’s socio-economic development 
programs31. In fact, the CoR’s plenary sessions that deliberated on Addis Ababa University 
were invariably vindictive of the hostile attitudes adopted by the EPRDF leadership 
towards the University’s academic community (36th, 48th, 49th, 63rd, 71st, 86th Plenary 
Sessions of the CoR). Furthermore, by orchestrating splits in the national trade union and 
teachers associations, not only did EPRDF destabilize their potential to countervail state 
forces, but also prevented them from influencing the policymaking process32. The 
opposition, which attempted to challenge EPRDF’s positions in the CoR, was faced with 
forced withdrawal at best, or expulsion at worst.  
         The above assessments show that, through its overwhelming control over the key 
policymaking institutions during the transition, the CoR and CoM, the EPRDF enhanced 
its leverage in the entire process of policymaking. The fusion of the party with the 
executive institutions militated against the chances of non-state actors influencing the 
policymaking process. The influence of non-EPRDF members of the CoR (who were the 
leftovers after the expulsions and withdrawals) on the policymaking process was marginal 
and ineffective. It was certainly clear that EPRDF opted for absolute control of the 
legislative process in CoR due chiefly to its overriding obsession with the exclusion of 
non-EPRDF political forces and nascent civil society organizations (CSOs) from the 
policymaking process. The above pictures of the immediate post-1991 Ethiopian 
policymaking process did not appear to augur well for an inclusive and participatory 
policymaking process, and the struggle between the EPRDF and non-government actors in 
influencing the policymaking process had been tilted towards the former.    
   
                                                
31
 The speech made by the head of  the Research and Publication Office of Addis Ababa University marking 
the 50th Jubilee Anniversary of the Founding of Addis Ababa University, January 2000.  
32
 Questionnaire Responses from Ethiopian Teachers’ Association (ETA) and Confederation of Ethiopian 
Labor Union (CETU), April 2003.  
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    4.2.3. The making of Ethiopian mega-public policy33, the Constitution-making       
                     process 
 
A constitution sets out the relationship between individuals and the government, and it 
defines the powers of the state and its agencies34. It also forms the very foundation of 
public life and regulates the relationship between those who govern and those who are 
governed, and the latter place the former in a position of trust and authority (Wessels, 
2001). This relationship therefore necessitates the participation of civil society and the 
entire citizenry in the constitution making process (ibid.). Wessels reasons: 
 
…it is in times of crises that constitutions are really tested. If a constitution is not perceived 
to be legitimate and if it does not accommodate the hopes and fears of the peoples that have to live 
under it, it will not be respected-nor will it ever become a living document adequately addressing 
the interests of the entire citizenry. At this point, politicians may tear the constitution to shreds and 
political violence and coups may become the order of the day. Conversely, if a constitution is 
legitimated and organically grows to become a living instrument, it can be the vehicle for ensuring 
representative, responsible and good government. (2001, xii)            
 
        To add to this, a constitution as a mega-public policy or at the summit of all public 
policies (a basic law, as lawyers would call it), not only offers principles and the spirit to 
steer the policymaking process, but also it patterns institutional and state-society 
relationships with respect to public policymaking. It is thus such a vital issue that it can 
only be of value when people who live under it establish ownership over it. The 
constitution-making process, therefore, must be able to bring all actors and stakeholders on 
board, regardless of creed, religion, sex, ethnicity, color and political views. It took South 
Africans, for instance, seven solid years (from 1989 to 1996) to produce a constitutional 
document in 1996 in many respects ‘pioneering borrowing from the constitutional 
jurisprudence of all parts of the world, and yet uniquely South African’ (Haysom, 2001: 
111). According to Mbete-Kgositsile (2001), the South African constitution has something 
for everybody that heralds a triumph to all South Africans, and it is this constitutional basis 
                                                
33
 Sponsored by EPRDF, the 1995 constitution affirmed that the constitution is the supreme law of the land; 
and further spells out: ‘any law, customary practice or a decision of an organ or a public official which 
contravenes this constitution’ is null and void.  Besides, citizens and all associations should abide by the 
constitution, and thus ‘all citizens... political organizations as well as their officials have the duty to ensure 
observance of the Constitution and obey it’ (FRDE, 1995:4).    
34
 On line at http://confinder.richmond.edu/, accessed on July 24, 2003 
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that has transformed the country into one of the most democratic countries on the African 
content. While the constitution-making process had gone through tortuous trajectories from 
‘talks about talks’ in 1989 to November 1996, when it was signed into law, due mainly to 
gracious leadership and the wisdom of its people, the South Africans have a Constitution 
which is hailed as model and inspiration to other countries. Most of all, the constitution is 
recognized as one of the most advanced constitutions in the world, ‘entrenching a 
constitutional democracy based on an extensive and progressive bill of fundamental rights’ 
(Haysom, 2001).  
          In August 1992 the CoR promulgated a law that established a Constitutional 
Commission whose competences revolved around writing and submitting a constitution to 
the CoR, organizing and conducting educational symposiums on constitutional principles, 
distributing the draft constitution to the public for discussion, canvassing for comments 
and suggestions on the draft and reporting that to the CoR (TGE, August 1992). The 
legislation spelt out the structure as well as composition of the Commission. It consisted of 
a general assembly, an executive committee and many other committees. Despite a high 
membership attrition rate35 all along, the general assembly had 29 members, drawing 7 
members from CoR, seven from different political organizations, Ethiopian Labor Union, 
Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce and women’s representatives each having 3 members; 
and Ethiopian Lawyers and Teachers Associations each comprising 2 representatives 
(ibid.). Not only did the Council of Representatives appoint the chairperson, the deputy 
chairperson and the secretary of the Commission to lead the executive committee as well 
as the entire constitution-making process, but it also selected all the delegates who 
participated in the drafting process (The 50th Plenary Session of CoR, August 1992; Kifle, 
2001).  
         According to Kifle (2001), since negotiations behind the scenes continued for OLF’s 
return, work on the actual drafting of the constitution was not begun till three months later. 
Three committees were formed to augment the drafting process, one dealing with human 
rights, the second working on state structure, and the last working on other constitutional 
matters that could not be categorized in either of the other two (the 69th Plenary Session, 
May 1993). Moreover, not only was a team of six local legal professionals assist the 
Commission, it also benefited from international experiences of constitutional experts who 
                                                
35
 In a certificate award ceremony held in the hall of the Council of Representatives in May 1995 to salute the 
services that the members of the Constitutional Commission contributed, only 20 of the 29 who had initially 
joined it showed up (the 105th Regular Session of the CoR, May 1995; Kifle, 2001).   
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came from India, France, the USA, Spain, Germany and Egypt  (ibid.). In pursuance of 
their mandates provided by the legislation, the Commission took the draft constitution to 
the people down to the neighborhood associations (Kebeles) to solicit ideas and comments, 
to such an extent that ‘as many as 30% percent of the general population are thought to 
have participated’ in the consultation process (Kifle, 2001: 137-138). Moreover, CoR had 
several sessions hearing the Commission’s report and following up the development of the 
constitution36. The last such sessions, as noted earlier, on the constitution were held in 
April and May 1994, where it was debated and a decision taken to send it to a 
Constitutional Assembly for ratification. While the last session witnessed a very lengthy 
debate, probably the most heated and acrimonious of all the sessions that CoR had ever 
held, nevertheless the Chairperson and few non-EPRDF members of the CoR who opposed 
EPRDF’s positions dominated much of the deliberations (CoR: the Minutes of the Plenary 
Sessions, July 1991 to August 1995).    
         In any case, the available international and local experts may have been brought on 
board, the Commission may well have ‘consulted’ the public, though Kifle himself seemed 
to doubt whether 30% of Ethiopian public were reached, the issue at stake is: was the 
Constitutional Commission in fact independent, as Kifle has tried to portray? Had the 
constitution-making process been inclusive, in the sense of bringing all the stakeholders 
and parties on board, as South Africans did? Which groups or players among the actors had 
a paramount and overwhelming influence as well leverage, to such an extent that they 
somehow wielded the prerogatives of determining the options as well as parameters within 
which the principles of Ethiopian mega-pubic policy (i.e. the constitution) and the 
provisions thereof were to be decided in their favor?        
         There are two diametrically contrasting views concerning which group, amongst the 
many political forces and actors, had a paramount influence as well as an imprint on the 
constitution-making process in Ethiopia. Some argued that EPRDF had only two of its 
members in the Constitutional Commission, and therefore, during discussions and debates 
in the Commission and in the process of drafting the constitution the former ‘was one 
among other actors’ (Andreas, 2001; Kifle, 2001). Accordingly, the predominance of the 
‘EPRDF was first felt in the constitutional assembly’ and it was only in the Constitutional 
Assembly that ‘the debate strictly followed party lines’, so much so that one gets the 
impression that the constitution-making process was more representative and participatory 
                                                
36
 The 47th, 49th, 50th, 69th, 84th, 93rd, 94th Plenary Sessions of the CoR. 
 144
in the Council of Representatives as well as in Constitutional Commission than it was in 
the Constitutional Assembly (ibid.). Others contended that the entire constitution-making 
process which instituted the second republic was flawed, because the constitution-making 
process, ranging from appointment of persons to the Constitutional Commission and the 
process of drafting it to its ratification by Constitutional Assembly were rather crafted as 
well as selfishly guarded by the EPRDF (Kassahun, 1995; Abbink, 1997; Vestal, 1996; 
Merera, 2003). ‘Owing to the absence of political space for peaceful involvement of 
opposition groups having alternative views in the process of formulating the constitution’ 
(Kassahun, 1995: 134), and EPRDF’s predisposition to incorporate ‘its ideology in the new 
constitution…and consolidate its vision of the future for the nation-even if that vision 
conflicted with that of the majority of the people’ (Vestal, 1997: 29); and the sponsors of 
the constitution, therefore, used their military might to consolidate and legitimize their hold 
on power through a constitutional engineering mechanism (Merera, 2003: 127). Putting it 
differently, the preceding argument suggests that the playing fields were never level for all 
the actors (state and society) in the making of the constitution, casting serious doubts on 
the impartiality, viability and credibility of the constitution-making process.  
         To begin with, the Constitutional Commission had almost immediately been deprived 
of its independence when CoR and its chairperson insisted on appointing 7 members from 
the EPRDF dominated CoR. Installed at the apex of the Commission, the chairman, vice-
chairman and the secretary of the Commission, which were such influential leadership 
positions, were known for their loyal support and allegiance to the EPRDF (the 50th 
Plenary Session, August 1992). Secondly, the opposition elements were either forced to 
withdraw or were expelled from the CoR, and others that had no seats in the CoR were 
effectively excluded from the constitution-making process through harassment and 
coercive measures of one kind or the other (Abbink, 1995, 1997; Marina, 1995; Merera, 
2003). Thirdly, as earlier noted, the EPRDF orchestrated a split in the leadership of the 
relatively strong civil society organizations in Ethiopia such as Teachers’ Associations and 
Labor Union, and loyal supporters were co-opted and appointed as members of the 
Constitutional Commission. In fact, it turned out to be unsuccessful, though the proposal 
by the Chairperson of the CoR to appoint two persons to be members of the Commission 
from the breakaway teachers’ association was challenged by non-EPRDF members (the 
84th Plenary Session of CoR, December 1994). Lastly, the parameters set by the new policy 
elites left no meaningful option, with the public playing no significant role in the process, 
nor were there any meaningful public participation in the constitution-making process. In 
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response to whether or not the Constitutional Assembly should consider the draft as a valid 
constitutional document and begin deliberating, an independent representative37 in its first 
session contended: 
 
In first place, fruitful, fair and meaningful debates on the draft constitution in the CoR had been 
marred by the absence of wisdom and gracious leadership. … Moreover, I toured through my 
constituency as well as other constituencies in Addis Ababa while the people were discussing the 
draft constitution, the majority of the people vehemently objected ‘self determination and up to and 
including secession’ and state ownership of land’. More particularly, the turn out of people in my 
constituency, namely, District 12, 06 neighborhood association (Kebele), for instance, was only 19, 
while actually the number of residents are 17, 770.  Even the 19 teen aged, high school completes, 
came to the district office wanting to be employed in the police force, after having heard 
announcement from Addis Ababa Police Commission which was to recruit them on the same day, 
the constitution was to be discussed. The residents in my and other districts, therefore, not only are 
very well aware of the fact that the constitution is the work of a single party, but also they showed 
their outright objection by not coming to the assembly halls of the districts. Besides, elections for 
the Constitutional Assembly have not been free and fair. After all, holding elections after having 
thrown your opponents or the opposition to jails is not only tantamount to galloping on a horseback 
across a field, and declaring one a winner where there is no contestant, but also it is undemocratic. 
The options are, therefore, either to articulate the genuine demands of people into the constitution, 
or to put the demands of the organization first, even if this conflicts with the interest of the people. 
Surely, an EPRDF zealot will choose the latter; I would rather go for the former. (Volume 1, the 
Minutes of the Constitutional Assembly, October, 1995)  
   
Abbink added: 
 
The drafting of a new constitution, although announced as a democratic process whereby all the 
civilians would have a significant say, was dominated by the TGE (i.e. EPRDF) and the commission 
it had appointed. Open discussions in the k’belles (the urban dwellers’ associations and the peasants’ 
associations) did not yield substantial changes, nor were they meant to. The meetings themselves 
were only visited by an estimated five percent of the total population. Even so, they allowed for the 
voicing of serious criticism of the draft constitution, yet they made no significant impact upon the 
final text. Since the discussions started in the media and in the Constituent Assembly, the clauses on 
the land law, on ‘the right to secession’ of disaffected ethno-regions and on some religious rights for 
Christians, proved controversial. But they were not rescinded or reformulated in the final version, 
approved in December 1994. (1995: 155)  
 
                                                
37
 The late Captain Admase Zeleke, an independent MP, voicing his objections to the contentious issues 
provided for in the constitution in October 1995.  
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         After having received the draft constitution from the Commission early in April 
1994, the CoR deliberated on every article. Much more extensive discussions, even 
acrimonious debates, however, were held on the controversial articles 39 and 40 (issues of 
independence and land) than on other provisions in the draft constitution. Much of the 
debate was a repetition of what had taken place in the Constitutional Commission, and it 
eventually proved unable to achieve consensus on these issues.  CoR, too, decided to send 
the competing ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ drafts on the two controversial issues to the 
Constituent Assembly (The 94th Plenary Session of CoR, April 1994). The ‘minority 
views’ that first originated in the Constitutional Commission, extended to the CoR as well 
as the Constitutional Assembly, suggested alternative resolution mechanisms to nationality 
(ethnic) problems, without completely shunning secession when and if the issue arises (the 
Draft Constitution, April, 1994: 18-20). In fact, they detailed legal and constitutional 
proceedings should a nation recognized under article 39, sub-article (5) as such, initiate 
secession for such justifiable reasons as if and when the rights of a nation provided under 
sub-articles (2) and (3) are denied, or suppressed, or when national wealth or fruits of 
national development have not been equitably distributed (ibid.). The alterative provisions 
included: a) presenting the case to a constitutional court, which examines the validity of 
the reasons and suggests compromise solutions, including awarding compensation for a 
nation that perceived itself disadvantaged; b) presenting the decisions of the constitutional 
court to the joint sessions of both houses of the national parliament; c) the decisions of the 
parliament shall next be forward to the legislative council of the nation’s self-government; 
d) if the latter rejects the decision of the national parliament, it shall by two-third majority 
vote suggest either other compromise solutions, short of secession, or shall decide to 
secede; e) if the nation’s legislative council decides in favor of secession by a two-thirds 
majority, the demand for secession will materialize three years after the demand for 
secession is supported by a majority in a referendum held by people of the concerned 
nation (ethnic group)  (ibid.).  The second contentious issue was Article 40, sub-article 3 
that provides for land ownership. The ‘minority’s’ alternative article was even bolder: 
 
Every Ethiopian citizen, including rural and urban land, has the right to ownership of private 
property. This right shall include right to acquire, to use, to dispose of such property by sale or 
bequest or transfer otherwise. (Draft Constitution adopted by the CoR, April 1994: 19)   
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           Spelt out in the current constitution, the ‘majority’s’ views represent the hallmarks 
of the ideological precepts of the TPLF/EPRDF. These political values which the latter had 
nurtured, and on which ‘it staked its political fortunes’, and the ideological values which it 
had spelt out in its programs both before and after 1991, have now boldly been stipulated 
in the mega-public policy, the national constitution that guides policymaking as well as 
state-society relationships. In the Tehadesso (Resuscitation)38 sessions in which the 
EPRDF’s weaknesses and strengths were appraised, its success in having its program 
integrated into a national constitution has been hailed as one of ‘the proudest of all the 
achievements over the last ten years’ (EPRDF, undated). Distributed to its leadership 
before it was to be adopted at the second congress held in Awasa from December 20 to 25, 
1994, the EPRDF draft program stated: 
 
3.1. Peoples’ right to self-determination including session should be guaranteed through statutory 
provisions. (EPRDF, 1993: 13) 
 
It continues: 
 
10.1.1. Land should be public property, its sale and exchange as well as land mortgage are to be 
prohibited (ibid: 16)39 
 
           A question that will logically follow therefore is: why was it that the same 
arguments that figured prominently (on the controversial articles of 39 and 40) in the 
Commission, reappeared in the CoR, and in the Constitutional Assembly, in the exact same 
fashion as they did in Commission? This points to the fact that because the EPRDF 
dominated the whole constitution-making process, and it culminated in its ratification by 
the Constitutional Assembly. In fact, even the EPRDF-dominated CoR made no significant 
changes to the draft constitution, other than the minute reformulations and reshuffling of 
                                                
38
 EPRDF acknowledged that political life at every level in the hierarchy of the ruling party hibernated    
from 1991 to 2001 for ten years, with the organization plunging into decadence as well as stagnation and its 
leadership and cadres engaged in widespread corruption and misappropriation of government funds (EPRDF, 
2003a). The Tehadesso campaign was, therefore, professed to have carried out to reverse the scenario that 
contravened the philosophy and values of revolutionary democracy. The wave of dismissal measures that 
targeted both the key leadership and rank-and-file cadres of the EPRDF following Tehadesso, nevertheless, 
enhanced the ascendancy of a selected elite group of leaders in the policymaking process. The civil service 
and the executive structure were overhauled to reflect the unambiguous dominance of party and executive 
leadership in policymaking.   
39
 EPRDF’s draft program was issued nearly half a year both before its Second Congress adopted it, even 
much earlier before the Constitutional Assembly ratified it. 
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articles; it rather fine-tuned and extended it, but did not reinvent it.  Most of EPRDF’s 
‘organizational operation’, as it came to be known during the infamous Dergue era, was 
effectively applied to the Constitutional Commission, rather than in the CoR. Nor would 
one contest the little effort required in this context in the Constitutional Assembly40. When 
the latter was convened in October 1994, EPRDF members constituted an overwhelming 
majority. Hence, EPRDF and its allies won 96.8% (539) of the 557 Constitutional 
Assembly seats, and independent candidates and other parties 3.2% (18) (HPR, August, 
1995). Andreas (2001) and Kifle (2001) also noted that the deliberations in the 
Constitutional Assembly were virtually captured by party disciplines, leaving no room for 
creative discourse. In other words, the entire process of public policymaking during the 
transition, including, of course, the making of the Constitution, was dominated by the 
Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) (see Chapter 5).  
         Adopted on 8 May 1996 and amended on 11 October 1996 by the Constitutional 
Assembly, the explanatory memorandum of the South African Constitution states: 
This Constitution was drafted in terms of Chapter 5 of the interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993) 
and was first adopted by the Constitutional Assembly on 8 May 1996. In terms of a judgment of the 
Constitutional Court, delivered on 6 September 1996, the text was referred back to the 
Constitutional Assembly for reconsideration. The text was accordingly amended to comply with the 
Constitutional Principles contained in Schedule 4 of the interim Constitution. It was signed into law 
on 10 December 1996. 
The objective in this process was to ensure that the final Constitution is legitimate, credible and 
accepted by all South Africans.  
To this extent, the process of drafting the Constitution involved many South Africans in the 
largest public participation programme ever carried out in South Africa. After nearly two years of 
intensive consultations, political parties represented in the Constitutional Assembly negotiated the 
formulations contained in this text, which are an integration of ideas from ordinary citizens, civil 
society and political parties represented in and outside of the Constitutional Assembly.  
This Constitution therefore represents the collective wisdom of the South African people 
and has been arrived at by general agreement (emphasis mine). 
 
                                                
40
  For comparison, see the Draft Constitution presented to the CoR by the Constitutional Commission in 
April 1994 and the Draft Constitution approved by CoR in May 1994, which was submitted to the 
Constitutional Assembly for ratification.     
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        While historical contexts may differ, compared with South Africa, the constitution-
making exercise in Ethiopia, nevertheless, was far more rigid, with the agenda much more 
influenced by pre-commitments of the victorious sponsors of the process, namely the 
EPRDF (Hyden, 2001; Jhala, 2001). By the virtue of the fact that the constitutional process 
began after the latter’s victory over the Dergue would mean that not only the victors 
controlled the parameters within which the process occur, the number of options for non-
EPRDF actors were also already foreclosed (Hyden and Venter, 2001; Jhala, 2001). In 
other words, not only did the overthrow of the Dergue’s regime by the EPRDF create a 
scenario in which the hegemony of the EPRDF was impregnable, but so also did the pre-
commitments that its victory institutionalized limit the choices available to the drafters of 
the constitution. 
        The foregoing discussions have therefore revealed quite clearly that this would have 
far worse consequences in terms of the relationship between the executive and the party, 
on the one hand, and the legislature and non-state actors, on the other, invariably limiting 
the role and influence of the latter in the policymaking process. 
  
4.3. The role of the legislature and the executive in the legislative process 
 
4.3.1. The legislative process in HPR 
 
The Ethiopian parliament consists of two chambers, the House of Federation (HoF), and 
the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPR). However, unlike countries practicing a 
parliamentary form of government, the former has no legislative powers. The members of 
the HPR are elected for 550 seats in parliament for five years from electoral districts 
constituted as such, with each district or constituency having a population of 100,000 
(FDRE, 1995). For instance, deputies won 546 and 547 seats in the general elections held 
in 1995 and 2000 respectively. Despite objections by the opposition for unfairly allocating 
advantages to the parties having uninhibited prior access to state and power resources, 
deputies to the HPR are elected by the first-past-the-post system (plurality of votes cast) 
(FRDE, 1995; Dessalegn and Meheret, 2004). Twenty seats are, however, reserved to 
provide for representation of minority ethnic groups in the HPR. MPs, as is presumably the 
case around the world, enjoy immunity from prosecution and/or will not be subject to any 
criminal and civil proceedings while attending to legislative duties or be reprimanded 
unless caught in flagrante delicto. Members of the HPR shall have the liberty to pay their 
allegiance to the constitution, the wish of the people and their conscience, although most of 
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the opposition and independent members of HRP questioned whether the ruling party’s 
(EPRDF’s) members of HPR abide, inter alia, by their conscience41. The twice-weekly 
(Tuesdays and Thursdays) plenary sessions of the HPR start towards the beginning of 
October and continue to the 9th of July of the following year annually.  
         The HPR is the highest authority with a wide range of legislative functions (FDRE, 
1995: 18). Its powers evolved from the broad federal jurisdictions assigned to it and the 
executive. Its competences include passing laws on: utilization of land, rivers and lakes 
crossing national boundaries and connecting two or more national regional states (NRSs); 
inter-state and foreign trade; air, rail, water transport operating in two or more NRSs, 
postal and telecommunication services; enforcing the rights enshrined in the constitution, 
including legislating electoral procedures; enacting labor and commercial codes. The HPR 
also enacts civil laws, when it so desires and/or requested to do so by the HoF; declares a 
state of emergency and state of war as and when the executive demands; approves the 
broad socio-economic and fiscal policies of the country, and passes laws on such issues as 
local currency, the national bank and foreign exchange; levies taxes and collects duties 
reserved for the federal government, and approves the central government’s (federal) 
budget; ratifies international agreements concluded by the executive; approves the 
appointment of judges, ministers, commissioners and other officials seconded by the 
executive; establishes the institutions of human rights and ombudsman; and questions  
and/or investigates the Prime Minister and members of the executive (ibid: 21-22). In view 
of the stringent party lines and discipline that EPRDF deputies have in fact been enjoined 
to observe, the latter has never taken place and is probably unlikely to materialize in the 
immediate future42. The Speaker of the HPR, and in his absence his deputy, presides over 
the plenary and ad-hoc sessions, and on behalf of the House acts as liaison with domestic 
and international agencies, leads, and administers its affairs and coordinates the various 
committees (FDRE, 2002). 
        The catalog of government institutions that have the power of initiating legislation 
include: the Speaker of the HPR and his deputy, at least twenty members of the HPR, 
standing and ad-hoc committees, and government organizations responsible to the HPR, 
the Council of Ministers and other government agencies, and the judiciary (op. cit.). All 
draft bills are introduced to the HPR via the Speaker. At least twenty members of the HPR 
                                                
41
 The author’s interview transcripts and notes.   
42
 Questionnaire responses from the members of HPR, who are also the members of SEPDU and OPDO, both 
of which are affiliates of EPRDF, March 2003  
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can propose a bill a week before the latter tending to it for a first reading, though the 
independent and opposition MPs consider this as a constraint limiting their participation in 
the legislative process43. Upon receiving a draft bill, the Speaker of the HPR presents the 
general content and spirit of the bill, and the next stage in the legislative process, namely, 
first reading starts forthwith. The first reading is a preliminary discussion on the draft 
legislation by a plenary session before referring the bill to a relevant standing committee, 
which begins with reading out of draft legislation by the Speaker or the person he 
delegates. If the bill is too voluminous for reading, however, the secretariat of the House 
distributes copies to every deputy before the date fixed for the reading, and this is soon 
followed by a discussion on the general spirit of the draft. Following the first deliberation, 
either the bill is referred to a relevant committee, or if MPs decide by two-third majority to 
deliberate in a plenary session, it will rather not be referred to any committee (ibid.). For 
most of the plenary sessions, which this author had been allowed to attend, deliberations on 
draft bills during the preliminary readings were speeded up, and ipso facto, MPs’ 
participation in the discussions, and the decision which relevant committee should the draft 
bill be referred to have invariably been marginal44.  
          Be that as it may, the standing committee that the draft bill is referred to primarily 
contacts the drafters, which in the majority of cases are the Prime Minister’s Office 
(PMO), the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the legal affairs departments of line ministries, 
consults them or even organizes a public gathering to elicit ‘public opinions’. Bills can also 
be referred to two or more standing committees, among others, vagrancy and labor laws, 
and the proclamation relating to the System of Intervention of the Federal Government in 
the NRSs are points in this case45.  The committees’ consultations with the public and the 
drafters are translated into recommendations, though only the Addis Ababan public and 
relevant government agencies in the capital are conferred with. In any case, this stage of 
the legislative process is designated as the second reading, the stage where a committee or 
committees’ leadership organizes opinions, and presents to the plenary session of the HPR 
by way of recommendations, although the recommendations have never contradicted the 
bill originally proposed. A third reading will follow, if the Speaker sees that a clash of 
opinions are rampant and the session designated as the second reading, generally, fails to 
achieve complete deliberation on the bill, albeit there has never been a bill transcending the 
                                                
43
 Questionnaire responses from the independent and opposition MPs, April 2003 
44
 Observation sessions attended, March, April, November and December 2003.  
45
 Observation sessions attended in 2003.  
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latter stage in the legislative process since the HPR has commenced business in 199546. 
With the committee presenting the amended version, the third reading brings the legislative 
process in the HPR to a close, although the law cannot become a law till it is signed by the 
Head of the State (i.e. the President) and published in the official law reporter - Negarit 
Gazeta. Following the decision of the HPR to adopt a law by a simple majority, it is 
submitted to the President for signature. However, the President’s marginal power with 
respect to the legislative process to use his power of not signing it could prolong the 
official adoption of the legislation for fifteen days from the day of submission; 
nevertheless, after that the law takes effect with or without his signature (FDRE, 1995, 
2002; Fasil, 1997).                           
 
4.3.2. Committees and legislative oversight in HPR 
 
The HPR has the power of legislation, the power to question the Prime Minister and other 
top officials of government agencies, to examine both the executive’s handling of its 
powers and discharge of its duties, taking measures should these have been misused 
(FDRE, 1995). However, party discipline and structure combined with a lack of 
competence among the bulk of the MPs, militated against the exercise of their legislative 
duties detailed in the constitution and other by laws47. In any case, calling the executive to 
account for its behavior and actions, and investigating its performances, are the 
responsibility of the HPR. The Chief Executive (the Prime Minister), for instance, annually 
presents himself twice before the House, in October to map out his plans for the year and 
in early July for the assessment of his government’s performances during the year. 
Nevertheless, in essentially substantive sense of the word-debate (vivacious debate, as 
such) - in the HPR takes place, and in some cases acrimonious debate often flares up 
between him and the opposition, each time the Prime Minister appears before the House to 
deliver reports48. Likewise, the head of each ministry or government agency annually 
delivers reports outlining action plans for the year, and presents budget appropriations in 
                                                
46
 The author’s observation sessions and talks with minute recorders, interviews with MPs and questionnaire 
responses from deputies, and the minutes of the HPR.    
47
 Ironically, EPRDF, Opposition and Independent MPs share almost the same understanding in this regard, 
questionnaire responses from members of the HPR, January 2003.   
48
 The Minutes of the HPR, October 2001 (2nd year, 2nd Plenary Session), January 2002 (2nd Year, 13th 
Plenary Session); July 2003 (3rd Year, 1st Special Session); and October 2003 (4th Year, 2nd Plenary Session); 
and regular and live transmissions of the events in the HPR on Ethiopian Television  
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some detail, which in most cases are followed by an outline of the accomplishments and 
problems encountered in the course of the year (FDRE, 2002).  
         Standing committees are the key clearance points at which decisions are taken at each 
stage of the legislative process. The HPR had nine such committees for much of the first 
term. In the wake of the Tehadesso (Resuscitation) campaign, nonetheless, they have been 
reorganized, which also coincided with a major restructuring of the executive government 
agencies. Charged with legislative duties and oversight over the executive ministries and 
government institutions, twelve standing committees have since been reorganized.  These 
are: 
 
1. Capacity Building Affairs Standing Committee   
2. Trade and Industry Affairs Standing Committee 
3. Rural Development Affairs Standing Committee 
4. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Affairs Standing 
Committee 
5. Infrastructure Development Affairs Standing Committee 
6. Budget and Finance Affairs Standing Committee 
7. Legal and Administrative Affairs Standing Committee 
8. Foreign, Defense and Security Affairs Standing Committee 
9. Women’s Affairs Standing Committee 
10. Information and Culture Affairs Standing Committee 
11. Social Affairs Standing Committee 
12. Pastoralists Affairs Standing Committee. 
 
            Each committee consists of 13 MPs, and elects a chairperson, deputy chairperson 
and a secretary. A proclamation has also empowered committees to subpoena and exercise 
oversight over more than eighty ministries and government establishments (FDRE, 2002). 
The Capacity Building Affairs Standing Committee, for example, has been assigned by law 
to supervise the Ministry of Capacity Building, Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology Commission, Civil Service Commission, Management Institute and Civil 
Service College. Similarly, all others are assigned to exercise supervision responsibilities 
over relevant executive agencies, the highest such organizations being fourteen 
government ministries and agencies supervised by the Legal and Administrative Affairs 
Standing Committee. Not only are they empowered to scrutinize bills referred to them, but 
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also are entrusted with the follow up of the implementation of national socio-economic 
policies and strategies, although their mandate to take measures of redress and/or take such 
‘necessary measures’ should discrepancies materialize has always been dubious. In fact, 
statutory provisions make no specific references as to what measures, if any, that the HPR 
or the standing committees should take in case of implementation failures and/or if the 
executive fails to account for its actions.  
        On the recommendation of the chairman of the party having the majority seats in the 
HPR (i.e. EPRDF) at the first session of every term, not only do the Speaker and his deputy 
preside over all the sessions, but they also coordinate the work of the various committees 
in the HPR (FDRE, 2002). Nevertheless, the election of the Speaker and his deputy as 
recommended is a foregone conclusion, for the EPRDF has well over 85 percent of the 
seats. The Speaker and his deputy, both of whom are members of the ruling party, have 
assumed the HPR’s leadership over the last two consecutive terms. Members of EPRDF 
run all committees and their leadership, except for Pastoralists’ Standing Committee, 
whose members are largely drawn from Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz and Afar NRSs, and 
which are particularly primed for these regions. Of the 156 MPs assigned to the twelve 
standing committees, the ruling party MPs controlled 86.5% of the committee 
membership; leaving the balance (i.e. 13.5% or 21 MPs) for the opposition, independent 
and friendly parties49. Additionally, a committee comprising of the Speaker, Deputy 
Speaker, chairpersons and secretaries of the standing committees coordinates the 
supervision exercise. The latter appears to have wielded major leadership responsibilities 
on matters concerning a review of the action plans of committees, the harmonization of 
workflow in the HPR, and even deliberating issues that the Speaker wishes discussed 
which might well include the agenda for the plenary sessions.  
       As part of the duty to exercise oversight over the executive, each standing committee 
instructs a head of a pertinent ministry or government agency to deliver an annual report to 
committee members, although other MPs may well attend such hearings. Overall, the 
executive has since 1995 delivered 140 reports, 103 and 37 during the first and second 
terms respectively (see Table 4.3.). Furthermore, between 1995 and 2003, the HPR had 
333 Plenary Sessions and approved 377 proclamations, despite the fact that the executive 
sent a preponderant number of the bills, and none has so far been rejected.50         
 
                                                
49
 The minutes of the Plenary Session of the HPR  
50
 The Minutes of the Plenary and Special Sessions of the HPR, July 1995 to June 2003.  
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Table 4.3. Plenary sessions in HPR, legislation approved and the executive’s reports 
to the HPR from 1995 to 2003 
Year Number of Plenary Sessions 
Number of Laws 
approved 
No. of Reports to 
HPR by the 
Executive 
First Term (1995-2000) 
1995/96 46 45 21 
1996/97 58 44 33 
1997/98 40 38 26 
1998/99 35 52 12 
1999/00 24 38 11 
Total 203 217 103 
Second Term (2000-2003) 
2000/01 32 38 20 
2001/02 31 37 7 
2002/03 47 85 10 
Total 110 160 37 
Source: Complied by the author from the minutes and archival sources in the HPR  
 
        Table 4.4 portrays the regional and sex compositions as well as the educational levels 
of the members of the HPR. MPs from Oromia, Amhara, South and Tigray NRSs won 477 
(87%) of the 547 seats in the 2000 general election, and apparently most of the MPs are the 
members of the ruling party. The remaining 70 (13%) MPs have come from ‘less 
developed’ NRSs of Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali, city regional state of Harari as 
well as Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa. Covering the largest territory as well as population, 
Oromia NRS’s MPs have the highest representation in the HPR, followed by Amhara, 
South and Tigray NRSs.  
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Table 4.4. The educational level and sex composition of the HPR for the second term 
Region 
No. of 
HRP 
Members 
Percentage 
Educational Status 
 Higher            High-School           Primary           Read &    
Education       Complete         School Complete    Write  
Sex Composition 
 
Male        Female 
Oromia 178 32.5 23 93 24 38 165 13 
Amhara 138 25.2 39 71 5 23 124 14 
SNNP 123 22.5 58 53 7 5 117 6 
Tigray 38 6.9 20 7 1 10 34 4 
Somali 23 4.2 11 5 1 6 23 0 
Afar 8  1 2 4 1 7 1 
Benshangul 
Gumuz 9  1 4 1 3 9 0 
Gambela 3 4.4 1 - 2 - 3 0 
Hareri 2  2 - - - 2 0 
Diredawa 2  - - 2 - 2 0 
Addis 
Ababa 23 4.2 18 5 - - 19 4 
Total 547 100 174 240 47 86 505 42 
Percentage   31.8 % 43.9 % 8.6 % 15.7% 92.3% 7.7 % 
Source: Complied by the author from the minutes and archival sources in the HPR  
 
 
       Besides, membership in the HPR exhibits severe gender imbalance, which may have 
probably undermined women’s capacity to advance the cause and goals of gender equality 
as provided in the Federal and Regional constitutions. While the educational attainment of 
the members in the HPR is adequate by Ethiopian standards, the table nevertheless 
demonstrates glaring gender disparities in HPR. In fact, Somali, Benshangul-Gumuz, 
Gambella, Hareri NRSs and Diredawa have virtually no women representatives in the 
HPR.  In brief, within the competence of the federal government’s jurisdictions, the House 
of Peoples’ Representatives has the power of legislation as provided for under the 1995 
Ethiopian constitution. Not only are the standing committees empowered to supervise the 
executive, at least nominally, they have also the power of initiating laws.  However, 
contrary to what statutes stipulated, except the few laws that the office of the Speaker 
initiated, neither the fractious independent nor opposition members of the HPR nor the 
standing committees have so far proposed legislation. The stark realty of the policymaking 
process in Ethiopia, therefore, appears to have left little room for independent initiative, 
nor is there any space for citizens to have a say in the legislative process (see Chapter 5).    
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4.3.3. The House of Federation (HoF): a non-legislative chamber  
 
Elected for five years, the second chamber of the Ethiopian parliament, the House of 
Federation (HoF), has come to symbolize ethnic representation and the embodiment of 
nations, nationalities and people (NNPs). Although critics claim that the phrases have 
entirely been borrowed from the earlier works of Joseph Stalin, the new constitution 
defines the NNPs as ‘a group of people who have or share a large measure of common 
culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, common or related belief of 
identities, a common psychological make up, and who inhabit an identifiable, 
predominantly contiguous territory’ (FDRE, 1995: 14, Assafa, 2002). Not only does a 
member represent each ethnic community in the HoF, one additional member for every one 
million of its population can also represent each ethnic community. As provided under the 
new constitution, each state legislature, or, State Council elects representatives to the HoF, 
or may opt to have the people elected their representatives (FDRE, 1995, 2001). Two terms 
having been served, no popular elections have so far been held to send representatives to 
the HoF. Hence, NRSs’ parliaments appointed 108 and 112 members representing 59 and 
66 NNPs, during the first (1995-2000) and second (2000-2005) terms respectively51.  
         In much the same way as the members of the HPR, the members of the HoF also 
enjoy parliamentary immunity from prosecution. Furthermore, while the presence of two-
third of the members constitutes a quorum, decisions are rather made by a simple majority 
vote (FDRE, 1995).  Although its term of mandate, as the HPR, is five years, unlike upper 
houses the world over, it can only sit for two sessions annually.  
         Statutes empower the HoF, inter alia, to interpret the constitution, to organize the 
Council of Constitutional Inquiry that can assist it in the interpretation of the constitution, 
to take decisions on the self-determination of NNPs, including secession as provided for 
under the constitution, to promote the equality of the peoples of Ethiopia, to settle disputes, 
if and when they arise between two or more NNPs, to determine the division of revenues 
evolving from central and NRSs tax sources, to determine formula applicable for the 
apportionment of subsidies that the central government earmarks for NRSs (FDRE, 1995, 
2001). Of all the responsibilities entrusted to the HoF, the one that vividly marks the 
constraints of not being a legislative chamber is that it merely identifies, but does not 
legislate, civil matters to be enacted by the HPR (ibid.). It can also order the central 
                                                
51
 The Speaker of the HoF’s Report delivered at its Plenary Session held in the 2nd term, First Year, Second 
Plenary Session, June 2001. 
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government to deploy its military forces to an NRS, if a constitutional crisis occurs.  The 
previous term and the current term, which is due to expire in June 2005, the HoF 
constituted three committees that by and large reflect its multiple responsibilities, and with 
each committee comprising eleven members. The committees include: the State Affairs 
Standing Committee, which deals chiefly with overseeing the rights of NNPs for self-
determination up to and including secession; the Revenue Administration Committee helps 
members determine revenues that arise from joint tax sources and determine the 
apportionment of central government’s subsidies to NRSs; and the Legal Affairs Standing 
Committee, which examines and calls on the members to attend to civil cases and 
constitutional oversight (HoF, 1998).  To fill the deficit caused by the ethnic criteria on the 
basis of which members to the HoF are appointed, the constitution provided for the 
establishment of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCI) to enhance constitutional 
interpretation. The latter consists of the President and the Vice-President of Supreme 
Court, ex-officio president and vice-president of the CCI, six legal professionals appointed 
by the Head of the State, and three members elected by HoF (FDRE, 1995, 2001). Election 
of the Head of the State (ceremonial President), listening to his annual address, a perceived 
constitutional disorder in any of the NRSs, and constitutional amendment bring both 
houses of the Ethiopian parliament for a joint session (ibid).  
       In view of the power of legislation, and compared with countries that have long 
instituted a parliamentary system of government as Ethiopia has recently had, the HoF is, 
nevertheless, not an upper chamber in its true sense of the functions that an upper chamber 
is called upon to perform. Canada and the United Kingdom are the leading model 
parliamentary democracies on which the framers of the Ethiopian constitution professed to 
have modeled the Ethiopian parliamentary system of government (Kifle, 2001). To the 
contrary, the Canadian Senate enjoys the power of legislation in much the same manner as 
the House of Lords of the UK and the Council of Provinces of the South African 
Parliament, although the ultimate decisions and much more policymaking powers lies in 
the lower chambers (the House of Commons in Canada and UK, and the Legislative 
Assembly in South Africa) than the upper houses. In fact, the House of Lords in the UK is 
also the highest court. To all intents and purposes, the Ethiopian ‘upper house’ the House 
of Federation, is nothing but a house of nations, nationalities and peoples (NNPs), and it 
simply epitomizes the pre-commitments that the sponsors of the current Ethiopian 
constitution cherished during their protracted war with the Dergue. Put differently, both in 
spirit and in practice it is an embodiment of ethnic representation, but with the formula 
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predetermined by the sponsors. The HoF, therefore, unlike its counter-parts in the UK, 
Canada, South Africa and most other upper chambers around the world, has no power of 
legislation, albeit with an extraordinary stubborn commitment to the NNPs, as the 
pronouncements in the constitution by and large stipulate.  
        Moreover, in the upper chambers of Canada, the UK and South Africa the opposition 
and the independent MPs have unrestricted access not only to be elected as members, but 
also have an unreserved right to participate in the debates on policy and legislative matters. 
On the contrary, while it is difficult to ascertain the exact figures of party affiliation for all 
the members of the HoF, the appointments of members of the HoF by NRSs’ Councils, 
which are overwhelmingly dominated by the ruling party, with all the seats won by 
EPRDF affiliates as in Amhara and Tigray NRSs, would attest to the fact that it is much 
less likely for the opposition and independent elements to make their debut in HoF. Far 
worse, the house, which decides on vital issues such as the interpretation of the 
constitution, self-determination up to and including secession, and the sharing of national 
wealth, is totally inaccessible to civil society and the public at large, nor has there been any 
channel of communication linking the non-state actors to the HoF, so much so that the 
former have little or no space for influencing the critical policy decisions of such serious of 
fundamental importance that affect their lives.   
  
4.3.4. The executive: spearheading the legislative/policymaking/ process 
 
The 1987 PDRE’s constitution vested the ceremonial and executive powers in the Head of 
the State (i.e. the President), although some portion of the executive and administrative 
powers had also been assigned to the Head of Government (i.e. the Prime Minister) 
(PDRE, 1987). The current constitution entirely reversed the allocation of powers, 
assigning the Head of the State (i.e. the President) and the Head of Government (i.e. the 
Prime Minister) ceremonial and enormous executive powers respectively. Nominated by 
the HPR, the joint session of the two houses of the Ethiopian parliament elects the 
President of the FDRE by a two-third majority. Unlike the parliament whose term of 
mandate expires after five years, the president’s term of office is for 6 years, and he can 
continue in office for another term. The constitutional design for the parliament and the 
executive’s stay in office a year less than the President is to establish a continuity of 
government and linkage between the preceding and the forthcoming terms (Fasil, 1997). In 
any case, the latter’s duties are invariably nominal. Among others, these include addressing 
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the joint session of the parliament annually, appointing ambassadors, granting high 
military titles, and decorating high domestic and foreign dignitaries with medals and 
prizes, of course, after having been recommended by the Prime Minister (FDRE, 1995). 
The constitution assigned the President little role in the policymaking process.  He signs 
bills into laws following their approval by the HPR, although laws can still take effect 
within fifteen days with or without his signature (ibid.).  
         Enormous policymaking power in Ethiopia is vested in the executive. The latter is 
comprised of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers (CoM). Although the 
‘election’ of the President and the Prime Minister is often concluded at the party forums 
behind the parliamentary scenes, the joint session of parliament and the HPR designate the 
President and the Prime Minister respectively as provided for in the constitution.52 Hence, 
elected by the HPR for five years, the Prime Minister is the chief executive officer, the 
chairman of the CoM, and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the country 
(FDRE, 1995). The current constitution limits the Head of State’s term of office to two; 
ironically, it is silent on the Head of Government’s term of stay in office, though the latter 
possesses such a huge responsibility and enormous powers that are susceptible as to be 
misused. The Prime Minister can have the HPR approve his nominees for the ministerial 
positions who, together with him, constitute the second leg of the executive (ibid.). He 
presides over the entire implementation process of laws and socio-economic and foreign 
policies of the country.    
       Consisting of the Prime Minister, his deputy, heads of the ministries and other 
government officials whom the PM wishes to be members, the second aspect of the 
executive constitutes the Council of Ministers (CoM) (FDRE, 1995, PMO, 2003). Its 
competences revolve around the initiation, formulation and supervision of the 
implementation of socio-economic and foreign policies (ibid.).  In fact, despite being 
subject to approval by the HPR, the CoM has control over the power of the purse, 
essentially because the latter remains in the limelight for much of the formulation, 
arrangement and the execution of the budget. The CoM holds regular sessions once in a 
week, and conducts emergency sessions when situations requiring such meetings arise. 
Besides, performance evaluation sessions are scheduled quarterly, or four times annually. 
Half of the members the Council of Ministers constitute a quorum, and decisions are made 
by a simple majority vote (ibid: 22).  
                                                
52
 Interview held with a senior member of EPRDF affiliate organization- South Ethiopia Peoples’ Democratic 
Movement (SEPDM), Awasa, April 2004.    
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        The three critical elements which attest to the executive’s prime role in the policy 
and/or legislative process are that it: formulates and issues new policies or modifies old 
ones; sends draft proclamations to be approved by the HPR; and issues regulations and 
publishes them in the official legal reporter - the Negarit Gazeta (FDRE, 1995, 2001; 
PMO, 2003). 
        One should not fail to stress that, in the Ethiopian context; the machinery of the 
legislative process starts rolling from the premises of the executive and is concluded with 
the seal of approval in the parliament building. To begin with, each ministry is empowered 
to initiate and/or formulate laws and policies (ibid.). Every ministry can, however, initiate 
and formulate laws and policies in line with procedures and modalities spelt out by the 
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO, 2003). Accordingly, each minister requests the Cabinet 
Affairs Minister in the PMO for the specific legislation and/or policy that his ministry 
tends to propose, and have the former incorporated into the legislative program which 
often comes at the beginning of the Ethiopian calendar year in September. The Legal 
Advisory Group, based in the PMO, sets up the programs and prioritizes them in light of 
the urgency and importance that they are accorded, and mostly priorities are set based on 
the information ascertained from executive government agencies (ibid.).  If the former is 
satisfied about their urgency and seriousness, the Legal Affairs Department of the ministry 
can propose a new law or modification of an old one, drafts and sends it to Cabinet Affairs 
Minister/Legal Advisory Group. The Cabinet Affairs Minister presents it to the next CoM 
plenary session, if it is satisfied with the formalities and technical trustworthiness of the 
legislation (ibid: 30-31). Following a first reading of the legislation under consideration, 
the CoM may well refer it to one of the relevant standing committees. At all stages of the 
clearance points that the draft legislation passes through, each (i.e. the ministry initiating 
the law, the Legal Affairs Advisory Group, the relevant standing committee that the law is 
referred to, and the CoM) should make sure that the bill does not conflict with the 
constitution, other laws and the international laws that the country has ratified (ibid.). The 
plenary session of the CoM decides whether a draft bill should be sent to HPR.  
     The structure of the CoM includes:  
1. A General Assembly/Plenary Session; 
2. Standing and Ad-hoc Committees; 
3. Cabinet Affairs Minister and Departments organized under it (PMO, 2003: 6). 
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Although the new operating guideline that has recently been issued by PMO did not 
mention the standing committees that the CoM has established, a previous guideline 
specified three such committees as follows: 
 
1. The Economic Affairs Standing Committee that includes ministers heading the 
economic sectors; 
 
2. The Social and Administrative Affairs Standing Committee that involves ministers 
heading social and administrative affairs; and 
 
3. The Legal Affairs Standing Committee is a composite of several ministers chaired 
by the Minister of Justice (PMO, September 1995).   
     
           Before the 2001 restructuring measure that fundamentally reorganized ministries 
and other government agencies, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) had three major 
divisions directly answerable to the PM.  Not only did the divisions serve as the linchpins 
of the entire socio-economic policymaking process, but also they bypassed the powers of 
the ministers and the CoM, in much the same manner as Haileselassie’s private cabinet 
overshadowed the powers of the cabinet of the then Prime Minister, Aklilu Habtewold, – in 
the early 1960s. Hence, the PMO supervised the relationship between central government 
and NRSs through its Regional Affairs Division, and controlled the work of huge 
ministries functioning in the economic and social sectors through its Economic and Social 
Affairs Divisions till 200153. By and large, the PMO remains the most authoritative and 
influential organ of the executive to date.   
        Currently, supported by advisors of high professional caliber in economics, social and 
legal affairs, the PMO is the most powerful institution in the executive structure (PMO, 
2003). The institution has three major divisions, each led by a minister directly accountable 
to the PM. These are Ministers in charge of PMO, Cabinet Affairs and Economic Affairs. 
The functions of the first include leading, coordinating and controlling the administrative 
affairs of the PMO; advising the PM on factors relating to strategic and administrative 
issues, including proposals about whether new government establishments should be 
constituted, old ones reorganized and/or merged with other establishments, or become 
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 Interview held with Head of the Administration Division of Prime Minister’s Office, January 2003    
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separate establishments. His responsibilities also include advising the PM about the 
magnitude of the structural and manpower requirements of a reorganized government 
institution, if any (ibid.). The Economic Affairs Minister, on the other hand, advises the 
PM on a range of macro-economic and monetary policies, and evaluates their 
implementation. Accountable to the PM, the Cabinet Affairs Minister leads the entire 
policy and legislation-making process ranging from arranging and making available 
logistical support to the CoM to maintaining and safeguarding the confidentiality of the 
cabinet decisions, from documentation and record keeping to maintaining the quality of the 
outgoing and incoming documents, and to dispatching draft bills to the HPR for approval. 
The competences of the Cabinet Minister largely revolve around the issue of making  
logistical support available to the CoM and mapping out action programs for legislative 
and policy decisions (PMO, September 2003: 10-15). Excluding the closest advisors to the 
PM, till September 2003 the PMO had well over 250 employees. For much of the 
legislative and policy-making process, however, the Prime Minister not only presides over 
the plenary sessions of the CoM, but also closely scrutinizes the agenda items. In other 
words, the Cabinet Minister heading the operational and logistical support in PMO should 
ensure that the PM approves the agenda items well before a plenary cabinet session 
commences (ibid: 13).  
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Table 4.5. The new nucleus of executive leadership and answerable executive ministries and 
government agencies   
Ministries Answerable Executive Agencies 
The Prime Minister’s Office 
Capacity Building* 
 
Ministry of Education 
Science and Technology Commission 
Civil Service Commission 
Management Institute 
Civil Service College 
Justice and Legal Order Institute 
 
Trade and Industry* 
 
Investment Commission 
Quality and Standards Authority 
Coffee and Tea Authority 
Government Owned Development Enterprises Supervising Authority 
Basic Metallurgic and Engineering Authority 
Ethiopian Foreign Trade Promotion Agency 
Livestock Marketing Authority 
 
Rural Development* 
 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission 
Social Rehabilitation and Development Fund 
Plant Genetic Industry Agency 
Agricultural Research Organization 
Bio Diversity Protection and Research Institute 
Rural Energy Development and Promotion Center 
 
Development Infrastructure* 
 
Ethiopian Road Authority 
Civil Aviation Authority 
Road Fund Office 
National Fuel Depots Administration 
Ethiopian Postal Service 
Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency 
Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation 
Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation 
Agency for the Administration of Rental Houses 
 
Finance and Economic Development* 
  
Central Statistical Authority 
Mapping Authority 
Population and Housing Census Commission 
Office for the Sale of Government Houses 
Federal Affairs* 
 
Police Commission 
Prisons Administration 
Urban Planning Institute 
Addis Ababa City Administration 
Dire Dawa City Administration 
 
Revenues 
Inland Revenues Authority 
Customs Authority 
National Lottery Administration 
Information Broadcasting Agency Mass Media Training Institute 
Sports, Youth and Culture 
Authority for Research & Conservation Heritage 
National Archives and Library Agency 
Ethiopian Conference Agency 
Ethiopian National Theatre 
Defense 
 
 
Mining 
 
Ethiopian Geological Survey 
Labor and Social Affairs 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
Water Resources 
 
 
Foreign Affairs 
 
 
Health 
 
Drug Administration and Control Authority  
Source:  FDRE, 2001;  
*Major Ministries and the ‘new nucleus of executive leadership’  
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        Recent times have witnessed a massive restructuring of line ministries and other 
government agencies, which have also been replicated by NRSs. While the restructuring 
measure might have shifted huge oversight responsibilities from PMO to major ministries 
(sarcastically described as ‘the ministers of ministers’), it has nevertheless appeared to 
expand, institutionalize and bolster the power of the executive. Six such ministries 
designated to lead and control a wide range of government agencies include Capacity 
Building, Trade and Industry, Rural Development, Development Infrastructure, Finance 
and Economic Development and Federal Affairs (see Table 4.5.). Not only are the heads of 
the major ministries the confidantes loyal to the PM, who is also the chairperson of the 
ruling party, in the wake of the ‘Tehadesso’ (Resuscitation) they also form a new nucleus 
of top executive and party leadership together with the PM. Furthermore, statutory and 
constitutional provisions allocate massive powers to the Prime Minister and the new 
nucleus of the executive leadership (FDRE, 1995, 2002). Hence, by default or design, the 
executive, essentially the Prime Minister, Prime Minister’s Office and the Council of 
Ministers, have over-arching roles in public policymaking in Ethiopia. 
             
4.4. Actors in the legislative process: the core NRSs under purview 
 
For much of its plenary sessions from July 1991 through April 1992, the CoR had in fact 
been preoccupied with the setting up of an entirely new local government structure to fit 
into the pre-commitments of the core constituent of the EPRDF, the TPLF (CoR, July 
1991-August 1994). Party and government officials sought a legal fine-tuning for their pre-
commitments work, which culminated in Proclamation Number 7/1992. The latter 
provided for the formation of fourteen regional administrations including the capital Addis 
Ababa, although the constitution abridged the states from fourteen to nine (cf. TGE, 1992, 
FDRE, 1995).    
       The nine NRSs, as provided in the 1995 constitution, include Tigray, Afar, Amhara, 
Oromia, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, 
Gambela and Harari (see Map 3). Having provided for a federal republic, not only does the 
new constitution delineate government structures and/or relationships between central 
government and NRSs, but also appears to have demarcated power relationships among the 
three streams of government, whether of the central government or of NRSs’ levels 
(FDRE, 1995). Recently, high government officials have nevertheless acknowledged that, 
in practice, there has not been any such separation of powers over the previous ten years 
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(EPRDF, undated, 2003a, 2003b). This prompted a wave of revisions of the NRSs’ 
constitutions towards the end of 2001 and early 2002. In any case, not only are NRSs’ 
parliaments the highest organs of government and sources of authority,  but also a wide 
range of powers are invested in them to allow them pass legislation that falls within  their 
jurisdictions (FDRE, 1995: 18, Zikre Hig, 2001, 35, Megelta Oromia, 2000, 22). Unlike 
the national parliament, each NRS has a unicameral legislative chamber, although the 
SNNP NRS has since 2001 established a council of nationalities to reflect the extent of the 
ethnic diversities in the region. Comprised of 62 representatives from 56 different ethnic 
communities, the latter is the exact replica of the national House of Federation (HoF). The 
SNNP NRS has 54 representatives in the HoF, the highest number of such representation 
from an NRS (HoF, April 2004).  
        Elected for five years, NRSs parliaments hold sessions twice annually, ipso facto 
making their legislative oversight role all the more difficult. The regional constitutions, 
both the old and revised ones, replicated the federal constitution. In fact, a thorough look at 
the constitutions of both the Amharic and English versions of the core NRSs gives one the 
impression that there are minute differences, except that each differs in the adoption of the 
flag, emblem, language and capital city (see Megelta Oromia, July 2000, Zikre Hig, 
November 2001, SNNPRS’ Revised Constitution, November 2001, Negarit Gazeta Tigray, 
November 2001).   
       The NRSs’ constitutions, however, detail the legislature-executive roles vis-à-vis the 
legislative processes, despite these having been broadly enshrined in the national 
constitution (FDRE, 1995: 19-20). While the legislative chambers have the power of 
making laws in matters that fall under NRSs jurisdictions, the highest powers of the 
executive are vested in the NRSs heads and council of the governments, the regional 
equivalents of prime minister and council of ministers. In much the same way as the 
federal structure, over the past two and half years each NRS has fashioned an elite corps of 
executive leadership in ways that subsume most of the executive government agencies 
under the bureaus for capacity building, rural development, infrastructure development, 
industry and trade, and mass participation and mobilization. The latter is particularly 
known for the mobilization and organization of the so-called ‘civil societies’, such as 
youths, farmers and women54. Having revised their constitutions towards the end of 2001, 
the four NRSs parliaments established separate secretariats and/or offices under the 
                                                
54
 Interview held with Deputy Heads of the Amhara and SNNP NRSs’ Mass Organizations and Mobilization 
Bureaus, January and April 2004 respectively.   
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leadership of the speakers and deputy speakers, which otherwise had been administered by 
the chief executive of the NRSs. A far more significant departure in terms of the prospects 
for the separation of powers, not only has each parliament formed from 3 to 5 standing 
committees, but the speakers and their deputies also hold permanent tenure in the 
parliamentary secretariats55.  
        Despite the difference in nomenclature, NRSs’ constitutions vested executive powers 
in the administrative or executive councils consisting of the president, his deputy and the 
heads of bureaus (ibid, SNNPRS, 2001: 113). In much the same fashion as the national 
legislative and policymaking process, the executive and party leadership dominate the 
legislative process in the NRSs. Apart from the laws proposed by the speakers that mainly 
deal with matters of procedure in the parliaments and secretariats, legislative proposals 
have originated from bureaus and executive government agencies56. Virtually, no single 
piece of legislation has so far originated from private initiative in the entire core NRSs, nor 
has there been any such expectation57. The parliaments of the four core NRSs have since 
1995 approved 302 proclamations, but most of these are replicas of legislation passed by 
the HPR (see Table 4.6.).  Inhabited by well over 86.5% (58 million) of the Ethiopian 
population, the core NRSs are the strongholds of the ruling party affiliates, OPDO, 
ANDM, SEPDM and TPLF operating in Oromia, Amhara, SNNP, and Tigray National 
Regional States. The independent and opposition candidates contested all except less than 
25 seats of in the 1329 seats of the four core NRSs parliaments. In fact, ANDM and TPLF 
contested all of the 294 and 152 seats in Amhara and Tigray NRSs respectively. It is 
therefore accurate to say that EPRDF has as much predominance in the NRSs’ policy and 
legislative process as in the national process.   
 
                                                
55
 Interview held with the Speaker of the Council/ Parliament of Amhara National Regional State and Legal 
Advisor to the President of Amhara NRS, Bahirdar, January 2004. 
56
 Interview with the Public Relations Officer of Tigray and Head of the Secretariat of the ‘Caffe’ Oromia 
February and May 2004 respectively. Caffe is the Ormogna language version of the regional parliament in 
Oromia NRS. 
57
 The author’s interview notes.   
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Table 4.6.  The number of population, districts, Kebeles, and total seats of the core 
NRSs parliaments, and date of adoption of the revised constitutions in the core NRSs  
NRS Population* No. of Zones 
No. of 
Districts 
(Woredas) 
No. of 
Neighborhood/ 
Kebele 
Administrations 
Total 
Seats  
No. of 
Proclamations 
Approved  
Dates of Adoption 
of the New NRSs 
Constitutions 
Oromia 25,088,000 14 197 6663 537 73 October 27, 2001 
Amhara 18,143,000 11 113 3234 294 85 November 5, 2001 
SNNPRS 14,085,000 13 104 3725 346 75 November 12, 2001 
Tigray 4,113,000 6 45 672 152 69 November 16, 2001 
Total 61,429,000 44 459 14294 1329 302  
Source: Compiled by the author from the secretariats of regional parliaments 
* Population and Housing Census Commission, 2004.  
 
 
        It is interesting to note that NRSs’ parliaments allow non-members to observe their 
plenary sessions, despite participants having little influence and role in the deliberations. 
Additionally, the Amhara NRS, at least nominally, assures the public to participate in the 
legislative process by way of diffusing the initiation of legislation, although there has so 
far been no proposal from the public (Zikre-Hig, March 2002). In any case, most of the 
decisions, including those draft bills sent by the executive, are invariably adopted 
unanimously, except again the Amhara NRS parliament rejected the executive’s draft 
legislation to provide for the establishment of Regional Revenue Authority by majority 
vote at its Seventh Regular Session in June 2003 (the Minutes of the 7th Plenary Session of 
the Amhara NRS Council, June 1993).   
         Figure 4.1 depicts a schematic representation of the policymaking process and 
structure of the core national regional sates (NRSs), where party and key government 
institutions increasingly become the linchpins of the policymaking process. Whereas there 
is an imperceptible hierarchical relationship between the legislative councils, the executive 
structures extend from the regional capitals to neighborhoods/Kebele and further down the 
line to governmental groups (mengestawi buden). Apparently, the legislative councils at 
each tier in the hierarchy have a closer relationship to the executive team than they have to 
each other. Hence, both in terms of statutory privileges and structure, the executive is 
much more advantageously situated than the legislature to put through policies and laws.  
In the language of one of the NRSs’ revised constitutions: 
 
The highest executive power in the Oromia Regional State is vested in the President and the 
Regional Administrative Council. The Regional Administrative Council comprises the President, the 
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Vice President, Bureau heads and others as determined by law. The President is the chairman of the 
Regional Administrative Council. (Magalta Oromia, 2000: 26-27)          
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Regional EPRDF Affiliates 
 
OPDO/ ANDM/SEPDM/TPLF 
 
 
 
     Figure 4.1. The core NRSs’ policymaking structure 
 
 
  Elected Councils                                                                                                                                                              Appointed Officials 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                    The Executive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own survey  
Core NRSs Parliaments 
4 NRSs Parliaments 
Total Seats 1329 
Zone Nationality Councils/District Special 
Councils 
(Amhara and SNNRSs) 
Total No. Of Zones 44 
District Councils 
Total 459 Councils in 4 NRSs 
 
Neighborhood/Kebele Councils 
Total 14294 Kebele Councils in 4 NRSs 
Regional Executive Councils 
(Cabinets) 
Presidents and Vice-Presidents  
(14 Members) 
Zone Administrations 
As arms of the NRSs executive  
(Variable) 
District Administrations 
(7 District Cabinet Members) 
Neighborhood/Kebele 
Administrations 
(7 Kebele Cabinet 
Members)   
NRSs Bureaus and Government 
Agencies 
Zone Administrative Desks 
District Administrative Offices 
Neighborhood/Kebele Administrative 
Offices 
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The NRSs’ cabinets include the President, the Vice-President and Heads of 14 Bureaus58. 
Like in the PMO, a team of experts and professional civil servants support the secretariat 
of each executive. Heads of Bureaus and government agencies and their deputies in the 
entire core NRSs are political appointees. Assigned to oversee government institutions, the 
civil service in the Amhara NRS, for instance, had 1252 political officials, all whom were 
members of the ruling party affiliate, ANDM (Amhara Civil Service Commission, January 
2004).   
     Be that as it may, the NRSs’ governments involve legislative councils, and 
administrative and judicial organs at each tier in the hierarchy. Three nationality zones in 
Amhara, and thirteen zones and six special districts in SNNP NRSs have currently elected 
legislatures, but all of the zones in Oromia and Tigray and seven zones in the Amhara 
NRSs are simply the executive arms of the regional government answerable to the chief of 
the NRS executive (see Table 4.6. and Figure 4. 1). It is worth noting, however, that while 
the NRS cabinets appoint the team of administrators assigned to the zone offices in Oromia 
and Amhara NRSs, zone administrators in Tigray are rather drawn from and appointed by 
the NRS legislature, though in all cases they are answerable to the executive (Magalta 
Oromia, July 2000, Negarit Gazeta Tigray, March 2002; Zikre-Hig, November 2001, 
Debub Negarit Gazeta, November 2001).  
        Likewise, the district legislatures are elected for a period of five years from the 
Kebeles that each district administers. Having been organized below the NRS legislature, 
not only is the district lawmaking body the highest organ of the local government in the 
district, but also it elects the speakers and deputy speakers from among the elected 
representatives (ibid.). The district executive arm consists of the principal district 
administrator and persons heading a few sector ministries. The lowest tier in the 
policymaking structure in Ethiopia, the Kebele, organizes local government units, with the 
legislative, executive and judicial arms patterned accordingly. Oromia and Tigray NRSs 
have till recently 197 and 6 districts and 6663 and 45 Kebeles, the highest and lowest 
figures in the core NRSs (Table 4.6). The sectors that constitute the cabinets at the district 
and Kebele levels include the principal administrator, deputy administrator, heads of 
                                                
58
 Although nomenclature is different, concepts essentially convey the same meanings. In the Amhara NRS 
the term Head of Government is used for President and in the SNNP NRS Chief Executive Officer is used.     
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capacity building, rural development, administration and security, mass mobilization and 
participation, information, and youth, sports and culture59.  
       Moreover, much like the national policymaking process, the executive and the ruling 
party’s absolute control over the legislature have appeared to have complicated 
policymaking in the NRSs. Not the least, not only does the executive team in each NRS 
form part of the core leadership in the ruling party affiliates in each region, but there is also 
the constitutional requirement that the leadership of the legislatures (speakers and deputy 
speakers) at each level in the hierarchy should be the members of the dominant party, 
which imposes limits on the checks and balances and separation of powers between the 
executive and the legislature. In summary, the NRSs’ constitutions have been revised 
primarily considering the fact that the revision would rectify the anomaly prompted by the 
absence of the checks and balances that the old constitutions failed to redress. The worst 
scenario in this situation, however, is that this tends to embolden the ruling party to 
increase the powers of the executive and the party in policymaking.     
 
4.5. Policies: a review of rural-centered development and education policies 
 
4.5.1. ADLI, at the apex of all socio-economic policies 
 
After having it incorporated into the constitution, EPRDF appeared to be poised for settling 
the issue of land in favor of state ownership60. However, it is such an issue of paramount 
importance that the controversy surrounding it continues to simmer. One of the contentious 
issues, as indicated, the land issue became the subject of heated debate both in the 
Constitution Commission and the CoR. While the ‘minority’ favored retaining the private 
ownership of land, the pro-EPRDF ‘majority’ emerged at age by promoting the state 
ownership of land. Article 40; sub-article 4, of the current Constitution states: 
                                                
59
 Interviews held with Amhara and Tigray NRSs Public Relation Officers, September 2003 and February 
2004 respectively.   
60
 The ruling party and government claim that restoring private ownership of land can induce Ethiopian 
farmers to sell their land, resulting in large-scale landlessness and the large-scale influx of the peasantry to 
the towns. The government argues that not only is there little employment in towns, but also that the large-
scale peasant migration can lead to a social crisis in the towns (EPRDF, March 2000). On the other hand, the 
clamor for the private ownership of land has been driven by a belief that this will augment economic 
development via a market economy and ownership security, and secure rights means that landholders have 
the right to dispose of their land in any way they please (Dessalegn, 1999; Terefe, 2001). While some 
acknowledge the decline in agricultural productivity and produce because of government intervention, land 
fragmentation, rising population pressure and lack of support to the peasantry in terms of modern agricultural 
implements, others appear not to condone the restoration the private ownership of land (Assafa, 2002). The 
latter reasoned that the middle ground rather lies in pushing back the government from meddling in land 
distribution and the affairs of the peasantry, but not in privatizing land (op. cit.).    
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The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is exclusively 
vested in the state and in the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a common property of the Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia shall not be subject to sale or other means of exchange. (1995, 
14)  
 
        Afterwards, almost all socio-economic policies in Ethiopia are tied up with rural and 
agriculture-related policies and strategies. Since the mid-1990s agricultural development-
led industrialization (ADLI) has become the centerpiece of EPRDF commitment to the 
peasantry, and thus is the cornerstone of government policies and strategies (EPRDF, 
1995). Not only are the government institutions which have direct links with the economic 
sector such as agriculture, industry and infrastructure organized in ways to meet rural and 
agricultural development goals, the health and education sectors are similarly patterned 
primarily to enhance rural development and growth. Few would probably contest that this 
again is another ideological carry-over of the TPLF’s commitments to the peasantry 
(Young, 1997; Befekadu and Berhanu, 2000). In other words, like the NNP and land 
issues, ADLI is in the lexicon of EPRDF’s pre-commitments, which has dominated all the 
socio-economic policy spaces.  
        Having bitterly denounced its predecessors (Hailesellassie’s and Mengistu’s regimes) 
for failing to pursue sound socio-economic policies and strategies, and holding them 
responsible for the woeful economic performance that the country has registered over the 
past number of years, the EPRDF government sought the solution to the Ethiopia’s past 
economic ills in what it called ‘correct development policies, strategies and instruments’ 
(EPRDF, 1995, 2000).  Party and government leaders see ADLI as the most fundamental 
palatable route to come out of the age-old economic problems that have long plagued the 
country (EPRDF, 2003a, 2003b, FDRE, 2001).  A government white paper notes (FDRE, 
November 2001) that agricultural development–led industrialization (ADLI) aims at 
structural transformation of the economy whereby a rapid growth of the agricultural sector 
is envisaged to raise the share of industry and social services in terms of output and 
employment. Since it accounts for about 50% of the GDP, more than 90% of the export 
earnings and engages over 85% of the population, ERPDF believes, as did the Dergue, that 
agriculture is the backbone of the economy (cf. PMAC, 1974, EPRDF, 1995).  
        Hence, the EPRDF-led government claims that if and only if socio-economic policies 
that are rural and agriculture centered, in infrastructure, industry, education and health 
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sectors are advanced, that accelerated economic development occurs, which at the same 
time can the benefits of all this accrue to the vast masses of people in Ethiopia. A 
government policy document recently stated: 
 
Ethiopia’s existing realities reveal that there is an acute shortage of capital. In contrast, the country 
is endowed with a large number of working age population and potentially cultivable land ... It is 
believed that faster growth and hence economic development could be realized if the country adopts 
a strategy that helps raise the employability of our labor resources and enhance productivity of land 
resources aimed at capital accumulation. Pursuing a development strategy that does not make 
extensive use of manpower and intensive use of land resources forfeits the considerable contribution 
that these resources could make to growth and capital accumulation. ADLI is seen as a long-term 
strategy to achieve faster growth and economic development by making use of technologies that are 
labor using, but land augmenting, such as fertilizer and improved seeds and other cultural practices. 
(FDRE, 2002:  37)  
 
        EPRDF further argues that a development policy that does not primarily aim at 
benefiting the rural and urban poor will only risk creating havoc and instability in the 
country (EPRDF, 2001). In other words, not only is targeting the people as the prime 
beneficiaries of development a fundamental economic issue, but it is also an issue of 
critical importance for peace, stability and national security. A government document 
further notes:  
 
Unless we ensure rapid development in the rural areas where the majority is poor and where the 
worst type of poverty plagues rural people, there can not be any meaningful measure to alleviate 
poverty. Rural and agriculture-centered strategy ensures rapid development in these poverty-stricken 
rural areas and makes the poor people prime beneficiaries of the development process. …Although 
not as far worse as the rural Ethiopia, urban areas also beset with poverty. ADLI is also the only 
remedy to relieve the urban poor of poverty. (FDRE, 2001: 15)  
 
          Furthermore, as agriculture experiences a rapid growth, different agricultural 
products will be produced in large amounts, eventually leading to price reductions from 
which the urban poor benefit (ibid.). The government further claims that agricultural 
development can create an environment conducive to the development of trade and 
industry. It accelerates trade and industrial development by creating opportunities for the 
supply of raw materials, capital accumulation, a work force as well as a broad domestic 
market. In other words, propelled by large-scale as well as accelerated growth in 
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agriculture, and following the accelerated growth in trade and industry, the urban 
population will benefit much from the job opportunities emanating from rapid 
development (ibid.).    
        The prevailing claim, therefore, not only places a high premium on agriculture and 
rural-centered development strategies to lead the entire economy, but industry and the 
service sectors can also register accelerated growth through backward and forward 
linkages. With agriculture at the hub of every facet of economic development, it sets up a 
train of inter-linkages and a chain of growth and development reactions. Put differently, 
the strategy underpinning the adoption of a rural-centered strategy appeared to be driven 
by a conviction that accelerated and sustainable growth in agriculture leads to increased 
quantity and quality of agro-industrial raw materials supplied (forward production linkage) 
to the industrial and export sector, thereby increasing the demand for agricultural products 
as well as the standard of living of the farmers (FDRE, 2002). Furthermore, this 
encourages farmers to use improved technologies, which will in turn ‘increase the demand 
for agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, improved seeds and farm implements (back ward 
production linkages)’ (op cit). In the final analysis, industrialization and services can be 
promoted and gradually assume their inevitable lead in the economy if agriculture and 
rural-centered development strategies are firmly established in the long run (FDRE, 2001, 
2002).  The ruling party and government, as leading protagonists, vowed to support only 
the domestic and foreign investors that will pay attention to the recipe and invest their 
resources to contribute primarily to agricultural development (ibid.).  
        In the industrial sector, EPRDF claims that Ethiopia’s industrial development should 
be patterned after those of countries that have registered the fastest economic growth such 
as Korea, Taiwan and Thailand (South East Asian Countries). Similarly, export-oriented 
industries also lead those industries that are primarily import substitutes or are not export 
oriented in the industrial development sector. The EPRDF government is skeptical about 
the Ethiopian private sector’s endurance to withstand the cutthroat competition that 
characterizes the world market and be able to emerge as winners. The government’s 
intervention has thus been justified on the grounds that bringing about propitious 
conditions for the few domestic investors who dare to be involved in the daunting task of 
joining the competition in the world market, which government claims can only be done 
with its support and leadership (EPRDF, undated, FDRE, 2001, 2002). Hence, not only is 
export industry the leader of the led, but it is also another key economic locus of 
government intervention.  
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        While the arguments and justifications proposed from the ruling party and 
government circles favoring ADLI appear appealing, many academics, Ethiopian 
economists and the opposition questioned the viability of the policy on various grounds.  
To begin with, although the government exerted enormous effort as well as made 
considerable investments, agriculture has failed to show any significantly improved 
performance over the last ten years (Befekadu and Berhanu, 2000; Befekadu et al., 2002). 
Befekadu and Berhanu write: 
 
… despite massive efforts by the government to improve the sector’s performance, agricultural 
production under EPRDF did not show a significant improvement over the Dergue years. In fact, … 
the sector’s performance was worse under EPRDF compared with the last ten years average of the 
Dergue. Even when we discount the first year, the average rate of growth of agriculture under 
EPRDF was 2.27 % per annum; not a significant improvement over the 2 % achieved under the 
Dergue. In any case, the rate of growth is much lower than the growth of population and its 
fluctuation with the rain is unabated. (2000, 156)   
 
Berhanu and Said further argue: 
 
The case for ADLI was made repeatedly on the basis of the standard arguments such as the need to 
increase agricultural incomes to generate demand for industrialization, to generate more domestic 
saving for investment, the possibility of getting more out of investment in agriculture owing to the 
high capital output ratio, the requirements of addressing poverty directly where it is most prevalent 
and the like. These arguments were complemented by promises of rapid economic growth that 
would be engendered by this strategy. These seemed reasonable arguments at the time and the 
public (including professional economists) were willing to wait to see the promised results. 
Accordingly, not much criticism was raised against the strategy at least in the first few years of its 
implementation”.  
 
They continued: 
Things start to change, however, as time passes and the promised results failed to materialize. 
Broadly, the criticisms against ADLI rest on both empirical and theoretical considerations. The 
empirical argument is that ADLI failed to deliver on its promise of rapid growth of output and 
productivity in agriculture and in the rest of the economy. While in the first few years following its 
implementation (particularly in 1995/96 and 96/97) output increased substantially mainly because of 
good cooperation from nature and significant expansion of cultivated area, it was soon followed by 
significant declines as a result of drought confirming the structural dependence of Ethiopian 
agriculture on the vagaries of nature. The absence of significant increases in productivity during this 
period further emboldened critiques of the strategy to question the core claims of the strategy that 
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assigns agriculture to play the lead role in the country’s transformation to an industrial economy. 
Furthermore, the strategy’s sole dependence on the expansion of green revolution inputs to increase 
output and productivity without addressing institutional issues, its assumption of price neutrality of 
supply side increases, its total neglect of demand side constraints that emanate from a very low level 
of urbanization of the country, its lack of consideration of the effect of population pressure on the 
available cultivable land and the decrease in average holding that it engendered, were all presented 
by critics to show why the strategy will not work in Ethiopia. (2004, 1-2) 
 
         The dismal economic performance in agriculture over the past twelve years has been 
attributed to smallholder farming and/or diminishing farmlands and absence of land 
security61. The latter is largely precipitated by the state ownership of land in Ethiopia. 
Serious doubts concerning ADLI persist primarily because Ethiopian agriculture employs 
technology/tools and implements which are too archaic and backward for a competitive 
modern economy. Secondly, the land policy that the government currently pursues appears 
to be problematic in ways that renders ownership security impossible. Thirdly, worse still, 
agricultural products are faired less in the world markets. Over the last ten years, for 
instance, despite the enormous efforts that have been exerted to improve the quantity and 
quality of coffee, Ethiopian exporters cannot get good prices for coffee mainly because 
multinationals dominate 70% of the market. In fact, the state ownership of land together 
with the rural-centered development policies is rather designed to clutch the Ethiopian 
peasants, who currently constitute the 85% of the population (Mesfin, 2004: 11; Befekadu 
and Berhanu, 2000: 199). In this regard, a resident manager of an international NGO 
reasons: 
 
Primarily ADLI focuses on smallholder agriculture. To share my grass root experiences, land in 
Sidama and Wolayita62 have over the years been distributed and redistributed quite a number of 
times to such an extent that farmers possess land almost equal to the size of a bed. How would one 
expect a farmer possessing such a minuscule plot of land to be productive? How would you imagine 
thus land of such miniscule size becomes productive, and at the same time lead the economy as well 
as the industry? Lurking behind all the sugar coating exercises surrounding state ownership of land 
and accompanying policy strategies (such as ADLI) merely serve none other than bolstering the 
EPRDF’s leverage in the socio-economic policy process. EPRDF has always made use of the land 
policy for its political gains. EPRDF often brings land issue to spotlight when elections approach. 
So it uses the land issue to alert the farmers to keep it in power. Or EPRDF uses land as a vehicle for 
                                                
61
 Interview held with Ethiopian academics and a resident manager of one of the international NGOs in 
Ethiopia, April and June 2004 respectively.  
62
 Densely populated regions in SNNP NRS 
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perpetuating power. For the peasantry, anybody who has the power to provide land and related 
resources is the king.  The deal between EPRDF and the farmer is therefore ‘I (EPRDF) provide you 
land and you (peasant) elect and keep me in power’. Thus, EPRDF has a very fundamental tool with 
which it can buy votes from the farmers. In contrast, if land were private property, the peasantry 
could have become independent, and could decide whom to elect and whom not to elect. Now, 
election is harnessed with the power that gives or withholds land. In Oromia NRS, the ruling party 
awards land certification when elections are approaching. The farmers elect the government that 
owns the land, for land is under state ownership, or face the consequences. In my view, the ruling 
party leaders have firm grips on land and agriculture related issues, not because they like the 
peasantry or agriculture, but because they knew that they would not have come to power without the 
support of the peasantry, nor do they stay in power without its support. Land has such a paramount 
political significance. (interview response, June 2004)  
 
         The overriding obsession of the party and government with land and concomitant 
policies seems to be precipitated primarily by a political and ideological rationale. The 
above discussion underscores the fact that, despite declining performance in agriculture, 
the government continues to adhere to agriculture-centered policies. This attests to the fact 
that ideological commitments have superseded the economic rationale and/or the routes for 
material achievements in development are substituted for socio-economic policies that 
primarily buttress the policy elites’ leverage in policymaking (see Chapter 5).        
 
4.5.2. Education policy: an archetype of imbalance in policymaking 
 
4.5.2.1.The predicaments in the making of the education policy 
  
 
The disenchantment with past education policies and the poor performances of the 
education system seemed to have precipitated the drawing up of a new education and 
training policy. Not only were schools in the pre-1991 education system badly managed, 
poorly equipped and overcrowded, but the curriculum also fell far short of addressing the 
socio-economic realties of the country (Seyoum, 1996; TGE 1994). The poor performance 
of the education system in the past was partly attributed to the deteriorating working 
conditions and badly organized teaching career system, although teachers’ social and 
material statuses have not shown any significant change ten years after the new education 
 179
policy was put into effect (cf. TGE, 1994: 4, Mulugeta, 63 2002: 104). The organization and 
administration of the education system were not adequately decentralized in ways to render 
the utilization of local initiative and reassure the realization of the potential of local 
administrative endeavor. The flaws embedded in the past education system has been 
described as follows: 
 
…It is known that our country’s education is entangled with complex problems of relevance, 
quality, accessibility and equity. The objectives of education do not take cognizance of the society’s 
needs and do not adequately indicate future direction. The absence of interrelated contents and mode 
of presentation that can develop student’s knowledge, cognitive abilities and behavioral change by 
level, to adequately enrich problem-solving ability and attitude, are some of the major problems of 
educational system. …Inadequate facilities, insufficient training of teachers, overcrowded classes, 
shortage of books and other teaching materials, all indicate the low quality of education. (TGE, 
1994: 2-3)        
  
         It was to redress the discontent with past policies and programs that the new 
education and training policy was launched in April 1994, although two years earlier CoR 
authorized the execution of a significant part of the policy’s component, namely the 
teaching of subjects in ethnic languages64. The policy pledged to pay more attention to the 
acquisition of scientific knowledge and the inculcation of problem-solving capacities as 
well as a culture that would engender the realization of the full potential of the educated 
youth (TGE, 1994). It also touched on the importance of establishing a relationship 
between education, training, research and development, on the one hand, and the institution 
of a decentralized administrative system to enhance a coordinated and efficient 
management in the education system, on the other (ibid.). The school structure has been 
transformed from 6-2-4 (six years of primary, two years of junior secondary and four years 
of high schooling) into 8-4 (eight years of primary and four years of secondary schooling). 
The primary and secondary schooling phases have each been divided into two cycles, with 
the primary education offering basic education in the first cycle (1-4), and which is 
followed by general education in the second cycle (5-8). Despite almost unanimous 
objections from the teaching establishment, a self-contained system of a teaching-learning 
process in which a single teacher undertaking the teaching of all the subjects in the first 
                                                
63
 The author was involved in a research to assess the implementation problems of the new education policy 
and its concomitant program (ESDP) in 1999. The survey covered two major NRSs (Oromia and SNNP 
NRSs) and Addis Ababa.   
64
 The transition period legislature, the Council of Representatives (CoR), decided that primary schools begin 
teaching subjects in nationality languages at its 16th Regular Session in September 1992.   
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cycle (1-4) of primary education has been instituted. Likewise, secondary education 
introduces two cycles of a general secondary education in the first cycle (9-10) 
accompanied by preparatory senior secondary schooling in the second cycle (11-12) 
(ibid.). In the past, the maximum duration of undergraduate degree programs at tertiary 
level was 4 to 6 years, but the new policy abridged that from 3 to 5 years.   
        The new policy stipulates several commendable objectives and lays down broad 
strategies to reach the goals. Revitalizing the education system with a measure of emphasis 
on democracy, respect of human rights, culture and the environment are, among others, 
lofty objectives boldly stated in the new policy (TGE, 1994).  Bringing education into line 
with the development requirements of the economy, broadening education at the primary 
level and eventually universalizing it, imparting relevance into the curricula, introducing a 
more equitable system of education, improving the quality as well as the professional 
competence of teachers and ensuring the linkages between education, research and 
development again are distinctly valuable objectives (ibid.). Substantial measures to 
execute the policy, however, were not taken till the policy was disaggregated into a 
program of action under the name of the Education Sector Development Program (ESDP I) 
in 1997/98. Under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s Office, financed largely by the 
government and supported by donors, the program (ESDP I) covered a period of five years 
from 1997/98 to 2001/2002. Not only did it target expanding chiefly primary education and 
a more equitable distribution of educational services, but also its proposed strategies such 
as the decentralization of educational administration, curriculum reform and school 
buildings professed to rectify the severe problems that had been lingering for many years 
in the past (FDRE, 1998).  
         It is interesting to note that there are resemblances in the conventions in which three 
regimes organized teams to draft education policies. The manner in which a group of 
expatriate and Ethiopian educators who drafted the Education Sector Review were 
assembled in 1972 is as much the same as the one organized to draft the Evaluative 
Research of the General Education System in Ethiopia (ERGESE) in 1983 and the 
Education and Training Policy in 1993, although unfortunately the former was preempted 
by an outbreak of a revolution in the country and did not see the that light its successors 
did. Put differently, the Imperial Government’s Education Sector Review’s obituary had 
been written long before its benefactor’s demise in 1974 (Seyoum, 1996). It should also be 
noted that in less than a generation the Ethiopian public saw three different educational 
policies under three different governments.  
 181
         In 1993 the TGE’s Prime Minister Office commissioned a group of persons largely 
drawn from the Ministry of Education and Addis Ababa University to draft a new 
education policy (Seyoum, 1996:42, Martin et al., 2000:62). Led and appointed by the 
PMO, a core task force that was comprised of eleven members, including the leaders of six 
sub-task forces, was set up to spearhead the formulation of the education policy.  The six 
sub-task forces in which the 42-member team was re-organized to include: curriculum and 
research; teacher training, training methods, including professional development and 
working conditions of teachers; educational measurement and evaluation; language in 
education; educational organization, management and finance; educational materials and 
support inputs (Martin et al., 2000). An additional seven committees, mainly meant to 
support the work of the 42 Ethiopian scholars, were also constituted from 22 different line 
ministries and other government organizations.                      
       To begin with, in the wake of 1991 the pre-commitment of the benefactors of 
Ethiopian public policies set both the precedents and the context in which all policies, 
including education policy, were to be formulated.  First, the supreme law of the land 
during the transition, namely the Charter, underscored the self-determination of ethnic 
communities and up to and including secession, and, second, a year earlier the Council of 
Representatives, which acted as the legislature during the transition period, approved a 
policy proposed by EPRDF and OLF that half a dozen ethnic languages should be the 
medium of instruction in the primary schools and in the respective ethnic communities. It 
was against this backdrop that the new education policy was introduced in 1994. Hence, a 
quick look at the Education and Training policy document reveals without any doubt the 
tone of the usual commitments of the EPRDF, for there is a tone of NNP and rural and 
agricultural focus in most of the policies that the EPRDF has so far promoted. Therefore, 
while the 1991 TGE charter formed the context of the new education policy, the EPRDF’s 
policy centered on agriculture and rural development preceded the ESDP, and each was 
fine-tuned to fit into the frame of references cherished and espoused by the benefactors. In 
this regard, government white papers issued in 1994 and 1996 on New Education and 
Training Policy and ESDP respectively stated: 
 
 Cognizant of the pedagogical advantage of the child in learning in mother tongue and the 
rights of nationalities to promote the use of their languages, primary education will be given in 
nationality language. 
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Making the necessary preparation, nations and nationalities can either learn in their own language 
or can choose from among those selected on the basis of national and countrywide distribution. 
(TGE, 1994: 23; emphasis added)   
 
Any sound educational policy should be conceived in the context of the country’s overall 
development objectives and strategies. The relevance of education to the emphasis now being placed 
on agriculture and rural development should be clearly established and the new strategy of 
economic development should, in turn, contribute towards the transformation of the educational 
system. Students at various stages of education must acquire skills and training that contribute in 
various ways to the new economic objectives. With the current policy of channeling more resources 
for the development of rural areas, the system of education, as has been perceived in the past, is 
distinctly irrelevant. …Emphasis has thus been placed on increased enrolment in primary education 
which provides the essential link with the country’s major resource base-agriculture and the masses 
of the peasantry. The focus on the primary education is in order to link up the spread of education 
with the objectives of economic growth which is based on the strategy of prioritizing agriculture in 
which the country possesses definite comparative advantages at present. The essential requirement, 
therefore, is a fundamental restructuring of the present system of education so as to create 
conditions for a rapid growth of basic education and to make it more relevant to the needs of the 
vast majority of Ethiopia’s population and the requirements of an agrarian economy. (FDRE, 1996: 
42-43; emphasis added)   
 
         Despite the fact that a series of literacy campaigns had been conducted in local 
vernacular languages since the latter half of 1970s, the policy accorded bold recognition of 
local or ethnic languages as medium of instruction at the primary level. The most 
important element that distinguishes the new policy from its predecessors is that not only is 
there a close association between the recognition of the political rights of ethnic 
communities and the subsequent right of such entities to use their languages as a medium 
of instruction for the entire period of primary education (Tekeste, 1993), but also there is a 
remarkable emphasis on reorienting education towards rural and agriculture development 
strategies, as the preceding section indicated. Hence, the new policy elites’ commitments 
to the NNPs and the peasantry figure much more prominently in education policy and 
programs than in other socio-economic policies.  
         In much the same way as its predecessors, nevertheless, the formulation as well as 
the implementation of both the new education policy and the ESDP benefited little from 
and were nurtured with few inputs from the relevant stakeholders and the general public 
(Seyoum, 1996; Mulugeta, 1999). The officials in the Ministry of Education (MOE) 
attempted to create consensus on the policy pronouncements with some of the teachers, the 
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public in Addis Ababa and in limited number of NRSs, which distinctly set the benefactors 
apart from their predecessors, albeit government authorities aggressively campaigned for 
their constituencies to give their backing to the policy wherever such meetings were held65. 
Not only were alternative ideas that aimed at changing or modifying the fundamental 
stipulations of the policy pronouncements discouraged, but audiences for the policy 
dialogue were also reluctantly arranged as public relations exercise, nor was the selection 
of participants representative66.  
         The few educators who participated in the workshops on the policy contended that 
the discussions on the draft education policy were by and large of an informative nature 
and permitted no opportunity for alternative views to be deliberated, nor were they meant 
to67. Even the ideas, views and comments that appeared fruitful and constructive were 
never aggregated in the policy. Representation of grassroots interests and the genuine 
constituencies of the policy left a lot to be desired, aside from the failure to incorporate 
their commentary68. By default or by design, the haphazard manner in which the 
workshops and discussions on the policy had been organized would give one the 
impression that the sessions were probably meant to recruit support for the policy, but not 
to capitalize on the creative initiatives of the educators.   
    Although he resigned from the team in the early phase of the process, a senior Ethiopian 
academic and educator who was appointed as a member of the team which drafted the 
policy characterized the making of the new Education and Training Policy as a top-down 
exercise, apparently with little input from the public and relevant stakeholders (Seyoum, 
1996). Civil society organizations such as teachers’ associations contributed very little 
mainly because of the split within the association at about the same time as the campaign 
in favor of the new policy was launched (ibid.). It is interesting to note that the TGE 
President told the transitional legislature, the CoR, in April 1993 that a group of scholars 
had been grappling with the study and drafting of a new education policy, and pledged that 
the draft policy document was to be presented for approval as soon as the drafting work 
was over. The policy document, however, was officially published exactly a year later 
                                                
65
 Interview and questionnaire responses from school principals and teachers in Bahirdar, Mekele, Awasa, 
Dessie, Nazreth and Addis Ababa, September to May 2004  
66
 Interview responses from school principals in Amaha and Tigray NRSs in December 2003 and February 
2004 respectively    
67
 Interviews held with two educational administrators at Mekele Special Zone Education Office in Tigray 
NRS, February 2004.  
68
 Interview held with two principals of secondary schools who participated in the workshops on education 
policy dialogues in South Wollo, Amhara NRS, December 2003.   
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without the seal of approval of the parliamentarians; and neither was it discussed in any of 
its regular nor special sessions (66th Plenary Session of the CoR, April 1993).     
       The making of the Education Sector Development Program (ESDP) was by far an 
even more exclusive than the policy. ESDP was perceived and formulated by the highest 
government actors and a cluster of funding or multi-donor agencies (Martin et al., 2000: 
9). The lower-level echelons in the education structure, and the ultimate beneficiaries of 
the program such as teachers, students and parents were distinctly excluded from the 
formulations as well as the laying down the modalities of its implementation (Mulugeta, 
2002:  104).  The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the Ministry of Education (MOE), 
representatives of some selected government institutions, representatives of NRSs’ 
educational bureaus, the World Bank and the team members of international technical 
assistance missions and donors were among the major actors actively involved in the 
making of the program and mapped out action plans for its implementation (JRM, March 
2003; MRM, March 2001; Martin et al., 2000). It is interesting to note the bizarre 
circumstances that transpired due in part to the conflict that arose between the World Bank 
representatives and the multi-donor mission in Ethiopia, who competed for the control of 
the preparation of the ESDP and the mechanisms of its execution (ibid.). Not only did the 
World Bank have the sanction of the PMO and MOE to commission several of its 
employees as active members of the various technical teams, but also it had greater role 
both in influencing the shape of the ESDP and exercising leadership in its implementation 
(Martin et al., 2000: 9). This became the major source of resentment among the multi-
donor missions, who would have clearly liked to be included as partners in influencing and 
shaping ESDP (ibid.).   
       While the PMO and the MOE claimed the political and organizational leadership, the 
World Bank together with the multi-donor mission (though accorded less profile compared 
to WB), played leading roles in the technical aspects of the ESDP. In fact, not only were 
the PMO and the MOE responsible for the coordination and organization of ESDP 
preparation, but the PMO also became the linchpin in setting the regional budget ceiling 
after consultation with the regional presidents and communicating the ceilings of the 
educational budget to the NRSs (ibid.). Any lower-level participation below the NRSs, if it 
existed at all, entailed communicating information, soliciting support and endorsement, but 
not for consultation and contributing to the ESDP planning process (Martin et al., 2000; 
Mulugeta, 2002; JRV, 2003).  Involving the lower levels and the relevant public in shaping 
the ESDP aside, information about the ESDP had not even been disseminated below the 
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top NRSs’ party and government officials, nor were there any significant attempts to 
rectify this (ibid.). In fact, in its own admission, an unpublished government policy 
document described ESDP as an outcome of a consultative process between central 
government, NRS governments and the donor community (FDRE, 2002: 2). Seyoum 
argued:   
 
It is strongly held that for educational reform to be effective, it is not only necessary but also 
essential that the target population, which is to be affected directly or indirectly by the reform, be 
involved in the reform process. This is in line with the idea of participatory decision-making, an 
essential element in a democratic process. It advocates that such involvement helps develop in the 
people the sense that they are not mere pawns to be manipulated as objects of reform, but are rather 
subjects of reform who have a voice and stake in the reform process. This is no doubt contrary to the 
age-old thinking that government alone knows what is good for people. As such, it rejects the 
paternalistic and parochial attitude of those in power towards the people. Thus, it subscribes to a 
bottom-up approach of reform that strongly advocates participation at grass roots level, a principle 
that ideas for reform could emanate from the bottom to the top. This in complete contrast to the top-
down approach that maintains a principle that what is good for the people should be handed down 
from those in power to the ones below. (1996:XVI: 12-13)  
 
         In brief, not only did policy elites and their donor partners conceptualize and 
formulate both the education policy and its concomitant program, but they also determined 
the modus operandi of the implementation process. Neither the educators, on whom the 
bulk of the implementation of the policy depended, nor did the public play any significant 
role in generating the policy. Ironically, implementing agencies, below the top NRSs 
bosses, who would have had a vital role in the execution both of the policy and the 
program, were peripheral actors for much of the conceptualization and formulation 
processes of the ESDP. The adverse consequences of this imbalance, as we shall soon see, 
were manifested in the shape of a chain of negative downward effects that affected the 
outcome of education policy implementation.  
 
4.5.2.2.The downward effects of the flaws in the education policy formulation  
 
The effective implementation of the education policy and the ESDP would have depended 
as much on winning the constituency of the education policy (teachers, students and 
parents), as on a carefully planned preparation and program to implement it. The Ethiopian 
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government had neither the policy constituency, which could back up sustainable 
implementation, nor the preparation to do it69. Hence, nearly ten years after the ESDP has 
been in full swing, Ethiopian policymakers have over the last five years been locked in a 
situation that is much like fighting fire to cope with the pressures of a lack of facilities, a 
dire absence of qualified and untrained teachers in the upper-primary and secondary 
schools, overcrowded classrooms at all levels of the education system, unprepared as well 
as over-worked teachers70 with the challenges that the policy set to institutions and actors. 
Rampant frustration and loss of interest in teaching and/or a widespread declining morale 
as well as motivation to teach, the influx of teachers to well-paying private schools, and 
even many of them increasingly leaving their teaching jobs in favor of other job 
opportunities have not augured well for an education system that is probably courting 
another crisis71. In SNNP NRS, in one zone alone 44% of teachers in the primary schools 
did not for some reason report for teaching duties at the beginning of the school year in 
2000/01 (MRV, 2003: 12). Educators (teachers) in three major NRSs have attributed the 
poor performance of the education system over the past ten years chiefly to the low 
importance accorded to the role of teachers and ordinary citizens in the making of the 
education policy72. In other words, the little effort exerted on widely and broadly involving 
the major stakes in the formulation process of the education policy as well as the program 
set in motion a chain reaction that severely jeopardized the process of implementation. 
Urging educators, usually under duress, to execute the pronouncements of the policy and 
the program, when they have not participated in its formulation, backfired in several ways.  
        The primary school gross enrolment both in absolute figures and proportionally, as 
the table below shows, has by far exceeded the target set for 2001/02. A considerable 
number of educators saw this as the most remarkable achievements of the education 
system over the last ten years73.  Thus the total primary school enrolment expanded from 
3.7 million in 1996/97, to 8.1 million in 2001/02, well over a million pupils higher than the 
target established for the program period. Furthermore, the qualification of teachers for 
                                                
69
 Questionnaire responses from the Pro-Government Ethiopian Teachers Association’s leadership, May 2003 
70
 A survey carried out among 300 teachers in 1999 showed that well over 83% of them would not hesitate to 
abandon their teaching duties in favor of other job opportunities, pointing to the dissatisfaction with the 
education system coming to head (Mulugeta, 2002: 103).     
71
 These are concerns universally shared by most educators (teachers) and academics who were interviewed 
by the author.   
72
 The responses of teachers to research questionnaires from Tigray, Amhara and SNNP NRS and Addis 
Ababa, September 2003 to April 2004     
73
 Questionnaire responses from primary school teachers in Addis Ababa, Dessie, Combolcha, and Bahirdar, 
September 2003 to January 2004     
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lower primary school has also improved a little over the target; although most of the 
educators with whom this author had talks felt that the figures seldom represented the true 
situation of the primary schools74. In 2001/02 primary schools constituted the largest 
portion of the system with 12,087 schools servicing an all-time high student population of 
a little over 8.1 million. The education system, however, performed far worse than 
expected when measured in terms of the most critical ingredients, which implies that the 
system is faulty.  The primary and secondary schools, as the table depicts, are plagued with 
overcrowded classrooms, under-qualified teachers for both primary and secondary schools, 
and inadequate textbooks. The dire shortages of resources in the face of highly expanding 
enrolment and declining teachers’ qualifications have even accentuated the problem of 
program implementation. While the share of education in the national budget has been set 
at 19%, it plunged to 10.5% in the year 2001/2002, nearly 5% below the base year of 
1996/97.    
 
                                                
74
 The author’s interview transcriptions   
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Table 4.7. Targets, achievements and performance indicators of the ESDP (1996/97-
2001/02). 
 
Indicators Target for 2001/02 
Base Year 
(1996/97) 
Achievement in 
2001/02 
Total number of Primary Schools  12, 597 9670 12, 087 
Total Primary School Enrollment (1-8) 7, 000, 000 3, 788, 000 8, 144, 000 
Gross Primary Enrollment Ratio (1-8) 50 %  34. 7 % 61.6 % 
Percentage of Qualified Teachers (1-4) 95.0 % 85.0 % 95.6  % 
Percentage of Qualified Teachers (5-8) 54.4 % 20.9 % 25.5 % 
Percentage of Qualified Teachers (9-12) 61.6 % 40.4 % 33. 7 %  
Pupil/Section Ratio at Primary (1-8)  50  57  73 
Student/Section Ratio at Secondary (9-12) 50 65 80 
Dropout Rate at Grade 1 14.2 % 29.0 % 27.5 %  
Repetition Rates (4-8) 6.4 % 10.5 % 10.4 % 
Textbook/Pupil Ratio*  1:1 1:5 1:1.5 
Girls Share of Primary School Enrollment  45.0 % 38.0 % 41.4 %  
Education’s Share of the National Budget 19.0 % 14.6 % 10.5 % 
   Source:  Compiled by the author from Annual Educational Statistics (MOE, 
2002/2003); Mid-Term Review Missions (2001); Joint Review Missions (2003).      
 
* There is a huge variation between NRSs varying from 1:1 to 1:5   
 
       The national consolidated figures do not adequately indicate, probably even distort, the 
true picture and/or the worst performances of the education system in the NRSs. Multi-
donor review missions (2003) reported that, while pupil/textbooks ratios in Amhara and 
SNNP NRSs varied from 1:5 to none, pupil/teacher ratios rather varied from 75:1 to 120:1 
in Amhara and from 30:1 to 330:1 in SNNP NRSs. This attests to the fact that the 
hallmarks of the new education policy, continuous assessment of the pupils performance 
and a pupil-centered education system, have hardly been achieved, for educators seldom 
have any opportunity to give individual attention to different students, and interactive and 
communicative teaching-learning process are also impossible to implement (MRM, 2001; 
JRM, 2003).  
       At the primary and secondary levels, the steadily declining morale among the 
educators (teachers) and a disappointingly low implementation capacity have aggravated 
the deteriorating quality of the education system. Over the past ten years this has been 
manifested in terms of inadequate textbooks, overcrowded classrooms, many unqualified 
teachers and insufficient funding. Although the Career Structure75, which has been 
operational since the end of the 90s, has been received positively by many educators, in 
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 Initiated and adopted by the MOE, the Career Structure was intended to provide teachers with monetary 
rewards commensurate to their teaching performances (MOE, 1999).     
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principle, as a means of rewarding good teaching performance and professional 
competence, it has effectively been abandoned in favor of Gimgema76, a mass evaluation 
system that the ruling party has long adopted to control the behavior of its leadership and 
cadres. Recent years have, in fact, witnessed that the criterion of teachers’ performance 
becomes not how most effectively they discharge their teaching duties and contribute to 
the actual teaching-learning process, but rather how far have they been close to the 
administration, and thus benchmarks such as the latter are increasingly getting precedence 
over those that have to do with real teaching responsibilities. Put differently, the so-called 
evaluation (gigema), in which teachers have hardly any say and on which they have not 
been consulted, have replaced the Career Structure. As a result, the policy has contributed 
only marginally to the promotion of the teaching profession and good teaching-learning 
environment. In fact, a study carried out in Oromia NRS (Abdi, 2003) has confirmed that 
not only does the Career Structure fail to contribute to the improvements of teachers’ social 
and economic statuses, but it has also not prevented teachers from leaving teaching for 
other jobs with better career opportunities, nor have salary increments been commensurate 
with the standard of living and/or compared with the pay in other government 
organizations.  
       It would probably be possible to rectify some of the problems as the implementation 
progresses, had there been qualified and professionally capable implementers. But as it 
stands now, the administrators appointed by government to oversee the implementation 
process merely serve as transmission belts of channeling information and instructions from 
the higher to the lower levels, or are simply mediums through which instructions flow from 
the higher to lower levels77. Poignantly, the situation in this case is that the very officials 
whom government has assigned to guide the implementation process do not even have a 
good knowledge either of the policy or the program (MRS, 2001; JRM, 2003). How would 
one therefore expect effective policy implementation to take place while the personnel 
leading the implementation process do not have a sound grasp of the policy and program 
objectives (ibid)? How would one imagine effective implementation to take place when the 
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 Gimgema: an institution that derives its origins from Maoism, a traditional means of accountability 
employed by TPLF leaders while they were in the armed struggle against the Dergue (Young, 1997: 203). 
The TPLF also made regular use of long, and usually well attended, mass meeting evaluations known as 
Gimgema to achieve a high level of agreement on the goals of the revolution and the means to pursue them 
(ibid.).   
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 Interview held with a secondary school principal in September 2003 in Bahirdar, Amhara NRS.   
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technical and managerial capacity of program (ESDP) administers at different levels in the 
educational structures to provide with guidance and support leaves much to be desired78?  
       In fact, educational administration and management have over the past ten years been 
a dumping ground of unqualified persons, who after having served a considerable number 
of years in teaching, are assigned to oversee the implementation of the policy. They are 
often persons who found their positions safe havens rather than a place to discharge their 
duties responsibly, persons with little knowledge of the policy as well as the program, little 
competence and experience of educational administration and with little capability of 
tackling the challenges of implementation79. Putting it differently, the leadership at every 
level in the hierarchy of educational structure is filled with political zealots who possess 
hardly any capability to lead educational institutions and with little knowledge or the 
means to rectify the complex problems of education policy implementation. As a result, 
they have become part of the problem, instead of resolving the many problems of 
education policy as well as program implementation. 
        An expatriate review mission (2003) reported an all-round lack of implementation 
capacity to execute the ESDP. Another multi-donor review mission (Mid Term Review 
Mission) reported:  
 
In almost every region, zone and Ministerial departments visited, the lack of adequate capacity was 
raised as the number one problem hindering implementation of ESDP, and the achievements of the 
educational quality improvements planned. In schools there are both insufficient numbers of 
teachers, and amongst those that there are, many do not have the required qualifications. At the 
Woreda (district) there are insufficient supervision visits to schools to support the teachers there. At 
the Zone there are too few civil works technicians and qualified accountants to manage the school 
construction activities needed, and account payments made. Those who are employed at this level 
do not have the necessary tools and transport to support their work. At the region, curriculum 
development, educational planning, budgeting, and accounting manpower are in short supplies 
leading to delays in the launching of annual programs. At the federal level, the professional 
personnel needed to provide technical support to the decentralized units have been decreasing as the 
program expands and the need for such personnel grows. The ESDP secretariat in the Ministry of 
Education (MOE) has fewer staff than at the beginning of the program and the engineering panel 
fewer architects. All procurement specialists have left the PPD (Planning and Programming 
Department), and the higher education department staff have not been increasing despite the 
creation of four new universities and a large increase in enrolments. Currently, there are 53 
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 A senior educator and academics in the felid expressing his concern with the implementation capacity of 
program administrators, June 2004    
79
 Interview held with a member of the old Ethiopian Teachers Association, June 2003, Addis Ababa 
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vacancies in the MOE, almost all of which are at the higher levels… (Mid Term Review Mission, 
2001: 8)  
 
    Suffice it to say that continuous evaluations have rarely been carried out to keep track of 
implementation activities. Even if foreign missions have been conducting continual 
assessments, government and party officials have so far paid little heed to them, despite the 
reports revealing that the process of education policy implementation is imperiled. It 
should, however, be solidly stressed that most of the problems that have prevailed in the 
education system could have been averted had there been astute leadership, careful 
planning of educational programs and broad consultation with the educators, independent 
civil society organizations and the public80. The empirical evidence makes abundantly 
clear that the dismal performance of the education system, and the disillusionment with the 
implementation process, chiefly emanate from the little attention accorded to the 
consultation process as well as to the participation of the constituencies of the policy (i.e. 
teachers, students and other relevant stakeholders) at the formulation phase both of the 
policy and the ESDP. In other words, the absence of genuine ownership of the policy from 
its ultimate beneficiaries resulted in the poor performance in the education system that has 
over the past ten years been manifesting itself in terms of poor-quality education, dire 
shortage of facilities and dissatisfied teachers with little motivation to support the 
Education and Training Policy and the implementation of the ESDP.   
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter assessed and analyzed the policymaking leverage that the groups and 
institutions have had on public policymaking since 1991. Not only did the policy choices 
made by the EPRDF dominate the entire transition period, but the Council of 
Representatives and the Council of Ministers had also been the major institutional 
mechanisms that EPRDF used to translate its choices into policies and programs. Having 
been assured of a majority control over the CoR, the EPRDF framed legislation, proposed 
policies and ensured their feasibility in the light of its pre-commitments. The making of the 
Ethiopian mega-public policy, among others, was the salient feature of the transition 
period. The constitution-making process exercise in Ethiopia, as earlier noted, was far 
more rigid, with the agenda being influenced much more by the pre-commitments of the 
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victorious sponsors of the process, namely the EPRDF. With hindsight, the overthrow of 
Dergue’s regime by EPRDF not only created a situation in which the hegemony of the 
EPRDF was established, but so also did the pre-commitments that its victory 
institutionalized limit the choices of other players located outside of the machinery of party 
and state structures.  
       Having been endorsed by a Constitutional Assembly in December 1995, the Ethiopian 
Constitution established a federal republic (FDRE) comprising of nine NRSs and a federal 
government (see Map 3). The constitution vests wide-ranging policymaking 
responsibilities in the central government. It also introduces a parliamentary form of 
government, with separate executive, legislative and judicial institutions (FDRE, 1995). 
The Ethiopian legislature has two chambers, namely the House of Peoples’ Representatives 
and the House of Federation. Although the power of making legislation is invested in the 
HPR, the executive sponsored almost all of the legislation. Neither the independent nor the 
opposition members of the HPR, or the standing committees proposed any legislation. 
Likewise, the executive and party functionaries in the NRSs have distinctly dominated the 
legislative and policymaking process. 
      In effect, the House of Federation is not an upper house. By default and by design, it is 
a house of nations, nationalities and peoples (NNPs), for it simply endorses the pre-
commitments that the sponsors of the current Ethiopian constitution have espoused and 
nurtured during their protracted struggle against the Dergue. In other words, unlike its 
counterparts in the UK, Canada, South Africa and most other upper chambers around the 
world, it does not have the power of legislation. Nor has there been any space for 
independent initiative to influence deliberations in HoF.  Put differently, the house that 
makes decisions on such vital matters as the interpretation of the Constitution, self-
determination up to and including secession, and the apportionment of national revenues 
has seldom been accessible to civil society and the public at large, nor has there been any 
channel of communication between it and the non-state actors.  
       This chapter also evaluated views for and against the government’s rural- and 
agricultural-centered policy, namely ADLI. The government claims that an accelerated 
economy can only be achieved through a rural- and agriculture-centered development 
process (FDRE, 2001). In other words, industrialization and services can be promoted and 
gradually supersede agriculture only if agriculture- and rural-centered development 
strategies are well-established in the long run (FDRE, 2001, 2002). To this end the 
government and the party guaranteed support only to those domestic and foreign investors 
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that invest their resources in and contribute primarily to agricultural development (ibid.). 
While professional economists have hardly contested the government’s claim that 
agriculture is the backbone of the country’s economy, they did question the viability of 
ADLI on the grounds that there has been disappointing performance of the agricultural 
sector over the previous ten years, leading the economy off track (Befekadu and Berhanu, 
1999; Berhanu and Said, 2004). Moreover, smallholder farming, the absence of ownership 
security and diminishing farmlands have also contributed to the dismal economic 
performance in agriculture. This, therefore, points to the fact that political and ideological 
values appear to propel the government and the party’s obsession with ADLI, rather than a 
sound overriding economic rationale (see Chapter 5).  
         Additionally, the insignificant attention paid to the articulation of the demands of the 
major constituencies during the formulation of the education policy as well as the attendant 
program has severely jeopardized its implementation outcomes. Hence, the empirical 
evidence proves that ten years after ESDP implementation began, the education system is 
replete with a dire shortage of qualified and trained teachers in the upper-primary and 
secondary schools, overcrowded classrooms at all levels of the education system, 
widespread lack of motivation and decreased morale among educators. The influx of 
teachers to better-paying private schools, and even many of them increasingly leaving 
teaching jobs in favor of other job opportunities bodes well for an education system, which 
is probably risking another crisis. At the center of the disappointing performance of the 
education system, the imperiled process of education policy implementation and/or 
imbalance, as the empirical evidences clearly attested, is chiefly the failure to garner the 
support of the major constituencies of the policy during the process both of formulation 
and implementation of the policy and the ESDP.    
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Chapter 5. The party, ideology and public participation in policymaking, 1991-2004 
 
 5.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter discussed in some detail the relationships between the executive and 
the legislatures at different levels of the policymaking structure, and further assessed the 
legal and political parameters that have turned the executive into a formidable force in the 
policymaking process over the years. But the ruling party (EPRDF) ‘is the brain of the 
revolutionary democratic system, the trendsetter, and the fulcrum of all decision-making 
organs. Policy objectives, strategies and fundamental socio-economic policies that guide 
and forge state-society relationships originate in the party. It also allocates candidates for 
elections, appoints, promotes and assigns members who hold key positions in the executive 
leadership’ (EPRDF, undated: 131). The party and the ideological doctrines that it 
promotes, therefore, provide the guiding principles for all socio-economic decisions and 
are the driving forces behind public policymaking in Ethiopia, as this chapter sets out in 
the sections that follow.  
         Informed by the ruling party’s unofficial as well as unpublished documents and other 
empirical sources, the next two sections unravel the interplay between the ruling party and 
government structures, and how the ideological doctrine that it promotes steers the 
organization of the state, the values that guide the course of policymaking process, the 
content of public policies and the context in which they are made. Particularly, the second 
section analyzes how the overriding obsession of the new policy elites with revolutionary 
democracy serves to enable them to lay exclusive claim to the power of policymaking and 
commits them to a specific set of socio-economic policies that leads to the exclusion of 
other players. 
         The third section illuminates how the combined forces of ideological doctrine and 
party discipline, on the one hand, and statutory provisions, on the other, accorded the 
ruling party enormous leverage to sway all policy and legislative decisions both at the 
national and regional levels. The next section sheds light on how the unified forces of 
clientelism, the ideological preoccupations of policy elites and a constellation of vulnerable 
and weak CSOs/NGOs militate against the growth of civil society and any pressure that 
they could exert on policy elites for meaningful changes and reforms in public policies. Put 
differently, not only do the omnipresent workshops, conferences and public hearings on 
government policies and practices appear to have functioned more as pro forma exercises 
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in public relations than as serious efforts to incorporate public demands and preferences 
into the draft legislation and public policies, but public participation has not been 
transformed into a force to have a bearing upon policies and practices. Finally, the 
concluding remarks recapitulate the core issues discussed in the chapter. 
 
5.2. The party: structure and operational principles 
 
In a bid to control larger constituencies beyond Tigary, the core constituency of the 
EPRDF, TPLF had long sought for a formation of a united front (TPLF, 1983: 6). This 
dream came true with the establishment of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary 
Democratic Front in 1989 (Young, 1997, Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). Except for the first 
plenary congress, EPRDF held four of the five plenary congresses after the fall of the 
Dergue, the last such plenary session being the Fifth Plenary Congress, which took place in 
August 2003. The structure of the umbrella front is comparable to other Marxist-Leninist 
fronts (see Figure 5.2). Composed of political cadres, fighters and representatives from 
mass organizations that are invariably drawn from each member organization, officially the 
highest body is the Congress. Equal numbers of members from each affiliate are elected 
for the Congress, Central Committee and Politburo (EPRDF 2003b). The Congress elects a 
Central Committee, which operates as the highest political organ, between Congresses, as 
well as an audit commission that monitors whether procedural regularities and scrupulous 
use of party resources are adhered to (ibid.). The number both of Central Committee 
(Council) and Politburo (Executive Committee) members has been highly expanded over 
the last three years. At the most recent Congress held in Amhara NRS capital Bahirdar in 
August 2003, the Central Committee and Politburo grew from 72 and 20 (in 1994)  to 180 
and 36 respectively81 (see Table 5.1). Both in terms of political clout and organizational 
strength, the TPLF has always been considered as the strongest partner within the EPRDF 
coalition, although its credibility has severely been shaken in the wake of the split within 
its leadership in mid-2001. Having suffered very little from the factional struggles that 
rocked the entire EPRDF apparatus, ANDM emerged considerably stronger than any other 
coalition partners. Yet it ranks as the second strongest group within the coalition, and its 
political importance and power appear to be steadily rising. For the most part, the senior 
member organizations of the front emerged as apparently the most powerful parties, both 
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in terms of mass mobilization and access to resources, for both are connected with big 
commercial parastatals (Paueswang et al., 2002; Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003).  
        Not only are OPDO and SEPDU less influential and autonomous, but the wave of 
continuing dismissals of members have also undermined the confidence of the members of 
both organizations. As a result, the two junior partners remain weak and relatively 
marginal to the core of the federal power structure. What is more, both appeared to be 
junior partners of the coalition, despite the fact that party rules stipulate otherwise. In any 
case, the structures of all of the affiliates have well been established throughout the four 
NRSs with local units/basic cells instituted in every peasant village, and industrial 
establishments and government institutions in the towns and as well as cities82, although 
the opposition have been emerging stronger in a neck-to-neck competition with the EPRDF 
affiliate, SEPDU, in the SNNP NRSs. SEPDU had 21 separate ethnic political 
organizations, with chaos and factionalism characterizing almost all of them. As of 
September 2003, the smaller ethnic parties were all disbanded, reorganized to form a single 
political entity and represent EPRDF in the SNNP NRS under the name of South Ethiopian 
Peoples’ Democratic Union (SEPDU).83 
        Despite the fact that the EPRDF’s strategy from the transitional period seems to have 
been to win political control over the four key regions of Oromia, Amhara, Tigray and 
SNNP NRSs, all the parties ruling the peripheral regions have always remained friends and 
allies of the EPRDF (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003). In the regions of Afar, Somali, Harar, 
Benishangul-Gumuz and Gamebella, the ruling parties - Afar National Democratic Front 
(ANDF), Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP), Harari National League (HNL), 
Benishangul-Gumuz Peoples Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF), and Gambella Peoples 
Democratic Party (GPDP) - have been loyal allies of the EPRDF (op. cit.). In fact, several 
members of the ally parties are appointed to key ministerial and government positions in 
the executive leadership. 
         In the immediate aftermath of Tehadesso (Resuscitation)84, the EPRDF leadership 
issued an internal party constitution that effectively institutionalizes party hierarchy, 
disciplines the behaviors of member organizations, reinvigorates party ideology and 
inspires the internal party life. It stipulates a number of points 
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 Interview held with party officials in Awasa, Bahirdar, Mekele and Addis Ababa.   
83
 Interview held with a senior member of the SEPDU, April 2004.  
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 See footnote 39.  
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1. Democratic order and rapid economic development can be built in Ethiopia when the 
objectives and ideals of revolutionary democracy are translated into practice. Hence, not 
only should revolutionary democratic organizations (affiliates) stand resolute in the 
achievement of these objectives, but also should be prepared to struggle loyally as well as 
firmly for the implementation of the front’s objectives and its internal constitution. 
 
2. Since Ethiopia is a multi-national state, justice to NNPs can be done not by a pan-
Ethiopian organization that draws its members regardless of ethnic denominations, but by a 
front that brings NNP organizations under an umbrella front. EPRDF is, therefore, a united 
front of NNP organizations, but does not admit individuals separately as members.  
 
3. EPRDF is a united front of NNP organizations that adopt revolutionary democracy as 
their guiding principle.  
 
4. Not only should each member organization ensure internal democratic life, but should 
also apply democratic centralism and self-criticism, and institute the system of Gimgema85.  
 
5. NNP affiliate organizations cannot pursue political and ideological objectives other than 
revolutionary democracy, nor should they have any different program other than the 
EPRDF’s program. Member organizations are, therefore, required to execute policy 
decisions made by the EPRDF central leadership in their respective NRSs.   
 
6. Member organizations have equal rights of participation in the front’s leadership and its 
decisions (EPRDF, 2003b: 3-5). 
 
           As we shall soon see, these principles set the basic guidelines as well as the modus 
operandi within which the entire party apparatus, member organizations and individual 
members operate.    
        Although the Congress assumes the highest authority in the structure formally and 
structurally, in reality, however, the Political Bureau/Executive Committee has sweeping 
powers, exercises control over the central issues such as organizational and propaganda 
works, agenda setting for EPRDF-wide functions, superintending with complete authority 
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over the implementation of the ‘decisions’ of the bodies constituted at the center. All 
EPRDF affiliates are duty bound to observe and implement the decisions of the Politburo 
(ibid, 2003b: 19). EPRDF’s decisions are executed through member NNP organizations, 
and so are duty bound to implement all policy decisions, programs and plans issued by the 
center. Furthermore, the Politburo (Executive Committee) bears overarching 
responsibilities on such key central organs of the party as EPRDF Secretariat, Propaganda 
and Organizational Divisions, Parliamentary structure, the Addis Ababa City Government 
division, Cadre Training Institute, and International Relations Division, Lower Bodies86  
(EPRDF, 2003b). Party constitution also imposes obligations on all member organizations 
to observe and execute the decisions of the Politburo (EPRDF, undated).  
           Since the Tehadesso (Resuscitation) campaign in 2001/02, not only have all EPRDF 
affiliates adopted the EPRDF’s central socio-political program, but have also rewritten 
their internal regulations to replicate the central party constitution.  Apart from this, each 
EPRDF member organization has an identical structure embracing a congress/assembly 
that meets once in two years, a central committee that sits twice a year, and a politburo that 
meets four times annually. The latter has sweeping policymaking, organizational and 
propaganda responsibilities. Furthermore, EPRDF reaches the remotest peasant villages 
through its regional affiliates. Its hierarchies are therefore stretched beyond regional 
capitals to encompass areas ranging from government units/organs in the capitals to small 
cell units in the peasant villages87 (Figure 5.2). Mostly, EPRDF hierarchies overlap 
perfectly with government structures so much so that the lines between party and 
government structures appear indistinguishable, although it claims that corrective actions 
have been taken in the wake of Tehadesso. In Amhara and Oromia NRSs, ANDM and 
OPDO co-opted district legislatures and local government executive leadership through 
party functionaries that run district conferences88. Similarly, not only are the entire local 
government administrative personnel at the district and Kebele levels members of each 
regional affiliate, but there is also a newly established government organization, namely 
Mass Mobilization and Civil Society Organization, which co-opted the leadership of mass 
organizations such as the youth, women, peasant associations and peasant cooperatives89.      
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such key organizations as Mega Publishing Company, Ethiopian Civil Service College, Trade Union, 
Teachers Association and other civil society organizations (EPRDF, 1998).    
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 Interview held with Heads of Organization and Propaganda Divisions of OPDO and ANDM. 
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 Interview held with the senior manager of CRDA. 
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        Over the last thirteen years since 1991, as indicated earlier, the government seems to 
have established a two-faceted structure of governance at all administrative levels. While it 
has built up a formal structure of government institutions to keep in line with constitutional 
provisions, in parallel the regime has built a party structure that retains a degree of control 
to the extent that it would be difficult to use these government institutions effectively to 
challenge the power of the ruling party (Pausewang et al., 2002; Vaughan and Tronvoll, 
2003). Therefore, the key policymaking power structure is ‘the combined administration 
and party system.  There is no tradition of an independent bureaucracy, functioning as a 
tool of administration, with a political layer of elected leaders deciding on the policy 
issues.  It is difficult to separate the party, the state, and the administration90’. This has 
nowhere been saliently featured than in the so-called core NRSs, where well over 85 
percent of the Ethiopian people live (see Figure 5.1).  
                                                
90
 Questionnaire response from Svein Ege, a Norwegian social anthropologist and Senior Researcher, who 
has been doing research over the last seventeen years on socio-economic policies in Ethiopia, August, 2003.    
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Figure 5.1. A standard structure of EPRDF member organizations 
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Figure 5.2. The Central Structure of Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 2004 
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        Party and state structures as yet remain indistinguishable; first, membership in the party 
structure guarantees government positions, and second, the ideological precepts have 
prompted the pursuit of specific socio-economic policy goals which at the same time establish 
party principles underpinning the control of policymaking institutions. Markakis (2001: 52), 
nevertheless, cited historical and political traditions that have been cherished in the past as the 
major attributes of the continuance of state-party fusion. He noted: 
 
The model is, once more, the TPLF experience in Tigray during the armed struggle, where a 
parallel provincial state administration was founded and staffed by the government’s members. 
This model was replicated by the EPRDF affiliates in Amhara, Oromia and Southern regions, 
and effort is made to do the same in the other regions. Nearly all the officials in the state 
administration, from the Kebele to the federal government are EPRDF members, having joined 
the party before or soon after election to their post. Government business is discussed and 
decisions are made in party meetings that precede meetings of state bodies. In view of the 
party-state merger, it is understandable that Ethiopians have difficulty distinguishing between 
them.  
 
Down the line, a group of central committee members preside on the socio-economic and 
political dynamics of the core NRSs. Since government is seen as an instrument in the 
advancement as well as realization of the party’s policy objectives, a group of Central 
Committee members is appointed by each party affiliate to run party and administrative 
responsibilities below the NRS structures (see Figure 5.1.). The Central Committee usually 
consists of the Head and Vice-Head of Council of NRS Government, Heads of Capacity 
Building Bureau, Rural Development Bureau, Urban and Industrial Development Bureau, 
Information Bureau, Finance and Economic Development, Justice and Administration 
Bureau, and the Speaker of the NRS parliament91. The members of the Executive Committee 
(Politburo) include the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson (most of whom are Politburo 
members of the EPRDF), and NRS Head of Government, Heads of Propaganda and 
Organization Affairs of each affiliate.  Below the NRS, each zone has a group of 3 to 5 
Central Committee members, which form a nucleus of party leadership that usually comprises 
the zone party chairperson, heads of zone organization, and propaganda departments. From 
this level down to the minute basic organizations and cells, the party sets up a web of close-
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knit organizational networks whose members unequivocally observe party disciplines and 
internal procedures meticulously mapped out by the higher echelon of the EPRDF leadership 
(Figure 5.1).  
 
 
Table 5.1.  The estimated number of members of each EPRDF affiliate and percentage 
of social composition till May 2004 
EPRDF Affiliates 
& NRS 
 
Population 
 
Members 
Represented in 
the Central 
Committee/ 
Council 
Members 
Represent
ed in the 
Politburo/ 
Executive 
Committe
e 
Number of 
Members 
Percentage 
of Rural 
Residents 
Percentage of 
Urban 
Residents 
Oromo Peoples’ 
Democratic 
Organization 
(OPDO)-Oromia 
25, 098,000 45 9 270,000 60 % 40 % 
Amhara National 
Democratic 
Movement 
(ANDM)-Amhara 
18, 143, 000 45 9 200,000 89 % 11 % 
South Ethiopia 
Peoples’ 
Democratic 
Movement 
(SEPDM)-SNNP 
14, 085, 000 45 9 150,000 60 % 40 % 
Tigray Peoples’ 
Liberation 
Movement (TPLF)-
Tigray 
4, 113, 000 45 9 80,000 85 % 15 % 
Total 61, 439, 000 180 36 700,000 72.0 % 28 % 
                                                                                                     
Source: Compiled from interviews with the heads of public relations (propaganda) and 
organization affairs of each party affiliate in Addis Ababa, Bahirdar, Awasa and Mekele  
 
 
        The above table shows that the EPRDF is probably the first of its kind in Ethiopia to 
recruit the largest number of members from the rural residents and the peasantry. Membership 
has preponderantly been drawn from farmers. Not only does this clearly show EPRDF’s 
leadership commitment to the peasantry, but it also demonstrates the patron-client relationship 
between the two that developed during the armed insurgency. The over-emphasis on the 
peasantry, nevertheless, essentially has strategic significance, for the party’s frequent claims 
harness its survival and continuance of power with the population that currently constitute 
eighty-five percent of the Ethiopian populace. Thus, the senior member organizations of 
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EPRDF, ANDM and TPLF, had up to May 2004 recruited 89 and 85 percent of their members 
from rural residents respectively. That is followed by OPDO and SEPDU, which have each 
enlisted 60 percent of their members from the peasantry.  The bulk of EPRDF’s urban 
members have, however, been recruited from civil servants working in the government 
institutions and schoolteachers. In much the same way as its predecessor, namely WPE, 
EPRDF failed to attract an intellectual corps of professional and academic people to its ranks, 
partly because of the uninviting internal party life, and partly because of excessive ideological 
fixation (EPRDF, 2003a). In fact, for most learned people in the Ethiopia, EPRDF is 
comparable with WPE of the Dergue era in terms of ideological obsession, organizational 
patterns and internal party life, a grim reminder of Ethiopia’s recent past. Be that as it may, 
OPDO, ANDM, and SEPDU and TPLF till recently had an estimated 270 000, 200 000, 
150 000, 80 000 number of members respectively, making up 700 000 in total92. Its access to 
the corridors of the state power as well as government sources combined with the multi-
million-dollar business enterprises that each member organization is connected with makes 
EPRDF the strongest ever political organization that spans socio-economic and political 
policies in the entire country. Through its coalition partners, EPRDF controls well over 86 
percent of the Ethiopian population, although it uses ally parties, government structures and 
resources to extend its influence to the remaining 14 percent of the population living in the so-
called peripheral NRSs (see Table 5.2).        
 
5.3. The significance of ideology in public policymaking 
 
Over the last thirty years since 1974 in Ethiopia the ideological commitments, which policy 
elites at different points in time embodied, have critically determined the parameters and 
principles within which public policies have been forged, and the nature and the type of socio-
economic and political policies pursued. During the Dergue rule Marxism-Leninism became 
the official ideology of the state, and the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) was the vanguard 
party reorienting policies along the lines of the official ideology (WPE, 1984, FDRE, 1987). 
Statutes, including the Constitution, reaffirmed the leading role of the only party and the 
inviolability the ideology, as Chapter 3 elucidated. Not only did almost all policies strictly 
follow the lead of the ideology, but the policymaking institutions were also patterned 
accordingly. Land and rural development reforms were typical of policies formulated and 
executed in a classic Marxist-Leninist style.         
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          In much the same manner as its predecessor, the EPRDF has over the last thirteen years 
advocated revolutionary democracy, although it was not in the spotlight till 2001. Not only is 
EPRDF the sole architect, designer and promoter of fundamental socio-economic policies 
such as urban, rural land policies, and including of course ADLI, but its ideology also sets 
guidelines as well as the preconditions for policy making, as well as making and unmaking 
government institutions93. In fact, although there are clear signals that EPRDF has been 
staunchly committed to Marxism-Leninism, its leaders have nevertheless cleverly avoided the 
official use of such concepts as class analysis, class struggle and the advent of communism 
for fear of reprisals from donors and such powerful financiers as the World Bank and the 
IMF94. Obviously this sets EPRDF leaders apart from their predecessors.   
        Unofficial and unpublished party documents and pronouncements professed that EPRDF 
put an end to its Marxist-Leninist wing few years before it held its Second Plenary Congress 
in Awassa in 1994, chiefly because of the loss of value that transpired immediately after the 
downfall of the communist block (EPRDF, undated, 2003a). However, the secrecy shrouding 
the way in which the undoing of the Ethiopian Workers Revolutionary Party (EWRP) and the 
shading of its attendant guiding principle (i.e. Marxism-Leninism) have been dealt with was 
amongst the chief causes for the split within the party leadership that led to untold havoc in 
2001 (ibid, Reporter, April 2002). Party pronouncements that have wider circulation within 
and among the most educated elements of the party asserted that the ‘Revolutionary 
Democratic Program’ was primarily seen as an instrument of uninterrupted transition to 
socialism (EPRDF, undated: 1, EPRDF, 2003b: 8). Hence, membership in the front was 
claimed to have been an eclectic mixture of Christian parishes, Moslem sheiks, non-
communist revolutionary democrats and Marxist-Leninists, although it is acknowledged that 
the Marxist-Leninist forces had their party, namely Ethiopian Workers Revolutionary Party 
(EWRP) (ibid).  Not only had Marxist-Leninist forces have a party designated as such, but 
they were also almost all members officially and universally recognized it as the vanguard 
organization of the EPRDF. The revolutionary democratic front - EPRDF and forces 
coalesced under it, therefore, acceded to and endorsed the leadership role of EWRP, and this 
had enormous influence on the EPRDF’s program and the ideological tools used to guide and 
analyze that program (EPRDF). EPRDF wrote: 
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 Interview held with a leader of the Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce, Addis Ababa, May 2003. 
94
 Interviews with an opposition MP, and human right activist, January and April 2004 respectively.  
 206
The fundamental rallying objective underpinning the leading role of the party was primarily the 
completion of the transition to socialism via democratic revolution. In other words, EWRP was well 
positioned at the helm of the democratic revolution and spearheaded the socialist revolution and the 
uninterrupted transition to socialism. Moreover, having been situated at the center of democratic and 
socialist revolution, EWRP, mapped out the EPRDF’s program, controlled and steered all its activities 
along these lines. Therefore, not only was the EPRDF’s program a minimum program of the party of a 
Marxist-Leninist type, but also was an essential tool of a transition towards socialist socio-economic 
formation… More importantly, communists had central place in the EPRDF, not only because Marxist-
Leninist ideology guided the analysis and interpretation of programs and policies, but also because the 
whole gamut of organizational leadership in the hierarchy of the EPRDF was controlled and led by the 
communists. The members of the EPRDF who had not accepted Marxism-Leninism as their guiding 
principle were thus regarded as revolutionary democrats which set the latter apart from the communist 
elements who represented as the potent forces of the EPRDF. (EPRDF, undated: 19). 
  
          EPRDF also claimed that the peasantry is the fundamental social base of the 
revolutionary democratic revolution, with the urban petty-bourgeoisie and the industrial 
workers rallying around the revolutionary democratic cause. Despite the official claim that 
places the peasantry as the fundamental base and the ultimate beneficiary of the revolution, 
the peasantry is organizationally scattered at best and intellectually ill equipped at worst; yet 
the communist intellectuals bestowed on them ‘the historic responsibility of leading the 
revolutionary democratic revolution’ (EPRDF, 2003b). EPRDF asserted that that historic role 
had till 1991 been assumed by EWRP.  
          The abrupt change in the global alignment of socio-economic and political forces that 
followed the jettisoning of communism towards the end of the 1980s produced a re-thinking 
of the opportunities and challenges among the EPRDF leadership, although it was a belated 
move as well and left a lot to be desired.  Choices were made, but they were far too few and 
too insubstantial to represent any substantive departure from the ideological values it 
ostensibly claimed to have abandoned. In the aftermath of 1991, EPRDF asserted that it had 
unfettered the relations of production towards the development of capitalism (EPRDF, 
undated: 22). However, EPRDF appeared to have resented this for “uninterrupted transition 
towards socialist socio-economic transformation has effectively been aborted by a legion of 
dramatic and unexpected changes that have occurred following the fall of social imperialism, 
under the leadership of former Soviet Union” (ibid, 23).  Having acknowledged the 
emergence of the United States ‘as a dominant imperialist force’, EPRDF further argued that 
not only has the ‘US become a militarily unmatched force, but also is economically the 
wealthiest country in the globe. What are more, the most powerful international organizations 
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that set the rules governing World economic order such as the World Bank, IMF and World 
Trade Organization came under the control of the US and thereby complicating the fate of the 
poor countries such as Ethiopia’ (ibid.).  
        In an attempt to rationalize the circumstances underlying the shedding of Marxism-
Leninism in favor of revolutionary democracy, which had been pegged to development 
scenarios in Ethiopia, EPRDF authors argued: 
  
The underlying favorable condition that boded well into the socialist revolution, namely, the prevalence 
of antagonistic contradictions between the imperialist camps will be unthinkable at least for the coming 
several decades. Not only has this situation been recognized, but also is that there no room for socialist 
socio-economic transformation and construction, though resentfully, has been accepted by the Ethiopian 
Marxist-Leninists. While the former Soviet Union was not a genuine socialist state”, EPRDF 
contended, “its abrupt collapse not only had detrimental consequences on socialist revolutions and 
transformations in the globe, but also had sowed lethargy and severe frustrations among the ardent 
believers of the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. (EPRDF, undated)  
 
        According to EPRDF, the negative attitudes that people around the world adopted 
towards socialism together with the meticulous propaganda campaign that the enemies of 
socialism relentlessly waged against it had enormous negative effects on Ethiopia (EPRDF, 
2003a: 23). Over and above the global circumstances, Ethiopian people’s distaste for 
socialism was even more aggravated by the Dergue’s 17 years of dictatorial rule under the 
guise of socialism, EPRDF aptly reasoned (ibid.).    
         Given that the routes for socialist revolution and socialist socio-economic construction 
are thwarted, ‘at least for the next several decades’, as EPRDF argued, what other options are 
there for EPRDF?  Who should lead the ‘revolution’? Who are the friends and the enemies of 
the revolution? Choices within the innermost circles of the EPRDF had to be taken to switch 
ideological course to revolutionary democracy in 1991, although the latter essentially, had as 
yet not moved beyond the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism95.  In any case, according to 
EPRDF, instead of the socialist option, the capitalist way of socio-economic development is 
indisputably successful (EPRDF, undated, 2003b). The capitalist road to development, 
EPRDF argued, in much the same way as socialist socio-economic construction, is ‘a product 
of incessant process of class struggle. Put it simply, it is a product of a class struggle between 
                                                
95
 Questionnaire responses from Teachers Association leaders, Independent and Opposition MPs, Ethiopian 
academics at Addis Ababa University, Bahirdar University and Civil Service College.   
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revolutionary democratic forces on the one hand, and dependents (to mean counter-
revolutionary democrats) on the other’ (ibid).    
       The gist of EPRDF’s ideological obsession, which lies at the center of its exclusive claim 
as well as leverage in public policymaking process, nonetheless rests squarely on its economic 
and agricultural policies. It presents itself as the only and exclusive option to lead the country 
along the road to capitalist development, and furthermore embraces a conviction, which has 
over the last three to four years (since 2001) appeared to have been transformed into an 
obsession, that it is the only organization that can resolve the deeply rooted agricultural 
structural problem of the country and steer it to rapid market-oriented development as well as 
prosperity.  Having presented itself as the single most revolutionary democratic organization 
that has defended the interests of the peasantry, EPRDF has situated itself in the limelight of 
political leadership, whose survival is inseparable from the rapid economic prosperity of the 
peasantry (EPRDF, 2003a: 27). The question is whether or not adopting agriculture-centered 
development policies is entwined with survival, being or not being and it is an issue of 
survival and national security. Strongly advocated among the inner circle of the EPRDF, this 
is the most fundamental distinguishing characteristic of revolutionary democracy that set the 
party apart from all other political opponents (EPRDF, 2003b: 26).  In other words, resolving 
the structural problems of agriculture is seen as the most critical revolutionary democratic 
economic objective and the pillar of all socio-economic and political policy objectives whose 
achievements are claimed to have solely due to EPRDF leadership (ibid.).  
          EPRDF, therefore, rules out the liberal bourgeois style of capitalist development led by 
the national bourgeoisie: first, because it is inappropriate to the Ethiopian realties; second, by 
mere virtue of the level of socio-economic development that Ethiopia has attained, the 
national bourgeoisie’s contribution to the capitalist development has left much to be desired 
(ibid). Nor can it lead the capitalist style of development in Ethiopia. The other potent force in 
this regard could probably be the dependent bourgeoisies (or comprador bourgeoisies96), 
although EPRDF sees the latter’s engagement in the economy as subversive to the extent of 
adversely affecting the development scenario through bribery, corruption, rent collection with 
little or no value accruing to the economy (EPRDF, 2002, 2003a, 2003b). In other words, 
instead of producing new wealth and values to bump up the national wealth, the dependent 
                                                
96
 ‘Comprador’ is a Portuguese derivation that literally denotes ‘buyer’. In current usage, however, comprador is 
a business group, which employs its economic stance to streamline transnational (foreign) capital without 
engaging itself in any significant way in the productive economic activities that promote domestic capital 
accumulation (Frieden and Lake, 1991).   
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bourgeois rather maneuvers subversive mechanism to amass the wealth already created, and 
so is alluded to as ‘anti-development’ (ibid).  
     In much the same as the revolutionary democratic version of the economy, EPRDF has its 
own version and understanding of democracy, which by and large differs from the type of 
democracy favored and prevailing in the west. Suffice it to say that its conception of 
democracy has been absolutely different from the liberal bourgeois variety based on 
individual participation, embodiment of a diversity of interests and plurality of participation 
and representation (see Dahl, 1998; Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003).  In fact, the liberal 
capitalist type of democracy has been regarded as sham and unpropitious for the Ethiopian 
reality (EPRDF, undated).  
      EPRDF’s authors further argued: 
 
The liberal democracy option under the leadership of the bourgeoisie is foreclosed. Given that the road 
to liberal democracy option is closed for the next several decades, Ethiopian state should only rely on 
the peasantry. Only a party or government that primarily depends on the peasantry as a social base and 
rallies the industrial workers and the urban poor can become the champion of democracy and at the 
same time successfully carries out capitalist socio-economic construction in Ethiopia. Therefore, not 
only should there be an organization which can usher in democracy and accomplish capitalist 
construction in radical and revolutionary fashion, but also should ensure that the broad masses of people 
(the peasantry, the industrial workers and the urban poor) are the primary beneficiaries of the outcomes 
of revolutionary and radical reforms. This order or social system can be labeled as revolutionary 
democracy, for the revolution is rigorously carried out in a radical and revolutionary fashion. It can also 
be considered as a petty-bourgeois democratic revolution, for the core social base of the revolution is 
the peasantry. The only political organization that has exclusive claim on building a revolutionary 
democratic political order in Ethiopia is, therefore, EPRDF. (EPRDF, 2003a: 31)   
 
        EPRDF, therefore, sees itself as the only pioneer and champion of democracy in 
Ethiopia. Furthermore, having situated its socio-economic and political policies within the 
ideological context of revolutionary democracy, often using the Marxist-Leninist conceptual 
and analytical tools, EPRDF considers individuals and groups (apparently, the opposition and 
CSOs) who deviate from its thinking as the enemies of the state, EPRDF and the 
revolutionary democratic order that it has ardently been striving to build (EPRDF, 2003a: 97).  
      Regarding the way it perceives itself, EPRDF goes on to say: 
 
EPRDF unequivocally and firmly stands for the most radical and fundamental socio-economic reforms 
in the country. ... EPRDF is in the driving seat of these reforms. The successful accomplishments of the 
re-forms are clearly linked with the existence of EPRDF. In the absence of EPRDF, neither basic socio-
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economic development nor radical reforms materialize, nor do the prospects bode well for a thriving 
society in Ethiopia…. Moreover, EPRDF is the only political organization that addresses NNPs’ 
sovereignty and unity based on the will of the people. … Considered from this vantage point, EPRDF 
possesses an enormous political clout in the determination of the fate of the country and its people. It 
has much more exceptional role than other political organizations around the world.  
 
EPRDF continues:  
 
The roles of most of the parties around the world are limited to the continuance of socio-economic 
development policies that have already been embedded in the past. Their roles therefore transcend very 
little beyond maintaining the status quo. In contrast, EPRDF’s role is all out unique as well as daunting. 
Not only is it striving to install a socio-political and economic system that has never existed before, but 
also is building a democratic and revolutionary socio-economic and political order. This calls for an 
organization that espouses correct revolutionary and democratic objectives and the competence to 
achieve these objectives. Currently, there is neither any such organization, other than EPRDF, to 
assume such daunting challenges and responsibilities in Ethiopia, nor will there be any organization that 
can substitute for EPRDF in the immediate future. … Till the socio-economic and political orders that 
EPRDF has struggled and stood for are engrained and rooted in the society, there will hardly be any 
organization which can promote and further such radical and historic role and avail astute leadership. 
EPRDF plays special and enormous historic role not only because it adopts revolutionary and 
democratic missions, but also because it has exceptional alignment and relationship with the classes and 
groups whose interests shall be met by revolutionary democratic order under the leadership of the 
EPRDF.  This has given EPRDF sweeping as well as enormous leverage, and the exercise of patronage 
and thereby elevating its unique and historic role/ and or leverage. (EPRDF undated, 120-121) 
 
         It is worth noting that the Marxist-Leninist conceptualization of a political party is one 
that formulates its programs to address the interests of specific social groups (or classes) to 
the exclusion of others. The party of a Leninist type is, therefore, established to provide 
benefits for the social groups from which it perceives itself to be drawing its inspiration and 
support, and neutralizes those that are considered vacillating and unwieldy; it will also isolate 
and attack, and even destroy, the protagonists of social classes that are perceived as the 
enemies of the revolution. As a result, led by revolutionary democratic intelligentsia, the 
revolutionary democratic movement is considered essentially a peasant movement that fosters 
the alliance of the industrial workers and the urban poor (EPRDF, 2003a: 38). On the other 
hand, the opponents of the revolutionary democratic order include the vacillating national 
bourgeoisie, comprador bourgeoisies, the constellation of parties that constitute the opposition 
and imperialism (EPRDF undated, 93 EPRDF, 2003a, 38).  
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         This preponderance of evidence make it unambiguously clear that revolutionary 
democracy both in conceptualization and approach is rooted and wedded to the ideological 
and theoretical postulates of Marxism-Leninism. Worse by far, and the starkest reality that 
lies at the bottom of the belief system, is the notion that it has clearly bred exclusions in 
public policymaking, for EPRDF supposes that ‘revolutionary democracy is the only belief 
system that underpins the entire process of socio-economic policymaking, and EPRDF is the 
only
 political entity in the country that can forge the only acceptable public policies and 
thereby lead the people and the country to development, peace and democracy’. Not least, the 
hallmarks of the ideology, namely, the class analysis and attendant class struggle, apparently 
position the EPRDF center stage in the socio-economic policymaking process. 
 
5.4.The legislatures as legitimating institutions of policy decisions  
 
The predominance of the party in every sphere of public life, coupled with the zeal with 
which revolutionary democratic objectives are advocated, generate an exclusive interest in, 
and claim on, public policies. Party ranks at higher levels primarily decide policy matters, for 
the most part immediately preceding the adoption of the same by legislative bodies. Once 
consensus has been reached on the lunatic fringes in the party and executive leadership, 
policy decisions are pushed through for government institutions to formalize, legitimate and 
implement them. The parliaments, both national and NRSs, are the chief instruments of 
legitimizing the policy decisions of party and executive leadership, although concerns and 
questions still persist among the civil society leaders and academics concerning how far 
legislatures of such stature overcome the overriding challenges of the imbalance between 
policymaking institutions and policy beneficiaries in Ethiopia97.     
       For some, the party and executive leadership’s overwhelming leverage in public 
policymaking as much rests on constitutional guarantees98 as on the majority seats in the 
parliament99.  In other words, the Constitution sets the rules and defines parameters for how 
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 Questionnaire responses from civil society leaders.  
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 Paraphrasing Harold Laswel’s statement ‘who gets what, when and how’, Hyden and Venter (2001, 15) state 
“who sets what, when and how”- to mean, who sets which rules, when and with what effects. Although the 
chapter that provides the bill of rights in the current Ethiopian Constitution represents a significant departure, 
most of the provisions on power and policymaking structures nonetheless give the new policy elites 
overwhelming leverage to sway policymaking.  
99
 Interview held with a member of EPRDF and Chairperson of Budget Standing Committee; and an Ethiopian 
Political Scientist and Senior Educator, AAU, March 2003 and January 2004 respectively.   
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should policies be made and executed, and who should do so; thus not only are the party and 
the executive acting accordingly, but also do they see no wrong in this exercise100.   
    An interviewee argues:  
  
Technically, they (the EPRDF) are formulating policies according to the dictate of the constitution. A 
constitution is a legal system that permits a government to institute a political order of its preference, and 
transform its political program into government policies and strategies. Thus, when any government 
seizes the lever of power, it launches its own constitutional making process, for the constitution permits 
the government to establish a political system of its own design. That was why Dergue annulled 
Haileseassie’s constitution, and like wise, EPRDF repealed the Dergue’s constitution and substituted for 
its own constitution in 1995. The present constitution thus sets the context that allows them institute a 
socio-political order of their own desire. The constitution has made the establishment of such government 
structures possible favorably and in the interest of the party. I have seen them pursuing this constitutional 
order consistently.101   
   
EPRDF, in its own assertions, reinforces this point: 
 
Only when a political party seizes state power that it can translate the demands of the social group that 
it represents into concrete deeds. Since a political party is established based on the good will of the 
forerunners who adopt and promote its objectives, it hardly accomplishes the objectives it sets out till 
the vanguards are elected to assume government offices.  A political party should therefore target 
political power as a major goal, and then use that power to translate its program into effect. This can 
range from having its program objectives and strategies incorporated into the constitution to 
transforming it into government policies and strategies. Not only does it use state power to make laws 
and policies, but also should advantageously use it to implement policies and programs. The 
assumption of state power per se therefore is both a goal and an essential tool for the achievement of 
party objectives. … (EPRDF, 2003a: 6, emphasis added).  
         However, the making of the constitution has largely been flawed, and the socio-political 
order that evolves from it is bound to be suspect, as empirical evidence showed in Chapter 4. 
Although constitutional and statutory provisions have clearly bolstered the leverage of the 
executive and party leadership, the issue at stake and of vital importance is how far has this 
affected the legislatures and with what effects. The party, in practice often but not always led 
by the Prime Minister, controls the government; the parliament is totally dominated by the 
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 The present Constitution stipulates that a political party or coalition of political parties that have the greatest 
number of seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives shall form the executive and lead it (Article 56, FDRE, 
1995:22) 
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 Interview held with an Ethiopian academic and political scientist, January 2004.   
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EPRDF, and in practice is only an organ to rubberstamp government decisions102. 
Furthermore, the party controls the local administration, particularly in rural areas, and by that 
the population and the elections. Officially Ethiopia is a parliamentary democracy, but much 
takes place behind the scenes, and the key party figures, with the Prime Minister as the 
outstanding figure, have the power to make and unmake the power base of any participant in 
the system, whatever that base may be (popularity shown in elections, prominence in the 
public discussion, leading administrator, etc.)103. 
        The anomaly lurking behind the constitutional order, however, is that it breeds a glaring 
imbalance between the legislature and the executive. The constitution introduces a 
parliamentary form of government, and one probably would see little problem with the 
EPRDF instituting a parliamentary structure, for it is one of the most democratic systems. 
Similar structures abound the world over; the UK, Canada and Israel are classic cases, just to 
name a few of the well-established parliamentary democracies. Apparently, the parliamentary 
form of government requires the PM and the bulk of the associates of the executive to be 
drawn from the parliament, and thus they are accountable to the parliament104. Nevertheless, 
in countries without a well-developed and nurtured democracy, and pluralistic political 
culture are significantly absent, vibrant civil society organizations (CSOs) and a strong 
opposition are non-existent, such as Ethiopia, the system is likely to promote the exclusive 
power of the executive leadership. What makes the Ethiopian political system even more 
interesting than similar situations elsewhere, is that a single party occupies well over 95% of 
the seats in the parliament (see Table 5.2).  
       As a result, not only does the party establish the government, but the members of 
parliament and the executive also belong to one party. Therefore, instead of the parliament 
controlling the executive, ironically, the executive is effectively controlling the parliament in 
Ethiopia105. Additionally, the Prime Minister is the leader of both the party as well as the 
executive, for the PM has to balance all relevant institutions. The party and the executive 
have, certainly, a predominant role as well as leverage in policymaking in Ethiopia. In 
contrast, despite the fact that the UK has a similar structure, the opposition parties are so 
strong that they can counter-balance and challenge the actions of the executive. Equally 
important, if value conflicts within the party in power in the UK, the ruling party MPs have 
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 Siegfried Pausewang, a German sociologist, who has done research and written on Ethiopia since 1967; 
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 Svein Ege, Norwegian social anthropologist and senior researcher, questionnaire response, September 2003.   
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 The current Constitution permits the PM to submit his nominees for the CoM from within and without the 
HPR (Article 74).  
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 Interview held with Ethiopian academic and senior educator in the Faculty of Law, AAU, November 2003.    
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virtually no fear in challenging their party and its leadership if they find their party advocating 
misguided policies, nor do the opposition MPs fear any harassment and reprisals if they 
challenge the ruling party106. Put differently, the ruling party MPs in parliamentary 
democracies, unlike in Ethiopia, are more accountable to their conscience than to party 
ideology. This by far sets the Ethiopian parliamentary system apart from other parliamentary 
democracies.  
 
Table 5.2. The ruling party’s leverage in the House of Peoples’ Representatives (HPR), 
1995 to 2004 
 
Name of Party 
Number of Seats in HPR 
 
1995-2000          2000-2004 
Percentage of Seats 
 
1995-2000        2000-2004 
EPRDF’s Leverage with 
Ally Parties in the 
Peripheral NRSs  
1995-2000     2000-2004 
Ethiopian 
Peoples’ 
Revolutionary 
Democratic Front 
(EPRDF) 
483 481 88.5 87.9 98.5 % 95.2 % 
Afar National 
Democratic Party 
(ANDP)* 
8 8 1.45 1.46   
Benshangul-
Gumuz Peoples’ 
Democratic 
United Party 
(BGPDUP)* 
9 9 1.65 1.65   
EPRDF’s Ally 
Parties  38 23 7.0 4.2   
Opposition None 13 None 2.38   
Independent MPs  8 13 1.47 2.38 1.5 % 4.8 % 
Total 546 547 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Source: Compiled and computed from the archives of the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives (HPR).  
* EPRDF’s ally parties whose loyal support to have buttressed EPRDF’s leverage in the 
national legislature (HPR) include, Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), Benishangul-
Gumuz Peoples’ Democratic Party (BGPDUP), Harere National League (HNL), and Gambela 
Peoples’ Democratic Front (GPDF) and Somali Peoples’ Democratic Party (SPDP)      
 
        With the opposition and most independent candidates boycotting the 1995 election, 
usually under duress and harassment, EPRDF won all the elections107, both national and local. 
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 The author’s interview notes.  
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 Pausewang et al. (2002) and Dessalegn and Meheret (2004) documented several incidences of irregularities in 
the elections and electioneering in Ethiopia.   
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The EPRDF coalition won 88.5% (483) of the seats in the legislative chamber, the House of 
Peoples’ Representatives. With the EPRDF ally parties supporting the voting, its leverage in 
the legislative and decision-making processes in the HPR scaled up to 98.5% during the 
whole of the first term, as the above Table depicts. Likewise, with only thirteen 
independent108 and opposition MPs each winning seats in the lower chamber, the EPRDF’s 
leverage in the decision-making process has remained intact during the second term (i.e. 
2000-2004). EPRDF’s absolute leverage in the legislative process, therefore, continues into 
the second term with 87.9% and 95.2% of the HPR seats at its disposal with and without the 
ally parties, as the Table demonstrates. 
         Accordingly, there has hardly been a bill   that goes beyond a second reading in the 
HPR, for it is certainly taken for granted that a bill will immediately be approved when a 
standing committee presents it to the HPR for a second reading. The Ministry of 
Information’s mass media board establishment proposal was, nonetheless, the only exception 
in that it reappeared in the House for a third reading. This was the only case that has so far 
been documented where the members of EPRDF united with the opposition, for the first time, 
in a debate against the media board’s exclusive dominance by the executive, for which the 
EPRDF MPs were severely admonished (EPRDF, 2003a: 66). The mass media board case 
came at a time when the EPRDF was emerging from the quagmire of the split within the party 
in 2001109. Having their confidence shaken by the havoc this caused, the EPRDF MPs allied 
with the opposition and independent MPs for the first time and voted against their party’s 
motion.  But when the media board issue reappeared for the third time, the opposition MPs 
only too discovered ‘reneged’ by the EPRDF members who ardently argued against the media 
board composition being dominated by the executive. This time the EPRDF MPs voted for 
the issue that they had voted against a weak earlier110.   
         For all practical purposes, EPRDF and the executive have, over the last nine years since 
the legislatures officially began deliberations in 1995, swayed almost all the decisions and 
voting, as Table 5.3 depicts. All bills – except in 1995/96 and 1996/97 in the first term and 
2000/01 in the first term – were received from the executive.  Up to 2003 the HPR approved 
377 laws, 97 percent (366) of which had been sent by the Council of Ministries. The office of 
the House Speaker proposed the remaining eleven bills (3 percent). Up until May 2004 no 
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private bill has been initiated, for party rules and statutory regulations impose severe 
limitations on private initiatives, as noted in Chapter 4.  96.3 percent and 98 percent of the 
bills during the first and second terms respectively have thus been proposed by the executive 
and endorsed by the legislature. All of the bills have been approved by a large majority, 
although the second term witnessed a steady diminution of voting unanimity. 83.4 percent of 
the laws during the first term, and 77.5 percent of the bills during the second term were 
approved unanimously and published in the official legal reporter, i.e., Neagrit Gazzetta.  
 
Table 5.3. Voting and the executive’s leverage in the legislative process, 1995- 2003  
Year 
 
Total no. 
of laws 
approved 
 
Laws sent by 
the executive 
 
Bills 
drafted by 
the office 
of the 
speaker 
 
Bills 
approved 
unanimously 
 
Laws 
passed with 
abstentions 
and/or 
voted 
against 
 
Percentage 
of bills 
approved 
unanimously 
Percentage 
of bills sent 
by the 
executive 
and 
approved 
First Term (1995-2000) 
1995/96 45 38 7 33 12 73.3. % 84.4 % 
1996/97 44 43 1 35 9 70.5 % 97.7 % 
1997/98 38 38 0 33 5 86.6 % 100 % 
1998/99 52 52 0 48 4 92.3 % 100 % 
1999/00 38 38 0 32 6 84.2 % 100 % 
Total 217 209 8 181 36 83.4 % 96.3 % 
Second Term (2000-2003) 
2000/01 38 35 3 32 6 84.2 % 92.1 % 
2001/02 37 37 0 24 13 64.9 % 100 % 
2002/03 85 85 0 68 17 80.0 % 100 % 
Total 160 157 3 124 36 77.5 % 98. 13 % 
Source: Compiled and computed by the author from the archival sources of the House 
of Peoples’ Representatives (HPR). 
 
         This attests to the fact that, while there appears to be a separation of powers in theory, in 
practice, however, there is unity of power111.  In other words, the establishment of separate 
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 Ethiopian academic and senior educator at AAU raised his concern about the executive-legislature 
relationships in Ethiopia, interview, January 2004.   
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legislative and executive institutions in Ethiopia is considered as the division of labor within 
the EPRDF, whereby a segment of the EPRDF and its supporters constitute the legislature and 
another subdivision forms the executive. The balance of power and attendant checks and 
balances that underpin the separation of power in its substantive sense is left nothing to be 
desired. One party has dominated the legislative as well as the executive, so much so that 
national and NRS parliaments symbolize a single party state in all substantive and imaginable 
senses of the concept112.  The last thirteen years has, therefore, witnessed a single party 
dominating the entire process of policymaking in Ethiopia.  
        This would mean that the legislature has little choices of exploring alternative public 
policies beyond the confines of the established party lines. Moreover, this has been 
complicated by the inner party ‘democracy’ and discipline that militate against creative 
initiative, for party members are barely allowed to promote ideas other than those of the party.  
        Personal choices made otherwise are considered seditious actions against the party, so 
are subject to admonitory measures, which may include severe reproaches at best, and 
expulsion from party and parliamentary membership at worst113 (EPRDF, 2003a). In other 
words, conceived primarily on the basis of revolutionary democratic ideals, party members 
have virtually been assigned seats in the legislatures in so far as they promote these goals.  
The same party document resentfully cited several incidences party members in the HPR 
acting in breach of the basic belief system of EPRDF. Among others the bills sent by the 
executive (PMO) to provide for the revision of the Charter of Addis Ababa City Government, 
anti-corruption legislation and the motion put forth to augment the executive’s leverage in the 
mass media board were classic cases in which the loyalty of EPRDF MPs faltered and for 
which they were severely chastised (EPRDF, 2003a: 66). 
         Not only has this been seen as an infringement of the constitutional guarantees of free 
expression of one’s views, but the MPs have also been reduced to party puppets who should 
put their hands out when they are told to do so, in support of party-sponsored legislation and 
motions114. In other words, MPs are merely considered as manufacturers of party-sponsored 
proclamations and professional attendees of wearisome executive narratives. Nevertheless, it 
is interesting to note, on the other hand, that for most EPRDF MPs, it serves no purpose to be 
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 In the immediate aftermath of the Tehadesso, national and NRSs MPs whose loyalty was called into question 
were expelled from both the parliaments and the party in 2001.   
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a member of a party, unless one firmly promotes the goals of the party and supports it in all its 
dealings.  The opposition parties should rather table any challenge to the proposals of the 
ruling party, but not the EPRDF members115.    
       Having seen no difference between party and the executive leadership, some ruling party 
members of the HPR have bestowed enormous trust on the executive, in terms of the 
capability to articulate policies and the competence to implement them. They are very 
strongly and candidly of the view that not only they have no objections to the executive 
presiding over or prevailing on the entire policymaking process, but there is also nothing 
wrong for the executive to command an overwhelming influence, for many of the persons in 
the executive are members of the HPR representing their positions. They further contended 
that officials in the executive are also in the political leadership (or are party leaders); thus 
they are in a better position than the legislature to be able to articulate and forge policies 
along party lines. The members of the executive, EPRDF MPs contended, are close to the 
world of politics as well as knowledgeable, so much so that they are better placed to initiate 
laws and formulate policies. What is more, these EPRDF MPs see nothing unconventional for 
the party and the executive leadership having overwhelming influence in the policymaking 
and legislative process, not only because the party and the executive leadership possess 
expertise, knowledge and competence in formulating policies and legislation by far better 
than MPs, but they also have the statutory power and access to resources to be able to marshal 
them for the execution of laws as well as policies.   
        Some EPRDF MPs have, on the contrary, perceived that the party has been engaged in a 
disciplining and muffling exercise, through a series of evaluations (Gimgema) carried out 
continuously around the residential areas. In other words, party rules and discipline, which 
have little official recognition in the HPR, weigh against the free expression of views in the 
parliamentary deliberations116. In fact, for some of EPRDF MPs even a slightest deviation 
from party lines may endanger one’s career, may even mean the loss of one’s parliamentary 
seat, and so they are careful ‘not to make any mistake’ that would embarrass party branch 
functionaries assigned to monitor and defend the ruling party’s interests. Stuck between their 
personal conscience and public political life, some EPRDF MPs, therefore, continue to live in 
a climate of fear and angst.  
       In search of empirical evidence, this author spent well over eight months in the 
parliament building at Arat Killo in Addis Ababa.  While he enjoyed a great deal of 
                                                
115
 Questionnaires responses from EPRDF MPs, March 2003  
116
 Questionnaire responses from EPRDF MPs, March 2003.   
 219
cooperation all along from the MPs with whom he had a long acquaintance, the secretariat, 
the administrative staff (support staff) working in the archival center and the minutes and 
documentation divisions, interviewing and talking to EPRDF MPs was nevertheless less 
successful. At some point, after having met EPRDF MPs and having fixed appointments for 
interviews, the author found only too often that his appointments with them had been 
cancelled, promises were broken and/or meetings declined on numerous occasions. When he 
run into many of the MPs inside the compound of the parliamentary building, he found them 
bizarrely apologetic, for they had been waiting to hear what their colleagues in the standing 
committees or the party structures would comment about the interview and even filling in 
questionnaires, for which, in contrast, the author got immediate cooperation from the 
opposition and independent MPs.  In fact, a member of the Social Affairs standing committee 
and an EPRDF MP who declined his request to interview him said:   
 
We (members of the HRP) are not policymakers; we only approve detailed legislation/proclamations 
that enhance the execution of policies when the executive sends them to the parliament. We barely play 
any significant role other than a public confidence-building exercise for the central (federal) 
government.  At the same time, one has to bear in mind that approving draft bills does not necessitate 
professional and educational competence, nor does such competence or qualification exist in the HPR. 
Apparently, the executive makes all the policies and the bulk of the laws/proclamations, but not the 
HPR. Personally, I see nothing wrong with this exercise.  
 
The author was then forewarned not to squander his time in the parliament building and 
solemnly advised to contact the PMO for him to get his research well done. He certainly did 
this, but due mainly to the secrecy shrouding the PMO, he got much more significant 
information which had a bearing on the executive as well as the party by lying low in the 
parliamentary building than from the PMO itself.  
       Suffice to say that the prevailing condition has bred an interesting phenomenon that has 
over the last thirteen years dominated the entire legislative process and the decisions in the 
HPR, namely that the EPRDF initiates, approves, adopts and executes legislation and policies. 
Put simply, it is an incestuous condition of policymaking process where EPRDF (party or the 
executive) initiates and sends to EPRDF MPs (HPR), and few days preceding the plenary 
sessions the EPRDF MPs (EPRDF) discuss and take a stand at the caucus, and next they 
endorse the policy at the plenary session in the HPR (by EPRDF)117.    
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       In short, the legislative process is far more complicated than one would imagine. The 
Ethiopian lower house, the HPR, has been fraught with a legion of problems. Primarily, the 
MPs are not meant to question the laws and other proposals delivered to them from the party 
and the executive, although MPs are accountable to the electorate, to their conscience and to 
the Constitution; as provided under the current Constitution. To say the least, stringent party 
requirements are imposed on the EPRDF MPs, who constitute the great majority in the HPR, 
to vote for any legislation sent to the House by the executive, regardless of their consent.  
Second, while there is division of labor between the legislature and the executive, the 
separation of power, which is at the hub of checks and balances between the former and the 
latter, is non-existent. Third, even if the House has constitutional guarantees to closely control 
the actions of the executive, the ability and expertise among most of MPs for such an 
oversight role has left much to be desired. Nor is the Secretariat of the House staffed with 
experts, so much so that they get the assistance/advice from the experts that this endeavor 
calls for or to be able to adequately discharge their legislative responsibilities over the 
executive. In other words, not only is there a dire shortage of professional and administrative 
support staff, but the available employees have not been well enough organized for the MPs 
to be able to subpoena the executive. Till the end of May 2004, for instance, only 31% of the 
required staff had been acquired. A more glaring and acute staff shortage has conspicuously 
surfaced in the areas where it has been badly needed, namely in the fields of professional legal 
support and research. Of the 329 support staff employed by HPR, professional staff 
constitutes only 18.5% (61 employees)118 of the total support staff, with low pay and 
declining morale characterizing almost or all of them. 
       Fourth, led and controlled by the Speaker and his deputy, the parliament’s secretariat is 
less one of providing effective leadership, which could have brought the MPs with more 
experiential learning and capacity-building exercises, than of protecting party interests, 
although there has been cautious optimism in this regard over the past two years. The Speaker 
and Deputy Speaker of the HPR more often than not discourage lively discussions and 
debates in the HPR. In fact, thorough deliberations have been discouraged, especially when 
the opposition and independent MPs raise queries and contentious issues, for which they have 
been very swiftly undermined119.   
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     Last, the weak intellectual capacity of most of the opposition MPs to be able to generate 
meaningful alternatives as well as the political skills to garner support in the House’s 
legislative debates, coupled with the preeminence of one party, have reduced the HPR into 
being a mere manufacturer of legislation, and MPs into professional consumers of mind-
numbing annual reports of heads of the executive agencies. 
      Likewise, EPRDF’s leverage in the NRSs legislatures have over the past ten years 
increased far more than the national ones, as Table 5.4 illustrates. Together with the ally 
parties in the peripheral NRSs, EPRDF has been swaying almost all the voting and decisions. 
In Tigray and Amhara NRSs, the party controls all of the seats (100%) in the parliaments. In 
Oromia and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ regional states, it has an 
overwhelming majority of seats, 99.6% and 93.4% respectively; with the opposition in SNNP 
NRS increasingly appearing to have an edge in the competition. As the Table below depicts, 
with 98 percent in the core NRSs, and 97 percent among its friendly parties, EPRDF leverage 
in the legislative and decision-making processes has clearly been unmatchable.  
 
Table 5.4. EPRDF’s leverage in the NRSs parliaments in 2000-2004.  
Region Total Male Female Opposition or Independent 
Percentage of ruling 
party seats in the NRSs 
Parliaments  
Oromia 537 467 70 2 99.6     
Amhara 294 250 44 0 100 
SNNPRS 346 308 38 23                93.4    98 % 
Tigray 152 110 42 0 100 
 
Afar 87 85 2 3 96.6 
Somalia 168 166 2 15 91.1 
Benshangul-Gumuz 80 67 13 5 93.8 
Gambella 55 55 0 0 100 
Hareri 36 29 7 0 100 
Total 1755 1537 218 48 97.3 
Source: Own survey and Polhemus, 2003.  
 
         In much the same manner as the national legal system, NRSs parliaments elect their 
Speaker (who is one of the leading figures of the NRS party affiliate of the EPRDF) upon the 
recommendation of political party, or political parties that have the greatest number of seats in 
the parliament. The constitutional rule applies to all councils established at district and Kebele 
levels with constitutional and legal provisions enhancing the leverage of the party and the 
executive. The function of both the national and NRSs parliaments is currently more one of 
approval, than of initiation, debate and rejection, for their statutory leverage are more severely 
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circumscribed by the overriding concerns of party rules and disciplines than legislative 
institutions.   
          Although the NRSs’ revised constitutions provide for a separation of the executive and 
the legislature that goes down all the way to the Kebele levels, reluctant legislative oversight 
and weak attendant checks and balances persist, chiefly for the following reasons: 
 
1. Seats in the NRSs’ parliaments are seized by the ruling party affiliates, entirely as in 
Tigray and Amhara, although the opposition has won only 2 and 23 seats in Oromia 
and SNNP NRSs respectively (see Table 5.4). In much the same way as the national 
parliament, deputies in the NRSs legislature are captives of stringent party discipline. 
In fact, not only are the lines between government and party far less distinguishable in 
the NRSs than the national (federal) structures, but their oversight role on the 
executive has also become wishful thinking. This has certainly detracted from the 
supposed virtues of separation of power.   
 
2.  There may have been some scrupulous ruling party MPs who ventured to challenge 
some of the proposals, but this was nevertheless thwarted by a conflict of interest that 
characterize most of the NRSs parliaments that enjoy double incumbency, in the 
legislature as well as the executive120. Putting it simply, apart from the Speakers and 
their deputies, the entire team of the members of the standing committees, who could 
have been better placed to exercise legislative oversight and the bulk of the deputies, 
are at the same time heads of government agencies at different levels of the regional 
executive government structures down the line to districts121. The most glaring 
anomaly reported in this case is the Amhara NRS, where 104 (35 percent) of the 294 
MPs are government appointees working in the executive government leadership at 
different levels in the executive structures (Polhemus, 2003).    
 
3. Except for Speakers and their deputies, the NRSs’ legislatures are not permanent, for 
they are required to hold ordinary sessions twice a year to approve the draft laws and 
decisions that the NRSs’ executive and party leadership had earlier made. 
Furthermore, sessions in excess of five, six days are the exception, or sessions of two 
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or three days are unusual and, therefore, two regular meetings of less than a week’s 
duration per year is barely enough time for the NRSs’ parliaments to do a good job of 
carrying out their myriad legislative responsibilities (Polhemus, 2003: 15). More 
apparently for such a big assembly of MPs as the Oromia and SNNPRS, with 537 and 
346 respectively, even weeklong sessions would not be enough (see Table 5.4).  These 
factors have imposed severe limitations on the NRSs legislatures’ competence to 
seriously subpoena and scrutinize the work of the executive. 
      
        The above assessments reveal that the process of policymaking in Ethiopia, ranging from 
agenda-setting to the system of voting to institutionalize decisions both in the national and 
NRSs parliaments, is entirely controlled by the inner circles of the party that also make up the 
executive leadership in the government structure. This pattern has also been replicated all 
along the policymaking structures down to the villages. In short, despite the ruling party 
seemingly to have emerged from its renewal process with greater enthusiasm for openness 
and transparency, in reality, its political ideology, revolutionary democracy, and the socio-
economic policy and legal framework have over the past thirteen years been bolstering 
exclusionary leverage in the public policymaking process.  
 
5.5.‘Public participation’ in public policymaking: the anomalies    
 
Citizens’ participation in the policymaking process is the sine qua non of both democratic 
governance and successful policy implementation, as the theoretical chapter noted. A 
policymaking process has to call for public participatory actions involving direct 
representation, empowerment and active decision-making (De Coning and Cloete, 2000). 
Participation in policymaking is a process, through which stakeholders’ influence and share 
control over development initiatives, and the decisions and resources which affect them 
(Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002). The Ethiopian Constitution stipulates that not only have 
citizens the right to participate in the national policymaking process, but they also have 
legitimate claims to put demands on government to be consulted with respect to policies and 
projects affecting them (FDRE, 1995: 16). Moreover, constitutional principles impose 
demand that the state encourages the public to participate in the making of public policies and 
programs (ibid). Genuine public participation should influence the direction of the policy as 
well as pattern of its implementation. If the course of the policy and its implementation have 
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not been influenced, changed, or modified to any significant extent, the trivial enterprise of 
exchanging words in the meeting halls does not constitute participation122. One’s clout in 
influencing the direction of the policy, and its implementation in terms of values that citizens 
and the autonomous organizations that represent citizens’ interests cherish, represents real 
public participation. 
         However, the goals that the political leadership has exclusive claim and it promotes 
determine the outcomes of public participations in authoritarian states (Huntington, 1976). 
The more decisive influence on political participation ipso facto comes from those elites who 
are able to command the offices and resources of government, and apparently, the decision to 
limit or intensify political participation depends on the calculus of policy goals to be achieved 
and elite interests to be served (ibid.). In fact, most policy elites would like to have the 
benefits of participation, in terms of support for themselves and their policies, but they would 
rarely like to incur the costs entailed in the participation, in terms of limits on their power, the 
time and effort required to win acquiescence, and the demands that participation produces for 
the allocation of scarce resources, as has been argued in the theoretical chapter (op. cit).  
        Public policy nonetheless presupposes the existence of various, divergent and multiple 
interests and groups that represent these interests; and the groups discuss, argue publicly and 
assess the opinions of the public in several ways to be able to articulate these interests in 
public policies123. Sadly, in an authoritarian system such as ours, aggregation of divergent 
interests and representation as well as recognition of the plurality of interests could not be 
realized, for public policies have come to represent the interests of power holders124. 
Therefore, considering the fact that policy dialogues that aim at accommodation of interests, 
and with good will to give and take, have hardly been part of the agenda of policy elites, 
public participation in the policymaking process becomes illusory125. 
         Hence, the unified forces of clientelism, ideological preoccupations of policy elites and 
a constellation of vulnerable and weak CSOs/NGOs militate against the growth of civil 
society and resilient pressure that it could have exerted on policy elites for meaningful change 
and reforms in public policies. Nor has any fruitful outcome emerged from the public 
dialogue forums, conferences and parliamentary hearings. Primarily the legal and political 
milieus have inhibited critical civil initiative and civil society organizations from thriving, 
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although constitutional pronouncements appear to motivate public participation in the 
policymaking process. Additionally, the official ideology of the ruling party sets the 
framework or context in which the public should participate in the policymaking process, as 
the discussions in the previous sections indicated. EPRDF professed that CSOs and peoples’ 
organizations can work towards the satisfaction of their interests and demands when they 
primarily promote and support EPRDF’s revolutionary democratic objectives and/or only 
when they operate within the ambit of revolutionary democratic socio-economic policy 
objectives (EPRDF, 2003b: 53). The dominant assertions within the ruling party leadership 
also claim that the broad national development objectives can only come true when the 
revolutionary democratic doctrine is disseminated and diffused amongst the bulk of Ethiopian 
society. National development objectives, including ADLI that lies at the center of socio-
economic development, can effectively be put into practice when the ideals of revolutionary 
democracy are deeply entrenched in the broad masses of the people. The efforts and resources 
of the party and government, therefore, primarily target organized groups, mass organizations 
and CSOs to ensure that they rally around EPRDF, and support and execute its socio-
economic development policies (op. cit.).  
         The ideological prescriptions and values have thus appeared to have inhibited the ability 
of NSAs to play a meaningful part in the policymaking process, although it has not been as 
frustrating as in the Dergue era.   Due chiefly to the ideological premises on which public 
policies are based, the political leadership encourages public participation in ways that 
generate controlled diffusion of EPRDF policies and strategies, and discourages independent 
initiative in the policymaking process126. While public participation in policymaking 
presupposes dialogue, give and take and a win-win situation, the preconditions imposed by 
the ideological parameters of policy elites foreclose such options, as the preceding sections 
have made unambiguously clear.    
        Party and government, for instance, pose legal and administrative hurdles to be able to 
control the activities of non-state actors and to force them to adhere to the prevailing values of 
policy elites. Government regulation, for instance, imposes restrictions that exclude both 
international and national non-government organizations (NGOs)127 from participating in 
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public policymaking. NGOs are entitled to registration and certification by the Ministry of 
Justice only when they adhere to the following restrictions128: 
 
1. NGOs shall not and cannot conduct political activities, for instance, conducting 
public surveys on social issues; 
2. NGOs are not allowed to organize debates around policy and political 
questions; 
 
3. NGOs are not allowed to provide financial and material support to political 
parties.  
 
The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) will have the NGO’s registration and certification revoked and 
close down its operations should any international or national NGO violate these regulations. 
The foregoing regulation alone demonstrates that NGOs’ participation in the policymaking 
process is closed off. The claim that the policymaking process is participatory means in fact 
that only the party and its supporters have consensus and an understanding on policy 
questions. Consequently, there is no space for autonomous, independent CSOs and 
independent-minded civil society organizations to make their critical inputs into public 
policies in Ethiopia. In other words, there is no favorable climate for creative thinking and 
critical contribution to public policies and genuine participation in the policymaking process 
in Ethiopia129. And there are no conditions where independent and autonomous CSOs 
participate in the policymaking process and debate on public policy issues.   
         In fact, instead of recognizing the differences and working together on the common 
goals that both sides, namely government and CSOs, share, the former rather continues to 
undermine the latter’s independence130. The prevailing circumstances characterizing the 
independent CSOs’ politico-administrative climate over the past thirteen years range from 
constituting government- and party-sponsored rival organizations to introducing regulatory 
measures and bureaucratic hurdles that have made registration and licensing difficult, and to 
applying punitive measures on CSOs that get involved in policy and rights advocacy ventures 
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such as Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO)131. On the other hand, establishing 
communication with policymakers to able to sell one’s views and proposals by way of 
lobbying, and getting involved in the policymaking process have even been bedeviled by the 
combined forces of the existing monolithic legislative-executive structure and overwhelming 
dominance of these structures by a single party132. Nor does there appear to be any prospect of 
nurturing a culture of lobbying, selling one’s proposals and soliciting support through the 
legislative channels.  
         Moreover, these have even been more complicated by the fact that state has always been 
an overwhelmingly dominant actor in this country. The government has been provider, guide 
and trendsetter. The government sets the rule of the game in the way that suits itself, with 
party and the executive leadership invariably superintending how and when people organize, 
behave and engage in official public activities. Apparently, the present government did not at 
the outset assume power by popular election, neither was there any consensus on policy 
agenda setting. Not the least, it showed no commitment to civil society and organizations, 
because the government aggressively promotes a philosophy in the name of nations, 
nationalities and peoples, which values individual freedom very little. The values it has 
nurtured and the philosophy that it promotes strengthens its exclusive claims to determine 
who should participate, how and with what effects. On the other hand, the independent CSOs 
and private sector are seen as peripheral actors who merely fill the void left by the incapacity 
and infirmity of the state.  
          As far as the history of NGOs in Ethiopia is concerned, while the NGOs sector was 
predominantly run by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) before 1991, 
currently Ethiopians run 67% of the NGOs, and thus NGOs are associations of citizens who 
exercise their constitutional rights (CRDA, 2003). Not only should NGOs’ participation be 
considered as citizens’ participation, but they are also the architects and owners of 
development process, rather than peripheral actors. Ironically, the government does not 
appear to see its citizens working in the various NGOs/CSOs constellations as its citizens, for 
they are not integral parts of the government civil service, and there are no mechanisms to 
ensure the loyalty of personnel working in the voluntary sector. So their participation in 
development and policymaking process is regarded with suspicion. On the other hand, 
government- and party-sponsored CSOs enjoy better support, access to the conduits of 
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government resources and information133. Considered from this point of view, the relationship 
between government and NGOs/CSOs is a strained one, although it has not so far been on a 
collision course. 
        On the contrary, participation in policy dialogue forums or discussions is dominated by 
particularistic and clientelstic participation or particularistic and clientelistic groups, who 
have neither the capacity nor the courage to seek fundamental changes in public policies, are 
more persuaded to participate in the policymaking than autonomous and independent civil 
society groups. Organized, monitored and managed by the ruling party, civil society 
organizations that have come to be known as government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) such 
as the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), Tigray Development Association (TDA), 
Organization for Rehabilitation and Development of Amhara (ORDA), Amhara Development 
Association (ADA), and youth, women and farmers associations’ participation in the policy 
discussions forums strike government’s cord. In other words, the government wishes to see 
these CSOs dominating the entire civil society space in the country134. Apparently, the party-
and state-sponsored organizations do not have any influence on policies and practices, nor do 
they make any critical inputs to the public policies and policymaking in Ethiopia. The claim 
that GONGOs are discussing public policies is, therefore, as much a waste of time as a 
mockery of participation, for they have not made any difference135.   
        On the contrary, government officials argued that civil society organizations are not as 
yet well organized in the sprit of a favorable milieu. They are in the making, but they had not 
been there and are not already there136. Furthermore, not only do the CSOs lack proper 
organization, but they are also incoherent and disoriented as to their policy preferences and 
direction. In fact, for most part they are drawn into the civil movement in a muddling-through 
fashion, as are they far from articulating as to what they seek to attain in the public 
policymaking domain137.    
        Currently, there are no strong civil society movements and organizations that can make a 
significant difference in this country138. Interest groups in the US, for instance, have such 
strong and extensive lobbying power that they can prevent legislation that negatively affects 
their business operations from being issued. Likewise, they lobby for a certain policy or 
legislation that furthers their interests to be passed by the Congress. The wealthiest American 
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businesspersons, who own multi-million dollars worth of investments in China recently 
lobbied in the Congress for China to be granted a preferred trading status, and they succeeded. 
Interest groups lobby directly with the lawmakers. This would certainly mean that 
independent interest groups influence policies and policymaking. This is chiefly because 
interest groups have money, strong organization and are very strong and powerful in many 
ways, although this represents a typical Western model. In contrast, interest and pressure 
groups in Ethiopia are weak, not only because they lack strong organization, but also because 
they function with meager resources, and within an unpropitious legal, political and 
administrative environment. Moreover, interest and pressure groups do not know the 
members of parliament. Even if they know them, the MPs in Ethiopia are members of EPRDF 
who approve legislation and policies that have only been made by their party, and accord 
primary importance to the party’s preferences and not the preferences and demands made on 
them by the people. In fact, they have such a tightly knit political party that the EPRDF MPs 
are weighted on the strength of the unflinching support that they give to their party’s policy 
proposals (EPRDF, undated, 2003a). In other parliamentary democracies, despite the fact that 
one is a member of a governing political party, one would not be afraid of opposing or even 
participating in a vote against the decisions of one’s own party. There is, therefore, neither a 
sound political culture nor the experience of a participatory policymaking process in Ethiopia. 
Although there are neither robust CSOs nor strong political pressure groups that can force 
government into changing the direction of policies, they are clearly vociferous. In so far as 
they do not influence policies and practices in any significant degree, the government wants 
them to remain vocal139.   
         However, women’s organizations whose major agenda and objectives address gender 
and related issues, such as Ethiopian Women Lawyers’ Association (EWLA)140, have made a 
remarkable debut in the Ethiopian public policymaking scene. Women’s organizations have 
over the last three years successfully put their imprints on family law, criminal procedures 
and criminal laws, not only because these groups were strong, but also because the state knew 
that the change or modification of such laws bring no harm to the party and executive 
leadership141. In fact, in this way the EPRDF enhances its image among the women, who 
currently constitute half of the Ethiopian populace.  
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        Hence, success stories in the all too familiar issues of gender, HIV/AIDS and child 
protection have certainly been documented, chiefly because the party and government tacitly 
approved them (CRDA, 2003, 2004; Dessalegn, 2002). EWLA, however, has come to 
represent one of such fortunate CSO, whose objectives barely differ from the parameters set 
by the ruling party and the executive. In contrast, the Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce, 
Teachers Association and Labor Unions, which represent hundreds of thousands of members, 
have not been successful in influencing government’s policies, because allowing to do so has 
probably been well perceived by policy elites as entailing the loss of their virtual control over 
public policymaking power. In other words, while the government and the party reluctantly 
accommodated and tacitly approved public participation that has resulted in change or 
modification of legislation on ‘soft issues’ (gender, HIV/AIDS, child protection), all the talks 
and participation of the past thirteen years on the substantive policy issues, that is, the ‘hard 
issues’ such as land security, federal structure, and the practices of the education policy, failed 
to produce any breakthrough.  
         It should, however, be noted that EPRDF’s rule has never dissuaded discussion on its 
policies and programs. In fact, the last four years have witnessed discussions and debates on 
major party-sponsored policies and strategies, with most of these forums organized and 
chaired by key figures in the party and executive leadership. This author, as a student of 
public policy, has over the last thirteen years been closely following, with a great deal of 
enthusiasm and zeal the debates and public policy discussions on the mass media and live 
discussions including most of the public hearings on draft legislation conducted in the 
Ethiopian parliament building. Hundreds and tens of hundreds of such meetings, discussions, 
which have pondered on a plethora of government policies and programs; mostly the 
gatherings involve government and non-government organizations, persons from all walks of 
life ranging from the rural and urban poor to the university professor have been conducted 
over the last thirteen years. For the most part the meetings take hours and hours of discussions 
and deliberations. Certainly, this sets EPRDF apart from its predecessors. But none of these 
forums result in any significant breakthrough in terms of change and/or modifications of the 
direction of government policies142. In short, the many hours of meetings, ‘consultations’ and 
discussions have failed to produce any substantive policy changes: first, because the new 
policy elites chiefly see such meetings as plebiscites on their policies; second, the values and 
ideological precepts that the sponsors of Ethiopian socio-economic policies have long 
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cherished clearly deter a culture of promoting win-win situations and/or mutual 
accommodation in public policymaking in Ethiopia (Assafa, 2002).     
        A classic point in this case which most CSOs devoted time and resources in bringing 
government and relevant societal stakeholders together in a year-long ‘policy dialogue course’ 
is the Sustainable Development for Poverty Reduction Program  (SDPRP), though the latter 
by and large involved urban stakeholders. Funded and supported by the IMF, World Bank and 
European donors, SDPRP is a large-scale and pervasive socio-economic program aiming at 
assuaging poverty in the country by 10% by the year 2005 (FDRE, 2002). Due in part to the 
wary attitudes that government has over the years adopted towards CSOs in general, and 
particularly to those that are professionally and intellectually equipped such as CRDA, Forum 
for Social Studies (FSS)143 and Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA)/Ethiopian Economic 
Policy Research Institute (EEPRI)144, and partly because the bulk of the researchers are drawn 
from Addis Ababa University or are retired professionals from academics, and largely 
because of the ideology that the inner circles of the party and the executive leadership 
promote, policy elites are predisposed to adopting a more exclusionary approach. Except for 
such crosscutting matters as gender, HIV/AIDS and environmental issues, whose 
incorporation into the poverty strategy program that most of the voluntary sector to have 
claimed credit for145; SDPRS was made in a typical EPRDF fashion. What is more, not only 
do most of the CSOs lack trustworthy constituencies with whose active engagement and 
pressure salutary effects on policymaking could have come about, but also they have hardly 
reached the most vulnerable citizens of misguided policies, such as the rural community. In 
other words, the constituencies of most the research-based independent institutions, including 
those of the highly professional ones, have not gone far beyond the urban cognoscenti. This 
has therefore been emerging as a dominant deterrent factor impeding the contributions that 
these independent civil institutions could have made to public policymaking in Ethiopia. 
        Furthermore, the public hearings and policy dialogue forums are primarily limited to the 
Addis Ababa community; as yet these forums are dominated by party stalwarts of both sides 
of the equation, the ruling party and the opposition146. Worse still, public hearings have never 
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changed the direction of government policies, nor are they meant to. However hard one tries, 
however many new and alternative and incisive ideas one comes up with, at the end of the day 
the original legislation as drafted by the executive, which more often than not emerges as the 
final enactments and are published in the Negarit Gazeta147.  
         In fact, video footage made on July 9, 2004, from the Parliament plenary session hall 
and screened live on Ethiopian Television (ETV), shows that in response to an opposition 
MP’s inquiry, Prime Minister Meles reaffirmed his unflinching stand on government policies 
when he told deputies: ‘Any compromises on such programs as land can only be made on the 
corpse of the EPRDF’. This attests to the fact that public participation in the development and 
policymaking process is translated to mean managed and controlled dissemination/diffusion 
of the EPRDF’s program via a seamless party fused with the state and through a lengthy 
consultation in which the sovereign consensus of party leadership translates into the will and 
consensus of the people (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003).  
       Considered from this perspective, the participation drives that we have been through for 
thirteen years now in Ethiopia are tenuous at best and a travesty of public participation at 
worst.  The thrust of our participation has never gone beyond sharing information on the 
policy decisions that have already been made by the policy elites or seeking consensus as well 
as holding a ‘plebiscite’ on the ascendant revolutionary democratic values of the ruling party, 
but it was never meant for eliciting views and ideas that can be brought to bear on 
fundamental change of policies in the ways that result a voluntary and collaborative move to 
joint (government and stakeholders) actions toward effective policy implementation. A classic 
case in this point is education policy. As analyzed in Chapter 4 in some detail, the exclusion 
of the very fundamental potent forces (teachers) in the formulation and implementation of 
education policy and program has stalled the implementation process.  
       The all too familiar and ubiquitous workshops, conferences and public hearings on 
policies and practices have certainly functioned more as pro forma exercises in public 
relations than serious efforts to incorporate participants’ input and their perspectives into the 
draft legislation and public policies. As a result, the interest to participate in such public 
discussions has increasingly waned, or some persons probably do so, as jokingly remarked, 
for ‘capacity-building exercise’148. The challenge facing public participation in the 
policymaking process has, therefore, as much to do with the authoritarian nature of the regime 
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on the supply side as the infirmity of the civil society on the demand side of the equation.  In 
other words, not only does the supply side of the equation involving the policymaking 
institutions lack the will to open the accessibility of the policymaking structure, but the 
weakness of the civil society organizations and citizens on the demand side to articulate their 
interests and become countervailing force persists.  
        In the NRSs the last four years since 2001 (in the aftermath of Tehadesso) have 
witnessed government- and party-induced participation, which has invariably been structured, 
monopolistic, and corporatist. They are structured because the ubiquitous Mass Mobilization 
and Participation Bureaus149 in each region sets the rules and parameters of participation and 
have the mass organizations such as youth, women and farmers organized. Second, they tend 
to be monopolistic because administrative hurdles preclude competing groups that represent 
similar or identical interests from forming similar associations or even joining them. As 
argued in the theoretical chapter and reinforced by the empirical evidence in the chapters that 
follow, party and government officials promote corporatist participation whereby the former 
designate clientelistic groups, from among the civil society organizations, to participate or 
orchestrate splits within them, as in the case of national teachers and labor associations and 
co-opt and made them tame ‘participants’ in the policymaking process. Therefore, the 
strength of the government’s and party’s claim that the policymaking process in Ethiopia is 
participatory is much more rhetoric than practice, more one of form than substance, as the 
foregoing assessments have made abundantly clear.     
 
5.6.Conclusion 
 
The EPRDF’s structure virtually represents a party of a Leninist type, as the empirical 
evidence earlier indicated. Additionally, although its congress holds plenary sessions every 
two to two and half years, and is ostensibly seen as a supreme decision-making organ of the 
coalition, in practice key policy decisions are made by the central committee and politburo. 
Firstly, unlike the latter two organs, membership in the congress changes every two years for 
it does not allow for a relatively permanent tenure. The congress’s ability to influence policies 
is, therefore, much less, apart from the few days of fanfare during which the members meet to 
attend to the reports of the top party officials and rubber-stamp the decisions of the highest 
party leadership. Secondly, the unwieldy and large allocation of membership to congress 
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together with the stringent rules that the rank-and-file members are required to adhere have 
little or no substantive influence on the policies and decisions of the party leadership, whose 
daily lives are engrossed with the day-to-day activities of the party and mapping out of its 
doctrines.  
        EPRDF also asserts that the liberal democracy ascendant in the West is inappropriate to 
Ethiopian realities. The only realistic option to liberal democracy in Ethiopia is, therefore, 
revolutionary democracy. At the heart of the revolutionary democratic doctrine lie the 
economic objectives, with the rural-focused agriculture-led industrialization policy being the 
touchstone of the doctrine as well the party’s commitment to the peasantry. The single most 
political organ that presents itself as a redeemer and insurer of the country against potentially 
incessant civil strife (which would stem from loss of development) and guarantor of fast 
socio-economic development modeled after Asian tigers are EPRDF. It also asserts that it has 
an exclusive claim on democracy and democratic order in Ethiopia (EPRDF, undated, 2003a, 
2003b). Hence, on all counts, namely, in terms of structure, leadership and ideological frame 
of references, the party and the network of the leading persons in the party leadership 
emerged as the single most important policymaking institutions. 
         Apparently, the dominance of the party in every sphere of socio-economic and political 
life in the country and the rigor with which ideology has been pursued generate the exclusivist 
claim as well as leverage in public policymaking. This has nowhere been more conspicuously 
manifested than in the legislatures. To say the least, the ruling party and the executive that 
constitute the inner circles of the party leadership have been almost unanimously swaying the 
votes and policy decisions made at every level of the country’s legislatures (national, NRSs, 
districts, and Kebeles). Admonished to observe stringent party rules and muffled by 
continuous evaluation exercises (Gimgema), EPRDF MPs must vote for their party’s 
proposals, regardless of the fact that these stand to contradict their personal values (i.e. 
conscience). The prevailing situation not only encourages absorption of party mistakes in the 
name of, and support for, the party at any cost, but it also stifles creative and research-based 
generation of policy ideas and innovative policy options150. Nor do the opposition MPs 
possess the intellectual caliber and organizational capacity to challenge the imperiousness of 
the ruling party in the policymaking process. Thus, as opposed to what the statutes provide, in 
practice the legislative process follows the following route: the party proposes legislation and 
policies – the CoM deliberates – the party MPs adopt the prevailing ruling party consensus on 
                                                
150
 The author’s interview notes.  
 235
the legislation/laws or other proposals preceding the HPR plenary session at caucus – the 
HPR sits for plenary session to adopt and formalize the legislation and other issues with little 
further ado151.  
        With EPRDF as the leading organ of the public policymaking process, inspired by 
democratic centralism and imbued with Marxist rationalization of policy pronouncements, the 
prospects for cooperative policy dialogues and public participation in the policymaking 
process are grim. In fact, the absence of commitment to liberal values on which civil society 
chiefly rests and the experience of fighting a protracted guerilla war predisposed it to 
authoritarian approaches (Clapham, 2004). Despite EPRDF claims that it alone represents the 
interests of the peasantry and broad masses, opportunities for the growth of independent and 
autonomous civil society movements have nonetheless been thwarted by authoritarianism. In 
effect, the ruling party weighs the participation of the various civil society organizations not 
on the basis of how many alternative policy scenarios they generate that have a bearing upon 
policies and practices, but on how far additional resources they can contribute to an economic 
and social development process within the strictures defined by the party and the executive 
leadership.    
         On the other hand, not only do the people lack the organized enterprise in ways to 
countervail the paramount power of the party and the executive leadership, but they are also 
immersed in attending to daily survival needs (refer Chapter 2). The absence of proactive civil 
society organizations coupled with docile legislatures that only rubber stamp the decisions of 
the party and executive leadership certainly reduces the citizenry’s role in the policymaking 
process. In other words, the CSOs’ participation in the policymaking process has been 
hampered as much by the legal and political contexts as by weak capacity, insufficient 
resources and weak motivation to contribute to public policymaking. As a result, government-
and party-sponsored CSOs have predominantly dominated the public participations in the 
public policymaking process, which are simultaneously structured, monopolistic and 
corporatist. Hence, the participation processes that we have been experiencing over the last 
thirteen years tended to be sham, not realities; they have largely been frothing of words, 
which have not been transformed into forces brought to bear upon policies and practices.  
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Chapter 6. Institutions, roles and leverage in public policymaking summed up 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter starts with an reappraisal of the significance of the theoretical framework. It 
offers a succinct explanation of how the pertinent conceptual and analytical theories, with 
roots in the mainstream of public policy analysis can be used to assess, examine and explain 
the data collected for the study. The chapter further presents a summary of the findings, 
reviews the hypotheses and the research questions, and explores potential mechanisms of 
dealing with the recurrent problems of public policymaking in Ethiopia. The first sub-section 
(6.3.1) assesses the dictates of ideology, and the limits it has imposed on the choice of public 
policies and programs, and on the institutional means of implementing policies. It uncovers 
the main phenomena and events that have provided policy elites with the justifications to 
sway the entire policymaking process over the past thirty years.  
        The next sub-section (6.3.2) revaluates the emergence and ascendance of a couple of 
closely linked institutions, namely the ruling party and the top echelon of the executive 
leadership, and the disproportionate influence they have on government, non-government 
institutions and overall public policymaking. The third section (6.3.3) recapitulates how the 
combined elements of ideological predilections, party and the executive leadership forestalled 
the participation of the non-state actors in public policymaking. Considering the empirical 
facts, phenomena and events discussed in the preceding chapters, the last section (6.3.5) also 
confirms the hypotheses. Finally, in view of the formidable challenges that Ethiopian public 
policymaking has been experiencing over the years, the chapter suggests potentially fruitful 
scenarios that policymakers (6.4) and academics (6.5) may find helpful in future.  
 
6.2. The significance of the theoretical framework 
 
To begin with, the theoretical chapter at the outset explored various definitions of public 
policy and adopted Gerston’s definition (Gerston, 1997). The latter sees policymaking as a 
middle ground between the extreme ends in the continuum of the policymaking process, 
namely, between those ‘who hold government positions of authority’, and those who demand 
change and are affected by the decisions of the policy elites, at least in the context of the 
developing countries. The rationale for selecting the definition is not only because it 
emphasizes that policymaking institutions should be subject to possible redirection in 
 237
response to pressures from those outside of government, but also because understanding the 
linkage between policymaking institutions and policy receivers are as vitally important as for 
searching ways of rectifying the imbalance between the two (see Chapter 2, section 2.2, cross-
referenced with Chapters 3, 4 and 5). 
        Furthermore, the theoretical and analytical framework adopted germane conceptual 
explanations with roots in the mainstream of public policy analysis. Empirical data have 
shown policymaking as an essentially elite preference. This correlates with the realities of 
public policymaking in Ethiopia as has been amply illustrated over a period of thirty years 
since 1974 (cross-reference Chapters 3, 4 and 5). As indicated earlier, in Ethiopia the roles of 
the ruling parties and state institutions in public policymaking have always been extensive, 
with the Dergue, WPE, EPRDF and the executive determining socio-economic policies and 
superintending their implementation (cross-reference Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5).  Policy elites in 
Ethiopia have been as suitably placed to pursue specific policies and have room to maneuver 
reform initiatives, as have the elites elsewhere in developing countries. In other words, the 
actions of policy elites in Ethiopia have always been visible and central in determining 
policies and their outcomes, for they have centrally been placed to propose policies and to 
determine the nature of institutions to implement policies (see Chapter 2 sections 2.3 [2.3.3] 
and 2.5 [2.5.1], and cross-reference Chapters 3, 4, 5).  Ethiopian policy elites have, however, 
made strong ideological commitments to Marxism-Leninism, democratic centralism and 
revolutionary democracy. These predispositions colored the perceptions of almost all socio-
economic policies (see Chapters 3 and 4). In the end, not only have these ideologies guided 
the modus operandi of policymaking for much of the last three decades, but also have helped 
to substantially enhance policy elites’ leverage in and control over the policymaking process.     
        Secondly, although interest groups normally exert pressure on government for policy 
actions, societal elements in Ethiopia remain as much bystanders and peripheral actors as in 
the bulk of developing countries (see Dror, 1968, 1986; Grindle, 1980; Horowitz, 1989; 
Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Turner and Hulme, 1997; Cloete, 1991, 2000). In Ethiopia, as has 
invariably been the case in most of developing world, civil organizations may well be 
organized and vociferous in the wake of 1991, but in reality they wield much less political 
influence. Party and government officials induce corporatist participation of a select group of 
party- and state-sponsored CSOs with much informal interaction behind the scenes that served 
to exclude and isolate critical and autonomous organizations (see Chapter 2, sub-section 
2.5.2).  As a result, neither the autonomous CSOs nor those backed by the party and the 
government wields influence on policies through votes or more visible lobbying activities, as 
 238
argued in Chapter 2 (sub-section 2.5.2).  In other words, organized civil activities in Ethiopia 
depend on clientele organizations of the government, and have little capacity to press a policy 
agenda, change or influence policies on their patrons in government (cross-reference 
empirical facts on Ethiopia, Chapters 3 and 4). Organizational interests and specific groups 
are not well institutionalized in Ethiopia and most of the developing countries, and the 
dispersion and separation of power within government, particularly through legislatures and 
regulatory bureaucracies, offer little formal access to interest groups (Chapter 2, sub-section 
2.5.2). In fact, the Dergue’s National Shengo (Assembly) and EPRDF’s HPR represented less 
as the expression of public preferences for more policy actions than a legitimization of elite-
driven policies. In other words, the parties and the executive use the national and NRSs 
legislatures to legitimize their actions, but will keep the legislators distant from actual 
policymaking (see Tables 5.2. 5.3 and 5.4).     
        The pluralist model as integral part of liberal values, on the other hand, upholds the 
direct participation of groups and individuals in policymaking. From the point of view of 
development, a developmental state that combines pluralism and market-led economic 
development is relevant to Ethiopian circumstances. However, the Marxist-Leninist approach 
and its variant revolutionary democracy, which are anchored in class and class struggle and 
democratic centralism, are antithetical to the pluralist model of accommodating interests in 
the policymaking process both in Ethiopia and developing countries.  This Marxist-Leninist 
approach will therefore have to change in order to implement the elements of the pluralist 
model of policy-making.    
This has even been more exacerbated by the dismal socio-economic performance and 
woeful socio-political and cultural conditions prevailing in the developing countries (see 
Cloete, 1991, 2000; Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Turner and Hulme, 1997). Information is 
limited, needs are great, resources are scarce and responsibilities are extensive (op. cit.). In 
almost all developing countries, national governments, highly centralized in large capital 
cities, make most of the decisions that affect people down the most remote village. 
Centralization of decision-making responsibilities tends to increase the government’s power 
and decrease its accountability to the citizenry. Reasons for this abound. First, the population 
of most of the developing countries is heavily rural, as for example, 85% the Ethiopia 
populace is rural (Chapter 2, section 2.4). A population that is both scattered and remote from 
government is less likely to have any significant influence on policymaking. Second, 
knowledge of what government is doing is more difficult to obtain. Structural conditions such 
as the low level of education, a large illiterate adult population, and limited communication 
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and information flow would mean that a much larger percentage of the population is out of 
touch with what is happening, especially when government is strongly centralized (see Smith, 
1971, 1985; Cloete, 2000; Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Horowitz, 1989). This ultimately 
enhances the role of policy elites, while tending to isolate them from critical information 
about what is occurring in the society, and thereby widening the gap between policy elites and 
societal actors (ibid.).  
        According to internationally accepted development indicators, for instance, Ethiopia is 
one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 171st out of 174 countries. Every aspect of 
socio-economic indicators reflects this dismal performance (World Bank Development Report 
2002, 232-239). The real per capita GNP measured in dollar terms is at an all-time low, i.e. 
US$100 (USD). According to the Bank’s development report 2001/2002, 31.3% and 76.4% of 
the Ethiopian population live under one dollar and two dollars a day respectively (World 
Bank, 236).  
       The adult literacy rate for Ethiopia stands at 35.5% as compared to 49.2% for all the least 
developing countries. Life expectancy at birth for the same year is 42, which is far below the 
64.7 average for all developing countries. In 1998 only 25% of the population had access to 
safe water and 19% to sanitation, while the infant mortality rate stands at 166 per 1000 live 
births. Primary health coverage stands at 50%. Additionally, the current structure of the 
economy is not much different than it was nearly four decades ago. Agriculture, for instance, 
still contributes more than 50% of the country’s GDP, with industry contributing 11% and 
services accounting for the balance (Befekadu and Berhanu, 1999). Hence, centralization of 
decision making in combination with socio-economic and political factors place policy elites 
in critical roles in policymaking, with societal elements having little or no influence on 
policymaking in Ethiopia (cross-reference Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5).
 
 
6.3. Public policymaking in Ethiopia: the challenges   
 
The supremacy of the executive and its claims on policymaking had been pervasive during 
Haileselassie’s years, with absolute executive powers vested in the monarchy and the person 
of the Emperor. The combined forces of party and executive leadership and their 
overwhelming dominance in the public policymaking are nevertheless relatively new 
conventions, phenomena and constructs that evolved and became ingrained in the Ethiopian 
political system after 1974. Ideology (Marxism-Leninism and revolutionary democracy) has 
since been a critical element guiding and as well as justifying policy elites’ claims on the 
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choice of public policies and the institutional and structural mechanisms of implementing 
them. Wedged between staggering financial and organizational capacity, on the one hand, and 
inhospitable politico-administrative and legal milieu, on the other, the civil society, a network 
of civil society institutions and the public have over the three decades remained at peripheral 
end of the policymaking process.  
  Hence, the most difficult challenges that the Ethiopian public policymaking process has 
been experiencing over the past thirty years can be encapsulated into three thematic issues. 
First, not only ideology has played critical role in the choice of public policies and 
institutional instruments for implementing them, but also laid the ground-work for policy 
elites to justify their claims on policy actions. While ideological precepts and the justifications 
underpinning them provided policy elites with overwhelming leverage in policymaking, it 
precluded civil society from making salutary contributions to the policymaking process. 
Second, the emergence and consolidation of a coterie of party and executive leadership 
(policy elites) have been the dominant phenomena in the realm of public policymaking over 
the last thirty years, with the ruling party institutions overlapping with the formally 
constituted policymaking government structures.  
  Third, the preceding two phenomena kept the civil society and other non-state actors at 
bay from the virtual process of formulating and implementing policies, albeit the weaknesses 
within the ranks of the CSOs simultaneously contributed to the imbalance. All these events 
have certainly prompted and/or accentuated the imbalances between the policymaking 
institutions and policy beneficiary civil society in Ethiopia, as the discussions in preceding 
chapters attempted to illuminate (see Chapters 3, 4 and 5). In view of the theoretical context 
set down in Chapter 2 and the empirical evidence discussed in the preceding chapters, the 
finings are summed up below.   
 
6.3.1. The dictates of ideology  
 
After a desperate search for outlook in the previous two years, 1976 heralded a turning point 
in Ethiopian history, not only because it witnessed the official introduction of scientific 
socialism, but also because it represented the genesis of the institutionalization of 
policymaking structures in the officially adopted ideology during the Dergue era. The 
ideological metamorphosis, which began before the Dergue’s ascension to power, culminated 
in the National Democratic Revolution Program (NDRP) and was in full sway in the 
aftermath of 1976. Predicated on the tenets of Marx and Lenin, the NDRP was a radical 
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departure from the tenets of both ‘Ethiopian socialism’ and ‘Ethiopia first’. This further set 
the stage for the Dergue to situate itself in an analogous position of a vanguard organization, 
spanning the entire process of formulating and implementing policies.  
       The nationalization of industries, banks and insurance companies, rural and urban land 
reforms were premised on and guided by these belief systems. The prevailing frame of 
references, too, influenced the organization of policymaking institutions. The restructuring of 
the Dergue, towards the last quarter of the 1970s into a standing committee, central 
committee and congress marked the culmination of the ideological metamorphosis and was an 
epitome of Soviet-style socialism. Consequently, not only did policymaking follow the lead of 
the official ideology, but also it featured prominently in guiding socio-economic 
policymaking, having no expectations, of course, of being challenged.  
        With the establishment of COPWE, the Dergue became increasingly engrossed with the 
orthodoxy of socialism and Marxism-Leninism, while simultaneously insisting on its 
originality. COPWE’s establishment represented a phenomenal resort to further integration 
and regimentation of government and non-government actors into highly centralized party 
mechanisms.  For the most part, the revolutionary elites used Marxian ideology and socialist 
institutions such as the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE), the hierarchical structures of the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE), NRDC-CPSC and the innocuous mass 
organizations to formulate, implement and legitimize policies.   
         The modus operandi of policymaking, the organization of policy-implementing 
institutions and the mobilization of ‘civil society’ behind government policies had been based 
entirely on the teachings of Marx and Lenin. Nationalization of the means of production and 
the re-organization of the economy based on central planning and a command structure, and 
the promotion of (anti-West and pro-East) proletarian internationalism, too, were dependent 
on this ideology. Not only did the latter set the parameters and modus operandi of public 
policymaking, but also provided opportune moments for the party and the executive 
leadership for setting the priorities for agenda setting, public policy choices to be made and 
selection of organizational instruments to put policies into effect. Put simply, policy elites 
adopted Marxism-Leninism, whose analytical tools steered the design of policy goals and the 
institutional means of formulating and implementing public policies.  
        In brief, the clamor for adopting and promoting Marxism-Leninism emanated from the 
fact that it served as an essential tool for mobilizing the ‘apathetic’ public behind the 
government-sponsored socio-economic transformations. What is more, the ideology was 
perceived as the only reliable conceptual tool and guiding principle for formulating the ‘most 
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appropriate’ socio-economic strategies and policies, and thereby determining the course of the 
country’s socio-economic and political development. The overriding goal of WPE was, 
therefore, building socialism and moving towards communism via a prolonged process of 
socialist construction and transformation. However, these mammoth objectives were seldom 
achievable without the leading role of the WPE and the principles of Marxism-Leninism 
(WPE, 1984). Both the constitution and WPE’s program vividly underlined the centrality of 
WPE, the vitality of democratic centralism and proletarian internationalism as keystones of 
PRDE (WPE, 1984, FDRE, 1987). 
  On the other hand, the primary impetus for the EPRDF’s protracted armed struggle 
against the Dergue regime emanated from the radical Ethiopian student movement of the late 
1960s and early 1970s (Young, 1997; Balsvik, 2003).  Having been members of the Ethiopian 
student movement, the leaders of the EPRDF were, therefore, much more predisposed to 
Marxism-Leninism than their predecessors were (Bahiru, 1994, Young, 1997). The 
establishment of EPRDF-wide Ethiopian Workers Revolutionary Party (EWRP) in 1991 
represented a consummation of EPRDF’s allegiance to Marxism-Leninism, despite the latter 
having already lost currency. In any case, EWRP was seen as the guardian of the interests of 
the peasantry and the urban poor and the cutting age of the uninterrupted transition to 
socialism (EPRDF, undated). Particularly the communists played vital roles in guiding the 
analysis and interpretation of programs and policies along Marxist-Leninist lines and 
monitoring the relationships between major players in the hierarchy of the EPRDF (op. cit.).  
         Although the Marxist rhetoric disappeared from the EPEDF’s lexicon soon after they 
seized power in 1991, due chiefly to fear of reprisals from Western donors, powerful 
international organizations and the US, and to a lesser degree because of its lack of currency, 
its variant - revolutionary democracy - was adopted in the mid-1990s and gathered 
momentum in the wake of the ‘resuscitation’ campaign in 2001152.   
         In much the same way as its predecessor, WPE, a Leninist style of organizing left its 
vestiges on the entire apparatus of the ruling party, EPRDF, as discussed in the preceding 
chapters. Hence, the politburo (executive committee) has sweeping powers in the 
determination of central guidelines that apply across the board and to all member 
organizations, in terms of setting the agenda for EPRDF-wide functions, exercising complete 
authority over its overall functions, and ensuring politburo decisions are implemented as well 
as adhered to, although the Congress that meets once in two years has formally been 
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designated ‘as the reservoir of powers’ (EPRDF, 2003b). In the wake of Tehadesso 
(Resuscitation), not only have all EPRDF affiliates adopted the EPRDF’s central socio-
political program, but they have also revised their internal regulations to replicate the central 
party constitution. In line with the national structure, each EPRDF member organization has 
an identical structure involving a congress that meets once in two years, a central committee 
that sits twice a year, and a politburo that meets four times annually. The latter has sweeping 
policymaking, organizational and propaganda responsibilities. Moreover, EPRDF reaches the 
outmost peasant villages through its regional affiliates. Its hierarchies have been stretched 
beyond regional capitals to span areas ranging from government units in the NRSs capitals to 
small cell units in the peasant villages, with party hierarchies superimposed on government 
structures to such an extent that the lines between party and government structures are blurred 
(see Figure 5.1).  
   Since the mid-1990s EPRDF has resorted to revolutionary democracy, which stems 
from its second plenary congress held in December 1994. The latter adopted an EPRDF 
program, which for the most part discounted the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric. Revolutionary 
democracy provides EPRDF with the best prospects of representing itself as the sole architect, 
designer and promoter of all socio-economic policies. Furthermore, revolutionary democracy 
assigns exclusive leverage to the EPRDF to set structures for policy making, and the making 
and unmaking of government institutions. Having completely discounted the liberal capitalist 
road to socioeconomic development as irrelevant and inappropriate, EPRDF leadership 
envisioned rural- and agriculture-focused development options as the panacea for the 
country’s pervasive socio-economic ills, with the ruling party as the prime mover of all socio-
economic and political decisions.  The peasantry is therefore considered as the fundamental 
social base of the revolutionary democratic revolution, with the urban petty bourgeoisie and 
the industrial workers rallying behind the revolutionary democratic cause.    
         Manifold factors motivated the EPRDF’s commitment to embrace a rural social base or 
constituency, as the empirical evidence in Chapters 4 and 5 showed. Primarily, the EPRDF 
claims that it is a party of the peasantry, and thus other social groups such as the urban poor 
and intellectuals (under the label of petty bourgeoisie) are relegated to secondary status vis-à-
vis the peasantry. The class analyses, which have over the last three years been dominating 
EPRDF literature, are more akin to the works of Marx, Lenin and Mao-Tsetung than the 
prevailing liberal values in the mainstream social sciences. So, EPRDF's 'love of the 
peasantry' is primarily impelled by this ideology, for it professed that the peasantry is the most 
fundamental constituent of revolutionary democracy.  
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         Equally important, its pre-commitments as a peasant insurgent movement, which drew 
the bulk of its fighting force from this social class, has probably prompted its present stand. It 
is worth mentioning here that currently EPRDF draws over 70 percent of its members from 
the peasantry (see Table 5.1). By default or by design, this, too, demonstrates that EPRDF 
clings to the rural constituency. In other words, EPRDF targeted the peasantry (the client) as 
the key social base of revolutionary democracy, partly because a rural social base has situated 
the EPRDF (the patron) at the hub of the policymaking process, with the latter setting all 
socio-economic policy agendas in the name of the former at its own free will. A classic case, 
among others, is ADLI, which was outlined in Chapter 4. Apparently, the peasantry is also the 
largest social group (85%) in Ethiopia, and therefore, much like its predecessor, EPRDF has 
always relied on the peasantry to validate its socio-economic policy decisions. After having 
reviewed the most recent unpublished and unofficial party documents and interviewed party 
officials, the author can safely construe that the urban constituency counts little vis-à-vis the 
peasantry, which has frequently been praised and/or flattered for having blessed their stay in 
power, and it has even been purportedly accepted, among the protagonists of revolutionary 
democracy, as the only social group to provide the imprimatur for EPRDF’s continuance in 
power (EPRDF, 2003a).  Not only has this provided the EPRDF with the opportunities to re-
assert absolute autonomy over the largest social class in Ethiopia, but it has also provided it 
with leverage to enforce all socio-economic policy decisions, including ADLI, which EPRDF 
claimed to have advocated in the interests of the peasantry. Not least, EPRDF presents itself 
as the single most important political organization that can set the only palatable public 
policies and lead the country to development, which has meant over the last thirteen years the 
exclusion of non-state players, who have little or no allegiance to revolutionary democracy, 
from public policymaking.   
         Since the Tehadesso (Resuscitation) campaign in 2001, EPRDF emerged with a 
renewed commitment to its political ideology, revolutionary democracy, with the rural-
focused socio-economic policies, NNP self-determination and secession at the heart of public 
policies and EPRDF at the centre of the socio-economic policymaking process. Despite the 
fact that the Tehadesso campaign was professed to have been launched to uproot factionalists 
that contravened the values of revolutionary democracy, the wave of dismissals that targeted 
both the key leadership and rank-and-file cadres of the EPRDF following Tehadesso, it 
nevertheless, also enhanced and consolidated the power of a selected elite group of the party 
and executive leadership, and emboldened them in their exclusive claim over the choice of 
types of policies to be adopted and institutional instruments to implement public policies.  
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6.3.2. The ascendancy of a corps of policy elites (party-melding-with-executive leadership).  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
For thirteen years after 1974 the Dergue unilaterally controlled the legislative process and the 
executive structure. Having begun as an Ad-hoc Supreme Coordinating Committee, a small 
group of military officers emerged as both legislators and collective executive personnel 
spanning the entire process of legislation and policy implementation (see Chapter 3).  Both 
the powers of legislation and execution had been united and invested in the Dergue.  It is 
worth noting here that the repository of real policymaking power, however, rested in the Ad-
hoc Supreme Coordinating Committee, and later in the Executive Committee of the Dergue, 
which came to be known as the ‘Politburo’.  
           By 1984 the merger of the executive (Dergue) and the party (COPWE/WPE) was 
indisputably evident. Mengistu was the chairman of COPWE/WPE and of the Dergue; the 
seven members of COPWE/WPE’s politburo members, led by Mengistu, were all members of 
the Dergue; more than 79 of the 117 full and alternate CC members of COPWE were 
members of the armed forces; all members of the Dergue’s standing committee and central 
committee, and all fourteen of COPWE’s regional committees, were headed by the Dergue’s 
representatives (Schwab, 1985). This made clear that that the party (COPWE/WPE) and the 
executive (the Dergue) were fused, although the latter was the single most important 
lawmaker till 1987. This, however, left the civilian ministers neither with the role to set policy 
agendas nor the power of influencing the directions of policy implementation. In any case, the 
same key figures in the Dergue leadership became the core constituents of party leadership 
and prime movers of parallel administrative and party structures, with all the civil mass 
organizations pegged with the party as well as administrative institutions.  
      Schwab further noted: 
 
Besides being responsible for organizing a vanguard political party and dealing with the issue of class 
formation, COPWE, in alliance with the Dergue, is in charge of developing the ideological parameters 
of the state and is also responsible for the affairs of the state. It is in latter two areas that real problems 
of policy-making and organization exist. As centralized as the political order is, lines of political and 
bureaucratic responsibilities are blurred, and it is difficult for those who fill roles in the Dergue, 
COPWE and the government bureaucracy, to decide where their political territory begins and ends. 
(1985: 52)    
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         Having achieved a remarkable power consolidation, the Dergue appeared to have been 
well poised to assert its powers in the wake of 1987. A government structure befitting a 
Soviet-style republic, namely, the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE), was 
officially established. The ruling party (WPE) rose well beyond constitutionally constructed 
state institutions to lead the state and society along socialism and affirm the legitimization of 
policies and practices. Above all, this period coincided with a consummation of a communist 
style of governing in all aspects of the political, social and economic systems, with all 
government and non-government institutions virtually becoming subservient to the party and 
the state (Vestal, 1997).   
        After the official inauguration marking the establishment of PDRE, government 
structures that reflected the new republican set up, as provided in the 1987 constitution, were 
put in place. Despite the fact that a unicameral legislative chamber (National Shengo/National 
Assembly), which was purportedly to enjoy extensive legislative powers, had been 
designated, the real policymaking power and the doing and undoing of government 
institutions remained with the very same top Dergue officials who simultaneously filled 
positions in the Council of the State, WPE central command and the Council of Ministers. 
Although a more ambiguous process of institutional structure appeared to have been running 
during the Dergue era than during that of its successors, not only was the unity of the party 
and the executive clearly obvious, but also the supremacy of the party-fused-with-the 
executive leadership in public policymaking was far bolder than 1991 and beyond.  
          In summary, for the thirteen years after the Dergue took power in 1974, the Standing 
Committee had performed as legislator formulating a plethora of policies with far-reaching 
consequences. A series of pieces of legislation also vested enormous executive powers in the 
Standing Committee, with the civilian ministers, who had marginally influenced the 
policymaking process, operating as the clearing-house of legislation. Towards the end of the 
1970s, not only did the establishment of COPWE/WPE, almost immediately represent a 
perfect blending of the executive administrative structures with the party, but it also set the 
precedent for the exclusive leverage as well as dominance of the combined institutions of 
party and the executive leadership over the entire gamut of public policymaking in Ethiopia. 
The period following the establishment of the PDRE in 1987, however, witnessed a 
constitutional means of affirmation and institutionalization of the dominance of the party and 
executive leadership in policymaking153.  
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      By the same token, the wedding between the ruling party (EPRDF) and the executive 
began during the EPRDF’s interim administration, gathered momentum and was 
consummated during what came to be known as the four years of transition from 1991 to 
1995. After ousting the Dergue from power in 1991, the EPRDF was well positioned to build 
and break the coalition in the TGE and make and unmake the participants in the CoR. 
Challenged very little, it pushed all its proposals through both the Council of Representatives 
(CoR) and the Council of Ministers (CoM).  
       Discounting the support that it exacted from individuals and ally parties, EPRDF had a 
progressively growing majority seat in the TGE legislative chamber, the CoR, up from 37% in 
1991 to 50% in 1995. As a result, not only did EPRDF successfully organize the voting 
system to have an EPRDF President elected, fill vital ministerial positions in the executive 
ministry such as Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
the Minister of Home Affairs, and assigned its representatives as permanent secretaries in the 
ministries where it had no ministers with ministerial portfolios, but also had CoR recognized 
its army as the defense force of the country during the transition (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
         Suffice it to say that EPRDF swayed all the socio-economic and political decisions 
during the transition. This period also witnessed the growing fusion of the EPRDF’s 
structures with the apparatuses of the state institutions. This set the stage for EPRDF to recast 
the constitution, and establish the second republic (FDRE) and the attendant network of 
institutional relationships in its own image. In fact, EPRDF had no qualms about laying 
claims on the institutionalization of its programs and ideological beliefs (revolutionary 
democracy) in the 1995 constitution and other bylaws, albeit issues and controversies 
surrounding the making of Constitution persist to this day (see Chapter 4). In summary, after 
1991 a transitional government consisting of the Council of Representatives and the Council 
of Ministers was organized, with the EPRDF permeating both the institutions, and the head of 
the state and EPRDF leader coordinating the set of connections between the transitional 
legislature, the executive and the party. In fact, this period had seen a resurgence of the 
ascendancy of the executive and the party leadership across the country after the fall of the 
Dergue.    
       Following the ratification of a constitution in 1994, a government in which EPRDF 
ascertained overwhelming and unchallengeable leverage in policymaking was reconstituted in 
1995. In other words, with EPRDF claiming the overwhelming majority of seats in the 
legislative chamber, HPR, the ruling party and the executive have reasserted and maintained 
sweeping powers. Supported by a team of advisors on a range of socio-economic issues, the 
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PMO is the most powerful institution with a massive proportion, and it has remained the most 
authoritative and influential organ of the executive to date. Not least, with the PM at the helm 
of the party and executive leadership and the PMO as the most active and key institution 
spearheading the legislative process, the executive’s influence in the policymaking process 
has been every bit as exclusive as during the Dergue’s period. Albeit the executive was 
reorganized and the PMO, as a result, ceded some of its functions to major ministries in the 
wake of Teheadesso, both institutions nonetheless retained virtual control over the choice of 
public policies and the making and unmaking of government institutions (see Chapter 4). It is 
worth noting, however, that the center of power is the person of the Prime Minister, who 
coordinates the key players in the policymaking process, although the network of the leading 
persons in the party and executive leadership determine the policies and the institutional 
means of execution154. 
  The constitutional and statutory provisions have further enhanced and institutionalized 
the fusion of the party with the executive and/or the hegemony of the party and the executive 
leadership in the policymaking process. The Constitution guarantees a political party or 
coalition of parties (EPRDF) the right to exercise executive powers, which gives it enormous 
leverage in the legislative process. Likewise, the constitutions of the four NRSs entail similar 
provisions that bolster the power of the executive and the party, enabling the ruling party to 
dominate the whole policymaking process radiating from Addis Ababa through the regional 
capitals down to district, Kebele and village levels. The tainted process of constitution 
making, additionally, bred not only exclusive policymaking leverage for the party and the 
executive, but has also over the last thirteen years generated a corps of legislatures, both at the 
national and regional levels, that rubber stamp the decisions of the executive and party 
leadership. As a result, the legislatures and the executive appear to be different in designation 
but are kindred and united in the person of the Chief Executive Officer (PM) and key party 
figures in Ethiopia.  
        The NRSs, further, replicated the same structural and operational patterns for much of 
1995 and beyond. Down the line, the lines between the executive and party are far less 
distinct, with the NRSs party officials’ simultaneously taking control of leadership positions 
in the executive, managing and monitoring policy implementation. Empirical evidence has 
made clear that this has nowhere figured more prominently than in the EPRDF-administered 
core NRSs, namely Oromia, Amhara, SNNP, and Tigray NRSs. Party and government 
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structures are closely entwined, with the party permeating the entire policymaking process.  In 
other words, not only does ideological recipe prompt the pursuit of a specific package of 
socio-economic policies (such as ADLI, state ownership of land, self-determination of ethnic 
communities up to secession, and so forth), which at the same time ensures control of state 
policymaking structures, but also party membership almost automatically guarantees 
executive positions at all levels on the ladder of government institutions.  Apparently, the 
historical and political traditions, which began during the Dergue rule, have additionally set a 
precedent for the continuance of state-party fusion.  
        Despite the fact that the EPRDF came forward with a commitment to empower districts 
and to build a strong government in the wake of the resuscitation after 2001, the ‘strong 
government drive’ has nonetheless imposed severe limitations on the degree of 
decentralization, so much so that it has led to a diminution of the regional and district-level 
local governments’ involvement as well as their leverage in policymaking. Notwithstanding 
the dominant claim within party and government circles favoring decentralization, was that 
constitutional guarantees of equality through ethnic federalism could tone down the fear of 
NNPs that had suffered from decades of repression and exploitation under the centralized 
power structures. The commitment to regional autonomy, which translated into formal moves 
towards the devolution of powers to the regions, was nonetheless contradicted by the center’s 
control of the political process at the regional level through the network of regional parties 
allied to the EPRDF155 (cross-reference Chapters 2, 4 and 5). Compared with other federal 
arrangements, such as in Germany, where federalism has been built bottom-up, and has in fact 
evolved over many years, Ethiopian federalism has rather been thrust on the population top-
down156. In the EPRDF-administered core NRSs, the decentralization process therefore has 
more of a propaganda dimension, with the EPRDF and its NRSs affiliates running and 
controlling the entire process of decentralization top-down. Hence, while in fact the thrust of 
Ethiopian decentralization should have allowed political forces, other than the EPRDF and its 
allies, to participate in the policymaking process, policy elites rather used it to exclude these 
forces and simultaneously develop ‘a very positive image’ among the donors and powerful 
international organizations. Nor does it permit space for the civil society and faith-based 
institutions to participate in the decentralization drive. In other words, not only is the current 
decentralization process without participation, but it is also still in many ways 
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decentralization without devolution, although a block budgetary grant to the district 
governments that has been awarded since 2002 has prompted cautious optimism.   
        On the other hand, in the peripheral regions where EPRDF has allegedly been elliptically 
ruling, a range of mechanisms has been used to influence the policy processes, some of which 
are described as follows:  
 
First, there is direct membership of elected EPRDF representatives on state councils, such as currently 
exists in Benishangul-Gumuz and Afar states. Secondly, there have been key EPRDF political 
‘advisors’ attached to the executive in each of the four peripheral states, who have played an active, and 
some claim decisive, role in political affairs. Third, the EPRDF provides a wide range of seminars, 
courses and educational functions for state party officials and bureaucrats, disseminating and 
streamlining an EPRDF ‘way of thinking’. Fourth, the EPRDF seems able directly to discipline 
members of its affiliated organizations and remove them from their political positions. EPRDF wears 
the ‘government hat’ to remove and discipline power holders in the peripheral NRSs (non-core NRSs) 
and replace them with loyal authorities.  Much of this authority has since 2001 been delegated from 
PMO to the Ministry of Regional Affairs. Finally, the federal armed or security forces have intervened 
to assume direct control in various ‘unstable’ peripheral parts of the country, such as the Somali, Afar, 
Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz NRSs, and within the troublesome Borena zone of Oromia NRS. 
(Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003: 134) 
 
         Wedged between dependence on the central government for the bulk of their revenues 
and constitutional tangles, NRSs appear to enjoy far less devolved decentralization than de-
concentration (Meheret, 1999, 2002). A recent publication by the World Bank has also 
described the decade-old decentralization process in Ethiopia as more of de-concentration 
than devolution (2001).  Notwithstanding the sweeping assertions of the FDRE constitution, 
the dependence of NRSs governments on financial transfers and the manners in which these 
transfers are negotiated reinforce the skeptics in their view that in reality the latter hardly 
possess unrestrained discretion to spend on development projects as they please (Lister, 
1998). Hence, the four peripheral NRSs (Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar and Somali) 
depended for well over 70 percent of their revenues on central government transfers in 
2002/03 (i.e. 1995 E.C). Similarly, the four EPRDF-administered (Oromia, Amhara, SNNP, 
and Tigray) and Hareri NRSs drew over 65 percent of their revenues from the federal 
government transfers, with the total NRSs’ financial dependence on central government 
scaling up to 67 percent in the same year (see Table 6.1). Moreover, central government’s 
stringent and arbitrary financial powers, the constitutional requirements that impose demands 
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on NRSs to accede to the norms of central government157, and the absence of competence 
among the members of the HoF to negotiate for better deal and formula have not augured well 
for the autonomous and self-administering NRSs, as widely provided for in the national and 
regional constitutions. 
 
 
                                                
157
 The FDRE constitution imposes a requirement that any organ of government, including the NRSs, observe 
the principles and norms detailed under Chapter 10 in the implementation of the constitution, other laws and 
public policies (FDRE, 1995: 32-34).    
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Table 6.1.  The NRSs’ governments’ revenue dependence on the central government subsidy transfers 2002/03 (1995 E.C) in millions of 
Birr*158 
 
Item/NRSs Tigrai Afar Amhara Oromia Somali 
Benishan
gul/ 
Gumuz
 
SNNRS Gambella Harari Regions’ Total 
1. Regional Revenue 90 18.5 230.0  374.5  36.0 20.2 188.0 8.6 10.7 976.5 
2. Recurrent Budget 
Transfer 291.2 159.0 789.0 1030.4 198.0 127.7 722.7 98.0 54.2 3470.2  
3. Total (1 +2) 382.2 177.5 1019.0 1404.9 234.0 149.0 910.7 106.6 64.9 4448.8 
4. Recurrent Budget 382.2 177.5 1019.0 1404.9 234.0 149.0 910.7 106.6 64.9 4448.8 
5. Capital Budget 
transfer 86.4 90.0 186.0 243.7 172.4 60.0 96.0 71.3 16.1 1021.9 
6. Foreign Loan & 
Assistance 107.5 70.9 277.4 362.5 105.3 53.4 232.9 40.9 20.0 1270.8 
7. Capital Budget 
(5+6) 193.9 160.9 463.4 606.2 277.7 113.4 328.9 112.2 36.1 2292.7 
8. Total Transfer 
(2+5) 377.6 249.0 975.0 1274.1 370.4 187.7 818.7 169.3 70.3 4492.1 
9 Total Budget  (4 + 
7) 576.1 338.4 1482.4 2011.1 511.7 262.4 1239.6 218.8 101.0 6741.5 
10. Transfer as % of 
Total Budget 65.5 % 73.6 % 65.8 % 63.3 % 73.4 % 71.5 % 66.0 % 77.4 % 69.6 % 66.6 % 
Source: Base data, compiled and computed from MoFED’s documents, and typology adapted from Lister, Stephen 1998.  
* Currently Ethiopian legal tender, Birr, is trading at 8.645 against 1 US Dollar
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6.3.3. Civil society: the peripheral end in the continuum of policymaking  
 
Although the Dergue’s socialist manifesto and the wave of rural and urban reforms that it had 
unleashed in the first few years appeared to project grassroots participation, these reforms 
nevertheless in effect were designed to enhance centralized control over the ordinary citizens. 
At the outset the legislation that the Dergue issued immediately following the land reform 
proclamation vested relatively autonomous powers in urban and rural Kebeles; yet parallel 
party and government administrative jurisdictions, which evolved over the years, 
overshadowed their powers. As a result, the urban dwellers’ and peasant associations, the 
labor and teachers’ unions, the women and youth associations served policy elites as channels 
of clientelistic connections to the ordinary citizens and transmissions belts of party and 
government directives, but not institutions through which the demands and interests of 
members were articulated into policies and programs (see Chapter 3). In other words, though 
they mushroomed in the wake of the reforms, party- (WPE-) sponsored grassroots ‘civil’ 
institutions had neither the autonomy nor the liberty to articulate their demands to influence 
public policies. The manner in which the reform measures had been managed fostered little 
public participation in socio-economic transformation. This was nowhere more conspicuously 
evident than in the rural Ethiopia, where the Dergue unleashed three-pronged campaigns 
(namely, collectivization, villagization and resettlement programs) that effectively inhibited 
grassroots participation.  
      On the other hand, bizarre and ambiguous processes had been used at once and 
simultaneously during the Dergue era. Most often than not policies had been launched, while 
in fact there had rarely been any thorough study prior to the adoption of the policy, or policies 
were adopted irrespective of the fact that they were sound or appropriate. No one knew the 
process of how the agenda was set, who proposed motions and how they were initiated, for 
there was virtually no functioning parliament to deliberate and approve legislation. There has, 
however, been little doubt that the key figures in the executive and the party leadership 
promulgated laws only when they wished so, or policies were formulated based on the whims 
of policy elites. As a result, public policies reflected the realities on the ground much less, 
chiefly because, while critical information concerning policy issues remained at the grassroots 
level, policymakers were at the top (cross-reference Chapter 2, section 2.5.2). Consequently, 
data and/or information that had a bearing on one’s reasoned judgment as to whether or not to 
make decisions on the agenda, by then could probably be filtered as it traversed up the 
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hierarchy, having had neither validity nor significance. Eventually, not only did the policies 
that had been conceptualized and formulated lead the public astray, but the implementation 
process was stalled and mostly rendered ineffective, for policies had been conceptualized by 
the elites at a higher level, but the real process of implementation took place at the lower 
levels in the peasant villages, workplaces and shop floors. In other words, the policymaking 
process during the Dergue era was not participatory and thus policies hardly addressed the 
interests of the public at the grassroots level at all. This set in motion a train of negative 
reactions that added to the social costs and reached crisis proportions, as most of the policies 
such as villagization, resettlement and the green revolution turned out to be experiments in 
“social engineering” that failed159. However, the brunt of all the failures and the crises that 
emanated from misguided policies ultimately fell upon the common citizenry, who had 
neither the opportunities nor the freedom to articulate their interests.  
           Accordingly, the major flaws of socialism were that party dogma and ideology almost 
entirely guided policymaking; as a result, opportunities to express or implement alternative 
ideas and policies were very slim. The values embedded in the system, such as democratic 
centralism, socialist legality and proletarian internationalism, and sole leadership role of a 
vanguard party of a Leninist type, did not allow any room for the citizenry to participate in the 
policymaking process. Hence, initiating agendas, conceptualizing public policies, adopting 
and implementing them had exclusively been the preserve of the executive and WPE 
leadership.      
        The Dergue was, therefore, statist all through, with all the negative implications of a 
statist style of leadership, with sloganeering and expediency characterizing its policy 
positions160. Not only were public policies based on, and implementing institutions 
established along, Marxist-Leninist lines, but the policy process was also completely 
centralized in the party and executive leadership. The stringent requirements of party ideology 
had absolutely discouraged civil society’s participation in the policymaking.  
Bahiru summed this up:  
 
…At no other time in Ethiopian history has a government had such total control over its subjects as in 
this period. The peasants were controlled by the peasant associations. The urban dwellers were under 
the tight supervision of urban dwellers associations. Neither labor, nor the youth, nor the press-in short 
no component of what is understood by civil society was allowed even a whiff of autonomy. It was one 
big exercise in recasting society in the image of a political regime. (1994, 10)    
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          In summary, policy decisions were made in a top-down fashion with absolutely no 
democratic participation, even when local issues were concerned, and without any possibility 
of contesting a controversial decision. Authoritarian implementation of policy, with little 
opportunity for critical input and feedback, also characterized the policymaking process. Not 
only was the scope for stakeholders’ participation in the policymaking process inhibited, but 
any room for demand articulation and aggregation by civil society was almost non-existent. 
Hence, policymaking was neither transparent, nor had there been any sincere institutional 
arrangement for public hearings, which could have promoted a sense of awareness as well as 
accountability about misguided policy initiatives amongst the beneficiaries and promoters of 
policies alike. To put it mildly, policymaking during the entire period of the Dergue era had 
been completely top-down. Nor had it been possible to ascertain the outputs, outcomes and 
the impacts of policies, for the system did not allow for any professional review of policies 
through ex-ante, ex-post facto and concurrent evaluation arrangements. Poignantly, various 
policy alternatives had barely been assessed before they were put into effect; ipso facto, they 
were either reversed or terminated after huge costs had been incurred, with the ordinary public 
bearing the brunt of all the consequences161.  
         In terms of the liberty that citizens enjoy to form civil associations and the 
countenance it has shown associations to determine their own governance systems, EPRDF’s 
approach to CSOs has certainly been a phenomenal departure in positive directions compared 
to its predecessors. EPRDF has nonetheless used its power resources to impede a potentially 
fruitful use of the official policies by CSOs. In fact, in reality EPRDF sees associations which 
have been less predisposed to revolutionary democracy as enemies of the second Ethiopian 
revolution as much as they saw the opposition and the private press in this way (EPRDF, 
undated, EPRDF, 2003a, 2003b). Most leaders of CSOs designate the current drive for 
associational life and the attendant participation cynically, though; as the saying in Ethiopia 
goes: ‘Endayamah Tiraw Endayibela Gefaw’162. Hence, CSOs are invariably ‘allowed to 
form, but not to perform’, as Chapter 5 indicated.    
        Although EPRDF situates itself in an analogous position as a guardian of the interests of 
the oppressed people and the guarantor of democracy in Ethiopia, the series of punitive 
measures together with the ideological predispositions it adopts have for some years now 
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prevent the same person from partaking of the meal or party”.  
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been deterring the growth and movement of a vibrant civil society. The ideological assertions 
lay great stress on the omnipotence of the government, the party (EPRDF) and state 
institutions as the only channels through which citizens’ demands for policy preferences are 
marshaled. The executive and the party have increasingly been emerging as menacing forces 
that societal forces have not been able to reckon with163. Instead of the independent civil 
society organizations that could have mustered the potential power to challenge and 
countervail state actors, clientelistic groups are rather considered as the true bearers of the 
revolutionary democracy, much as in the days of the Dergue, with the latter having marginal 
influence on the formation and implementation of policies, and apparently with little capacity 
and resilience to press demands for policy reforms on their patrons. On the contrary, civic 
movements, which opt to assert their autonomy, have either been excluded or neutralized, and 
have found their connections with the extant or potential constituencies severed. They have 
not had access to the policymaking institutions, nor have there been opportunities for civil 
movements to exert pressure on the state and party for policy changes or reforms (see Chapter 
5).   
         In fact, working with and affiliating one to civil society is politically a very sensitive 
and threatening activity in Ethiopia. Most indigenous civil society organizations have mostly 
been reluctant to recruit openly and develop a popular base, or to address civil society issues 
such as autonomy, democratic culture or accountability to their constituents, despite the fact 
that the recognition of freedom of speech and the right to associate are provided for in the 
Constitution (Sisay, 2002). As a result, there has invariably been a tense and complex 
interaction between continuing authoritarianism and opportunities for autonomous civil 
society activity (Clapham, 2004). 
         Especially most rural institutions, to the degree that they exist, are weak and have very 
little leverage, although the official assertions suggest quite the contrary164.  They may at best 
be able to organize people around collective interests of no avail to the government.  As soon 
as they challenge any activities of the local authorities, their leaders and members are 
harassed, find themselves excluded from services, or exposed to arbitrary administrative 
decisions, arrests, concocted accusations and so forth165.  
         Suffice it to say that patron-client relationships predominantly characterize the bulk of 
the civil societies of developing countries such as Ethiopia, as argued in Chapter 2. Governing 
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elites and the higher echelons of the executive are expected to relate to the society and 
distribute the benefits through these patron-client channels, in exchange for which the patrons 
deliver their support and the compliance of the clients to the regime. The state selects or 
works through patrons who can take care of their followers and keep them under control; 
resources and access provided by the government enrich the patron, reinforce the patron’s 
authority and stabilize the regime (Esman, 1991). 
         Similarly, EPRDF has embraced the conviction that it alone represented the ‘genuine 
interests of the people’, and especially of the peasantry who provided the backbone of its 
protracted war against the Dergue, and instituted party- and government-sponsored ‘civil 
organizations’ with aggressive funding and patronage characterizing all of them (Clapham, 
2004).  Public participation in policymaking in EPRDF Ethiopia have not so much had public 
empowerment significance as much as having instrumental value as propaganda (see Chapter 
5). As a result, public participation in the policymaking process has not as yet generated any 
substantive outcome, precisely because participation is a channel to recruit support and solicit 
consensus for the policies that have unilaterally been formulated by the party and the 
executive. Nor has participation provided opportunities for genuine citizens’ empowerment. 
In fact, in part due to the spur of clientelistic links and patronage, and partly due to the 
absence of commitment to a more open institutionalized participation, state- and party-
sponsored participation reinforced exclusions.  Suffice it to say, thus, that there a huge 
imbalance has been developing between policymaking institutions, on the one hand, and civil 
society and civil society organizations, on the other.   
         It is worth noting, however, that voluntarism, independence and autonomy are the 
hallmarks that form the basis for the CSOs’ being and the critical ingredients that underpin 
whether they should have a meaningful role, and make inputs and contributions to public 
policymaking. The Dergue as much precluded CSOs from forming as well as functioning 
voluntarily, as the EPRDF presents obstacles to the autonomous and independent existence of 
CSOs.  The latter used a range of mechanisms from forming marionette ‘civil society and 
development associations’, to orchestrating splits in the CSOs, with the former having clearly 
overwhelming advantages over independent ones.     
         The trend appears more chiefly point to the fact that an iron curtain has appeared to be 
descending over the last thirteen years, with revolutionary democracy as the central bulwark 
of the fence. Behind this fence lies the EPRDF, the gatekeeper of the fence and of the bulk of 
state structures that have evolved over the years, as well as the party-business conglomerates 
and constellations of EPRDF NGOs, leaving the peasantry, in whose interests the EPRDF 
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purported to have forged all the socio-economic policies, and most independent CSOs and 
most NSA peripheral actors as by-standers to public policymaking.   
 
6.3.4. Concluding remarks from a comparative perspective  
            
On balance, the WPE/Dergue and EPRDF had more in common than they had differences, as 
Table 6.2 below depicts. Till 1991 there appeared few differences between them, except for 
the fact that while the WPE/Dergue sought a solution to the simmering national conflicts 
through an exercise of some form of regional autonomy within a unitary state, the EPRDF 
rather promoted the rights of NNPs to self-determination up to secession and thereby radically 
altering the status quo. Both parties (WPE and EPRDF), however, exerted extraordinary 
efforts to have their ideological values integrated into the constitutions, and formally 
institutionalized these values. Both parties perceived themselves as the only cutting edge, 
prophets and architects of socio-economic transformation and policymaking in Ethiopia, 
albeit the current global context has made any official propagation of the teachings of Marx, 
Lenin and Mao-Tsetung obsolete.  
          Equally, caught up in the nitty-gritty of Marxism-Leninism, revolutionary democracy 
provides the raison d'être for EPRDF to assume a virtually exclusive claim on the socio-
economic and political policymaking process in the wake of 1991. Not only is the peasantry 
seen as the core constituent of the second Ethiopian revolution, exactly as the Dergue did, but 
also far-reaching socio-economic policies to safeguard its interests, such as state-ownership of 
land and ADLI, have been promoted in its name. Tasks appear to be daunting and the 
resources are gravely inadequate but the market orientation – which sets EPRDF apart from 
its predecessor – means that optimism within the ruling party circles is running high to build a 
market-oriented economy with ALDI situated at the heart of all socio-economic development. 
The non-liberal style of capitalist development has continued in earnest, ironically as 
government and party parastatals permeate the commercial and private sectors. In short, in 
view of the efforts exerted to recast policies in the image of revolutionary democracy and the 
obstinacy with which this has been promoted to guide policies and practices, EPRDF has a lot 
more in common with its former nemesis, WPE (see Table 6.2). 
 On other hand, with the Dergue at the highest echelon of the executive leadership, the 
civilian ministers influenced agenda setting marginally. In fact, the responsibilities of 
ministers were limited to deliberating and advising than conceptualizing and initiating 
legislation and policies (PMAC, 1976, 1977). Nor had they the power of influencing the 
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direction of policy implementation. In contrast, not only do the ministers currently possess 
overwhelming legislative and policymaking powers, but top ranking officials of the ruling 
party also have the power to set policy agendas and determine the socio-economic policies. 
On the other hand, over the past three decades, a range of legal and constitutional provisions 
has endowed the executive and party leadership with overwhelming leverage in 
policymaking. The 1987 and the 1995 constitutions, the Dergue’s PDRE and EPRDF’s FDRE 
constitutions respectively, are typical cases in point, though the latter in many ways entails 
significant departures from the Dergue’s. While the 1987 constitution empowers the ruling 
party to lead both government and society across the country, the national and NRSs’ 
constitutions invested the ruling party with overwhelming powers to influence socio-
economic and political life after 1995 (PDRE, 1987; FDRE, 1995; NRSs constitutions, 1995, 
2001). In other words, the constitutions appeared to have been designed to enhance the fusion 
of the party and the executive and the dominance of the combined forces of the party and the 
executive in policymaking. Notably, the making of the 1987 and 1995 constitutions attest to 
the fact that so much effort has been exerted by the ruling parties to recast government 
structures in the images of the executive and party leadership (policy elites). In both regimes 
the party and executive leadership have absolutely been dominating the legislatures (national 
and regional), so much so that the latter have been relegated to ‘legitimating houses’ of the 
decisions of the party and executive leadership. There has, therefore, been a huge gap between 
the executive and the legislature at the national and regional levels, with the balance of power 
tilting to the former.  
       Not only have the Chief Executive Officers, in both regimes, represented an embodiment 
of the ascendancy of the joint force of party and executive leadership, but they have also been 
advantageously situated to provide leadership and coordinate a network of relationships 
among key institutional and individual players in the policymaking process. Mengistu was, 
for instance, the Chairperson of the Dergue, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, 
and the President of the country and the leader of the party (WPE). In other words, one person 
coordinated the range of networks of relationships between party and government, the army 
and government, the legislature and the executive. Similarly, Meles is currently the leader of 
the ruling party, EPRDF, the Chief Executive Officer and the Commander-in-Chief of the 
national armed forces. This places him in an auspicious position to use his executive status to 
lead the legislative process and at the same time coordinate the relationship between the 
parliament and the executive. Having become a party leader that has an overwhelming 
majority of seats in the HPR, he is further poised to get his party’s policy proposals through 
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the parliament and the CoM, although most of the politburo and all of the CC members of the 
EPRDF are also members of the Council of Ministers166. In summary, the centrality of both 
party and the executive leadership in the policymaking process has been vested in the persons 
of Mengistu (1974-1991) and Meles (1991 and beyond). 
              Moreover, the wave of radical reform measures that the Dergue launched in the early 
years of its establishment originated from the demands of the public and civilian activists, 
although there had not been any channel of communication between the public and 
policymakers. Nor had there been any consultation between the affected parties and the 
government both before and after a certain policy was conceived and formulated. This 
combined with the terror that Dergue carried out in the last half of the 1970s demobilized 
civilian activists and civil movements that at the outset challenged the regime. As a result, the 
Dergue’s absolute leverage in formulating and implementing policies in accordance with the 
mainstream of socialist ideology continued unchallenged. In other words, the terror generated 
‘popular acquiescence’ for policies centrally made and implemented by the military elites 
(Schwab, 1985).    
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Table 6.2. Party nomenclature, ideological commonalities and policy implications  
Assessment parameters 
Parties/Regimes 
Dergue 
                           EPRDF 
Till 1991 
EPRDF after 1991 
Nomenclature of Party Workers’ Party of Ethiopia (WPE) 
Ethiopian Workers 
Revolutionary Party 
(EWRP) 
Ethiopia Peoples’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
Claimed social base 
Industrial workers, 
peasantry, broad masses, 
with worker-peasant 
alliance as the driving 
force of the revolution. 
The proletariat, 
peasantry, urban poor, 
and progressive 
intellectuals …etc 
Mainly the peasantry, but also 
includes the urban poor and 
revolutionary democratic 
intellectuals…etc 
Officially espoused ideology 
 
Marxism-Leninism Marxism-Leninism Revolutionary Democracy 
Class partisanship 
 
Primarily to industrial 
workers 
To the proletariat of 
each nation, nationality 
and people 
Primarily to the peasantry 
Theoretical and analytical 
tool Marxism-Leninism Marxism-Leninism Marxism-Leninism 
Vanguard class Industrial workers 
The proletariat of each 
nation, nationality and 
people 
Petty bourgeois and revolutionary 
democratic intellectuals of each 
nation, nationality and people 
Goal of the revolution 
Building socialism via 
bourgeois democratic 
revolution 
The same 
 
Building capitalism, but with 
measures/actions ensuring more 
benefits which accrue to the 
peasantry and the broad masses of 
the people, with ADLI at the center 
of the socio-economic 
development 
Land ownership State ownership The same The same 
 
Rights of nationalities 
 
Regional autonomy Self-determination, including secession 
Self-determination, including 
secession 
System of the economy 
 
Command and control The same 
Market-economy with close state 
scrutiny, party parastatals 
dominating the spectrum of 
businesses in the private sector, 
and with ADLI as the center piece 
of economic development 
Enemies of the revolution Imperialism, bureaucratic 
capitalism and feudalism The same 
Imperialism, the national and 
comprador bourgeoisies 
International alliances Soviet Union and world 
socialism 
China and World 
socialism 
Tactical alliance with imperialism, 
and is characterized by both 
cooperation and struggle 
Source: Base data, unpublished and unofficial party and government documents, and 
typology provided by the author.  
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As indicated earlier, policies were conceived, formulated and adopted by the same 
Dergue leaders, with Marxism-Leninism, democratic centralism and Soviet-style government 
structures chiefly characterizing the polity. Likewise, state-society relationships were forged 
along the same lines. By default or design, the proliferation of government-sponsored mass 
organizations on a grand and national scale provided the Dergue elites with the basis as well 
as the instrument to pre-empt any civilian dissent. Mass organizations (such as All Ethiopian 
Trade Union, Urban Dwellers’ Associations, All Ethiopian Peasant Associations, 
Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth Association, and Revolutionary Ethiopia Women’s 
Association) became instrumental in the mobilization of civil society under the Dergue and 
WPE, although the former had virtually no part in policymaking.  
         On the other hand, the current Ethiopian constitution contains the most democratic bill 
of rights which has never been legislated in the history of Ethiopian policymaking, except, of 
course, for the provisions on land ownership and the question of nationalities, which continue 
to be controversial (see FDRE, 1995: 5-16).  Additionally, in terms of the freedom that 
citizens enjoy to form civil associations and the tolerance that the government has shown civil 
institutions to decide on their internal governance systems, EPRDF has demonstrated a 
relatively far more positive approach than its predecessor’s.  However, the clamor for a more 
active engagement of citizens in the making and shaping of policies that affect their lives has 
not succeeded, due in part to the limits imposed by the reigning ideology (i.e., revolutionary 
democracy) and also because of the prevailing deficiencies in the Ethiopian democratic 
system. Popular sovereignty over the state, the accountability of leaders to the people, 
guarantees for the protection of human rights in practice, independent access to complaint and 
redress, the free expression and formation of public opinion, and social and economic rights 
are all established on paper, by law, although in everyday life they come second to the needs 
of the ruling party and executive leadership (Pausewang et al., 2002).   
 
6.3.5. Running through the hypotheses and research questions 
 
Stretching back thousands of years in history, the imbalance/gap between policymaking 
institutions and policy beneficiaries persists to this day (see Chapter 3). The indigenous 
traditions evolved over several hundred years and the values that have long been embedded in 
the political culture encouraged neither opposition nor reasoned criticism of government 
policies, even if these entail potentially fruitful alternatives and/or outcomes. Rooted in the 
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past, traditional and indigenous political values have adversely influenced the dynamics of 
public policymaking and state-society relations in contemporary Ethiopia.  
         Beginning in earnest with the coming into power of the Dergue in 1974, the fusion of 
the ruling party leadership with the top echelon of the executive gathered momentum in the 
wake of 1991 (see Chapters 3, 4 and 5). This together with constitutional and legal regimes 
has provided policy elites with paramount leverage over the formulation of socio-political and 
economic policies and the management of implementation. Over the past three decades, 
therefore, the loci of policymaking powers have been squarely vested in the party stalwarts 
and the executive leadership, with overlapping membership invariably characterizing both 
institutions (cross-check with research question 1). The national and regional legislative 
institutions have merely represented rubber-stamping organs of the party and the executive’s 
decisions, and have indeed become fig leaves to cover their elitism. Not only have the parties 
(WPE and EPRDF) and their ideologies (Marxism-Leninism and revolutionary democracy) 
inspired and legitimated policy actions, but they have also added the dynamism for 
institutionalizing policymaking and configuration of implementing structures (cross-check 
research question 2).  
       The public policymaking process in Ethiopia has, therefore, seen glaring imbalances at 
two levels over the last three decades: first, between the executive and the legislature, and 
second, between the policymaking institutions, on the one hand, and ordinary citizens and 
civil society organizations (CSOs) representing various interests, on the other. At both levels, 
the party and the executive exact enormous power leverage. On the other hand, the ordinary 
citizens are as highly disorganized as they are tied up with attending to their daily survival 
needs (cross-check with research question 3). Hence, they have little time to become fully and 
actively involved in holding government institutions accountable and responsive, articulating 
policy demands to policymaking institutions aside. The legislatures have become detached 
from society and rubber-stamp party and executive decisions.  
       The empirical evidence and the preceding discussions have, therefore, clearly 
substantiated the hypotheses as follows:  
 
1. Not only has ruling party-fused-executive leadership (policy elites) emerged as 
disproportionately dominant in public policymaking in Ethiopia, but also the effort 
that they have been exerting on initiating, influencing and legitimizing policies 
circumscribed the potential contributions of the legislatures and non-state actors to 
public policymaking (cross-check research questions 1 and 3). This has certainly 
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created gaps and/or imbalances between policymaking institutions and policy 
beneficiaries.  
 
2. The dominant ideologies (Marxism-Leninism and revolutionary democracy), which 
policy elites have embraced and promoted over the past three decades, set the 
parameters for the type of socio-economic policies to be pursued and the institutional 
means of implementing them. In other words, policies and institutional structures 
chosen for implementing them follow the lead of the ideologies and the prevailing 
frame of references. The dictates of ideology in public policymaking have clearly 
fostered exclusive leverage for ruling party-fused-executive leadership in the 
policymaking process (cross-reference with research question 2).  
 
3. Hence, formulating and implementing sound policies and engaging citizens more fully 
in the public policymaking process obviously calls for forging a balance between the 
state and civil society in Ethiopia (cross-reference research questions 3, and see also 
6.4). 
 
   In summary, first, the emergence of a powerful and monolithic party-fused-executive 
policymaking structure over the last three decades in Ethiopia has permitted little space for 
societal demands and pressures to influence and shape policies and their outcomes. Second, 
not only have the tenacity with which Marxism-Leninism and revolutionary democracy been 
pursued and promoted dictated the nature and type of socio-economic policies, but the latter 
ideologies have also enhanced and ensured exclusive leverage in the policymaking process, 
apparently, for the parties and executive leadership. Third, the absence of a countervailing 
force of organized, articulate and proactive civil societal groups and associations in Ethiopia 
result in imbalances between policymaking institutions and policy beneficiaries (cross-
reference research question 3). Fourth, sponsored by the policy elites, and premised primarily 
on the ideological pre-commitments that they embraced, not only have constitutional and 
statutory provisions promulgated over the last three decades bolstered their leverage, but also 
set parameters under which public policies are made, with the non-state players having little 
or no influence on policies and practices (cross-check with research question 2). Last, the 
means for legitimizing the power of policy elites has clearly been institutionalized in the 
parties and the ideologies that the ruling parties have been upholding.  
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6.4. The way forward: options and recommendations for policymakers 
 
The black box of Ethiopian public policymaking has been unraveled, and the inherent defects 
of public policymaking have also been studied.  The dominant forces, institutions and their 
leverage in policymaking in Ethiopia based on the practices, and against the background of 
developing countries have been identified and assessed. Next, proposals are put forward to 
address the most salient problems of policymaking in Ethiopia (cross-check research question 
4).    
          The concept of public participation has formed part of development, public policy and 
academic discourse for a very long time now, although it raised a pervasive concern and 
entered the spotlight of the Ethiopian policymaking scene only after 1991. Policymaking and 
legislating in Ethiopia has so far exclusively involved ‘elected representatives’ and 
bureaucrats. In addition, organized citizens can initiate laws through less significant outlets. 
Nor are there sufficient and viable channels through which individual citizen’s demands can 
be marshaled to the national and NRSs legislatures for these demands to be articulated in the 
from of legislation, laws and policies. There is, therefore, a compelling need to create better 
direct input opportunities to give Ethiopian citizens of all walks of life a chance to influence 
policies and implementation outcomes. Put differently, greater and genuine public 
participation in the policymaking process results in much more representative policy-making 
as well as enhancing the quality of services provided by policies and programs. 
        Not only have public involvement practices, including the public hearings by the HPR 
and NRSs legislatures, so far been lacking sincerity in their intent, but they have also failed to 
empower the public. Neither the professional associations’ annual workshops, nor 
government-sponsored public meetings nor those sponsored by CSOs bring about any 
substantive policy changes. What is more, direct, binding and referenda mechanisms of 
involvement by the non-governmental institutions and CSOs for rulemaking, changing or 
modifying and influencing policies in Ethiopia have not been institutionalized (cross-
reference Chapter 2). Nor have the national and NRSs constitutions provided for citizens to 
exercise such direct and binding decision-making, except for call-up elections and plebiscites 
on disputed internal borders. In fact, these plebiscites have so far been manipulated for highly 
charged propaganda purposes167. 
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 The 2001 call-up elections held in Tigray NRS to replace party factionalists and the 2004 referendum 
conducted by the National Election Board (NEB) ostensibly to resolve internal border dispute between Oromia 
and Somali NRSs are recent cases in this point.  
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       A true public participation exercise should, therefore, extend beyond manipulation of the 
public by government and party policy preferences to actual control of decisions by citizens. 
Public involvement is meaningless unless it accords true decision-making power to citizens. 
Participation has come to mean more than voting and can include writing or calling on elected 
officials, attending public hearings, contributing written comments on agency rules, lobbying, 
educational efforts aimed at informing public opinion, general petitions from the public 
regarding their policy preferences, lobbying for or against legislation, and actual delegation of 
decision-making power to stakeholders in decision-making processes (Toddi and Ascher, 
1997).                 
      Despite their widespread use, public hearings and comments that have been conducted 
over the last ten years (since 1995) are not held in high esteem. The most common critique 
made by academics, participants and MPs alike is that citizens’ commentary does not 
influence policy outcomes168.  In other words, sponsored by the party, the executive and the 
legislatures, a plethora of public hearings and public meetings that have been held since 1995 
did not appear to extend beyond soliciting token inputs into legislation and these were 
invariably tenuous (see Chapter 5).  Not only has citizens’ participation in the policymaking 
process been far from sufficient, but citizens have also not been accorded direct and binding 
leverage to deliberate on policies. Almost all of such public hearing exercises have been 
conducted with a very small segment of the Addis Ababa community, with almost over half 
of the audience of the public hearings often dominated by the ruling party MPs. Stakeholders 
and communities outside of the capital have not, therefore, been consulted enough, nor does 
there appear any prospect of involving as wide a public as possible outside of the capital in 
the future169. The HPR approved several laws hastily, and with little input from affected 
parties, for public hearing exercises offered citizens little chance of influencing legislation.  
Vagrancy laws and the System for the Intervention of the Federal Government in the NRSs’ 
affairs, and anti-corruption legislation are classic cases in point, and the political fallout 
emanating from these pieces of legislation persist to this day170.  
          Public deliberation and participation are nevertheless keystones in nurturing democratic 
culture, and thus policymakers and the public alike should perceive public involvement in the 
policy process as an unassailable good (Adams, 2004). The government structures at each 
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 The author’s observation note on the plenary sessions of the HPR, and public hearings held in the Ethiopian 
parliament building, between October and December 2003.   
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 The author’s observations of the HPR plenary sessions and public hearings at the Ethiopian Parliament 
building   
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level of the hierarchy can be more accountable, responsive to citizens’ policy preferences and 
more concerned with the quality of services that policies and programs deliver only when 
well-designed and multi-channel institutions that provide relevant stakeholders, CSOs and 
active citizens with direct, binding and deliberative participation methods are devised, 
institutionalized and earnestly practiced, for the standard and conventional policymaking 
through elected representatives such as the HPR and NRSs parliaments alone allow 
Ethiopians little direct influence on policies (cross-reference Chapters 4 and 5) . Nevertheless 
the latter can still be used to complement and supplement the more direct and binding 
citizens’ participation in the policymaking.   
         A range of options is available in this regard. Non-binding direct involvement, as in 
public hearings and comment periods, means that the public will influence policymaking less 
directly. Their comments are non-binding and will be mediated by the administering 
bureaucratic agency or mostly by single-party dominated legislatures, as the cases of the 
national and core NRSs parliaments amply testified. Referenda permit each stakeholder or 
participant in the process to represent their own interests, and as a result there may be less 
chance of biased representation in the process (cross-reference Chapter 2). In contrast, the use 
of public comments and hearings means that vested interests may be represented unevenly, as 
in the widely held public hearings by the HPR, for participation can be much less universal 
than in a general election and can be biased towards favoring particularly vocal, persistent 
constituencies and party stalwarts (see Chapters 3, 4 and 5). Therefore, both in terms of 
degree of openness and the high potential to exact wider latitude of public involvement, 
referenda can best empower the citizenry (Adams 2004, Toddi and Ascher, 1997). A 
referendum process may be a very blunt public involvement and policymaking tool, although 
small and manageable public hearing deliberations and roundtable discussions guarantee 
technically competent outcome due in part to the expertise that such exercises potentially 
involve (Toddi and Ascher, 1997).    
       Moreover, the potential for the decisions to be accepted as legitimate also varies, 
depending on the public involvement method selected and the context of the decision. In most 
democratic situations a referendum results in a decision that will be accepted as legitimate, 
where the rules for the voting process are transparent and the principle of majority rule is 
widely accepted (ibid.). In contrast, not only are the decision rules associated with non-
binding public hearings, public meetings and comments more opaque, but they are also more 
likely to be ‘democratic rituals’ that lack the deliberative qualities and have even clearly 
failed to give citizens a voice in the policy process (Toddi and Ascher, 1997; Adams, 2004). 
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Because of this opacity, the decision-making process stands a greater risk of being perceived 
as illegitimate.  
       Not only are most of the public participation modalities that have so far been practiced in 
Ethiopia non-deliberative and non-binding, but they also entail a high risk of being 
manipulated by the party and the government (policy elites), as argued earlier. Hence, 
participation has not had the objective of empowering citizens to have their demands 
incorporated by public institutions, and at the same time influence policies, nor have the 
participation mechanisms been institutionalized in the Constitution and other bylaws.   
      Additionally, disillusionment reigns when government solicits public input without much 
regard for the function it is to play in developing policy, for there has been a lack of clear 
guidelines by the legislatures or any government agency as how public inputs generated 
through public meetings and public hearing exercises are to be handled. Not only has this 
definitely challenged the legitimacy of public policymaking in Ethiopia, but it has also 
predisposed the process to a controversial outcome. Therefore, clear scenarios should be 
developed with regard to how public inputs should be structured and how they will affect the 
final decision, with the support of unambiguous statutory provisions.  
         However, this is not to write off the merits of public hearings as channels of voicing 
policy concerns as well as preferences. Public hearings can be effective avenues for citizens’ 
expressions of concerns and for policy demands, if they involve a much wider public than 
Addis Ababa and in the NRSs as possible. They should therefore encompass as representative 
a sample of the relevant public in the entire country as possible, so that they provide citizens 
with a constructive role in voicing their concerns on policy matters and influencing policy 
decisions. Otherwise public hearings will remain hollow rituals that merely provide a façade 
of legitimacy, as has in fact been the case over the past ten years (since the HPR has started 
functioning in 1995).  In fact, public hearings could probably afford citizens high chances of 
influencing policy agendas, for they provide citizens with the opportunity to convey 
information to policymakers about the prevailing public views on public policies, influence 
public opinion, set future agendas and communicate with other citizens, although they have 
still been ill-suited for fostering a direct and binding influence on the policy process. In short, 
public hearings, public meetings and comment periods have the best chance of success in 
Ethiopia, only if they complement such deliberative, direct and binding public participation 
mechanisms as referenda, citizens’ advisory commissions171, round table forums and joint 
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 Citizens’ advisory commissions are also known as blue ribbon panels, citizens’ councils, advisory boards, and 
so forth (Adams, 2004).  
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citizen-legislature committees, networks committed to enhancing civic life, and so forth.  A 
multiple institutional design whereby Ethiopians can be provided with the opportunities to 
participate effectively and influence policies and implementation outcomes can forge the 
balance between state and society in public policymaking.     
       Public participation in the policymaking process can be enhanced when the public’s 
access to information and knowledge of what a government does is readily made available to 
the ordinary citizens. The adult literacy rate (i.e., 37.4%) in Ethiopia remains the lowest in 
Africa, and public participation in policymaking will not go far enough with an illiterate 
public. Educating the public en masse is, therefore, as critical and important as delivering the 
information in boosting public participation.       
       Additionally, a nascent but burgeoning civil movement since 1991 appeared to indicate a 
growing interest and enthusiasm among the Ethiopian CSOs to assume more responsibilities 
in policymaking, although this has not as yet been buttressed by a greater flexing of capacity. 
In other words, the emerging global phenomena of renewed emphasis on democratization and 
the empowerment of civil and social movements and fledgling civil society organizations in 
Ethiopia offer the opportunity for a repositioning of the policymaking process to get the social 
movements involved in the deliberation, formulation and implementation of policies. The 
civil service reforms that the EPRDF government has been implementing over the past five 
years to make the public bureaucracy more accountable and responsive can become fruitful 
and successful, if the independent and autonomous civil movements are provided with space 
extending well beyond the realm of the state.  
        Although both government circles and active civil society groups have presumably 
recognized a well-functioning and strong civil society as the hallmark of good governance, 
due in part to an inauspicious politico-legal environment, and partly to socio-historical and 
political hangovers, the relationships between state and party, on the one hand, and the bulk of 
CSOs, on the other, have largely remained less one of mutual reinforcement than of 
polarization. 
       A balance between state and society vis-à-vis public policymaking would, nonetheless, be 
inconceivable where only the centripetal forces (EPRDF, and government bureaucracy, NRSs 
government and party structures) are allowed to function without balancing centrifugal forces 
(non-state actors, CSOs, NGOs, the opposition, independent organizations of the various 
sections of the society such as farmers, youth, labor, teachers, etc.). Furthermore, neither the 
public bureaucracy accountable to the public, nor responsive service provisions, nor 
participation in governance is imaginable in the absence of an active and vibrant civil society 
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and civil society organizations and a politico-legal framework well suited to a functioning 
civil society, as argued in the theoretical chapter. In fact, the government has recently 
recognized the profound changes that have been achieved over the past decade in the civil 
society landscape are difficult to accommodate within the institutional and legal framework, 
which was developed for an earlier and more limited understanding of CSOs (FDRE, 2004), 
notwithstanding significant measures to rectify the legal and political limbo has persisted to 
date.  
           It may, therefore, be most appropriate to view the government-civil society relationship 
in Ethiopia as one of supply and demand in which beneficial/salutary outcomes are possible 
only if both elements of the equation are capacitated. Civil society’s important role as an 
articulator of social demands cannot be effectively played in the absence of required state 
capacity (Friedman, 2003).  Thus, while civil society is often seen as a check on an 
overweening state or one which is unresponsive in the sense that it can respond to social 
demands but chooses not to - prompting an emphasis on strengthening civil society in relation 
to the state to see the growth of civil society and state capacity as complementary, not 
antagonistic (op. cit.). In summary, building a market economy, rectifying the deficiencies in 
public accountability, addressing the issue of good governance through its manifold 
dimensions such as devolved decentralization, more openness in government, and effectively 
fulfilling governmental functions depends as much on a less interventionist state as on an 
active and vibrant civil society. 
         Furthermore, although instituting a policy analysis unit near the higher echelons of the 
executive of the government has already been recommended (Alemayehu, 1998), it will be 
unlikely to solicit critical inputs into the policymaking process, partly due to the high 
potential of this unit being manipulated by the party and the executive, and partly due to the 
growing pessimism with the dominant ideological belief system, as argued earlier. Nor can it 
objectively balance the policy demands of the state and society (see Chapter 2). Therefore, 
professionally calibrated, private, interdisciplinary and independent arms-length policy think-
thank institutions are more likely to resolve the growing shambles in public policymaking in 
Ethiopia. Civil society institutions such as Ethiopian Economic Association/Ethiopian 
Economic Policy Research Institute and Forum for Social studies can probably provide added 
significance to professionalizing and pragmatizing of policymaking in Ethiopia (cross-
reference Chapter 2, section 2.7). However, neither civil society organizations that are 
primarily committed to advocating and lobbying for a set of improved socio-economic 
policies nor government-sponsored organizations such as Ethiopian International Institute for 
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Peace and Development (EIIPD) can substitute for the work of an independent think-thank 
that should be organized outside of the machinery of government and civil movements. It is 
only advanced and intellectually equipped think-thank institutions such as Rand Corporation, 
Brookings Institute and the Dutch Scientific Council on Government Council (DSCGP) that 
can professionalize and pragmatize Ethiopian policymaking and simultaneously provide 
policy counseling to government, CSOs, private companies and to all individuals and groups 
who seek its professional service for fees.   
        Additionally, there has so far been no institution or center for public policy studies in any 
of the institutions of higher learning in Ethiopia. Establishing a center or centers for public 
policy studies at the universities, therefore, not only further enhances the blending of 
empirical rigor with sound theoretical/analytical tools in the fields of public policy analysis, 
political and policy sciences, but also the research freedom accorded to such institutions 
further professionalizes and pragmatizes the policymaking process. For instance, the severe 
flip-flop mistakes that the current government committed over Ethio-Eritrea border conflict 
would probably have been assuaged and/or averted, if such research-based institutions had 
long existed and operated in the country.    
          Moreover, forging the balance between state and society and making government 
responsive as well as accountable calls for improving the policymaking capacity of 
government (cross-reference Chapter 2, section 2.7). For the policymaking system to 
accommodate the demands of the public as well as have a high chance of success not only 
necessitates significant redesign of the central policymaking process, but the initiative can 
also serve as an effective mechanism for the institutionalization of policymaking and analysis 
in the entire governance structure (Dror, 1986). However, the increased capacity in 
government should under no circumstances be allowed to substitute for a viable and well-
functioning legislature and a vibrant civil society.   The Ethiopian Civil Service College has 
since its establishment been used to train party cadres, and some government employees. It 
should now be reorganized with a measure of academic independence and autonomy to train 
professionally competent government civil servants. 
    What is more, the 1995 Ethiopian constitution appears to limit and separate governmental 
powers, as it appears to institute checks and balances. In reality, there is little chance of one 
branch (say, the legislature) thwarting the power of another (say, the executive) should it 
threaten to become too powerful and take steps beyond its mandate as invariably is the case, 
chiefly because by default or design, power is invested in the ruling party. The latter 
represents a linchpin for a network of relationship among all the branches of government both 
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at the central and at NRSs levels.  Hence, the separation of the party and the executive 
leadership is as complicated as separating Siamese twins. In other words, instituting 
constitutional amendments is not nearly as complicated as separating the party and the 
executive, although the latter process will certainly rectify many critical problems of public 
policymaking in Ethiopia.          
     
6.5. Areas of future research and recommendations for academics  
 
There are manifold challenges and daunting tasks that the Ethiopian public policymaking 
process has to contend with. Among others, future academic research may have to reckon 
with the following:  
 
• Ethiopia has witnessed a ‘policy explosion’ since the mid-1970s and/or a large number 
of radical socio-economic policies have been formulated and executed over the last 
three decades. Not only does over 70% of the Ethiopian populace still live below the 
poverty line, but also food insecurity persists, affecting millions of Ethiopians. Thirty 
years on, why have the policies not resolved this grim reminder of national ignominy?       
 
• Although problems of implementation have increasingly been used as excuses for 
misguided and ideologically driven policies, the content of policies and the socio-
political and administrative context in which the policies are implemented warrants 
thorough study. Among others, academic research should pay attention to the social-
cultural and administrative context of implementing a range of agricultural extension 
programs, cooperatives, low-cost housing and the lack of policy on housing, education 
policy and practices that have diminished educators’ contributions at all levels of the 
education structure, the malfunctioning of urban management and the attendant urban 
services that have increasingly been deteriorating over the last three decades, and the 
dangerous trend our diversity as a national state has been trading.  Particularly, 
attention may have to be given to the impact of changing global forces on the choice 
of policies and the processes.    
   
• Policymaking is centralized and is not subject to scrutiny by the bulk of Ethiopian 
populace. The public is remote geographically, educationally and in terms of receiving 
information from the locus of policymaking and this militates against the direct 
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involvement of the most wronged section of the Ethiopian public in policymaking. 
Research should focus on how the extremely peripheral beneficiaries in the 
policymaking process in Ethiopia, namely the urban and rural poor, in whose interest 
policy elites claimed to have framed programs, and who ultimately, ironically though, 
have over the decades borne the brunt of misguided policies, could be brought on 
board in influencing all policies affecting their lives?  
 
• 
 The dissertation emphasized the close relationship between the executive and the 
legislature. The role of the third stream of government (i.e. the judiciary) and its 
leverage in the policymaking process has not been examined. Research should 
investigate the role of the judiciary in the policymaking process, its stature and the 
constraints this branch of government has so far been experiencing in policymaking.    
 
• Academics are much more predisposed to, and in a better position to form, centers for 
public policy studies and private policy think-tanks, and to enjoy the relative privilege 
and the relative freedom to select policy issues to be examined and the framework of 
analysis. A think-tank or autonomous policy analysis organization, in its substantive 
current sense, is an arms-length institution that can have a thoughtful cooperative 
relationship with the government as well as private enterprises and civil endeavors, for 
it is through maintaining such relationships that it can be guaranteed sustained access 
to vital information that has a bearing on policy analysis, and the latter receive 
comprehensive, reasoned and research-based advice on policies and practices (Dror, 
1980, 1984, 1986, 1992;  Alemayehu, 1998).      
 
• Several policies in Ethiopia have ignited storms of political controversy ever since 
1991. Urban land lease, state ownership of land, ADLI, education policy and ethno-
federal structure are, inter alia, the critical ones. Additionally, nearly a decade since 
the Constitution has come into effect, finding an appropriate balance between state 
and society, and central and NRSs governments, remains as unattainable as it was in 
the early 1990s, when the Constitution was adopted. Concerted research effort should, 
therefore, be exerted to find common ground among the extremes. It is thus Ethiopian 
academics’ charge to observe and critique trends in policy making to try to ensure that 
the policymaking process and outcomes are democratic, open, legitimate and, equally 
important, technically competent and timely.  
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Despite the fact that Ethiopian academics have over the last three decades been 
grappling with inadequate facilities, unfavorable academic and administrative milieus it is in 
the best interests of the common citizenry to address the above proposals in due course of 
their research endeavors.   
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